Professional Documents
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MILITARY
BALANCE
2023
published by
for
The International Institute for Strategic Studies
Arundel House | 6 Temple Place | London | wc2r 2pg | UK
THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
The International Institute for Strategic Studies
Arundel House | 6 Temple Place | London | wc2r 2pg | UK
Editorial Christopher Harder, Jill Lally, Jana Phillips, Nicholas Woodroof, Charlie Zawadzki
Design, Production, Information Graphics Alessandra Beluffi, Ravi Gopar, Jade Panganiban,
James Parker, Kelly Verity, Jillian Williams, Loraine Winter
Cartography Alessandra Beluffi, Kelly Verity
Research Support Hannah Aries, Anna Blacklaws, Daniel Gearie, Yuka Koshino, Erica Pepe
This publication has been prepared by the Director-General and Chief Executive of the Institute and his
Staff, who accept full responsibility for its contents. The views expressed herein do not, and indeed cannot,
represent a consensus of views among the worldwide membership of the Institute as a whole.
ISBN 978-1-032-50895-5
ISSN 0459-7222
Cover images: The Boeing X-37B Orbital Test Vehicle (DoD/Corbis via Getty Images); Launch of China’s third aircraft carrier, the Fujian
(Li Tang/VCG via Getty Images); The B-21 Raider, the next-generation US bomber, is unveiled at Palmdale, California (Frederic J. Brown/
AFP via Getty Images); Ukrainian soldiers fire a CAESAR self-propelled artillery-piece (Aris Messinis/AFP via Getty Images); K2 main
battle tanks and K9 self-propelled artillery pieces delivered to Poland from South Korea (Mateusz Slodkowski/AFP via Getty Images).
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1
Contents
Indexes of Tables, Figures and Maps .........................................................................................................................................................................................4
Editor’s Introduction ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................5
Index of FIGURES
North America Middle East and North Africa
1 US defence budget as % of GDP................................................................. 25 14 Middle East and North Africa: defence spending by country
Europe and sub-region, 2022....................................................................................310
2 The FREMM frigate: selected national variants ..................................... 57 15 Middle East and North Africa: defence spending as % of
3 Europe: selected countries, inflation (%) 2017–27............................... 60 GDP (average)..................................................................................................310
4 Europe: regional defence spending as % of GDP (average) ............. 62
Latin America and the Caribbean
5 Europe: defence spending by country and sub-region, 2022 ......... 63
16 Latin America and the Caribbean: defence spending by
6 Europe defence budget announcements, 2022 ................................... 64
country and sub-region, 2022 ...................................................................371
Russia and Eurasia 17 Latin America and the Caribbean: regional defence
7 Recapitalising Russia’s bomber inventory .............................................158 spending as % of GDP (average) ..............................................................371
8 Russia: defence expenditure as % of GDP .............................................161 18 Latin America: selected countries, inflation (%), 2017–27 ..............372
9 Ukraine: selected Ukrainian main battle tank (MBT) upgrades.....166
Sub-Saharan Africa
Asia
19 Sub-Saharan Africa: defence spending by country and
10 Asia: defence spending by country and sub-region, 2022 .............216
sub-region, 2022 ............................................................................................428
11 Asia: regional defence spending as % of GDP (average) .................217
20 Sub-Saharan Africa: regional defence spending as % of
12 Asia: sub-regional real-terms defence-spending growth,
2021–22 (USDbn, constant 2015).............................................................219 GDP (average)..................................................................................................428
13 China: defence budget compared with the rest of Asia (total), 21 Sub-Saharan Africa: total defence spending by sub-region,
2008–22, USDbn, constant 2015 ..............................................................225 2008–22 .............................................................................................................429
Index of MAPS
1 Europe: regional defence spending (USDbn, %ch yoy) ..................... 61 7 Middle East and North Africa: regional defence
2 Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine: February–March 2022 .......154 spending (USDbn, %ch yoy).......................................................................309
3 Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine: April–October 2022 ...........155 8 Egypt: defence industry ...............................................................................314
4 Russia and Eurasia: regional defence spending (USDbn, %ch yoy)..161 9 Latin America and the Caribbean: regional defence spending
5 China and Russia: selected military cooperation (USDbn, %ch yoy)...........................................................................................370
activities, 2019–22 .........................................................................................211 10 Sub-Saharan Africa: regional defence spending
6 Asia: regional defence spending (USDbn, %ch yoy) .........................218 (USDbn, %ch yoy)...........................................................................................427
Editor’s Introduction
Change in military affairs is often incremental and slow. In Change is under way elsewhere too. In some cases,
many nations there is a formal process in which national- however, procurement and modernisation plans are being
security priorities are assessed, defence policies are produced delayed by economic realities. Higher rates of inflation
or updated and restructuring efforts reshape military organ- in 2022 eroded the value of many defence investments.
isations. Meanwhile, procurement plans lead to the arrival of Indeed, despite announced increases to defence budgets, in
new or upgraded equipment, changing the size and compo- 2022 global defence spending fell for the second year in real
sition of inventories, which in turn can lead to equipment terms because of soaring inflation rates. European and Asian
being retired, stored or destroyed, or sold or transferred to defence spending still grew in real terms, and with spending
others. War, or other national emergencies, can change the uplifts set to continue into the mid-2020s, these will be more
trajectory and pace of change. In 2022, Russia’s ill-fated deci- effective as inflation abates. The application of special funds
sion to launch a full-scale invasion of Ukraine illustrates how or off-budget expenditure to supplement defence spending
defence transformation can be accelerated or even prompted, has become more prevalent in 2022 as countries seek to
especially in Europe. rapidly increase investment. Such measures can reduce trans-
The Military Balance captures important changes that are parency and accountability while also creating issues for
under way in military organisations and inventories. Russia’s defence economists seeking to accurately track and compare
armed forces, of course, have suffered considerable losses in like-for-like international defence budgets.
personnel and equipment in the invasion, though Moscow’s In China, the 7% nominal increase in the 2022 budget,
decision to mobilise means that personnel numbers remain over 2021 figures, represents a CNY95bn (USD16bn) boost in
relatively similar to previous years’ figures. The assessment funding for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the largest-
of personnel strength in Ukraine has also changed this year, ever annual increase in absolute terms, even though growth
as that country has looked to boost numbers and improve has in recent years stalled in real terms. These funds are
combat capability after Russia’s invasion. Elsewhere, war
enabling the PLA’s continued modernisation. The launch of a
in East Africa has also led to notable changes in this year’s
new aircraft carrier drew headlines, but China also continues
estimate for the personnel numbers of the armed forces of
to launch more, and more complex, frigates and destroyers.
Ethiopia and Eritrea.
According to the US Department of Defense (DoD), Beijing
Equipment inventories are changing too. Russia failed to
has also improved its strategic capabilities by introducing
gain air superiority over Ukraine and relied mainly on stand-
new and longer-range submarine-launched ballistic missiles
off attacks using its land-attack cruise missiles, depleting
like the JL-3 (CH-SS-N-20). The PLA Navy (PLAN), according
its inventory. As a consequence, Moscow has turned to
to the DoD, likely began ‘near-continuous at-sea deterrence
importing Iranian direct-attack munitions. In turn, this
patrols’, with the JL-3 possibly allowing the PLAN to target
is driving closer defence-industrial cooperation between
the US from longer ranges than before, giving it options to
Moscow and Tehran. Russia’s tank and artillery fleets have
enhance the survivability of its deterrent. And then there
suffered significant attrition. Around 50% of its pre-war fleet
is the change to China’s land silo-based nuclear deterrent,
of modern T-72B3s and T-72B3Ms is assessed to have been
first publicly observed in the West by open-source analysts.
lost. Moreover, the composition of Russia’s inventory has
China’s air-force inventory is also changing: there are more
changed. As modern vehicles have been destroyed, Russia
has looked to maintain its fleet by bringing older vehicles out Y-20 transport aircraft and now YY-20A tankers, and yet
of store. The war is finally driving out of many East European more J-20A combat aircraft. Moreover, new J-20As and new
inventories the Soviet-era equipment that many states have Y-20s are now considered to be fitted with locally manu-
retained since the end of the Cold War. The flow of Western factured engines, respectively the Shenyang WS-10C after-
artillery to Ukraine is modernising Kyiv’s inventory and burning turbofan and the Shenyang WS-20, replacing the
delivering improved capability. Meanwhile, Russia’s 2022 Russian Saturn AL-31F and Soloviev D-30KP engines. For
invasion sharpened Poland’s threat perceptions. Warsaw is years, China’s inability to domestically manufacture military-
accelerating its plans to build up its armoured vehicles and specification turbofans had been held as one of the factors
artillery, on top of its existing goals of boosting its air and limiting the development of its military capability.
naval power. Indeed, the strategic centre of gravity in Europe This is important as numerical changes to the invento-
has moved further north and east: Germany announced a ries in The Military Balance reflect only one aspect of military
special EUR100 billion (USD106bn) fund for defence and, capability. The process of generating numerical estimates is
like Poland and Finland, joined the group of European made somewhat easier where countries exhibit a degree of
nations ordering from the United States the fifth-generation transparency in defence affairs, particularly open societies
F-35 combat aircraft. Meanwhile, in 2023 Finland will almost and nations that ascribe to defence-reporting systems – such
certainly formally join NATO, alongside Sweden, a decision as to NATO for defence-planning purposes, or to the OSCE
that they only took after Russia’s 2022 invasion. and UN for arms-control and confidence-building purposes.
6 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
And there is an increasing volume of online reporting and More broadly, headline numbers remain useful as an indi-
imagery through, for instance, social media, and informa- cator, but they have to be scrutinised. For instance, despite
tion from commercial providers of satellite imagery. Data significant combat losses, Russia’s personnel numbers
gathered through these sources has to then be assessed remained relatively high, but attrition and mobilisation meant
alongside other information including from routine open- that, by the end of the year, the ground forces contained large
source monitoring and consultations with other defence numbers of relatively inexperienced personnel. And while
specialists. An active conflict sharpens the challenge yet the numbers of China’s fleet of destroyers and frigates, or
further. And the war in Ukraine illustrates the importance of heavy transport aircraft, may be relatively uniform, these
of information warfare, and the risks of this for analysts, fleets generally comprise more modern platforms than before.
as governments actively exploit the information space in If anything, these factors highlight the importance of
order to shape narratives. However, the increasing number looking beyond numbers to qualitative evaluations of mili-
of open-source citizen analysts and independent research tary capability. Equipment holdings may look good on
organisations scrutinising conflict and defence affairs has paper, but can they be effectively used? Assessments like
in recent years provided an increasingly rich source of these include judgements of industrial sustainability, logis-
information, for instance in contributing to assessments tics, maintenance, strategies and plans and training, areas
of Russian and Ukrainian equipment losses during the in which Russia’s armed forces have in 2022 demonstrated
current war. The growth in publicly-available courses in significant deficiencies. Such evaluations may also include
analytical techniques, as well as technical tools, has helped difficult-to-gauge factors such as the effect of corruption
this process. The expanding activity of groups like these, on industry or the armed forces, military morale or even
and the profusion of open-source data more generally, are ‘will’ among populations. Additionally, they must consider
leading government agencies to establish units focused on the broader defence-funding burden for states, and where
open source. In the case of the war in Ukraine, this volume appropriate include assessments of purchasing power parity.
of information, and the pace at which it has been generated, Assessments like these require considered methodological
has meant that analysts have to consider carefully a profu- approaches. These qualitative factors do not readily lend
sion of often very diverse data, and in many cases repriori- themselves to comparable assessments between states – a key
tise analytical capacity; this inevitably creates risk for other function of IISS defence data in The Military Balance. For this
areas of study. That said, though conflict makes it prob- reason, the IISS Defence and Military Analysis Programme
lematic to judge numbers with precision, assessments can has expanded its work in these areas and is looking to devise
nonetheless be made, including judgements that a particular ways of assessing the broader factors influencing capability,
category of equipment may be in service, but the numerical in ways that are comparable between states. We are inte-
breakdown between types is unclear. An additional compli- grating our judgements into the MilitaryBalance+ database,
cation is that combat attrition to both formations as well as and this volume illustrates in graphic form one aspect: our
equipment makes it yet more difficult to generate accurate approach to identifying important factors that we think influ-
estimates based on long-established methods, such as on ence equipment capability. We are continuing similar work
tables of organisation and equipment. However, more infor- on military-cyber issues and on defence expenditure while
mation often becomes available over time, enabling more exploring other means to deliver in our work further qualita-
precise judgements. tive as well as numerical assessments of global defence data.
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Chapter One: Defence and military analysis
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February in Russia’s military power that took place after the
2022 is reshaping the security environment in latest modernisation phase (the ‘New Look’) began
Europe and has ramifications elsewhere. The scale in 2008 has not brought the desired outcome. While
of Moscow’s miscalculation is apparent nearly a year important vulnerabilities in Russian capabilities have
on, but at the outset it was not clear that Russia would been demonstrated, once Russia resorted to artil-
face such difficulty. One of the preliminary lessons lery-heavy assaults the gap between expectation and
offered by the war – beyond those for the bellig- performance was – in relation to Russia’s weapons –
erents – is that defence and intelligence specialists perhaps reduced a little. But in other aspects – such
need to sharpen focus on methodologies important as command and control, maintenance, logistics, plan-
to the assessment of military capabilities, and in this ning, reconnaissance and soldier training – significant
case revise how they evaluate Russia’s armed forces. deficiencies soon became apparent. In the first real test
Other early take-aways include those related to the of Russian combat power against a peer adversary for
importance of aspects of military capability such as decades, the armed forces have so far come up short.
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), Military setbacks and the only incrementally-
longer range artillery and better targeting, and the growing resources that Russia is committing to the war
importance of training and morale. Yet more concern have meant that there is a growing gap between mili-
resilience, both civil and military. Meanwhile, tary realities and Russia’s aims. As of late 2022, though
although the United States has led international mili- state media control remained tight, and public support
tary support for Ukraine, and Washington perceives ostensibly remained high, some in the Russian secu-
Russia as the immediate threat, its longer-term focus rity community likely recognised this gap. A crucial
remains what it views as the challenge from China. issue was whether this was recognised also by
Beijing continues to modernise its armed forces at President Putin and the military leadership and, if it
pace. Russia’s war also offers lessons for the US was, whether they would sustain their intentions or
armed forces and its defence industry, both for its revise goals in line with miltary realities on the ground.
involvement in Europe, but also in possible contin- If a key objective of the war was to reassert Russian
gencies elsewhere, including in Asia. primacy over its ‘near abroad’, it has had the oppo-
site effect. The war has reinforced Ukrainian state-
Military miscalculation hood and galvanised its population and armed
Russia’s initial military campaign was launched on a forces. The effect of the war on Russia’s periphery
range of assumptions that proved to be ill-judged and has been varied. Belarus has been drawn closer to
over-optimistic: Ukraine’s leaders did not flee, and the Moscow and has been complicit in Russia’s actions
Ukrainian armed forces did not collapse. Moreover, by offering logistical and material – if not directly
Russia’s strategy was based on a poor understanding physical – support. But in Central Asia, Russia’s grip
of its own armed forces. Russia’s recent military oper- appeared weaker at the end than at the start of 2022,
ations, and forces with important elements postured while its ability to be an effective broker elsewhere,
for fast and decisive missions, gave its leaders a false such as between Armenia and Azerbaijan, is in doubt.
sense of confidence. Recent operations took place The effect in Europe has been profound. Russia’s
within relatively permissive operating environments, European strategy, as winter deepened, appeared to
while training and exercises did not adequately focus on weakening Western public resolve by cutting
prepare Russian forces for offensive actions against gas supplies. This has caused European states to
a determined and well-armed opponent. Russian sharpen their attention on resilience and energy secu-
forces displayed lower standards of tactical compe- rity. It has made more important continued Ukrainian
tence, command, leadership and logistics than their military progress in winter 2022–23 – even if this is
Ukrainian counterparts. The significant investment at a reduced tempo compared to its mid-September
Defence and military analysis: The shadow of war 9
to early November 2022 high point. This is impor- the main challenge for Washington. Moreover, while
tant not only to maintain pressure on a Russian force there is concern across the world about the conflict,
that is trying to reconstitute, but also to bolster argu- many responses were circumspect. China and India
ments in Western Europe that holding firm during an remained ‘neutral’, while several Middle Eastern and
energy crisis and, indeed, providing continued mili- African states also hedged. President Xi Jinping of
tary support to Ukraine were worthwhile. China has claimed that the growth in NATO member-
ship resulted in the Ukrainian crisis – a narrative that
Europe refocuses on Russia was first articulated by Moscow. And in other states
The security environment in Europe is shifting there are more hard-headed calculations of how the
sharply against Russia due to further NATO enlarge- conflict may directly affect them, for instance in rela-
ment, decisions by European states to boost their tion to the supply of hydrocarbons or military mate-
military capability and additional US commitments. riel. Although the leaders of China and Russia in
In 2019, NATO was described as experiencing ‘brain early February 2022 announced a ‘no limits’ bilateral
death’ by French President Emmanuel Macron, at a friendship, the rhetoric may exaggerate the depth
time when the then US president, Donald Trump, and potential of contemporary Sino-Russian rela-
was at best ambivalent about the value of the Alliance, tions, and a formal Sino-Russian military alliance or
following decades of various US presidents exhorting direct Chinese military support for Russia’s war in
Europeans to increase their defence spending. Ukraine both seem unlikely prospects. Nevertheless,
Russia’s 2022 invasion has given NATO a renewed the bilateral partnership is now closer and includes
raison d’être and impelled Finland and Sweden to an increasingly strong military dimension that goes
formally apply to join the Alliance. It has caused beyond defence-industrial cooperation.
many states to reassess their defence priorities and
has in effect shifted further north and east the stra- East Asia
tegic centre of gravity in Europe. For Germany, In Asia, the war in Ukraine added complications
Russia’s invasion marked a new era in European secu- to an already-deteriorating security environment.
rity, and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced Concerns were expressed in some states about the
a EUR100 billion (USD106bn) fund for defence. And potential problems arising from a dependence on
as of the end of 2022, Helsinki and Stockholm were Russia for defence sales and support; Soviet- and
well on the path to NATO membership in 2023. At its Russian-origin equipment comprises a significant
Madrid Summit in 2022, NATO agreed a new force portion of the inventories of nations such as India
model to boost force size and readiness and to replace and Vietnam. Meanwhile, China has grown more
the NATO Response Force, but as before, a key chal- assertive regarding reunification with Taiwan, while
lenge will be in transforming members’ commitments relations between China and the US have become
into effective capability. At the same time, European more abrasive. Beijing was harsh in its criticism of
defence expenditure is being increased. This the visit to Taipei, in August 2022 by Nancy Pelosi,
spending trajectory is readily apparent in Russia’s then-speaker of the US House of Representatives;
immediate European neighbours and at its most the visit was accompanied by large-scale Chinese
obvious in Poland, where the defence minister said military exercises near Taiwan. Meanwhile, China’s
the defence budget should increase from 2% to 3% of military modernisation continued to prompt concern
GDP in 2023. The February 2022 invasion reinforced in Washington, which views it as the Department of
Warsaw’s security concerns and spurred a rapid Defense’s ‘pacing challenge’. China appears to have
programme to modernise its land forces with new expanded its nuclear capabilities, and at the end of
equipment, including South Korean and US armour. the year the Pentagon’s annual report on China’s
For at least the next decade, Russia will be central military capability noted other important develop-
to European security concerns, and will be important ments including in submarine capability and the
in driving defence policy developments and acqui- integration onto modern Chinese combat aircraft and
sition plans. But these concerns are not universally transport aircraft of domestically produced military-
held. The United States led the Western response grade jet engines.
to Russia’s actions, and while the Biden adminis- Tensions also rose on the Korean Peninsula. By
tration’s National Security Strategy did say that late October 2022, North Korea had launched more
Russia was indeed an acute threat, China was still ballistic missiles than in any previous year. These
10 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
activities included, for the first time since 2017, inter- judgement that Russia was planning an attack and
continental ballistic missile-related launches and that Moscow was plotting to stage a ‘false flag’ attack
the launch, in October, of a claimed new interme- as a pretext for this. Although for many govern-
diate-range ballistic missile; this reportedly overflew ments these did not appear to dramatically ‘move the
Japan. Speculation continued that North Korea was needle’ in the weeks leading up to 24 February, there
preparing for its seventh nuclear test. Meanwhile, is a case to be made that such ‘intelligence diplomacy’
the new South Korean administration has stressed strategies may in future gain more traction, not least
the development of independent national military because of what Russia’s invasion implied about US
capabilities and strengthened military cooperation intelligence penetration of Russian decision-making
with the US. Large-scale bilateral exercises have circles and the accuracy of its assessment in this case.
resumed, after some years in which these were scaled That said, gaining such information may be more
back to support diplomatic discussions with North difficult elsewhere.
Korea. And in July, the government emphasised the It is unclear whether governments have integrated
importance of South Korea’s ‘Kill Chain’ system and this rapid declassification process such that it will
the other two associated systems (Korea Massive automatically be employed in the next crisis, or even
Punishment and Retaliation and Korean Air and that they see a requirement for this. Processes have
Missile Defense) which had been renamed amid the been established that would make it easier to share
short-lived thaw in inter-Korean relations after 2018. intelligence assessments and it is becoming easier to
Meanwhile, the lifting of US-imposed ‘missile guide- share information with trusted partners. Nonetheless,
lines’ in 2021 has allowed Seoul to accelerate its devel- briefings like these, including the declassification of
opment of ballistic missiles with two-ton warheads intelligence information and making this available
which could help to provide a powerful precision- to the public, have value in keeping populations
strike capability. informed and helping to shape narratives. They are
In Japan, the war in Ukraine and Taiwan-related particularly valuable when civilians are being asked
developments influenced the defence policy consid- to endure degrees of hardship because of wars else-
erations of the Kishida administration. As antici- where, as in the energy crisis in Europe in the winter
pated, the government released revised versions of of 2022. And they are important when civilians
the National Security Strategy, National Defense receive information from so many sources, some of
Program Guidelines and Medium-Term Defense varied analytical provenance, that can often provide
Program at the end of 2022 , recasting the latter two as information faster than governments have tradition-
the National Defense Strategy and Defense Buildup ally been able to, often because they are restricted by
Program. The annual defence White Paper noted an classification constraints. Moreover, there has been
‘increasingly severe’ security environment and that a wealth of open-source information on the war in
Japan needed to strengthen its defence capabilities Ukraine produced by citizen analysts and private
‘dramatically’. Alongside a raft of important defence firms, making use of commercially available satellite
procurements, including the plan to modify the two systems to deliver imagery-based assessments that
Izumo-class helicopter carriers to allow shipborne were until recently the preserve of governments.
F-35B operations, in December it was announced
that Japan would join Italy and the United Kingdom Questions of analysis
in a programme to develop a new sixth-generation The war raises other questions relating to military
combat aircraft. Governments in Asia and elsewhere capability assessments, in that Russia’s military power
are continuing to monitor the war in Ukraine for was in many quarters misjudged. A caveat is needed:
early lessons relating to military capability and also some elements of the armed forces have been used
broader national-security issues. only sparingly, such as the submarine service, while
the strategic-bomber force has for the most part been
The Ukraine war: some early lessons able to launch its stand-off munitions – even if some
In late 2021 and early 2022, US national-security offi- of these have appeared to be sub-optimal. However,
cials engaged in a series of briefings to Ukrainian and Russia’s military exercises, for instance, were more
European leaders, relating intelligence assessments scripted than they appeared. This was widely under-
about Russia’s intent to mount a full-scale invasion. stood to be the case for large-scale strategic exercises
Intelligence assessments were declassified with the like Zapad, but not so much for Russia’s snap exer-
Defence and military analysis: The shadow of war 11
cises – designed to test combat readiness – that had to also consider that the impressive performance of
become a feature since Sergei Shoigu became defence Ukraine’s forces has been against a Russian adversary
minister in 2012. The same goes for Ukraine, where that has proven surprisingly poor, so caution should
there was generally an underestimation of the capa- be taken in judging whether all of Ukraine’s forces
bility of its still-nascent non-commissioned officer have improved to the same degree, or that they have
(NCO) corps and, more broadly, of the fighting overcome all of the challenges associated with their
potential and ‘will’ of its armed forces and society. post-Soviet heritage.
This calls for stricter application of structured analyt- However, in Russia, achieving effective change
ical techniques to avoid cognitive biases like mirror- in this regard will require political will, as well
imaging. But this is challenging when it is difficult as improvements in education and training. But
to gain access to armed forces and harder still when devolving and encouraging independent decision-
these forces are themselves deceived by their own making seems to conflict with the type of control
reporting. It calls for techniques, possibly including and governance that has characterised President
environmental scanning, that could lead to thorough Putin’s rule. This may be a risk in other authori-
study of societies as well as their armed forces, and tarian states too, perhaps including China, though
for more regular and more qualitative assessments of circumstances are different there (for instance,
military capability. China has had prominent anti-corruption initia-
For instance, while Russia has sunk consider- tives), and again, much depends on the quality of
able sums into its post-2008 military-modernisation the enemy these forces would face. Nonetheless, this
process, it may be that the effectiveness of these invest- is a problem for the Russian armed forces moving
ments has been reduced by the impact of Russia’s forward. The ground forces now need to rebuild
political culture and of corruption. Alongside poor while engaged in a high-intensity fight. Many of
military and political leadership, further revelations its most experienced troops were lost in the early
of entrenched corruption in Russia’s armed forces months of the war, and it is unclear not only how
will not help to improve mutual trust. In advanced Russia will address the issue of adequately training
Western armed forces this is seen as an important and then integrating new troops into existing units,
factor in helping to enable effective military leader- but also whether its military culture can change
ship at all levels. Indeed, the war has highlighted the enough in future so that its troops can become mili-
importance of the human factor in war and reinforced tarily effective against a peer adversary.
the value of investing in personnel, including the
competence of commanders at all levels and adequate Military matters
individual and collective training, without which The war in Ukraine has shown how important it is
investments in equipment can be wasted. for armed forces to be able to adapt. Both Russian
After 2014, Ukraine’s armed forces embarked and Ukrainian forces adapted during combat, though
on a programme to train and professionalise its with varying degrees of success. After failing in its
troops, including the development of a profes- initial attempt to seize the country with a dispersed
sional NCO cadre. With the support of NATO and set of multiple axes of advance and an optimistic
individual member states, through vehicles such as ‘thunder run’ approach, Russia reshaped its offen-
NATO’s Ukraine Defence Education Enhancement sives towards the east. Russia’s failure to gain control
Programme (DEEP), four areas were addressed of the air meant it had to resort to greater use of
for bilateral support from allies: basic training; stand-off weaponry and, towards the end of 2022,
train-the-trainer courses; the development of a to augment these with uninhabited aerial vehicles
professional NCO career system; and the creation of (UAVs) and direct-attack munitions sourced from
professional military education systems for NCOs. Iran. Ukraine, for its part, has also rapidly sourced
Reports on the progress of Ukraine’s military reform and used direct-attack munitions and has developed
were in many cases mixed, though the demonstration a capacity to fuse information from small UAVs to
under fire of Ukraine’s military adaptability and resil- improve the capability of its artillery forces. It also
ience indicates not only that more structured analysis dispersed its air force and maintained combat effec-
would have been helpful here, but also that such tiveness and has also developed a capability to attack
reforms can bring results in traditionally hierarchical Russian targets at-reach using UAVs and missiles.
post-Soviet armed forces. However, it is important These include the attacks on the Russian Black Sea
12 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Fleet flagship Moskva and some of Russia’s strategic- from anti-armour systems, but not eliminate it.
bomber bases, and at closer ranges using direct-attack Urban operations have highlighted the continued
munitions. Attacks like these have highlighted risks importance of capabilities, and training, suitable for
to static locations including supply bases and head- this terrain. Meanwhile, the war suggests that both
quarters and also troop concentrations; it appears to unguided and smart ammunition have comple-
be increasingly difficult to hide on the battlefield. mentary roles. Large amounts of both conventional
The war has also been a stark reminder of the unguided ammunition and precision weapons have
importance of magazine depth, evidenced by high been expended. Anti-armour weapons illustrate the
usage rates for guided weapons and artillery ammu- benefits but also the costs of precision, with concerns
nition and the severe attrition of armour. It indicates expressed not only over whether Ukraine may run out
that any future military capability that relies exclu- of stocks of Western supplied anti-armour systems,
sively on precision weapons will not only likely but also about national stocks and defence-industrial
be costly, but will also need careful replenishment capacity in countries that have supplied such systems
planning. This may require some production lines to Ukraine.
to remain open that would otherwise close, and Neither combatant in Ukraine has secured overall
government and industry to work together on suit- air superiority. Ground-based air defence has proved
able procurement mechanisms. It may also require effective in limiting freedom of action and losses
striking a balance between mass and capability. have been inflicted, while Russia’s comparative lack
There is greater concern over supply-chain issues of modern short- and medium-range air-launched
because of the war – concerns which had already precision-guided munitions has been exposed. The
been expressed during the coronavirus pandemic. importance of ISR has also been highlighted, along-
There are now additional concerns relating to side the ability to rapidly distribute information from
sourcing and traceability in the lower levels of the the sensor to the shooter. And the vulnerability of
supply chain. Along with interest in supply chain helicopters to air defences has been apparent on both
assurance, this is also leading to a reconsideration in sides. But while air forces have looked to the war for
some countries over what supply chains and compo- lessons in 2022, some key developments in aerospace
nents may need to be onshored. At the same time, technology have more direct relevance elsewhere.
industrial capacity issues highlight potential near- The unveiling in December of the new US strategic
term difficulties in increasing production to replace bomber, the B-21, was clearly focused on Asia-Pacific
Western materiel supplied to Ukraine. contingencies; it was anticipated that China’s next-
Moreover, concerns over supply-chain vulner- generation bomber would also be shown. In areas
abilities form only one aspect of resilience. There is such as combat-aircraft design and manufacture, a
also now greater focus than for decades on the resil- problem for Washington’s allies and partners is that
ience of critical national infrastructure and of soci- its requirements mean its designs will be at a price
eties to state-based threats, including from physical point that few of them will be willing or able to accept.
attack as well as from cyber and broader disinfor- In turn, this may lead groups of nations to team up in
mation threats. However, effectively tackling these order to deliver advanced capabilities. However, the
challenges requires long-term government attention, more diverse their requirements, the harder it will be
including in the education sphere, and a joined-up to produce systems on time that are affordable and
approach within government and between govern- able to meet all their needs.
ment, the private-sector business community and In the maritime domain, Russia’s navy has been
broader society. embarrassed by Ukrainian tactics, but it was not
The war has illustrated the continuing impor- really configured to face an opponent with very
tance of the combined-arms approach to warfare – limited naval capability but adept at using naval
including the integration of UAV and counter-UAV guerrilla tactics. Rather, it was designed to hold
capabilities into land units, and also how increasingly at bay an opponent with significant naval depen-
pervasive surveillance can pose risk for manoeuvre dence. For all the setbacks, Russia was at the end
forces. Furthermore, it has highlighted the importance of 2022 still essentially enforcing a distant blockade
of long-range precision artillery and also the armour of Ukraine’s trade. This underscores global energy
versus anti-armour fight. Fitting active-protection and resource interdependence, and the importance
systems to armoured vehicles can reduce the threat of maritime trade flows and sea lanes of communi-
Defence and military analysis: The shadow of war 13
cation, as well as the potential of blockades. More economic environment that will persist in the short
broadly, for navies as for land and air forces, Ukraine term will impose constraints on public expenditure,
has brought home the need to consider attrition, not least the higher cost of debt financing in light of
magazine depth and sustainment ability. It has also increased interest rates designed to curb inflation.
brought home the threat of unconventional tactics Global defence expenditure grew in nominal
and emerging technologies, and critical undersea terms in 2021 and 2022 but higher rates of inflation
infrastructure vulnerabilities. meant expenditure fell in real terms in both years. In
recent years, high inflation eroded defence spending
Money counts in real terms in countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin
In the wake of the disruption caused by the corona- America and the Caribbean, the Middle East and
virus pandemic, the global economic climate is again North Africa and Russia and Eurasia, but this trend
fraught. Surging inflation, commodity-price spikes, is now more widespread. Europe and Asia were the
supply-chain crises and heightened economic uncer- only regions globally to continue to exhibit defence-
tainty resulting from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine spending growth in real terms in 2021 with Russia
have derailed an economic recovery that, in some and Eurasia joining them in 2022 as war fuelled
countries, was far from complete. Inflation rates above-inflation increases in the region.
increased globally in 2021 as a result of higher energy For some governments, such as those in Europe
costs, a recovery in demand and ongoing pandemic- and Asia, security challenges continue to sharpen
related supply-chain disruptions. even as the value of their defence investments is being
The war had led some countries in Europe to undercut. This makes it more important not only to
increase their defence spending, and others else- spend wisely and ensure that procurements deliver
where to take the opportunity to revise defence strat- on time and on budget, but also to see that full use is
egies. In 2022, around 20 countries in Europe pledged made of the possibilities deriving from collaborative
to increase defence spending, with varying degrees of equipment development and from defence and mili-
size and immediacy. Nonetheless, the difficult global tary partnerships.
Chapter Two: Defence budgets and expenditure
Top 15 defence budgets in 2022 (USDbn)†*
1. United States a
2. China
3. Russiab 4. United
Kingdomc USDbn
900
242.4 87.9
800
70.0 700
(PPP ε192)
(PPP ε360) 600
5. India 6. France 7. Germany
500
766.6
400
100
5.9% 5.0% 4.8% 4.8% 4.5% 4.5% 4.5% 4.3% 4.2% 4.1% 4.0% 3.8% 3.8% 3.5% 3.5%
©IISS
Planned global defence spending by region 2022†* Planned defence spending by country 2022†*
Other Eurasia, 0.5%
Latin America and the Caribbean, 2.6% Sub-Saharan Africa, 1.0%
Russia, 4.4% Latin America, 2.6%
Other Middle
Asia, 25.7% East and North
Africa, 7.3% United
Saudi States
Arabia, 2.3% 38.2%
North America
Other Asia
39.5% 5.8%
South
Middle East Korea, 2.1%
and North Africa Japan, 2.4%
9.6% United
India, 3.3% Kingdom
Sub-Saharan China, 12.1% 3.5%
Europe
Africa, 1.0% 16.7% Non-NATO France, 2.7%
Russia and Eurasia, 4.9% Europe, 1.3% Other NATO, 7.8% Germany, 2.7%
©IISS
† At current prices and exchange rates
* Analysis only includes countries for which sufficient comparable data is available. Notable exceptions include Cuba, Eritrea, Libya, North Korea and Syria.
Defence and military analysis: Defence budgets and expenditure 15
2.0
1.9
USDtr
1.8
1.7
1.5
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
©IISS
† At constant 2015 prices and exchange rates
16 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Chapter Three
North America
According to the 2022 National Defense Strategy The US Navy ‘Navigation Plan’ outlined goals, including
(NDS), released in unclassified form in October, Russia 12 nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, 66 tactical
is an ‘acute’ threat but China is the pacing challenge submarines, 96 large and 56 small surface combatants,
for the Department of Defense. The modernisation of as part of a force design for 373 crewed vessels, plus
China’s armed forces remains the principal driver of US approximately 150 uninhabited surface and subsurface
policy attention and capability development. platforms, to be achieved by 2045.
The US has led the international response to Russia’s The US Air Force unveiled the Northrop Grumman
2022 invasion of Ukraine. US officials have played key B-21 Raider bomber in December 2022, but a timeline for
roles in coordinating defence assistance to Ukraine, the public display of a prototype crewed element of the
and the US has delivered significant stocks, including Next-Generation Air Dominance project remains unclear.
anti-armour weapons, various air and missile defence The FY2023 DoD budget request prioritises the
systems, and HARM anti-radiation missiles and artillery Pentagon’s plan to build advantage by investing in
(particularly HIMARS rocket artillery). innovation and modernisation as well as industrial
The US Army is focused on regenerating its capability capability. The Pentagon is also looking to improve
for large-scale combat operations under its Multi- recruitment and retention, and the FY2023 budget
Domain Operations (MDO) concept. Integrating includes a 4.6% pay raise for both military and
lessons drawn from Ukraine delayed the official civilian personnel.
publication of MDO as army doctrine, though the Canada and the US agreed to upgrade infrastructure
updated document – FM 3-0, Operations – was and systems associated with the North American
eventually published in October. Aerospace Defense Command.
100
80
US
1,359,600
60
40
Canada 66,500
20
Regional
0
6.9% total
2014 2016 2018 2020 2021 2022 1,426,100
North America 17
North America
Arms procurements and deliveries 29 ►
United States: selected tactical combat aircraft, 2014–22 Advanced Modern Ageing Obsolescent
3,500
3,000
2,500
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
0
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
*Including only Ftr, FGA and Atk aircraft (not incl AC-130J)
US real-terms defence budget trend, 2012–22 Canada real-terms defence budget trend, 2012–22
800 10 100 15
8 12
6 80 9
USDbn, constant 2015
600 4
Year-on-year % change
Year-on-year % change
6
2
60
0 3
400
-2 0
40
-4
-3
200 -6
20 -6
-8
-10 -9
0 -12 0 -12
2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022
18 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
North America
Canada and the United States took strides to deepen politically and materially. Well before Moscow’s
cooperation over continental defence in 2022. It is troops crossed their start line, administration officials
increasingly acknowledged that both have important were briefing Ukraine’s leaders with Washington’s
defence and security interests in the Arctic, the assessment of President Vladimir Putin’s intent, with
Atlantic and the Pacific. The year also saw the similar disclosures to other European leaders. And
release of major strategic documents by the US. The a public campaign saw the rapid declassification of
unclassified versions released in the public domain intelligence pointing to indicators of Russian activity,
are shorter than the classified versions for government alongside the significant amount of information
but still contain important insights into US priorities. derived from commercially available sources that was
Washington also released an Arctic strategy. For its made available by civilian analysts. US officials have
part, Canada stepped up its maritime deployments played key roles in coordinating defence assistance to
to the Indo-Pacific and Europe and made progress Ukraine, and the US has delivered significant stocks
on some key defence acquisitions, such as the future including anti-armour weapons, various air- and
fighter programme. Both nations delivered defence missile-defence systems, and HARM anti-radiation
assistance to Ukraine in the wake of Russia’s full- missiles and artillery – particularly HIMARS rocket
scale invasion, with the US leading contributions artillery. Nonetheless, the president has maintained
from NATO Allies and partner states in terms of a solid ‘red line’ against the commitment of any
both political coordination and material assistance. US forces. Military trainers were withdrawn from
Washington also increased its deployments to Ukraine in advance of 24 February. Meanwhile,
Europe, with forces increasing by over 20,000 in 2022. the administration has been firm about the US
At the same time debates in the US over prioritisation commitment to NATO, deploying additional troops
continue, notwithstanding Russia’s actions in to Romania, Poland and the Baltic states, as well as
Ukraine, because of China’s military modernisation bolstering the air and naval presence in Europe and
and deepening concern over its activities in the Indo- being central to the movement to bring Finland and
Pacific more generally, but particularly in relation to Sweden into the Alliance, following their application
Taiwan. China is Washington’s ‘pacing challenge’ and to join.
its principal security concern. According to the 2022 National Defense
Shared continental security concerns led both states Strategy (NDS), released in unclassified form in
to re-establish in 2022 the Cross Border Crime Forum, October, Russia is an ‘acute’ threat, but China is the
which includes counter-terrorist and cyber-security pacing challenge for the Department of Defense
collaboration as well as law enforcement cooperation (DoD). Indeed, the report continued, the ‘most
over borders, travel and transportation. Both states, comprehensive and serious challenge to U.S. national
but especially the US, also remain concerned by security is the PRC’s coercive and increasingly
security challenges from transnational organised aggressive endeavor to refashion the Indo-Pacific
criminal groups, including drug cartels active in region and the international system to suit its interests
Latin America. Importantly, Ottawa and Washington and authoritarian preferences’. The US is concerned
in 2022 took steps to upgrade the capabilities of the by China’s policy and military posture in relation to
North American Aerospace Defense Command Taiwan, which it sees as part of this broader pattern of
(NORAD) following a Joint Statement on NORAD destabilising and coercive behaviour. In late October,
Modernisation in 2021. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said Beijing had
decided that the status quo over Taiwan was ‘no
THE UNITED STATES longer acceptable, that they wanted to speed up the
process by which they would pursue reunification’,
The Biden administration has led the international with the possibility that if pressure on Taiwan did not
response to Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, both speed reunification Beijing could use force to meet
North America 19
its goals. Yet this view is not uniformly espoused in produce ‘plutonium pits’ for nuclear weapons. For its
the administration, and there remains considerable part, the Missile Defense Review reflected a growing
North America
debate internally over the likelihood of Chinese diversity and sophistication of threats, indicating the
aggression against Taiwan, the most plausible time need for sensors and command-and-control systems
period and the form that any such attack might take. to be able to operate more seamlessly and rapidly
While the administration has sent select equipment to across the threat landscape, though with minimal
Ukraine, but not personnel, the president has leaned detail overall in the unclassified version on plans for
in a more assertive direction in East Asia. Without meeting these challenges.
formally abandoning US ‘strategic ambiguity’ over
Taiwan, President Joe Biden had, by October, stated Meeting ambition
on more than one occasion that he would likely send A key challenge for the DoD will lie in delivering on
US combat forces to help Taiwan defend itself in the the ambitions contained in its strategy documents,
event of a Chinese attack. not simply in terms of military capability
The modernisation of China’s armed forces development and maintaining the funding needed
remains the principal driver of US policy attention to support these but also in relation to the broader
and capability development. Washington believes capabilities required to support its ambitions – for
Beijing ‘has modernized and expanded nearly every instance in national defence industry, the supply
aspect’ of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and that chain and innovation. Moreover, the DoD and the
China is focused on offsetting US military advantage. national security establishment and industry need
The NDS says that the PLA is ‘rapidly advancing and to meet these requirements at the right timescale
integrating its space, counterspace, cyber, electronic, – not only during what the Biden administration’s
and informational warfare capabilities to support its 2022 National Security Strategy called the ‘decisive
holistic approach to joint warfare’, and that it is also decade’ of the next ten years, but beyond that. At
speeding and expanding nuclear modernisation. the same time, it must cope with the prioritisation
To deliver a force able to ‘strengthen and sustain problem highlighted by actual and potential threats
deterrence, and to prevail in conflict if necessary’, to security in Europe as well as in the Indo-Pacific.
the DoD says in the NDS that it will prioritise a But these are not new problems. And much of the
force that possesses capabilities that can ‘penetrate rhetoric in the Biden administration’s strategic
adversary defenses at range’, that ‘securely and documents will be familiar to readers of recent
effectively provides logistics and sustainment to versions, even if there was more on the importance
continue operations in a contested and degraded of allies and partners than before. Indeed, in early
environment’, that maintains information and November 2022, Under Secretary of Defense Colin
decision advantage and is able to rapidly mobilise Kahl described the 2022 NDS as in some ways just
force and generate combat power. Integrated with the next iteration of the 2018 version, issued under
the NDS were unclassified versions of the Nuclear the leadership of president Donald Trump and
Posture Review (NPR) and Missile Defense Review. secretary of defense Jim Mattis. But after nearly two
DoD did not release an unclassified space strategy. years in office, perhaps the most striking aspect of the
The NPR reflects international tensions in its Biden administration’s defence and military policy,
language and also seems to balance the revived move under Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, is its
to retire older systems such as the B83 gravity bomb, broad continuity – from the Trump administration
as well as the cancellation of the development agreed as well as the last major military initiatives of the
by the Trump administration of the nuclear-armed Obama years and the bipartisan agreement on
sea-launched cruise missile, with maintenance of how to size, structure, modernise and fund the US
other developments agreed during the Trump-era. defence establishment.
These include the low-yield warhead for Trident II In practical terms, these conceptual and rhetorical
(the W76-2), the life extension to the B61 gravity bomb initiatives help justify the significant emphasis
(the B61-12) and the developmental Long-Range on research, development, test and evaluation
Standoff weapon. Also prominent were commitments (RDT&E). The RDT&E budget is now greater than
to upgrade all legs of the nuclear triad, make nuclear USD130 billion annually, an historic high that
command and control more resilient, and expand the considerably exceeds the full investment budget
capability of the National Nuclear Safety Agency to of the rest of NATO combined. These investments
20 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
have reached such a scale largely because systems short-duration crises without substantially impairing
that have been at the conceptual or laboratory level high-end warfighting readiness’. Washington is
for years are now reaching advanced prototyping looking to build strength in key areas, including
and field-testing phases, with low-level production surveillance and decision systems, ‘particularly in the
to follow. space domain’, hardening its command-and-control
Investments have also led to the creation of a networks and developing systems that can ‘mitigate
Pacific Deterrence Initiative to complement the adversary anti-access/area-denial capability’. It was
European Deterrence Initiative developed after noteworthy that the NDS also highlighted the need to
Russia’s aggressions against Ukraine from 2014. The improve logistics and sustainment, reinforcing the US
Pacific Deterrence Initiative’s funding stands at ability to ‘quickly mobilise and deploy’ forces in the
about USD6bn compared with USD4bn for Europe face of denial operations.
in the president’s 2023 budget request. The plan But the sustainment reference points to other
helps with infrastructure modernisation, enhanced concerns, including not only those highlighted
training initiatives – including in the Indo-Pacific by growing strategic competition with China but
with the other ‘Quadrilateral Security Dialogue’ also those deriving from the war in Ukraine, and
nations of India, Japan and Australia – and greater related to security of supply and weapons stocks. It
targeted experimentation and research (including is significant that in 2022 defence officials have paid
with Australia and the United Kingdom under the numerous visits to US defence plants at varying
AUKUS arrangement of 2021). To date, however, it positions in the supply chain. Measures being
has not led to significant changes to US posture, at considered include mitigating vulnerabilities in the
least in the broader Indo-Pacific. Modest alterations current supply chain and improving innovation
continue, such as deployment changes of a few and planning for procurement mechanisms that can
thousand troops at most in Guam and in Australia. help industry develop or maintain the capability to
Moreover, according to analysts, it remains unclear boost production. But although investments may be
if the Pentagon is moving quickly enough to address growing, and US strategic logic increasingly shifts
acute gaps and vulnerabilities, such as shortages to a paramount focus on China, there remains much
of sensors and munitions that would be useful in continuity in force structure and in strategy. While
helping Taiwan fend off possible Chinese attack and the defence debate suggests a desire for greater
vulnerabilities in military and national infrastructural change, actual adjustments have so far occurred
command and control, or alternatives to forward- more slowly.
located airfields and aircraft carriers that could This may change with the influx of greater
survive possible Chinese pre-emption in any war. resources into the Pentagon. Since the mid-2010s,
Meanwhile, the documents also note the challenge there has been a notable defence-budget build-up in
from what the NDS termed ‘persistent threats’ from the US. The process began under former secretary
North Korea, Iran and violent extremist organisations. of defense Mattis, whose 2018 NDS called for
Their persistence perhaps helps explain why the ‘additional resources in a sustained effort to solidify
shift towards great-power competition has been our competitive advantage’. That objective has been
constrained in scope, pace, and overall strategic largely attained over the ensuing half decade even if,
effect within the DoD. Under the updated force- during the Biden years, it has been sustained more by
planning construct, the joint force is intended to Congress than by the administration. Vast spending
‘simultaneously defend the homeland, maintain on COVID-19 relief made it hard even for fiscal hawks
strategic deterrence and deter and, if necessary, and defence doves to turn off the tap, while inflation
prevail in conflict’. However, the precise force-sizing pressures have further strengthened the argument
construct remains unclear from the public document. in the course of 2022 for large defence outlays. And
Risk-mitigation efforts ‘rooted in integrated Congress has added tens of billions of dollars to the
deterrence’ are seen as key to deterring ‘opportunistic requested defence budget in each of the first two
aggression’ if the US is involved in an ‘all domain years of the Biden presidency. Nonetheless, these
conflict’. Cooperation with allies is seen as key, as sums need to be focused correctly, provide quality
is the US nuclear deterrent and other capabilities and quantity, and deliver on the range of technologies
such as space and cyber. But the force is also meant and systems for this and the next generation of US
to have the ability to ‘respond to small-scale, armed forces.
North America 21
North America
for large-scale combat operations under its Multi- Under Waypoint 2028–2029, the 10th Mountain
Domain Operations (MDO) concept. These plans and 25th Infantry Divisions will likely become ‘Light
pre-date Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine Divisions’ and the 82nd Airborne and 101st Air
in February 2022, but that conflict has influenced Assault Divisions ‘Joint Forcible Entry Divisions’.
thinking in key areas. These include the importance All of these divisions will receive a new light tank
of being able to conduct effective combined-arms battalion operating the General Dynamics Griffin
warfare at scale, precision long-range firepower II design selected to fulfil the Mobile Protected
and mobile air- and missile-defence capabilities. Firepower (MPF) programme requirement in June
Integrating lessons drawn from Ukraine delayed the 2022. Original plans to assign an MPF company to each
official publication of MDO as army doctrine, though Brigade Combat Team have been dropped following
the updated document – FM 3-0, Operations – was concerns about overloading brigade headquarters
eventually published in October. staff. The 82nd and 101st will also receive a dedicated
Moving into 2022, the army had already identified cavalry squadron for divisional reconnaissance, but
a number of ‘critical gaps’ in the design of its current the Light Divisions will not. The newly formed 11th
divisional structures, and new divisional structures Airborne Division, created from US Army Alaska in
proposed under its Waypoint 2028–2029 initiative mid-2022, may retain a tailored structure due to its
are intended to help overcome these shortcomings. role as the army’s dedicated Arctic and extreme cold-
Under these proposals, the 1st Cavalry Division (and weather operations formation.
likely the 1st Armored Division) will restructure All of the new divisional designs will also receive a
as ‘Penetration Divisions’, each retaining three new combat support brigade with engineer, chemical,
Armored Brigade Combat Teams (ABCTs), but with biological, radiological and nuclear, military police
the addition of an organic engineering brigade, a battalions and a short-range air-defence battalion
dedicated division-level armoured cavalry squadron operating the new M-SHORAD system to counter
and an extra artillery battalion to be equipped with helicopters and UAVs. M-SHORAD was first fielded
the forthcoming 155mm M1299 Extended Range in Germany in 2021, and the first CONUS-based
Cannon Artillery system. These changes are intended M-SHORAD battalions began activating in 2022.
to make the revised formations better able to conduct The army plans to take delivery of its first platoon of
breakthrough operations against peer opponents in M-SHORAD Increment 2 (Directed Energy) systems
defensive positions. The Army National Guard is also by the end of 2022 to go alongside the already-issued
expected to form its own Penetration Division, with production models of the M-SHORAD Increment 1
the realignment of existing brigades under the 34th (Kinetic Effect) system.
Infantry Division’s headquarters. There has been a significant short-term expansion
The remaining nine active force ABCTs and of the army’s presence in Europe following Russia’s
medium-weight Stryker Brigade Combat Teams invasion of Ukraine. By May 2022, this had grown to
(SBCTs) based in the continental US (CONUS) seem 45,000 personnel, with a full corps headquarters, two
set to be redistributed into three ‘heavy divisions’ division headquarters, two further ABCTs and one
comprising two ABCTs and one SBCT each. These airborne brigade combat team deployed in addition
divisions will lack the dedicated division-level assets to regular forward-based and rotational forces.
available to the two Penetration Divisions and serve Balancing these deployments, the army has also
instead as general-purpose heavy armoured and continued to adjust its long-term posture elsewhere.
mechanised formations. Having previously ended its ABCT rotations to the
With the Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle Middle East, the transfer of the Korea Rotational
programme still in the prototyping stage, and not Force deployment from an ABCT to an SBCT in late
expected to begin being issued to units until 2029, 2022 means that the vast majority of the army’s heavy
the army is now taking delivery of upgraded M2A4 armour is now concentrated in Europe and CONUS.
Bradley variants, and the first unit set was issued in In the Pacific, the army has instead focused on
early 2022. Development efforts in the Robotic Combat lighter forces, and longer-range missile capabilities,
Vehicle uninhabited ground vehicle programme with the establishment of an additional brigade-
have been refocused, with work on medium-weight level Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF) included
22 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
in the president’s FY2023 budget. This third MDTF III Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, despite various
was officially established in Hawaii at the end of proposals to try to accelerate destroyer construction.
September 2022. In 2022, one new destroyer commissioned up to
The army’s new theatre-missile capabilities, November, while two Flight IV Virginia-class nuclear-
including the short-range Precision Strike Missile powered guided-missile submarines joined the fleet,
(PrSM), will not start to be fielded until 2023, plus the 12th San Antonio-class landing platform
although deliveries of the first modernised M270A2 dock, to a slightly improved design. A keel-laying
multiple-launch rocket system, one of the intended ceremony took place in June 2022 for the first of the
launch platforms for PrSM, began in mid-2022. The new Columbia-class nuclear-powered ballistic-missile
Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft programme, submarines, although concerns are mounting as to
intended to replace the retired OH-58D Kiowa whether these vessels – the navy’s top procurement
helicopter, appears to be behind schedule, with the priority – will remain on schedule. The ceremonial
competitive demonstration phase now delayed until keel laying for the third Gerald R. Ford-class carrier,
at least late 2023. On 5 December 2022, the army the new USS Enterprise, took place in August. The
announced it had selected the Bell-Textron V-280 same month, construction began on the first of the
Valor as their chosen option to replace the ubiquitous Constellation-class frigates.
UH-60 Black Hawk under the Future Long-Range Efforts to maintain and refurbish the existing
Assault Aircraft programme. fleet continue to be challenged by high operational
demands as well as maintenance backlogs. The
US Navy Ukraine war saw the extended deployment to the
The US Navy is still struggling to deal with the Mediterranean of an aircraft carrier (initially the
growing challenge from China and multiple other USS Harry S. Truman, replaced by the USS George H.
demands. Several proposals to address the navy’s W. Bush), while in early 2022 the navy surged four
future fleet size and structure have been forthcoming. additional destroyers into the European theatre.
These involve varying combinations of large and Separately, in June, the Biden administration
small surface combatants and uninhabited vehicles of announced that two additional destroyers would
various descriptions. be forward deployed to Europe, bringing the total
Perhaps the most notable is the new Navigation forward-deployed presence to six.
Plan from the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral In the Indo-Pacific, deployments remained at a high
Michael Gilday. Released in July 2022, the goals tempo, including a number of freedom-of-navigation
outlined included 12 nuclear-powered aircraft transits of the Taiwan Strait during 2022. The latest
carriers, 66 tactical submarines, 96 large and 56 Rim of the Pacific exercise included significantly
small surface combatants (as part of a force design greater integration of uninhabited platforms. The
for 373 crewed vessels, to be achieved by 2045), LHA USS Tripoli also carried out a further test of the
and approximately 150 uninhabited surface and ‘Lightning carrier’ with a record 20 Lockheed Martin
subsurface platforms. F-35B Lightning II aircraft aboard, potentially adding
Gilday also argued that industrial capacity needs options to US Navy aviation operations at sea.
to increase, as it is the greatest obstacle to growing The latest update to the US Marine Corps’ Force
the fleet. However, the US Navy is also facing friction Design 2030 plan to make the force more agile
with Congress over its shipbuilding plans and its included an increased emphasis on reconnaissance
efforts to decommission older vessels in order to and counter-reconnaissance to both strike and hide.
focus on newer capabilities and future programmes. The first Marine Littoral Regiment was formed in
Five of the US Navy’s Ticonderoga-class cruisers March with the re-designation of the 3rd Marine
were among the ships decommissioned in FY2022, Regiment. The plan intends to make the marines
and nearly 40 more vessels are slated by the navy more expeditionary, more focused on long-range
for decommissioning in FY2023, although Congress missile strikes, less dependent on centralised
was seeking to prevent a significant number of command, control, communications and intelligence
these planned retirements. All the Ticonderogas are support, and generally more focused on China. The
scheduled to leave the fleet by 2027, a significant loss USMC is looking to diversify its footprint in the
of vertical launch system firepower that will not be Asia-Pacific region in particular, and the goals of
replaced straight away by the arrival of new Flight USMC Commandant General David Berger include
North America 23
helping joint-force commanders better monitor the course of the next decade or so. The air force’s plan
China and deter it from committing various ‘gray to cut the size of the F-22A fleet, removing 33 Block 20
North America
zone’ micro-aggressions as well as possible larger aircraft during FY2023 to free up additional funding
attacks in places such as Taiwan. The plan received for NGAD, met with political opposition.
considerable criticism from a number of senior retired The fall in total fleet numbers is due to ongoing
USMC officers. Differences between the navy and the and historical issues with the Lockheed Martin F-35
marines also appeared to be holding up plans for a Lightning II. The aircraft’s entry into service was
new light amphibious ship for dispersed operations, delayed by years and it is now being bought at lower
particularly in the Pacific. production rates than first envisaged. The F-35A,
For the US Coast Guard, top procurement priorities however, will provide a central element of the mass of
are a new class of medium-sized Offshore Patrol the air force’s future combat capability. Before then,
Cutters (OPCs) and new icebreakers. After delays, however, several technical and financial concerns
the first of up to 25 OPCs was due for completion in will need to be addressed. The air force is looking
late 2022. A detailed design and construction contract to the Block 4 development of the aircraft, combined
for a second new heavy icebreaker, or Polar Security with Technical Refresh 3 to allow the F-35 to operate
Cutter, was awarded at the end of 2021, with the first against the advanced threats now envisaged. The
ship scheduled for delivery in the spring of 2025. air force has cautioned that these aircraft need to be
affordable and delivered in time.
US Air Force While there has been no indication yet of when
The US Air Force turned 75 in 2022, while the average a prototype, or prototypes, of the crewed element
age of a key fleet component – the Boeing KC-135 of NGAD will be made public, roll-out of the
tanker – is 59. Although the KC-135 is a comparative Northrop Grumman B-21 Raider bomber took place
outlier, the air force continues to grapple with the in December 2022. As of September 2022, six test
challenges of recapitalising a swathe of ageing types aircraft were on the production line. The B-21 will
in its combat and support fleets at the same time as operate alongside the KC-135 which, irrespective of
attempting to build combat capacity. There remains its age, will remain in the inventory beyond 2040. The
also a 1,650 shortfall in pilots and the wider demands McDonnell Douglas KC-10 Extender, operated in far
of recruitment and retention. smaller numbers, will be retired during FY2024.
The USAF continues to view China as the pacing The KC-46A has now been cleared to refuel
challenge, but it is also confronted by the ‘acute both the F-22A and F-35 (currently up to 97% of US
threat’ of Russia. While the latter is more immediate, aircraft) and was deployed on operations to Europe
the former is more sustained and technologically and the Middle East in 2022. However, the revised
demanding. Russia’s war on Ukraine has reinforced refuelling vision system required for initial operating
concerns over Moscow’s willingness to use military capability (IOC) has been delayed again, this time to
force, but the performance of its Aerospace Forces October 2025. Despite this, the USAF is reportedly
(VKS) in the conflict has so far been lacklustre at best. considering dropping the KC-Y tanker programme
The USAF is trying to employ a strategy centred contest altogether and bringing forward the planned
on combat aircraft fleets to address the immediate KC-Z programme instead.
challenge of Russia and the longer-term and more The first of 351 T-7A Red Hawk training aircraft,
demanding issue of the build-up of Chinese airpower. intended to replace the T-38C Talon, was delivered
It is far from a simple task, with the confluence of in April 2022. Boeing also delivered the first test
several long-term issues compounding the difficulty. MH-139A helicopters in August 2022 following a
The combat aircraft fleet continues to decline in lengthy Federal Aviation Administration certification
number and, along with the overall cut, the service process. The MH-139 will replace the USAF ICBM
will also see the number of types fielded reduced to force’s venerable UH-1N models.
four, the latter by design. Combat aircraft types will The HH-60W Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR)
be reduced to the Boeing F-15EX Eagle II, Lockheed programme of record was cut by one-third in the
Martin F-16 Fighting Falcon, Lockheed Martin F-35A president’s FY2023 budget (from 113 to 75 helicopters)
Lightning II, and Next Generation Air Dominance as the USAF reportedly re-examines its future CSAR
(NGAD) aircraft. The F-15C/D Eagle, F-15E Strike Eagle requirements. This, in turn, has significantly increased
and Lockheed Martin F-22A Raptor will be retired over the HH-60W’s unit cost.
24 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
The USAF expects to divest an initial batch of A-10 which was tied to the US armed forces’ withdrawal
attack aircraft in 2023, although retiring the whole from Afghanistan (USD6.5bn), support for Ukraine
fleet remains politically contentious. Nearly the entire (USD6.5bn) and other priorities. This additional
C-130H fleet remained grounded well into October spending increased the FY2022 DoD budget from
due to engine issues. The AIM-260 Joint Advanced USD742bn to USD757bn. Against this number, the
Tactical Missile has not yet officially achieved its Biden administration’s FY2023 DoD budget only
projected 2022 IOC, although it is reportedly in live- constitutes a 2.2% increase over FY2022. However, it
fire testing. The hypersonic AGM-183A Air-launched is possible that additional DoD funds will be used to
Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW) achieved its first support Ukraine in FY2023, as the war has become
successful live firings from a B-52 bomber in summer a strategic priority for the Biden administration.
2022, but the USAF has delayed any production In May, Congress passed a USD40bn Ukraine aid
decision on the system to 2023. In late 2022 the package that provided a framework for continuing
USAF selected a Raytheon and Northrop Grumman military, economic and humanitarian support.
team to develop prototypes of its planned scramjet In September, the administration requested an
Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile design. additional USD11.7bn for Ukraine as part of an
Supply-chain issues delayed the planned launch emergency funding package to hedge against the
of 28 Tranche 0 small satellites as part of the USSF likelihood of a ‘continuing resolution’, or temporary
proliferated low Earth orbit constellation test and funding measure, starting in FY2023.
demonstration phase from September 2022 to perhaps Even more important to the discussion of
March 2023. Earlier in 2022, the USSF awarded year-on-year growth is the impact of inflation on
contracts for the follow-on Tranche 1 satellites for budget growth and purchasing power. Inflation
the communications Transport Layer and missile- estimates for the FY2023 budget request are tied
warning Tracking Layer constellations. to the GDP Price Index and an assumed average
inflation rate of 2.2% during 2023. The defence
DEFENCE ECONOMICS budget’s buying power will be eroded if inflation
exceeds 2.2% on average over the course of 2023, as
On 28 March 2022, the DoD submitted its Fiscal Year other indices and forecasts suggest.
(FY) 2023 budget request to Congress with a top line
DoD budget of USD773bn. Biden called the request
Table 1 The US DoD budget request by appropriation
‘one of the largest investments in our national security title, USDm
in history’.
Requests/ 2022 DoD 2022 2023 DoD Change
The proposed discretionary budget request Enacted budget Requested Base Base between
included USD29.8bn for Department of Energy by Appropriation Enacted Requested FY2022
Title (USDm) Enacted
atomic-energy defence activities and USD10.6bn and FY23
for ‘defense-related activities’ carried out by the FBI Requested
and other government agencies. Defence-related Military 163,699 166,714 173,883 +7,169
discretionary spending amounts to USD813bn, Personnel
with total DoD funding reaching USD827bn when Operations and 292,299 294,550 309,343 +14,793
Maintenance
mandatory spending is included.
Procurement 143,256 145,212 145,939 +727
Inflation, growth and purchasing power Research, 107,456 118,787 130,097 +11,310
Development,
According to the DoD announcement, the USD773bn Testing, and
top line request constitutes a 4.1% increase over the Evaluation
enacted 2022 defence budget of USD742bn, which Military 7,143 13,375 10,198 -3,177
Construction
itself included USD25.6bn in additional funding over
President Biden’s FY2022 request. However, some Family Housing 1,401 1,525 1,956 +431
have questioned the accuracy of the announced 4.1% Revolving 1,394 2,112 1,583 -529
Management
increase due to two developments that complicate and Trust Funds
year-on-year comparisons. Totals 716,648 742,275 773,000 +30,725
Firstly, Washington authorised USD14.3bn in Source: Defense Comptroller, FY23 Defense Budget Overview Book,
supplemental defence spending during FY2022, Appendix A, April 2022
North America 25
North America
4 3.71 non-kinetic threats to the US homeland as well as US
3.37 3.54 3.49
3.30 allies, interests and personnel.
3.06
3 For its part, Russia constitutes an immediate and
% of GDP
Initiative and the USD4.2bn European Deterrence Military; USD34m to help the DoD deter, detect and
Initiative, both of which intersect with the broader address ‘extremism in the ranks’; and development
integrated deterrence approach. and implementation of talent-management initiatives
The FY2023 DoD budget request also prioritises that improve racial and gender diversity at key points
DoD’s plan to build advantage by investing in in the military-career lifecycle.
innovation and modernisation as well as industrial
capability. The DoD’s RDT&E requests have been Military departments and armed services
important in funding modernisation projects in recent The FY2023 request reveals uplifts to the budgets of the
years. The FY2023 RDT&E request, at USD130bn, DoD’s military departments, though the Department
was USD11bn higher than the USD119bn enacted of the Air Force (including the US Space Force (USSF))
in FY22, itself a record amount. Priorities within and the Department of the Navy (including the US
this broad category of spending include investment Marine Corps (USMC)) receive significantly larger
in science and technology, artificial intelligence, increases than the Department of the Army.
microelectronics, 5G, and an Industrial Base Analysis The Department of the Air Force technically
and Sustainment (IBAS) programme to strengthen has the highest budget and received the biggest
the US defence-related supply chain. The FY2023 increase in funding, at USD11.8bn. Modernisation
budget’s IBAS programme will focus on building efforts across both the US Air Force (USAF) and the
capacity in chemical production, bio-manufacturing USSF are crucial to supporting the air force’s seven
and rare-earth element supply chains. ‘operational imperatives’: 1) establishing space
resiliency; 2) achieving an operationally optimised
A people-friendly budget Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS), the
The Pentagon is also looking to improve recruitment air force’s contribution to the DoD’s Joint All-Domain
and retention, and the FY2023 budget includes a Command and Control (JADC2); 3) advancing
4.6% pay rise for military and civilian personnel – the development of the sixth-generation Next Generation
largest in 20 years for military personnel – among Air Dominance family of systems; 4) achieving more
several other programmes to ‘cultivate [the US] target engagements at scale; 5) defining optimised,
military and civilian workforce, grow [DoD] talent, resilient basing, sustainment and communications;
build resilience and force readiness’. 6) defining the family of systems supporting the B-21
The pay rise and funding of a USD15/hour long-range strike capability; and 7) transitioning to a
minimum wage for the federal workforce also serves wartime posture against a peer competitor.
as a measure to offset the effects of what could be a Nonetheless, funding issues threaten to slow air
prolonged period of inflation volatility. Personnel force and space force modernisation precisely as there
investments also include several measures to ‘ensure is increasing demand for USAF capabilities to help
accountable leadership’ and build a more diverse and maintain deterrence in the Indo-Pacific. It should
equitable workforce. These include USD479 million to also be noted that the overall Department of the Air
implement the recommendations of the Independent Force FY2023 budget is distorted by USD40.2bn in
Review Commission on Sexual Assault in the pass-through funding (USD41.4bn in FY22), which is
allocated to, but not controlled by, the USAF and which
Table 3 The US DoD total budget request by military usually funds classified or non-disclosed programmes.
service, USDm Moreover, of the remaining USD194bn, USD170bn
Requested/ FY22 FY2023 Difference % of Total goes to the air force (22% of the total FY2023 budget
Enacted budget Enacted Requested between Base request) while USD24.5bn (3% of the total budget
by service Budget FY2022 Topline
(USDm) (USDm) and Request request) goes to the space force. This means the overall
FY2023 for FY2023 USAF budget is less than that of the US Army.
Army 174,854 177,315 +2,461 22.9 As a result, the USAF is increasingly looking to
Navy 221,302 230,848 +9,546 28.9 divest legacy systems to free up funds to reinvest
Air Force 222,279 234,116 +11,837 30.3 in more modern capabilities. The FY2023 budget
Defense Wide 138,125 130,721 -7,404 16.9 calls for the retirement of 150 aircraft, the transfer
Total 756,560 773,000 +16,640 100 of 100 MQ-9 Reaper uninhabited aerial vehicles
Source: Defense Comptroller, FY23 Defense Budget Overview Book, (UAVs) to another government agency, as well as the
Appendix A, April 2022 divestment of 1,463 aircraft during the Future Years
North America 27
Defense Program (FYDP). The same FYDP calls for up funds for modernisation. For the USN, the budget
the procurement of just 467 aircraft, just under 90 envisions the retirement of 12 ships in FY2023 and 24
North America
of which are to be procured in FY2023, including 15 over the course of the FYDP, including 16 before the
F-35A and F-15EX combat aircraft. end of their service life. The USMC budget stresses the
The FY2023 budget increases the Department need to continue the retirement of ‘legacy capabilities
of the Navy’s budget by USD9.5bn over the and excess capacity’ while the force ‘reallocates
enacted FY2022 budget with more funding across savings for initiatives that support readiness’ and the
military personnel, maintenance and operations, USMC’s Force Design 2030.
procurement, and RDT&E. Procurement funding is The Department of the Army budget has the
set at USD27.9bn for nine battle-force ships, including least overall growth, at USD2.5bn. This reflects
two Block V Virginia-class attack submarines, two the continuing transition from 20 years of counter-
Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, one Constellation-class terrorism and counter-insurgency operations to
frigate, incremental funding for the Columbia-class preparing for high-intensity large-scale operations.
ballistic-missile submarine, and four support and Interestingly, even though the RDT&E budget is
logistics ships. Another USD16.8bn is dedicated to the highest it has ever been, both army RDT&E and
the procurement of 96 fixed-wing, rotary-wing, and procurement funding have decreased in the FY2023
uncrewed aircraft with plans to buy 15 F-35Bs and budget request. Funding for military personnel sees
13 F-35Cs. The budget also includes USD4.7bn for the biggest increase, at USD2.9bn, reflecting the strong
weapons procurement. emphasis placed in the budget request on ‘the army’s
As with the USAF, the US Navy (USN) and the most enduring advantage’: its ‘highly qualified
USMC budgets include platform retirements to free and capable people’. The army budget request also
Table 4 US National Defense Budget Function and other selected budgets, 2000, 2010–23
USD in National Atomic Other Total National Defense Department Department Total Total
billions, Defense Energy Defense of of Federal Federal
current- Budget Defense Activities Homeland Veterans’ Government Budget
year Function Activities Security Affairs Outlays Surplus/
dollars Deficit
Discretionary
FY BA Outlay BA BA BA BA Outlay BA BA
2000 290.3 281.0 12.4 1.3 304.0 300.8 294.4 13.8 45.5 1,789.0 236.2
2010 695.6 666.7 18.2 7.3 721.2 714.1 693.5 45.4 124.3 3,457.1 -1,294.4
2011 691.5 678.1 18.5 7.0 717.0 710.1 705.6 41.6 122.8 3,603.1 -1,299.6
2012 655.4 650.9 18.3 7.7 681.4 669.6 677.9 45.9 124.0 3,526.6 -1,076.6
2013 585.2 607.8 17.5 7.4 610.2 600.4 633.4 61.9 136.0 3,454.9 -679.8
2014 595.7 577.9 18.4 8.2 622.3 606.2 603.5 44.1 165.7 3,506.3 -484.8
2015 570.8 562.5 19.0 8.5 598.4 585.9 589.7 45.3 160.5 3,691.9 -442.0
2016 595.7 565.4 20.1 8.3 624.1 606.8 593.4 46.0 163.3 3,852.6 -584.7
2017 626.2 568.9 21.4 8.7 656.3 634.1 598.7 62.3 178.8 3,981.6 -665.4
2018 694.5 600.7 23.3 9.0 726.8 700.9 631.2 103.0 191.8 4,109.0 -779.1
2019 712.6 654.0 24.0 9.1 745.7 718.8 686.0 61.4 194.2 4,447.0 -983.6
2020 738.8 690.4 26.0 9.7 774.5 756.6 724.6 114.2 233.3 6,553.6 -3,132.4
2021 719.5 717.6 29.4 10.8 759.6 741.7 753.9 123.2 255.4 6,822.4 -2,775.3
2022* 727.0 741.0 29.5 10.1 766.6 753.7 779.7 71.4 257.9 5,851.6 -1,415.0
2023* 784.0 767.6 31.8 11.1 827.0 813.4 808.6 76.5 296.7 5,792.0 -1,153.9
Notes Selective Service System). It does not include 2
Early in each calendar year, the US government
FY = Fiscal Year (1 October–30 September) funding for International Security Assistance presents its defence budget to Congress for the
* (request) (under International Affairs), the Veterans next fiscal year, which begins on 1 October. The
1
The National Defense Budget Function Administration, the US Coast Guard (Department government also presents its Future Years Defense
subsumes funding for the DoD, the Department of Homeland Security), nor for the National Program (FYDP), which covers the next fiscal year
of Energy Atomic Energy Defense Activities Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). plus the following five. Until approved by Congress,
and some smaller support agencies (including Funding for civil projects administered by the the budget is called the Budget Request; after
Federal Emergency Management and DoD is excluded from the figures cited here. approval, it becomes the Budget Authority (BA).
28 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
mentions the service’s leadership in publishing More broadly for Canada, Russia’s 2022 invasion
a climate strategy in 2022, its continued focus on increased security concerns over the Arctic and may
the electrification of its vehicle fleet, and efforts to have helped to stimulate a renewed focus in Ottawa
develop and test tactics for Arctic operations. on the defence and security aspects of Canada’s
interests there.
CANADA The significant modernisation and upgrading
that Canada announced in June to its NORAD
Canada’s defence minister, Anita Anand, said at the capabilities was partly a reflection of this. The
June 2022 IISS Shangri-La Dialogue that Canada is government said it would invest in an Arctic
‘an Atlantic, Arctic and Pacific nation’. The challenges over-the-horizon radar system, a polar over-the-
that this presents for the country were underscored horizon radar system, and a new network of sensors
during the year, with perceived security concerns called Crossbow distributed across northern Canada.
emerging on all three fronts. These plans also reignited debates in Canada over
Following the invasion of Ukraine, the government missile defence more broadly. Prime Minister Justin
unveiled in April an uplift of CAD8bn (USD6.3bn) in Trudeau attended Canada’s signature Arctic exercise
defence spending over five years. Accompanying the Operation Nanook in August. NATO Secretary-
budget move was the announcement of a new defence General Jens Stoltenberg undertook his first official
policy review – billed as an update of the 2017 review visit to Canada’s Arctic at the same time. Meanwhile,
proposition entitled ‘Strong, Secure, Engaged’ – Canada hosted the first meeting since 2014 of chiefs
because of the requirement ‘to reassess Canada’s role, of defence of Arctic nations (without Russia). The
priorities and needs in the face of a changing world’. Canadian Navy has enhanced its presence in the
In Europe, Canada sought to adjust and bolster, region, including extended deployments by the first
to a degree, its contributions. Its training mission in two of its new Harry DeWolf-class Arctic Offshore
Ukraine, Operation Unifier, was paused weeks before Patrol Ships; the third of the class was delivered to
the start of hostilities with the intention to relocate the navy in September.
it outside Ukraine. It was announced in August Meanwhile, Canada sought to enhance its
that up to 225 personnel would resume the training presence in the Indo-Pacific, including a two-frigate
effort based in the United Kingdom, initially for deployment during 2022. One of the ships, HMCS
four months. Canadian military aid to Ukraine has Vancouver, joined a US Navy destroyer on a transit
included M777 howitzers, replacement barrels and of the Taiwan Strait in September. The same vessel
funding for 20,000 rounds of 155mm ammunition. It undertook operations to support implementation
also redeployed its military air transport detachment of UN sanctions against North Korea, maintaining
in the Middle East of two C-130J Hercules transport a task also performed by Canadian vessels in
aircraft to the UK to help with the Ukraine military previous years.
aid effort. At the end of March, Ottawa finally chose the
Under its Operation Reassurance mission to support Lockheed Martin F-35A Lightning II as its preferred
NATO, Canadian personnel deployed to Poland for bidder for its future combat aircraft programme.
several months to support the reception of Ukrainian But the delivery targets are challenging, with a
refugees there. Other modest enhancements included requirement for the first nine aircraft to be in service
the addition of a battery of four M777 howitzers by December 2027 and all 88 of the planned aircraft to
and personnel to join the 540 Canadian personnel be in service by 2031.
leading the NATO Enhanced Presence Battlegroup Concerns remain over costs and the timetable
in Latvia. Canada also deployed two Halifax-class for the navy’s new Canadian Surface Combatant,
frigates on NATO operations during 2022 as well as for which Lockheed Martin is the prime contractor
two Kingston-class mine-countermeasures vessels. with a heavily modified version of the UK Type-26
Ottawa also assigned a CP-140M Aurora (P-3 Orion) Global Combat Ship design. Likewise, the new
Maritime Patrol aircraft to NATO from February to Protecteur-class Joint Support Ships appeared to be
July and deployed from August to December 2022 further delayed, with deliveries of the two vessels
a new rotation of six CF-18 (F/A-18) Hornet combat now expected in 2025 and 2027 respectively. As a
aircraft to the enhanced NATO Air Policing Mission result, Canada has extended the lease on its interim
in Romania. converted auxiliary Asterix.
North America 29
North America
Significant events in 2022
In 2014, the US cancelled the Ground Combat Vehicle programme, which had been OMFV and AMPV are direct replacements for systems already in service, but the
designed to produce a series of replacement armoured vehicles for its Armored and MPF project is intended to give Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs) a direct
Stryker Brigade Combat Teams, including for the 1980s-era M2 Bradley infantry fighting precision-fire capability that they have not had before. Following a four-and-a-half-
vehicle. Two years later, the army proposed the NGCV as the replacement programme. year ‘middle-tier acquisition-rapid prototyping phase’, the army selected General
Indeed, the NGCV is now envisaged as one of the army’s ‘big six’ modernisation Dynamics’ Griffin, which is based on the Austrian–Spanish ASCOD chassis. Vehicles
priorities, but it encompasses five programmes at different stages of development. will undergo further tests before unit deliveries begin in 2025.
The Bradley replacement effort is now called the Optionally Manned Fighting The army has been experimenting with uninhabited ground systems for many years
Vehicle (OMFV). This is in the concept-design phase and contracts were awarded and in 2018 announced that it would pursue a Robotic Combat Vehicle (RCV) programme
to five industry teams in 2021. The army intends to give the next-stage contracts in three weight categories. In 2020, contracts were awarded to two industry teams for
THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
to three teams in 2023 with the aim to award a low-rate initial production (LRIP) experimental prototype trials vehicles in the Light and Medium categories. These trials
contract in 2027. also featured modified M113 and Stryker vehicles acting as surrogates for Heavy RCVs. In
The Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV) and the Mobile Protected Firepower mid-2022, the army announced that it would prioritise the Light variant and use it to inform
(MPF) programmes are both now in low-rate production. The former will replace development of the other two.
support versions of the M113 family of tracked vehicles with five variants and is The least developed, yet potentially most expensive, of these programmes is the Decisive
potentially worth over USD15 billion. The AMPV has an improved version of the Bradley Lethality Platform (DLP), which is intended to replace the M1 Abrams main battle tank. The
hull and, with approximately 5,000 M113s in US service, the programme has potential Abrams is currently undergoing SEPv3 upgrades; a further SEPv4 variant is planned later in the
for expansion. decade, and the army is exploring either a further iteration of Abrams or a brand-new design.
Programme Classification Replacing Status Quantity to DoD-estimated Potential contractors First unit Notes
be acquired total acquisition equipped
cost (USD billions)
Decisive Lethality Main battle tank M1 Abrams Technical-analysis tbd tbd Extent of programme
Platform (DLP) phase likely dependent
on RCV-H success
Optionally Manned Infantry fighting M2 Bradley Concept-design tbd 2029 LRIP decision
Fighting Vehicle (OMFV) vehicle phase expected 2027
Armored Multi-Purpose Armoured personnel M113 LRIP 2,897 15.33 BAE Systems Land 2023 First LRIP contract
Vehicle (AMPV) carrier (tracked) & Armaments awarded February 2019
Mobile Protected Light tank New capability LRIP 504 6.65 General Dynamics 2025 First LRIP contract
Firepower (MPF) Land Systems awarded June 2022
Heavy (RCV-H) Heavy uninhabited New capability Tests conducted tbd tbd To weigh
ground vehicle with surrogate 18.1-27.2 tonnes
systems
Medium (RCV-M) Medium uninhabited New capability Experimental tbd tbd To weigh
ground vehicle prototype testing 9.1-18.1 tonnes; EMD
decision in FY2024
Vehicle (RCV)
Light (RCV-L) Light uninhabited New capability Experimental tbd 2028 To weigh no more
Robotic Combat
ground vehicle prototype testing than 9.1 tonnes; EMD
decision in FY2023
DoD = Department of Defense (US); EMD = engineering, manufacturing and development; tbd = to be decided
North America 31
North America
Country Equipment 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022†
Australia F-35A 2 8 8 14 12 12
Denmark F-35A 4 2
Egypt F-16C/D 7 20
Iraq F-16C/D 4 10 7 6 11
Israel F-35I 2 7 5 6 4 6 3
Italy F-35A 6* 2* 2* 1* 2* 1* 3*
F-35B 1* 1* 1* 1* 1*
Korea, F-15K 2 2 3
Republic of
F-35A 6 7 11 12 4
Kuwait F/A-18E/F 12 16
Morocco F-16C/D 3 13 6
Norway F-35A 2 2 6 6 6 6 6 3
Pakistan F-16C/D 14 14 1
Qatar F-15QA 4 4 14
Saudi F-15SA 4 29 19 21 11
Arabia
Singapore F-15SG 4 2 8
Turkey F-16C/D 3 11
F-35A 2 2
North America
Canadian Rangers 5,300 Reservists FORCES BY ROLE
Provide a limited military presence in Canada’s northern, FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
coastal and isolated areas. Sovereignty, public-safety and 4 sqn with F/A-18A/B Hornet (CF-18AM/BM)
surveillance roles ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE
FORCES BY ROLE 2 sqn with CH-148 Cyclone
MANOEUVRE MARITIME PATROL
Other 2 sqn with P-3 Orion (CP-140M Aurora)
5 (patrol) ranger gp (209 patrols) SEARCH & RESCUE/TRANSPORT
Army Reserves 21,500 Reservists 3 sqn with AW101 Merlin (CH-149 Cormorant);
Most units have only coy-sized establishments C-130H/H-30 (CC-130) Hercules
FORCES BY ROLE 1 sqn with C295W (CC-295)
COMMAND TANKER/TRANSPORT
10 bde gp HQ 1 sqn with A310/A310 MRTT (CC-150/CC-150T)
MANOEUVRE 1 sqn with KC-130H
Reconnaissance TRANSPORT
18 recce regt (sqn) 1 sqn with C-17A (CC-177) Globemaster
Light
1 sqn with CL-600 (CC-144B)
51 inf regt (coy)
1 sqn with C-130J-30 (CC-130) Hercules
COMBAT SUPPORT
16 fd arty regt (bty) 1 (utl) sqn with DHC-6 (CC-138) Twin Otter
3 indep fd arty bty TRAINING
10 cbt engr regt (coy) 1 OCU sqn with F/A-18A/B Hornet (CF-18AM/BM)
1 EW regt (sqn) 1 OCU sqn with C-130H/H-30/J (CC-130) Hercules
4 int coy 1 OCU sqn with CH-148 Cyclone
10 sigs regt (coy) 1 OCU sqn with Bell 412 (CH-146 Griffon)
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 sqn with P-3 Orion (CP-140M Aurora)
10 log bn (coy)
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
3 MP coy
5 sqn with Bell 412 (CH-146 Griffon)
Royal Canadian Navy 12,600 3 (cbt spt) sqn with Bell 412 (CH-146 Griffon)
1 (Spec Ops) sqn with Bell 412 (CH-146 Griffon –
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
SUBMARINES 4 OPCON Canadian Special Operations Command)
SSK 4 Victoria (ex-UK Upholder) (of which 1 in long-term 1 sqn with CH-47F (CH-147F) Chinook
refit) with 6 single 533mm TT with Mk 48 HWT EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 12 AIRCRAFT 110 combat capable
FFGHM 12 Halifax with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84L FGA 96: 71 F/A-18A (CF-18AM) Hornet; 25 F/A-18B (CF-
Harpoon Block II AShM, 2 8-cell Mk 48 mod 0 VLS with
18BM) Hornet
RIM-162C ESSM SAM, 2 twin 324mm SVTT Mk 32 mod 9
ASW 14 P-3 Orion (CP-140M Aurora)
ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 1
SAR 7 C295W (CC-295)
57mm gun (capacity 1 CH-148 Cyclone ASW hel)
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 2 TKR/TPT 5: 2 A310 MRTT (CC-150T); 3 KC-130H
PSOH 2 Harry DeWolf (capacity 1 CH-148 Cyclone TPT 42: Heavy 5 C-17A (CC-177) Globemaster III;
ASW hel) Medium 26: 7 C-130H (CC-130) Hercules; 2 C-130H-30
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 12 (CC-130) Hercules; 17 C-130J-30 (CC-130) Hercules; Light
MCO 12 Kingston (also used in patrol role) 4 DHC-6 (CC-138) Twin Otter; PAX 7: 3 A310 (CC-150
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 10 Polaris); 4 CL-600 (CC-144B/C)
AORH 1 Asterix (Resolve) (capacity 2 CH-148 Cyclone TRG 4 DHC-8 (CT-142)
ASW hel)
HELICOPTERS
AX 9: AXL 8 Orca; AXS 1 Oriole
ASW 22 CH-148 Cyclone
Reserves 4,100 reservists MRH 68 Bell 412 (CH-146 Griffon)
24 units tasked with crewing 10 of the 12 MCOs, harbour SAR 14 AW101 Merlin (CH-149 Cormorant)
defence & naval control of shipping TPT • Heavy 15 CH-47F (CH-147F) Chinook
34 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
North America
and security of supply.
United States Dollar USD 2021 2022 2023
ACTIVE 1,359,600 (Army 464,900 Navy 346,300
GDP USD 23.0tr 25.0tr
Air Force 325,100 Space Force 8,400 US Marine Corps
per capita USD 69,227 75,180
174,550 US Coast Guard 40,350)
Growth % 5.7 1.6
Inflation % 4.7 8.1 RESERVE 817,450 (Army 506,600 Navy 98,250
Def exp [a] USD 794bn 822bn Air Force 173,400 Marine Corps Reserve 33,050
Def bdgt [b] USD 760bn 767bn 827bn
US Coast Guard 6,150)
[a] NATO figure
[b] National Defense Budget Function (50) Budget Authority. ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
Includes DoD funding, as well as funds for nuclear weapons-
related activities undertaken by the Department of Energy. US Strategic Command
Excludes some military retirement and healthcare costs
HQ at Offutt AFB (NE)
Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015)
785 US Navy
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
598 SUBMARINES • STRATEGIC • SSBN 14 Ohio with
2008 2015 2022
up to 20 UGM-133A Trident D-5/D-5LE nuclear SLBM,
Population 337,341,954 4 single 533mm TT with Mk 48 ADCAP mod 6/7 HWT
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus US Air Force • Global Strike Command
Male 9.3% 3.2% 3.3% 3.5% 22.0% 7.9%
FORCES BY ROLE
MISSILE
Female 8.9% 3.1% 3.2% 3.3% 22.4% 9.8%
9 sqn with LGM-30G Minuteman III
BOMBER
Capabilities 5 sqn with B-52H Stratofortress
The United States remains the world’s most capable military 2 sqn with B-2A Spirit (+1 ANG sqn personnel only)
power, with a unique ability to project power on a global
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
basis. In October 2022, the Biden administration issued a new
National Security Strategy clearly prioritising China as the ‘most SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS
consequential geopolitical challenge’ facing the US, with Russia ICBM • Nuclear 400 LGM-30G Minuteman III (1
an immediate but mainly regional threat. These priorities were Mk12A or Mk21 re-entry veh per missile)
echoed in a new National Defense Strategy (NDS) that was AIRCRAFT
accompanied by a new Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and a new BBR 66: 20 B-2A Spirit; 46 B-52H Stratofortress
Missile Defense Review (MDR). The NDS emphasised homeland AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
defence, integrated deterrence and ‘campaigning’ to tackle sub- ALCM • Nuclear AGM-86B
conflict competition that is already under way. It reflected the fact
that the force structure is under strain, requires recapitalising with Strategic Defenses – Early Warning
an emphasis on new technology, and needs improved resilience,
including of the industrial base. Russia’s further invasion of Ukraine EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
in February 2022 led the US to bolster its presence in Europe and RADAR
also supply large amounts of military and other aid to Ukraine. The NORTH WARNING SYSTEM 50: 14 AN/FPS-117;
NPR reaffirmed broad nuclear modernisation plans but cancelled 36 AN/FPS-124
the proposed nuclear-capable sea-launched cruise missile SOLID STATE PHASED ARRAY RADAR SYSTEM
capability. It also stated that the US would consider using nuclear (SSPARS) 5 AN/FPS-132 Upgraded Early Warning
weapons only ‘in extreme circumstances’ but did not institute a
Radar located at Beale AFB (CA), Cape Cod SFS
‘no first use’ policy. The MDR reinforced increasing US concern
(MA), Clear SFS (AK), Thule AB (GL) and RAF
about growing air and missile threats. The US maintains an all-
volunteer force, including significant reserves, with high levels of Fylingdales (UK)
training throughout all commands and services. The Pentagon is SPACETRACK SYSTEM 7: 1 AN/FPS-85 Spacetrack
trying to improve readiness. Modernisation priorities include a Radar at Eglin AFB (FL); 6 contributing radars at
renewal of strategic nuclear capabilities, including a new class of Cavalier SFS (ND), Clear SFS (AK), Thule AB (GL),
ballistic-missile submarine and a new long-range bomber, as well RAF Fylingdales (UK), Beale AFB (CA) and Cape Cod
as improved naval capabilities likely to include both crewed and SFS (MA); 3 Spacetrack Optical Trackers located at
uninhabited platforms. The US Army is focused on regenerating Socorro (NM), Maui (HI), Diego Garcia (BIOT)
its capability for large-scale combat operations under its Multi-
PERIMETER ACQUISITION RADAR ATTACK
Domain Operations concept, and the updated doctrine document
‘FM 3-0, Operations’ was published in October. The US continues to CHARACTERISATION SYSTEM (PARCS) 1 AN/
actively develop its defensive and offensive cyber capabilities. The FPQ-16 at Cavalier SFS (ND)
country has the world’s most capable defence industry, active in all DETECTION AND TRACKING RADARS 5 located
sectors and with a dominant position in the international defence at Kwajalein Atoll, Ascension Island, Australia, Kaena
36 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Point (HI), MIT Lincoln Laboratory (MA) sqn, 3 mech inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn); 1
GROUND BASED ELECTRO OPTICAL DEEP SP arty bde HQ; 1 log bde; 1 (hy cbt avn) hel bde)
SPACE SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM (GEODSS) 1 (7th) inf div (2 (1st & 2nd SBCT, 2nd ID) mech bde (1
Socorro (NM), Maui (HI), Diego Garcia (BIOT) armd recce sqn, 3 mech inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn,
STRATEGIC DEFENCES – MISSILE DEFENCES 1 CSS bn))
SEA-BASED: Aegis engagement cruisers and destroyers 2 (2nd & 3rd CR) mech bde (1 armd recce sqn, 3 mech
LAND-BASED: 40 ground-based interceptors at sqn, 1 arty sqn, 1 cbt engr sqn, 1 CSS sqn)
Fort Greely (AK); 4 ground-based interceptors at Light
Vandenburg SFB (CA) 1 (10th Mtn) inf div (3 (1st–3rd IBCT) lt inf bde (1 recce
sqn, 3 inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn); 1 log
Space bde; 1 (cbt avn) hel bde)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 1 (25th) inf div (2 (2 & 3rd IBCT) inf bde (1 recce sqn, 2
SATELLITES 144 inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn); 1 log bde; 1
COMMUNICATIONS 47: 6 AEHF; 6 DSCS-III; 2 (cbt avn) hel bde)
Milstar-I; 3 Milstar-II; 5 MUOS; 5 SDS-III; 2 SDS-IV; 1 5 (Sy Force Assist) inf bde(-)
TacSat-4; 1 TacSat-6; 6 UFO; 10 WGS SV2
Air Manoeuvre
POSITIONING, NAVIGATION & TIMING 30: 12
1 (11th) AB div (1 (1st IBCT) inf bde (1 recce sqn, 3 inf
NAVSTAR Block IIF; 7 NAVSTAR Block IIR; 7
bn, 1 arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn); 1 (2nd AB BCT)
NAVSTAR Block IIRM; 4 NAVSTAR Block III
AB bde (1 recce bn, 2 para bn, 1 arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn,
METEOROLOGY/OCEANOGRAPHY 4 DMSP-5
1 CSS bn))
ISR 14: 5 FIA Radar; 5 Evolved Enhanced/Improved Crystal
(visible and infrared imagery); 2 NRO L-71; 2 NRO L-76 1 (82nd) AB div (1 (1st AB BCT) AB bde (1 recce bn, 1
ELINT/SIGINT 31: 6 Mentor (advanced Orion); 2 mech coy; 3 para bn, 1 arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS
Mercury; 2 Nemesis; 1 Sharp (NRO L-67); 3 Trumpet; 4 bn); 2 (2nd & 3rd AB BCT) AB bde (1 recce bn, 3 para
Improved Trumpet; 12 Naval Ocean Surveillance System bn, 1 arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn); 1 (cbt avn) hel
(NOSS); 1 NRO L-85 bde; 1 log bde)
SPACE SURVEILLANCE 8: 6 GSSAP; 1 SBSS (Space 1 (101st) air aslt div (3 (1st–3rd AB BCT) AB bde (1 recce
Based Surveillance System); 1 ORS-5 bn, 3 para bn, 1 arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn); 1 (cbt
EARLY WARNING 10: 4 DSP; 6 SBIRS Geo avn) hel bde; 1 log bde)
REUSABLE SPACECRAFT 1 X-37B OTV 1 (173rd AB BCT) AB bde (1 recce bn, 2 para bn, 1 arty bn,
COUNTERSPACE • EW Counter Communications 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn)
System (CCS) Other
1 (11th ACR) trg armd cav regt (OPFOR) (2 armd cav
US Army 464,900 sqn, 1 CSS bn)
FORCES BY ROLE COMBAT SUPPORT
Sqn are generally bn sized and tp are generally coy sized 3 MRL bde (2 MRL bn)
COMMAND 1 MRL bde (1 MRL bn; 1 SSM bn (forming))
4 (I, III, V & XVIII AB) corps HQ 1 MRL bde (5 MRL bn)
1 (2nd) inf div HQ 4 engr bde
1 (56th) arty comd 2 EOD gp (2 EOD bn)
SPECIAL FORCES 10 int bde
(see USSOCOM) 2 int gp
MANOEUVRE 4 MP bde
Armoured 1 NBC bde
2 (1st Armd & 1st Cav) armd div (3 (1st–3rd ABCT) armd
3 (strat) sigs bde
bde (1 armd recce sqn, 2 armd bn, 1 armd inf bn, 1 SP
4 (tac) sigs bde
arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn); 1 SP arty bde HQ; 1
1 (1st MDTF) cbt spt bde (1 (I2CEWS) cbt spt bn)
log bde; 1 (hy cbt avn) hel bde)
2 (2nd & 3rd MDTF) cbt spt bde(-)
1 (1st) inf div (2 (1st & 2nd ABCT) armd bde (1 armd
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
recce sqn, 2 armd bn, 1 armd inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 cbt
engr bn, 1 CSS bn); 1 SP arty bde HQ; 1 log bde; 1 (cbt 2 log bde
avn) hel bde) 3 med bde
1 (3rd) inf div (2 (1st & 2nd ABCT) armd bde (1 armd 1 tpt bde
recce sqn, 2 armd bn, 1 armd inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 cbt ISR
engr bn, 1 CSS bn); 1 lt inf bn; 1 SP arty bde HQ; 1 log 1 ISR avn bde
bde; 1 (cbt avn) hel bde) HELICOPTER
Mechanised 2 (cbt avn) hel bde
1 (4th) inf div (1 (3rd ABCT) armd bde (1 armd recce sqn, 1 (cbt avn) hel bde HQ
2 armd bn, 1 armd inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, AIR DEFENCE
1 CSS bn); 2 (1st & 2nd SBCT) mech bde (1 armd recce 6 SAM bde
North America 37
North America
Army National Guard 329,750 reservists 11 med bde
Normally dual-funded by DoD and states. Civil- HELICOPTER
emergency responses can be mobilised by state 2 (exp cbt avn) hel bde
governors. Federal government can mobilise ARNG for
major domestic emergencies and for overseas operations Army Stand-by Reserve 700 reservists
FORCES BY ROLE Trained individuals for mobilisation
COMMAND EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
8 div HQ ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
SPECIAL FORCES MBT 2,645: ε540 M1A1 SA Abrams; 1,605 M1A2 SEPv2
(see USSOCOM) Abrams; ε500 M1A2 SEPv3 Abrams; (ε2,000 more M1A1/
MANOEUVRE A2 Abrams in store)
Reconnaissance ASLT ε100 M1128 Stryker MGS (being divested 2022)
1 armd recce sqn RECCE 1,745: ε1,200 M3A2/A3 Bradley; 545 M1127
Armoured Stryker RV (ε800 more M3 Bradley in store)
5 (ABCT) armd bde (1 armd recce sqn, 2 armd bn, 1 IFV 2,959: ε14 LAV-25; ε2,500 M2A2/A3 Bradley; 21
armd inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn) M2A4 Bradley; 334 M7A3/SA BFIST (OP); 83 M1296
Mechanised Stryker Dragoon (ε2,000 more M2 Bradley in store); 7
2 (SBCT) mech bde (1 armd recce sqn, 3 mech inf bn, 1 Stryker MCWS (in test)
arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn) APC 10,477
Light APC (T) 4,930: 130 AMPV (in test); ε4,800 M113A2/A3
14 (IBCT) inf bde (1 recce sqn, 3 inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 cbt (ε8,000 more in store)
engr bn, 1 CSS bn) APC (W) 2,613: 1,348 M1126 Stryker ICV; 280 M1130
6 (IBCT) inf bde (1 recce sqn, 2 inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 cbt Stryker CV (CP); 167 M1131 Stryker FSV (OP); 258
engr bn, 1 CSS bn) M1133 Stryker MEV (Amb); 21 M1251A1 Stryker FSV
1 (Sy Force Assist) inf bde(-) (OP); 46 M1254A1 Stryker MEV (Amb); 68 M1255A1
4 inf bn Stryker CV (CP); 425 M1256A1 Stryker ICV
Air Manoeuvre PPV 2,934: 2,633 MaxxPro Dash; 301 MaxxPro
1 AB bn LWB (Amb)
COMBAT SUPPORT AUV 21,516: ε12,500 JLTV; 2,900 M1117 ASV; 465 M1200
8 arty bde Armored Knight (OP); 5,651 M-ATV
1 SP arty bn ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
8 engr bde AEV 567: 149 M1150 ABV; 250 M9 ACE; 152 M1132
1 EOD regt Stryker ESV; 16 M1257A1 Stryker ESV
3 int bde ARV 1,274+: 360 M88A1; ε914 M88A2 (ε1,000 more
3 MP bde M88A1 in store); some M578
1 NBC bde VLB 383: ε230 M60 AVLB; 93 M1074 Joint Assault Bridge;
2 (tac) sigs bde 20 REBS; 40 Wolverine HAB
17 (Mnv Enh) cbt spt bde MW 3+: Aardvark JSFU Mk4; some Husky 2G; 3+ Hydrema
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 910 MCV-2; M58/M59 MICLIC; M139; Rhino
10 log bde NBC VEHICLES 234 M1135 Stryker NBCRV
17 (regional) log spt gp ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
HELICOPTER MSL
8 (cbt avn) hel bde SP 1,133: 120 M1134 Stryker ATGM; 13 M1253A1
5 (theatre avn) hel bde Stryker ATGM; ε1,000 M1167 HMMWV TOW
AIR DEFENCE MANPATS FGM-148 Javelin
3 SAM bde RCL 84mm Carl Gustaf
ARTILLERY 5,096
Army Reserve 176,850 reservists SP 155mm 689: 486 M109A6; 203 M109A7 (ε850 more
Reserve under full command of US Army. Does not have M109A6 in store)
state-emergency liability of Army National Guard TOWED 1,267: 105mm 821 M119A2/3; 155mm 446 M777A2
FORCES BY ROLE MRL 227mm 594: 368 M142 HIMARS; 226+ M270A1/A2
SPECIAL FORCES MLRS
(see USSOCOM) MOR 2,507: 81mm 990 M252; 120mm 1,076 M120/
COMBAT SUPPORT M1064A3; SP 120mm 441; 363 M1129 Stryker MC; 78
4 engr bde M1252A1 Stryker MC
4 MP bde SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS
2 NBC bde SRBM • Conventional MGM-140A/B ATACMS; MGM-
2 sigs bde 168 ATACMS (All launched from M270A1 MLRS or
3 (Mnv Enh) cbt spt bde M142 HIMARS MRLs)
38 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
37 Arleigh Burke Flight IIA with Aegis Baseline 6/7/9 Block 2 SAM, 2 Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS (capacity
C2, 12 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with RGM-109E Tomahawk up to 23 ac/hel incl: 6 AV-8B Harrier II FGA or F-35B
North America
Block IV LACM/SM-2 Block III/IIIA/IIIB/IV SAM/ Lightning II FGA ac (possible 20 F-35B as full ‘Lightning
SM-3 Block IA/B SAM/SM-6 Block I SAM/ASROC carrier’); 4 AH-1Z Viper atk hel; 4 CH-53E Sea Stallion
A/S msl, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with hel; up to 6 MV-22B Osprey tpt ac; 3 UH-1Y Iroquois tpt
Mk 54 LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 1
hel; 3 LCAC(L); 60 tanks; 1,687 troops)
127mm gun (capacity 2 MH-60R Seahawk/MH-60S
LPD 12 San Antonio with 2 21-cell Mk 49 GMLS with
Knight Hawk hels) (of which 1 vessel also with 1
Mk 15 SeaRAM with RIM-116C RAM Block 2 and RIM-116C RAM Block 2 SAM (1 vessel also fitted with
3 vessels also with 1 Optical Dazzling Interdictor, 1 Solid-State Laser Technology Maturation (SSL-TM)
Navy (ODIN) LWS) LWS) (capacity 2 CH-53E Sea Stallion hel or 2 MV-22
DDGM 28 Arleigh Burke Flight I/II with Aegis Baseline Osprey; 2 LCAC(L); 14 AAV; 720 troops)
5/9 C2, 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84D Harpoon Block 1C LSD 10:
AShM, 12 8-cell Mk 41 VLS (of which 2 only 5-cell and 4 Harpers Ferry with 2 Mk 49 GMLS with RIM-
fitted with reload crane) with RGM-109E Tomahawk 116C RAM Block 2 SAM, 2 Mk 15 Phalanx Block
Block IV LACM/SM-2 Block III/IIIA/IIIB/IV SAM/SM-3 1B CIWS (capacity 2 CH-53E Sea Stallion hel; 2
Block IA/B SAM/SM-6 Block I SAM/ASROC A/S msl, LCAC(L); 40 tanks; 500 troops)
2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 54 LWT, 2
6 Whidbey Island with 2 Mk 49 GMLS with RIM-
Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS (of which 5 vessels with
116C RAM Block 2 SAM, 2 Mk 15 Phalanx Block
1 Mk 15 SeaRAM with RIM-116C RAM Block 2, 1 Mk
15 Phalanx Block 1B instead of 2 Phalanx), 1 127mm 1B CIWS (capacity 2 CH-53E Sea Stallion hel; 4
gun, 1 hel landing platform LCAC(L); 40 tanks; 500 troops)
FRIGATES 22: LANDING CRAFT 145:
FFGHM 6 Independence with 2 quad lnchr with NSM LCU 32 LCU 1610 (capacity either 1 M1 Abrams MBT
(RGM-184A) AShM, 1 11-cell SeaRAM lnchr with RIM- or 350 troops)
116C Block 2 SAM, 1 57mm gun (capacity 2 MH-60R/S LCM 8 LCM 8
Seahawk/Knight Hawk hel and 3 MQ-8 Fire Scout UAV) LCP 33 Maritime Positioning Force Utility Boat (MPF-UB)
FFHM 16: LCAC 72: 68 LCAC(L) (MLU ongoing) (capacity either
10 Freedom with 1 21-cell Mk 49 lnchr with RIM-116C
1 MBT or 60 troops); 4 Ship to Shore Connector (SSC
RAM Block 2 SAM, 1 57mm gun (capacity 2 MH-
(capacity 1 MBT or 145 troops)
60R/S Seahawk/Knight Hawk hel or 1 MH-60 with 3
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 13
MQ-8 Fire Scout UAV)
6 Independence with 1 11-cell SeaRAM lnchr with AFDL 1 Dynamic
RIM-116C Block 2 SAM, 1 57mm gun (capacity 2 AGOR 6 (all leased out): 2 Ocean; 3 Thomas G.
MH-60R/S Seahawk/Knight Hawk hel and 3 MQ-8 Thompson; 1 Kilo Moana
Fire Scout UAV) ARD 2
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 89 AX 1 Prevail
PCFG 5 Cyclone with 1 quad Mk 208 lnchr with BGM- ESB 3 Lewis B. Puller (capacity 4 MH-53/MH-60 hel)
176B Griffin B SSM UUV (1 Cutthroat for testing)
PBF 84: 32 Combatant Craft Assault; 2 Combatant Craft MISSILE DEFENCE • Long-range 3 8-cell Mk 41 VLS
Heavy; 30 Combatant Craft Medium Mk 1; 20 Defiant 40
with SM-3
(40PB)
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 8 Naval Reserve Forces 98,250
MCO 8 Avenger
COMMAND SHIPS Selected Reserve 55,500
LCC 2 Blue Ridge with 2 Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS
(capacity 3 LCPL; 2 LCVP; 700 troops; 1 med hel) (of Individual Ready Reserve 42,750
which 1 vessel partially crewed by Military Sealift
Command personnel) Naval Inactive Fleet
AMPHIBIOUS Notice for reactivation:
PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 31: 60–90 days minimum (still on naval-vessel register)
LHA 2 America with 2 8-cell Mk 29 GMLS with RIM- EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
162D ESSM SAM, 2 Mk 49 GMLS with RIM-116C PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS
RAM Block 2 SAM, 2 Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS
FRIGATES • FFH 1 Freedom with 1 57mm gun
(capacity up to 29 ac/hel incl: 6-13 F-35B Lightning II
AMPHIBIOUS 4
FGA ac (possible 20 as full ‘Lightning carrier’); 4 AH-1Z
Viper atk hel; up to 12 MV-22B Osprey tpt ac; 2 MH-60S LHA 2 Tarawa
Knight Hawk MRH; 4 CH-53E Sea Stallion tpt hel; 2 UH- LSD 2 Whidbey Island
1Y Iroquois tpt hel; up to 1,800 troops) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 4
LHD 7 Wasp with 2 8-cell Mk 29 GMLS with RIM-7M/P AOE 2 Supply
Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 Mk 49 GMLS with RIM-116C RAM ARS 2 Safeguard
40 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Military Sealift Command (MSC) AK 2: 1 Sea Eagle; 1 SLNC Corsica (long-term chartered)
AOT 4: 2 Empire State; 1 SLNC Pax; 1 SLNC Goodwill
Fleet Oiler (PM1) (long-term chartered)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 16 US Maritime Administration (MARAD)
AOR 16: 1 John Lewis with 1 hel landing platform;
National Defense Reserve Fleet
15 Henry J. Kaiser with 1 hel landing platform
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Special Mission (PM2) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 20
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ACS 2: 1 Flickertail State; 1 Keystone State
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 21 AGOS 2 General Rudder
AGM 2: 1 Howard O. Lorenzen; 1 Sea-based X-band AGM 2: 1 Pacific Collector; 1 Pacific Tracker
radar AK 8: 2 Cape Ann (breakbulk); 1 Cape Chalmers
AGOR 6 Pathfinder (breakbulk); 1 Cape Jacob; 2 Cape May; 1 Del Monte
AGOS 5: 1 Impeccable (commercial operator); (breakbulk); 1 Savannah
4 Victorious AP 4: 1 Empire State VI; 1 Golden Bear; 1 Kennedy; 1
AGS 1 Waters State of Maine
ARC 1 Zeus AX 2: 1 Freedom Star; 1 Kings Pointer
AS 4 Arrowhead (long-term chartered)
ATF 2: 1 HOS Red Rock (leased); 1 MV Hercules Ready Reserve Force
Ships at readiness up to a maximum of 30 days
Prepositioning (PM3) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 40
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 14 ACS 4: 1 Flickertail State; 1 Gopher State; 2 Keystone State
AG 2: 1 V Adm K.R. Wheeler; 1 Fast Tempo AK 2 Wright (breakbulk)
AKR 5: 2 Bob Hope; 1 Stockham; 2 Watson AKR 34: 1 Adm W.M. Callaghan; 4 Algol; 1 Cape Arundel;
AKRH 5 2nd Lt John P. Bobo 4 Cape Capella; 1 Cape Decision; 4 Cape Ducato; 1 Cape
ESD 2 Montford Point Edmont; 1 Cape Henry; 2 Cape Hudson; 2 Cape Knox;
Service Support (PM4) 4 Cape Island; 1 Cape Orlando; 1 Cape Race; 1 Cape
Trinity; 2 Cape Trinity; 2 Cape Victory; 2 Cape Washington
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 12 Naval Aviation 98,600
AH 2 Mercy with 1 hel landing platform
10 air wg. Average air wing comprises 8 sqns: 4 with F/A-
ARS 2 Safeguard
18; 1 with MH-60R; 1 with EA-18G; 1 with E-2C/D; 1 with
AS 4: 1 Dominator; 2 Emory S. Land; 1 Malama (long-
MH-60S
term chartered)
ATF 4: 1 Gary Chouest; 1 MV Ocean Valour; 2 Powhatan FORCES BY ROLE
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
Sealift (PM5) 22 sqn with F/A-18E Super Hornet
(At a minimum of 4 days’ readiness) 10 sqn with F/A-18F Super Hornet
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 1 sqn with F-35C Lightning II
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 18 1 sqn (forming) with F-35C Lightning II
AOT 1 Maersk Peary (long-term chartered) ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE
AK 4: 2 LTC John U.D. Page; 1 Maj. Bernard F. Fisher; 12 sqn with P-8A Poseidon
1 CPT David I. Lyon 1 (special projects) sqn with P-8A Poseidon
AKR 13: 5 Bob Hope; 2 Gordon; 6 Watson 12 sqn with MH-60R Seahawk
3 ASW/ISR sqn with MH-60R Seahawk; MQ-8B Fire Scout
Fleet Ordnance and Dry Cargo (PM6)
ELINT
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 1 sqn with EP-3E Aries II
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 16
ELINT/ELECTRONIC WARFARE
AOE 2 Supply
13 sqn with EA-18G Growler
AKEH 14 Lewis and Clark
AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL
Expeditionary Fast Transport (PM8) 3 sqn with E-2C Hawkeye
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 6 sqn with E-2D Hawkeye
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 14 COMMAND & CONTROL
AP 2 Guam 2 sqn with E-6B Mercury
EPF 12 Spearhead MINE COUNTERMEASURES
2 sqn with MH-53E Sea Dragon
Dry Cargo and Tankers TRANSPORT
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 2 sqn with CMV-22B Osprey (forming)
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 6 2 sqn with C-2A Greyhound
North America 41
North America
1 (FRS) sqn with C-2A Greyhound; E-2C/D Hawkeye; Sidewinder II; SARH AIM-7 Sparrow (being
TE-2C Hawkeye withdrawn); ARH AIM-120C-5/C-7/D AMRAAM
1 sqn with E-6B Mercury ASM AGM-65F Maverick; AGM-114B/K/M Hellfire;
2 (FRS) sqn with F/A-18E/F Super Hornet APKWS
1 (FRS) sqn with F-35C Lightning II AShM AGM-84D Harpoon; AGM-119A Penguin 3;
1 (FRS) sqn with MH-53 Sea Dragon AGM-158C LRASM
2 (FRS) sqn with MH-60S Knight Hawk; HH-60H Seahawk ARM AGM-88B/C/E HARM/AARGM
2 (FRS) sqn with MH-60R Seahawk ALCM • Conventional AGM-84E/H/K SLAM/
1 (FRS) sqn with P-3C Orion; P-8A Poseidon SLAM-ER
6 sqn with T-6A/B Texan II BOMBS
2 sqn with T-44C Pegasus Laser-guided: GBU-10/-12/-16 Paveway II; GBU-24
5 sqn with T-45C Goshawk Paveway III; GBU-51 LCDB
2 hel sqn with TH-57B/C Sea Ranger Laser & INS/GPS-guided: EGBU-12 Paveway II;
1 hel sqn with TH-73A EGBU-24 Paveway III; GBU-52 LCDB; GBU-54 Laser
1 (FRS) UAV sqn with MQ-8B Fire Scout; MQ-8C Fire Scout JDAM
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER INS/GPS-guided: GBU-31/-32/-38 JDAM; AGM-
13 sqn with MH-60S Knight Hawk 154A/C/C-1 JSOW
2 tpt hel/ISR sqn with MH-60S Knight Hawk; MQ-8B
Naval Aviation Reserve
Fire Scout; MQ-8C Fire Scout
FORCES BY ROLE
ISR UAV
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
1 sqn with MQ-4C Triton
1 sqn with F/A-18E/F Super Hornet
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE
AIRCRAFT 988 combat capable 1 sqn with P-3C Orion
FGA 704: 10 F-16A Fighting Falcon; 4 F-16B Fighting 1 sqn with P-8A Poseidon (forming)
Falcon; 52 F-35C Lightning II; 5 F/A-18B Hornet; 16 1 sqn with MH-60R Seahawk
F/A-18C Hornet; 4 F/A-18D Hornet; 327 F/A-18E Super ELECTRONIC WARFARE
Hornet; 286 F/A-18F Super Hornet 1 sqn with EA-18G Growler
ASW 126: 14 P-3C Orion; 112 P-8A Poseidon TRANSPORT
EW 158 EA-18G Growler* 6 log spt sqn with B-737-700 (C-40A Clipper)
ELINT 9 EP-3E Aries II 1 log spt sqn with Gulfstream V/G550 (C-37A/B)
AEW&C 74: 20 E-2C Hawkeye; 54 E-2D Hawkeye 5 sqn with C-130T/KC-130T Hercules
C2 16 E-6B Mercury TRAINING
TKR/TPT 3: 1 KC-130R Hercules; 1 KC-130T Hercules; 1 2 (aggressor) sqn with F-5F/N Tiger II
KC-130J Hercules 1 (aggressor) sqn with F-16C Fighting Falcon
TPT • Light 54: 4 Beech A200 King Air (C-12C Huron); TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
6 Beech A200 King Air (UC-12F Huron); 8 Beech A200 1 sqn with MH-60S Knight Hawk
King Air (UC-12M Huron); 27 C-2A Greyhound; 2 DHC- EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
2 Beaver (U-6A); 7 SA-227-BC Metro III (C-26D) AIRCRAFT 64 combat capable
TRG 576: 44 T-6A Texan II; 231 T-6B Texan II; 7 FTR 31: 2 F-5F Tiger II; 29 F-5N Tiger II
T-38C Talon; 55 T-44C Pegasus; 237 T-45C Goshawk; FGA 24: 12 F-16C Fighting Falcon; 10 F/A-18E Super
2 TE-2C Hawkeye Hornet; 2 F/A-18F Super Hornet
TILTROTOR • TPT 27 CMV-22B Osprey ASW 4: 2 P-3C Orion; 2 P-8A Poseidon
HELICOPTERS EW 5 EA-18G Growler*
ASW 271 MH-60R Seahawk TKR/TPT 11 KC-130T Hercules
MRH 258 MH-60S Knight Hawk (Multi Mission Support) TPT 40: Medium 19 C-130T Hercules; PAX 21: 17
MCM 28 MH-53E Sea Dragon B-737-700 (C-40A Clipper); 1 Gulfstream V (C-37A);
ISR 3 OH-58C Kiowa 3 Gulfstream G550 (C-37B)
TPT 13: Heavy 2 CH-53E Sea Stallion; Medium 3 UH- HELICOPTERS
60L Black Hawk; Light 8: 5 UH-72A Lakota; 2 UH-1N ASW 5 MH-60R Seahawk
Iroquois; 1 UH-1Y Venom MRH 12 MH-60S Knight Hawk
TRG 116: ε10 TH-57B Sea Ranger; 76 TH-57C Sea MCM 6 MH-53E Sea Dragon
Ranger; 30 TH-73A
UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES • ISR 114 US Marine Corps 174,550
Heavy 64: 5 MQ-4C Triton; 19 MQ-8B Fire Scout; 36 3 Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF), 3 Marine
MQ-8C Fire Scout; 4 RQ-4A Global Hawk (evaluation Expeditionary Brigades (MEB), 7 Marine Expeditionary
and trials); Medium 35 RQ-2B Pioneer; Light 15 RQ- Units (MEU) drawn from 3 div. An MEU usually consists
21A Blackjack of a battalion landing team (1 SF coy, 1 lt armd recce coy,
42 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
1 recce pl, 1 armd pl, 1 amph aslt pl, 1 inf bn, 1 arty bty, COMBAT SEARCH & RESCUE/TRANSPORT
1 cbt engr pl), an aviation combat element (1 medium-lift 1 sqn with Beech A200/B200 King Air (UC-12F/M Huron);
sqn with attached atk hel, FGA ac and AD assets) and a Beech 350 King Air (UC-12W Huron); Cessna 560 Citation
composite log bn, with a combined total of about 2,200 Ultra/Encore (UC-35C/D); Gulfstream IV (C-20G)
personnel. Composition varies with mission requirements TANKER
FORCES BY ROLE 3 sqn with KC-130J Hercules
SPECIAL FORCES TRANSPORT
(see USSOCOM) 16 sqn with MV-22B Osprey
MANOEUVRE TRAINING
Reconnaissance 1 sqn with F/A-18C/D Hornet
3 (MEF) recce coy 2 sqn with F-35B Lightning II
Amphibious 1 sqn with MV-22B Osprey
1 (1st) mne div (2 armd recce bn, 1 recce bn, 3 mne regt (4 1 hel sqn with AH-1Z Viper; UH-1Y Venom
mne bn), 1 amph aslt bn, 1 arty regt (3 arty bn, 1 MRL 1 hel sqn with CH-53E Sea Stallion
bn), 1 cbt engr bn, 1 EW bn, 1 int bn, 1 sigs bn) ATTACK HELICOPTER
6 sqn with AH-1Z Viper; UH-1Y Venom
1 (2nd) mne div (1 armd recce bn, 1 recce bn, 3 mne regt
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
(3 mne bn), 1 amph aslt bn, 1 arty regt (2 arty bn), 1 cbt
6 sqn with CH-53E Sea Stallion
engr bn, 1 EW bn, 1 int bn, 1 sigs bn)
1 sqn with CH-53K King Stallion (forming)
1 (3rd) mne div (1 recce bn, 1 mne regt (2 mne bn, 1 AD
1 (VIP) sqn with MV-22B Osprey; VH-3D Sea King;
bn, 1 log bn), 1 arty regt (2 arty bn), 1 cbt spt bn (1 armd
VH-60N White Hawk
recce coy, 1 amph aslt coy, 1 cbt engr coy), 1 EW bn, 1
CISR UAV
int bn, 1 sigs bn)
1 sqn with MQ-9A Reaper
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
ISR UAV
3 log gp
2 sqn with RQ-21A Blackjack
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIR DEFENCE
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES 2 bn with M1097 Avenger; FIM-92 Stinger
IFV 488 LAV-25
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
APC • APC (W) 207 LAV variants (66 CP; 127 log; 14 EW)
AIRCRAFT 417 combat capable
AAV 1,360: 1,200 AAV-7A1 (all roles); ε160 ACV (in test)
FGA 417: 135 F-35B Lightning II; 10 F-35C Lightning
AUV 6,929: 1,725 Cougar; ε4,500 JLTV; 704 M-ATV
II; 134 F/A-18C Hornet; 79 F/A-18D Hornet; 53 AV-8B
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
Harrier II; 6 TAV-8B Harrier
AEV 42 M1 ABV
TKR/TPT 46 KC-130J Hercules
ARV 105: 60 AAVRA1; 45 LAV-R
TPT 20: Light 18: 2 Beech B200 King Air (UC-12F Huron);
MW 38 Buffalo; some Husky 2G 2 Beech B200 King Air (UC-12M Huron); 7 Beech 350
VLB ε30 M60 AVLB King Air (C-12W Huron); 7 Cessna 560 Citation Encore
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE (UC-35D); PAX 2 Gulfstream IV (C-20G)
MSL TRG 3 T-34C Turbo Mentor
SP 106 LAV-AT TILTROTOR • TPT 273 MV-22B Osprey
MANPATS FGM-148 Javelin; FGM-172B SRAW- HELICOPTERS
MPV; TOW ATK 134 AH-1Z Viper
ARTILLERY 1,459 TPT 288: Heavy 135: 129 CH-53E Sea Stallion; 6 CH-
TOWED 812: 105mm: 331 M101A1; 155mm 481 M777A2 53K King Stallion (in test); Medium 25: 11 VH-3D Sea
MRL 227mm 47 M142 HIMARS King (VIP tpt); 8 VH-60N White Hawk (VIP tpt); 6 VH-
MOR 600: 81mm 535 M252; SP 81mm 65 LAV-M; 92A (in test); Light 128 UH-1Y Venom
120mm (49 EFSS in store for trg) UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES
UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES CISR • Heavy 2 MQ-9A Reaper
ISR • Light 100 BQM-147 Exdrone ISR • Light 40 RQ-21A Blackjack
AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence FIM-92 Stinger AIR DEFENCE
SAM • Point-defence FIM-92 Stinger; M1097 Avenger
Marine Corps Aviation 34,700 AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
3 active Marine Aircraft Wings (MAW) and 1 MCR MAW AAM • IR AIM-9M Sidewinder; IIR AIM-9X
FORCES BY ROLE Sidewinder II; SARH AIM-7P Sparrow; ARH AIM-
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 120C AMRAAM
4 sqn with AV-8B Harrier II ASM AGM-65E/F IR Maverick; AGM-114 Hellfire; AGM-
1 sqn with F/A-18C Hornet 176 Griffin; AGM-179A JAGM; AGR-20A APKWS
5 sqn with F/A-18C/D Hornet AShM AGM-84D Harpoon
5 sqn with F-35B Lightning II ARM AGM-88 HARM
1 sqn with F-35C Lightning II LACM AGM-84E/H/K SLAM/SLAM-ER
North America 43
North America
Laser & INS/GPS-guided: EGBU-12 Paveway II; GBU- PBI 63 Marine Protector
49 Enhanced Paveway II; GBU-54 Laser JDAM LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 65
INS/GPS guided GBU-31/-32/-38 JDAM; AGM-154A/ ABU 52: 16 Juniper; 4 WLI; 14 Keeper; 18 WLR
C/C-1 JSOW AGB 12: 9 Bay; 1 Mackinaw; 1 Healy; 1 Polar (1 Polar
in reserve)
Reserve Organisations AXS 1 Eagle
Marine Corps Reserve 33,050 US Coast Guard Aviation
FORCES BY ROLE
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
MANOEUVRE
AIRCRAFT
Reconnaissance
SAR 44: 11 HC-130H Hercules; 15 HC-130J Hercules; 5
2 MEF recce coy
HC-144A; 13 HC-144B
Amphibious
TPT 16: Medium 14 C-27J Spartan; PAX 2 Gulfstream
1 (4th) mne div (1 armd recce bn, 1 recce bn, 2 mne
V (C-37A)
regt (3 mne bn), 1 amph aslt bn, 1 arty regt (2 arty bn,
HELICOPTERS
1 MRL bn), 1 cbt engr bn, 1 int bn, 1 sigs bn)
SAR 142: 44 MH-60T Jayhawk; 49 AS366G1 (MH-65D)
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
Dauphin II; 49 AS366G1 (MH-65E) Dauphin II;
1 log gp
Marine Corps Aviation Reserve 12,000 reservists US Air Force (USAF) 325,100
FORCES BY ROLE Almost the entire USAF (plus active-force ANG and AFR)
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK is divided into 10 Aerospace Expeditionary Forces (AEF),
1 sqn with F/A-18C/C+ Hornet each on call for 120 days every 20 months. At least 2 of the
TANKER 10 AEFs are on call at any one time, each with 10,000–15,000
2 sqn with KC-130J Hercules personnel, 90 multi-role ftr and bbr ac, 31 intra-theatre
TRANSPORT refuelling aircraft and 13 aircraft for ISR and EW missions
2 sqn with MV-22B Osprey
TRAINING
Global Strike Command (GSC)
1 sqn with F-5F/N Tiger II 2 active air forces (8th & 20th); 8 wg
ATTACK HELICOPTER FORCES BY ROLE
2 sqn with AH-1Z Viper; UH-1Y Venom SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 9 ICBM sqn with LGM-30G Minuteman III
1 sqn with CH-53E Sea Stallion BOMBER
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 4 sqn with B-1B Lancer
AIRCRAFT 24 combat capable 2 sqn with B-2A Spirit
FTR 12: 1 F-5F Tiger II; 11 F-5N Tiger II 5 sqn (incl 1 trg) with B-52H Stratofortress
FGA 12: 5 F/A-18C Hornet; 7 F/A-18C+ Hornet COMMAND & CONTROL
TKR/TPT 17 KC-130J Hercules 1 sqn with E-4B
TPT • Light 7: 2 Beech A200 King Air (UC-12F); 2 TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
Beech 350 King Air (UC-12W Huron); 3 Cessna 560 3 sqn with UH-1N Iroquois
Citation Encore (UC-35D)
TILTROTOR • TPT 24 MV-22B Osprey
Air Combat Command (ACC)
HELICOPTERS 2 active air forces (9th & 12th); 12 wg. ACC numbered
ATK 26 AH-1Z Viper air forces provide the air component to CENTCOM,
TPT 30: Heavy 8 CH-53E Sea Stallion; Light 22 UH- SOUTHCOM and NORTHCOM
1Y Venom FORCES BY ROLE
FIGHTER
Marine Stand-by Reserve 700 reservists 3 sqn with F-22A Raptor
Trained individuals available for mobilisation FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
4 sqn with F-15E Strike Eagle
US Coast Guard 40,350 3 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon (+6 sqn personnel
9 districts (4 Pacific, 5 Atlantic) only)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 3 sqn with F-35A Lightning II
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 334 GROUND ATTACK
PSOH 23: 1 Alex Haley; 13 Famous; 9 Legend with 1 Mk 3 sqn with A-10C Thunderbolt II (+1 sqn personnel only)
15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 1 57mm gun (capacity 2 MH- ELECTRONIC WARFARE
65 hel) 1 sqn with EA-18G Growler (personnel only –
PCO 62: 14 Reliance (with 1 hel landing platform); 48 USN aircraft)
Sentinel (Damen 4708) 2 sqn with EC-130H Compass Call
44 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
North America
EW 7 EC-130H Compass Call 1 sqn with F-22A Raptor (+1 sqn personnel only)
ISR 38: 2 E-9A; 4 E-11A; 26 U-2S; 4 TU-2S; 1 WC-135R FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
Constant Phoenix 10 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon
ELINT 22: 8 RC-135V Rivet Joint; 9 RC-135W Rivet Joint; 1 sqn with F-35A Lightning II
3 RC-135S Cobra Ball; 2 RC-135U Combat Sent GROUND ATTACK
AEW&C 31: 7 E-3B Sentry; 1 E-3C Sentry; 23 E-3G 4 sqn with A-10C Thunderbolt II
Sentry ISR
C2 4 E-4B TKR 156: 126 KC-135R Stratotanker; 30 KC- 1 sqn with E-8C J-STARS
135T Stratotanker COMBAT SEARCH & RESCUE
TKR/TPT 70: 36 KC-10A Extender; 34 KC-46A Pegasus 3 sqn with HC-130J Combat King II
TPT 336: Heavy 182: 36 C-5M Super Galaxy; 146 C-17A 3 sqn with HH-60G Pave Hawk
Globemaster III; Medium 105: 10 C-130J Hercules; 95 TANKER
C-130J-30 Hercules; Light 23: 4 Beech 1900C (C-12J); 1 sqn with KC-46A Pegasus
19 Learjet 35A (C-21A); PAX 26: 4 B-737-700 (C-40B); 4 16 sqn with KC-135R Stratotanker (+1 sqn personnel only)
B-757-200 (C-32A); 9 Gulfstream V (C-37A); 7 Gulfstream 3 sqn with KC-135T Stratotanker
550 (C-37B); 2 VC-25A Air Force One TRANSPORT
TRG 1,126: 178 T-1A Jayhawk; 443 T-6A Texan II; 505 1 sqn with B-737-700 (C-40C)
T-38A/C Talon 6 sqn with C-17A Globemaster (+2 sqn personnel only)
HELICOPTERS 10 sqn with C-130H Hercules
MRH 4 MH-139A Grey Wolf (in test) 1 sqn with C-130H/LC-130H Hercules
CSAR 62: 52 HH-60G Pave Hawk; 10 HH-60W Jolly Green II 4 sqn with C-130J-30 Hercules
TPT • Light 62 UH-1N Huey TRAINING
UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES 261 1 sqn with C-130H Hercules
CISR • Heavy 210 MQ-9A Reaper 1 sqn with F-15C/D Eagle
ISR • Heavy 27: 10 RQ-4B Global Hawk; ε10 RQ-170 4 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon
Sentinel; ε7 RQ-180 1 sqn with MQ-9A Reaper
AIR DEFENCE COMBAT/ISR UAV
SAM • Point-defence FIM-92 Stinger 10 sqn with MQ-9A Reaper
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AAM • IR AIM-9M Sidewinder; IIR AIM-9X Sidewinder AIRCRAFT 596 combat capable
II; SARH AIM-7M Sparrow; ARH AIM-120C/D FTR 157: 123 F-15C Eagle; 14 F-15D Eagle; 20 F-22A Raptor
AMRAAM FGA 354: 288 F-16C Fighting Falcon; 46 F-16D Fighting
ASM AGM-65D/G Maverick; AGM-114K/M/N/R Hellfire Falcon; 20 F-35A Lightning II
II; AGM-130A; AGM-176 Griffin; AGR-20A APKWS ATK 85 A-10C Thunderbolt II
AShM AGM-158C LRASM CSAR 12 HC-130J Combat King II
ALCM ISR 13 E-8C J-STARS
Nuclear AGM-86B (ALCM) ELINT 11 RC-26B Metroliner
Conventional AGM-158A JASSM; AGM-158B TKR 162: 138 KC-135R Stratotanker; 24 KC-135T Stratotanker
JASSM-ER TKR/TPT 12 KC-46A Pegasus
ARM AGM-88B/C HARM TPT 197: Heavy 50 C-17A Globemaster III; Medium
EW MALD/MALD-J 144: 99 C-130H Hercules; 35 C-130J-30 Hercules; 10 LC-
BOMBS 130H Hercules; PAX 3 B-737-700 (C-40C)
Laser-guided GBU-10/-12/-16 Paveway II, GBU-24 HELICOPTERS • CSAR 18 HH-60G Pave Hawk
Paveway III; GBU-28 UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES • CISR • Heavy
Laser & INS/GPS-guided EGBU-24 Paveway III; EGBU- 24 MQ-9A Reaper
28; GBU-49 Enhanced Paveway II; GBU-54 Laser JDAM
Air Force Reserve Command 68,300 reservists
INS/GPS-guided GBU-15 (with BLU-109 penetrating
warhead or Mk84); GBU-31/-32/-38 JDAM; GBU-39B FORCES BY ROLE
Small Diameter Bomb (250lb); GBU-43B MOAB; GBU- BOMBER
57A/B MOP 1 sqn with B-52H Stratofortress (personnel only)
Multi-mode guided GBU-53/B Stormbreaker FIGHTER
2 sqn with F-22A Raptor (personnel only)
Reserve Organisations FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
2 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon (+1 sqn
Air National Guard 105,100 reservists personnel only)
FORCES BY ROLE 1 sqn with F-35A Lightning II (personnel only)
BOMBER GROUND ATTACK
1 sqn with B-2A Spirit (personnel only) 1 sqn with A-10C Thunderbolt II (+2 sqn personnel only)
46 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
US Navy Special Warfare Command 10,500 UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES • CISR • Heavy
50 MQ-9 Reaper
FORCES BY ROLE
North America
SPECIAL FORCES Reserve Organisations
8 SEAL team (total: 48 SF pl)
2 SEAL Delivery Vehicle team Air National Guard
FORCES BY ROLE
Reserve Organisations ELECTRONIC WARFARE
Naval Reserve Force 1 sqn with C-130J Hercules/EC-130J Commando Solo
ISR
FORCES BY ROLE
1 sqn with MC-12W Liberty
SPECIAL FORCES
TRANSPORT
8 SEAL det
1 flt with B-737-200 (C-32B)
10 Naval Special Warfare det
2 Special Boat sqn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
2 Special Boat unit AIRCRAFT
1 SEAL Delivery Vehicle det EW 7 EC-130J Commando Solo
ISR 13 MC-12W Liberty
US Marine Special Operations Command TPT 5: Medium 3 C-130J Hercules; PAX 2 B-757-200
(MARSOC) 3,500 (C-32B)
FORCES BY ROLE Air Force Reserve
SPECIAL FORCES
FORCES BY ROLE
1 SF regt (3 SF bn)
TRAINING
COMBAT SUPPORT
1 sqn with AC-130J Ghostrider (personnel only)
1 int bn
1 sqn with M-28 Skytruck (C-145A) (personnel only)
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
COMBAT/ISR UAV
1 spt gp
1 sqn with MQ-9 Reaper (personnel only)
Air Force Special Operations Command
(AFSOC) 16,800 DEPLOYMENT
FORCES BY ROLE
ARABIAN SEA: US Central Command • US Navy • 5th
GROUND ATTACK
Fleet 1,000: 2 SSGN; 2 DDGHM; Combined Maritime
3 sqn with AC-130J Ghostrider Forces • TF 53: 3 AKEH; 1 AOR
TRANSPORT
4 sqn with CV-22B Osprey ARUBA: US Southern Command • 1 Forward
1 sqn with Do-328 (C-146A) Operating Location
1 sqn with MC-130H Combat Talon ASCENSION ISLAND: US Strategic Command • 1 detection
3 sqn with MC-130J Commando II and tracking radar at Ascension Auxiliary Air Field
3 sqn with PC-12 (U-28A) AUSTRALIA: US Pacific Command • 1,700; 1 SEWS at Pine
TRAINING Gap; 1 comms facility at Pine Gap; 1 SIGINT stn at Pine
1 sqn with M-28 Skytruck (C-145A) Gap; US Strategic Command • 1 detection and tracking
1 sqn with CV-22A/B Osprey radar at Naval Communication Station Harold E. Holt
1 sqn with HC-130J Combat King II; MC-130J
BAHRAIN: US Central Command • 4,700; 1 HQ (5th
Commando II
Fleet); 10 PCFG; 4 MCO; 1 ESB; 1 ASW flt with 2 P-8A
1 sqn with Bell 205 (TH-1H Iroquois)
Poseidon; 1 EP-3E Aries II; 2 SAM bty with M902/M903
1 sqn with HH-60W Jolly Green II; UH-1N Huey
Patriot PAC-3/PAC-3 MSE
COMBAT/ISR UAV
3 sqn with MQ-9 Reaper BELGIUM: US European Command • 1,150
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE BRITISH INDIAN OCEAN TERRITORY: US Strategic
AIRCRAFT 31 combat capable Command • 300; 1 Spacetrack Optical Tracker at
ATK 31 AC-130J Ghostrider Diego Garcia; 1 ground-based electro-optical deep
ISR 22 MC-12 Javaman space surveillance system (GEODSS) at Diego Garcia
CSAR 3 HC-130J Combat King II US Pacific Command • 1 MPS sqn (MPS-2 with equipment for
TPT 109: Medium 49: 8 MC-130H Combat Talon II; 41 one MEB) at Diego Garcia with 2 AKRH; 3 AKR; 1 AKEH; 1 ESD;
MC-130J Commando II; Light 60: 20 Do-328 (C-146A); 5 1 naval air base at Diego Garcia, 1 support facility at Diego Garcia
M-28 Skytruck (C-145A); 35 PC-12 (U-28A) BULGARIA: NATO • Enhanced Vigilance Activities 150; 1
TILT-ROTOR 51 CV-22A/B Osprey armd inf coy with M2A3 Bradley
HELICOPTERS
CANADA: US Northern Command • 150
CSAR 7 HH-60W Jolly Green II
TPT • Light 34: 28 Bell 205 (TH-1H Iroquois); 6 UH- CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 10
1N Huey COLOMBIA: US Southern Command • 70
48 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
CUBA: US Southern Command • 650 (JTF-GTMO) at HUNGARY: NATO • Enhanced Vigilance Activities 150; 1
Guantanamo Bay armd inf coy with M2A3 Bradley
CURACAO: US Southern Command • 1 Forward ICELAND: US European Command • 100; 1 ASW flt with
Operating Location 2 P-8A Poseidon
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • IRAQ: US Central Command • Operation Inherent Resolve
MONUSCO 3 2,000; 1 mech inf bde(-); 1 atk hel bn with AH-64E Apache;
MQ-1C Gray Eagle; 1 spec ops hel bn with MH-47G Chinook;
DJIBOUTI: US Africa Command • 4,000; 1 tpt sqn with
MH-60M Black Hawk; 1 CISR UAV sqn with MQ-9A Reaper;
C-130H/J-30 Hercules; 1 tpt sqn with 12 MV-22B Osprey; 2
NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 12
KC-130J Hercules; 1 spec ops sqn with MC-130H/J; PC-12
(U-28A); 1 CSAR sqn with HH-60G Pave Hawk; 1 CISR UAV ISRAEL: US Strategic Command • 100; 1 AN/TPY-2
sqn with MQ-9A Reaper; 1 naval air base X-band radar at Mount Keren
EGYPT: MFO 426; elm 1 ARNG inf bn; 1 ARNG spt bn ITALY: US European Command • 13,050
1 tkr sqn with 12 KC-130J Hercules; 2 tpt sqn with 12 PORTUGAL: US European Command • 250; 1 spt facility
MV-22B Osprey at Lajes
North America
US Strategic Command • 1 AN/TPY-2 X-band radar at QATAR: US Central Command • 10,000: 1 ISR sqn with
Shariki; 1 AN/TPY-2 X-band radar at Kyogamisaki 4 RC-135 Rivet Joint; 1 ISR sqn with 4 E-8C JSTARS;
JORDAN: US Central Command • Operation Inherent 2 tkr sqn with 12 KC-135R/T Stratotanker; 1 tpt sqn
Resolve 3,000: 1 FGA sqn with 18 F-15E Strike Eagle; 1 CISR with 4 C-17A Globemaster; 4 C-130H/J-30 Hercules; 2
UAV sqn with 12 MQ-9A Reaper SAM bty with M902/M903 Patriot PAC-3/PAC-3 MSE
KOREA, REPUBLIC OF: US Pacific Command • 30,400 US Strategic Command • 1 AN/TPY-2 X-band radar
US Army 21,500 ROMANIA: US European Command • 4,000; 1 air aslt bde
FORCES BY ROLE with M119A3; M777A3; 1 Aegis Ashore BMD unit with three
1 HQ (8th Army) at Pyeongtaek; 1 div HQ (2nd Inf) 8-cell Mk 41 VLS launchers with SM-3
located at Pyeongtaek; 1 mech bde; 1 (cbt avn) hel bde;
SAUDI ARABIA: US Central Command • 2,000; 1 FGA sqn
1 MRL bde; 1 AD bde; 1 SAM bty with THAAD
with 12 F-16C Fighting Falcon
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
M1A2 SEPv2 Abrams; M2A3/M3A3 Bradley; M109A6; SERBIA: NATO • KFOR • Joint Enterprise 660; elm 1 ARNG
M270A1 MLRS; AH-64D/E Apache; CH-47F Chinook; inf bde HQ; 1 ARNG recce bn; 1 hel flt with UH-60
UH-60L/M Black Hawk; M902 Patriot PAC-3; THAAD; SINGAPORE: US Pacific Command • 200; 1 log spt sqn; 1
FIM-92A Avenger; 1 (APS) armd bde eqpt set spt facility
US Navy 350
SLOVAKIA: NATO • Enhanced Vigiliance Activities 400; 1
USAF 8,350 SAM bty with M902 Patriot PAC-3
FORCES BY ROLE
SOMALIA: US Africa Command • 100
1 (AF) HQ (7th Air Force) at Osan AB; 1 ftr wg at Osan
AB with (1 ftr sqn with 20 F-16C/D Fighting Falcon; SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 8
1 atk sqn with 24 A-10C Thunderbolt II); 1 ftr wg at SPAIN: US European Command • 3,250; 4 DDGM; 1 air
Kunsan AB with (2 ftr sqn with 20 F-16C/D Fighting base at Morón; 1 naval base at Rota
Falcon); 1 ISR sqn at Osan AB with U-2S
SYRIA: US Central Command • Operation Inherent Resolve
USMC 200
900; 1 armd inf coy; 1 mne bn(-)
KUWAIT: US Central Command • 10,000; 1 ARNG armd bn;
THAILAND: US Pacific Command • 100
1 ARNG (cbt avn) hel bde; 1 spt bde; 1 CISR UAV sqn with
MQ-9A Reaper; 1 (APS) armd bde set; 1 (APS) inf bde set TURKEY: US European Command • 1,700; 1 tkr
LIBYA: UN • UNSMIL 1 sqn with 14 KC-135; 1 air base at Incirlik; 1 support
facility at Ankara; 1 support facility at Izmir
LITHUANIA: US European Command • 250; 1 radar unit
US Strategic Command • 1 AN/TPY-2 X-band radar at Kürecik
MALI: UN • MINUSMA 10
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: US Central Command • 5,000: 1
MARSHALL ISLANDS: US Strategic Command • 20; 1 ISR sqn with 4 U-2; 1 AEW&C sqn with 4 E-3B/G Sentry; 1 tkr
detection and tracking radar at Kwajalein Atoll
sqn with 12 KC-10A; 1 ISR UAV sqn with RQ-4 Global Hawk; 2
MEDITERRANEAN SEA: US European Command • 6th Fleet SAM bty with M902/M903 Patriot PAC-3/PAC-3 MSE
6,000; 1 CVN; 1 CGHM; 2 DDGHM; NATO • SNMG 2; 300;
UNITED KINGDOM: US European Command • 10,000
1 DDGHM
FORCES BY ROLE
MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 2
1 ftr wg at RAF Lakenheath with (2 FGA sqn with 23
NETHERLANDS: US European Command • 450 F-15E Strike Eagle, 1 FGA sqn with 21 F-35A Lightning II;
NIGER: US Africa Command • 800; 1 CISR sqn with MQ- 1 FGA sqn with F-35A Lightning II (forming)); 1 ISR sqn
9A Reaper at RAF Mildenhall with OC-135/RC-135; 1 tkr wg at RAF
NORWAY: US European Command • 1,100; 1 (USMC) Mildenhall with 15 KC-135R/T Stratotanker; 1 spec ops gp
MEU eqpt set; 1 (APS) SP 155mm arty bn set at RAF Mildenhall with (1 sqn with 8 CV-22B Osprey; 1
PERSIAN GULF: US Central Command • US Navy • 5th sqn with 8 MC-130J Commando II)
Fleet 500: 1 DDGHM; 6 (Coast Guard) PCC US Strategic Command • 1 AN/FPS-132 Upgraded Early
PHILIPPINES: US Pacific Command • Operation Pacific Warning Radar and 1 Spacetrack Radar at Fylingdales Moor
Eagle – Philippines 200
POLAND: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 700; FOREIGN FORCES
1 armd bn with M1A2 SEPv2 Abrams; M2A3 Bradley
Germany Air Force: trg units with 40 T-38 Talon; 69 T-6A
US European Command • 15,000; 1 corps HQ; 2 div HQ; 2
Texan II; • Missile trg at Fort Bliss (TX)
armd bde with M1A2 SEPv2 Abrams; M3A3 Bradley; M2A3
Bradley; M109A6/7; 1 AB bde with M119A3; M777A2; Netherlands 1 hel trg sqn with AH-64D Apache; CH-47D Chinook
2 SAM bty with M902 Patriot PAC-3; 1 FGA sqn with 12 Singapore Air Force: trg units with F-16C/D; 12 F-15SG;
F-22A Raptor; 1 CISR UAV sqn with MQ-9A Reaper AH-64D Apache; 6+ CH-47D Chinook hel
50 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Chapter Four
Europe
The war in Ukraine has caused many states to reassess 300,000 troops no later than 30 days. But as before,
their defence priorities, and it has effectively shifted a key challenge will be in transforming members’
the strategic centre of gravity in Europe further commitments into a capability.
to the north and east. Poland has accelerated its Finland and Sweden were on the path to NATO
project to recapitalise and expand its ground forces’ membership in 2023. For NATO, their accession implies
armour and artillery capabilities. This change has an expanded collective defence obligation. Nevertheless,
been accompanied by a rapid increase in defence NATO will benefit from Northern Europe becoming
expenditure: a new spending level was set at 3% of a more integrated space in terms of deterrence and
GDP from 2023. defence. It means that, bar Russian coastlines in the
As part of efforts to close Germany’s long-standing Gulf of Finland and in Kaliningrad, the shores of the
defence-capabilities gap, Germany’s Chancellor Baltic Sea will be controlled by NATO members.
Olaf Scholz announced in February the creation of One outcome of the drive to deliver security
a EUR100bn (USD106bn) special fund to finance assistance to Ukraine is that legacy equipment and
Bundeswehr investment and equipment projects. ageing ammunition stocks are being flushed out of
Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine has European inventories. This will be more pronounced in
reinvigorated NATO. At its Madrid summit in June Central and Eastern European countries, where many
2022, NATO agreed a new force model to boost force states had retained Soviet-era legacy equipment
size and readiness and to replace the NATO Response in their inventories. It creates an opportunity to
Force. The assumption under the new three-tier model accelerate military modernisation and consider
is that the new force would be able to deploy at least expanding equipment commonality.
France 203,250
Germany 183,150
Total European
spending Italy 161,050
USD335bn
United Kingdom 150,350
Spain 124,150
Europe
France Advanced
Germany Modern
Greece Ageing
Obsolescent
Italy
Netherlands
Poland
Spain
Sweden
Turkey
United Kingdom
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
*’Combat aircraft’ includes fighter, fighter ground-attack and attack aircraft
France Modern
Germany Ageing
Obsolescent
Greece
Italy
Poland
Romania
Serbia
Spain
Turkey
United Kingdom
0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500
Europe
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which frameworks such as the UK-led Joint Expeditionary
began on 24 February 2022, has profoundly affected Force (JEF). In capability terms, both countries bring
defence-policy debates in Europe, both at the national valuable assets into the Alliance, albeit in limited
and at the multilateral level. It is leading some nations numbers. Taken together, their defence spending
to reconsider the likely character of a potential war amounts to less than 5% of the combined spending of
in Europe and resulting capability requirements, European NATO nations. For NATO, the accession of
including doctrine, equipment and personnel, and Finland and Sweden implies an expanded collective-
also dispositions. Between January and the end defence obligation. This would include protecting
of July, 20 European states announced defence Finland’s 1,340-kilometre land border with Russia.
spending increases. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Nevertheless, NATO will benefit from Northern
the United Kingdom declared ambitions to raise their Europe becoming a more integrated space in terms
defence spending to 2.5% of GDP. The UK ambition of deterrence and defence. It means that, bar Russian
was briefly raised to 3% by 2030 (the figure for coastlines in the Gulf of Finland and in Kaliningrad,
which Poland is aiming) but by late year, and amid the shores of the Baltic Sea will be controlled by NATO
a changed economic outlook, the new administration members. However, both Finland and Sweden will
of Rishi Sunak reduced the target back to 2% of likely need to make additional defence investments
GDP. Germany announced a special EUR100 billion due to demand signals from the NATO Defence
(USD106bn) fund to pay for defence-modernisation Planning Process (NDPP), notwithstanding their
needs. NATO and European Union members also history of partnering with NATO members. Filling
agreed to several packages of sanctions against Russia billets in NATO’s multinational command structure
and began to deliver substantial military assistance will increase the burden on the cohort of staff officers.
to Ukraine. Russia’s invasion caused other notable At the same time, both states will need to consider
shifts in government policy and public opinion. how they would enable the inflow of a large number
Finland and Sweden applied for NATO membership, of NATO forces in the event of a collective defence
and Denmark held a referendum on 1 June which contingency on NATO’s eastern flank. No decisions
effectively ended Copenhagen’s opt-out from the have yet been made on permanent NATO structures
military aspects of the EU’s Common Security and in Finland and Sweden. But, at the very least, NATO
Defence Policy (CSDP). states will likely want to discuss the prepositioning
Finland and Sweden are likely to formally join of equipment and command and control (C2)
NATO at some point in 2023. At NATO’s Madrid arrangements that, while primarily staffed by Finland
Summit, held from 28–30 June, the Alliance formally and Sweden, include a multinational layer that could
invited the two nations to join, after they both applied expand quickly if required. This will also require
the preceding month. By October, 28 NATO member Finland’s and Sweden’s exercise posture to evolve
states had ratified the required accession documents, further. Currently both states conduct some exercises
with only Hungary and Turkey remaining. Finland with NATO members, but closer ties with Alliance
and Sweden had previously collaborated closely members will mean closer integration with NATO
with NATO, including on operations and through exercise cycles.
after the collapse of the Afghan government and security which Russia threatens the Alliance and the desirability of
forces, damaged NATO’s standing and also suggested accepting the costs – and loss of flexibility – that a larger
a degree of strategic failure. (Alliance members had and more permanent presence would demand.
withdrawn their troops earlier, in April 2021.) Then, in NATO’s enhanced forward presence has expanded
September 2021, France was caught off guard by the from four battlegroups – in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and
Australia–UK–US defence trilateral known as AUKUS, Poland – to eight with new multinational deployments
which caused significant upset in Paris. in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia. At the time
A new Strategic Concept, agreed at NATO’s 28–30 June of the Madrid Summit, these comprised some 9,600
Europe
summit in Madrid, elaborated on some of these changes, personnel from 24 NATO nations. Furthermore, Canada,
stating that ‘the Euro-Atlantic area is not at peace’ and France, Germany and the UK have indicated that they
that Russia is ‘the most significant and direct threat to will pre-assign forces to reinforce the countries where
Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro- they already lead NATO’s forward-presence battlegroups.
Atlantic area’. The document also said that terrorism is These pre-assigned forces are up to brigade-level
‘the most direct asymmetric threat to the security of strength, but it is unclear whether dedicated assets exist
our citizens and to international peace and prosperity’, to enable their rapid deployment, when needed, from
reflecting NATO’s 360-degree approach and the need their respective home bases.
to demonstrate concern for the security priorities of NATO also agreed a new force model to increase the
NATO’s southern member states. China was, for the first scale and readiness of its forces and to replace the NATO
time, explicitly assessed in a NATO Strategic Concept, Response Force (NRF). Founded in 2002 and expanded in
and Beijing’s ambitions and policies were considered 2015 to include up to 40,000 personnel, the NRF concept
to ‘challenge [NATO] interests, security and values’. The includes the ambition to be able to deploy initial elements
Strategic Concept did not create any new core tasks for within five days and the whole force no later than 30 days.
NATO – some had mooted resilience as a potential addition In contrast, the new force model is based on a three-tier
– but the task list has been reordered with deterrence structure. The first tier, intended to be deployable in less
and defence, crisis prevention and management, and than ten days, encompasses at least 100,000 troops.
cooperative security all folded under the overarching The second tier, ready at 10–30 days’ notice, comprises
theme of collective defence. The summit declaration 200,000 troops, and the third tier, ready at 30–180 days’
stated that NATO had ‘set a new baseline for our deterrence notice, comprises an additional 500,000. As such, the
and defence posture. NATO will continue to protect our assumption is that the new force model would generate
populations and defend every inch of Allied territory at at least 300,000 troops at a readiness level comparable to
all times.’ However, realising this ambition will require the NRF of old (i.e., deployed no later than 30 days).
significant and coordinated efforts by member states. These forces are intended to be drawn together
NATO members began to increase defence spending across multiple domains, including cyber elements, and
in the years after Russia first invaded Ukraine in 2014, will be pre-assigned to specific defence plans. NATO
and additional uplifts were announced by some after plans to transition to this new force model in 2023, even
February 2022. Madrid saw additional commitments though the details of the composition and exact scale
to ‘build on’ the 2014 defence investment pledge, are still being discussed. Germany was the first country
agreed at that year’s Wales Summit, and to ‘decide next to publicly outline its intended offer to this new force
year on subsequent commitments beyond 2024’. As model, suggesting that by 2025, Berlin would provide
well as this, important outcomes evident after Madrid approximately 30,000 troops, 65 aircraft and 20 naval
relate to additional forward-deployed personnel, vessels for the high-readiness component (within the
more prepositioned equipment and a much-increased first 30 days). However, unless the US force posture in
ambition for high-readiness forces. These efforts are Europe changes significantly, it is likely that most of
intended to increase the defence and deterrence posture the high-readiness forces will need to be European. In
on the eastern flank. That said, certain media reports at the past, similar initiatives, including both the NRF and
the time of the Madrid Summit suggested that some of the NATO Readiness Initiative (agreed in 2020), suffered
NATO’s eastern members had hoped for an even greater from the tendency of allies to make offers to contribute,
effort to underpin a strategy of forward defence, making while finding it time-consuming and challenging to
permanent some of the rotational deployments by NATO actually meet the required standards. These issues
allies to their countries. However, despite NATO’s new- are unlikely to disappear now that the ambition has
found unity, member states disagree on the extent to increased significantly.
54 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Supporting Ukraine
Ukraine’s efforts to defend itself have been actively industry stocks. The EU used its European Peace Facility
supported by NATO and EU members, though the level (EPF) to commit EUR3.1 billion (USD2.6bn) by October
and speed of support has varied. Assistance has included 2022 – half of the EPF budget for 2021–27 – and approve,
ammunition, intelligence, some maintenance and repair for the first time ever, the supply of lethal weapons to
support, as well as funding. Equipment donations have a third country. (The EPF is an off-budget instrument,
ranged from Soviet-era legacy equipment to more established in March 2021, to fund partner nations’
sophisticated systems in active service with NATO armed equipment and infrastructure needs.) To help with the
forces. They have also included refurbished equipment coordination and logistics of the national contributions
that was either in deep storage or has been purchased from to Ukraine, a US European Command (EUCOM) Control
Europe 55
Centre Ukraine/International Donor Coordination Centre ammunition stocks are being flushed out of European
(ECCU/IDCC) was established in March 2022 under US and inventories. While these effects will be more pronounced
UK leadership, with a Ukrainian liaison element. This helps in Central and Eastern European countries, where many
match Ukrainian requests with donor offers and assists states had retained Soviet-era legacy equipment in their
with the delivery of equipment to Ukraine and training inventories, this creates an opportunity to accelerate
requirements for Ukrainian personnel. The EU agreed on the pace of military modernisation and to consider
17 October to launch the EU Military Assistance Mission expanding equipment commonality within the broader
(EUMAM Ukraine), which initially aims to train 15,000 context of rising budgets. However, it is questionable
Europe
Ukrainian soldiers on the territory of EU member states whether (particularly) Europe’s defence industries
and is, at first, mandated for two years. Meanwhile, one will be able to deliver at the timescales needed by
notable effort has been the training programme set up customers. Another potential problem is that additional
in July by the UK, with the aim of training in the UK up funding might tempt governments to either invest in
to 10,000 Ukrainian recruits and existing personnel every their national defence-industrial base, where it exists,
120 days. The programme, run by the UK’s 11th Security or pursue industrial-policy goals rather than focus on
Force Assistance Brigade, involves some 1,000 UK immediate capability needs. Careful calibration will be
personnel. Since it started, Canada, Denmark, Finland, the needed to balance national programmes and industrial
Netherlands, Norway and Sweden have indicated they capacity, given the desire by some to strengthen Europe’s
would participate in the effort. defence-industrial and technology base and the instinct
One side effect of the drive to deliver security assistance of others to cement existing international partnerships
to Ukraine is that legacy equipment and ageing through arms orders.
The war in Ukraine has caused many states to region, as well as the planned deployment of a new
reassess their defence priorities, and it has effectively amphibious Littoral Response Group in 2023 and a
shifted further north and east the strategic centre of frigate later in the decade. But while the Indo-Pacific
gravity in Europe. For NATO, this will likely make tilt, announced in March 2021 by the UK government,
it harder to maintain its 360-degree approach. The is likely to remain only a modest driver of British
clear positioning of Russia as the key threat in the military planning, the UK deployed forces in 2022 –
new Strategic Concept, when viewed alongside including four Typhoon combat aircraft and an A330
the mixed legacy of crisis-management operations Multi-Role Tanker Transport (MRTT) – to take part
– including arguable failure in Afghanistan and a in Australia’s Pitch Black air exercise. Germany also
sense in some capitals that the EU might be a more sent aircraft to Pitch Black. Following on from the
appropriate vehicle for dealing with instability and Indo-Pacific deployment of the frigate Bayern in 2021
state fragility on NATO’s southern periphery – is and early 2022, Berlin sent six Eurofighter Typhoons,
making it harder to ensure that the southern flank four A400M transport aircraft and three A330
receives appropriate attention. Nevertheless, finding MRTTs to Pitch Black and to Australia’s navy-led
credible ways to do so will be needed for unanimity Kakadu drill. Additional engagements with Japan,
over NATO’s engagement on the eastern flank. The Singapore and South Korea were planned in the
Strategic Concept characterises China’s attempts to framework of this deployment. For its part, France
undermine and reshape the international order as maintains warships and troops in the region and
a systemic challenge to Euro-Atlantic security. But routinely deploys additional vessels and aircraft.
China has not been placed directly into a deterrence In 2022, it deployed to the region several Rafale
and defence framework because a number of NATO combat aircraft and tanker and transport aircraft as
allies do not believe that Beijing poses a military part of a force-projection exercise, including some to
threat to their security. That said, the return of take part in Pitch Black.
war to Europe has not displaced the ambitions of
several European governments to play a growing EU defence initiatives
security and defence role in the Indo-Pacific, though In March 2022, the EU published its ‘Strategic
resources to achieve this will be limited. The UK Compass for Security and Defence’. The process
has demonstrated intent, with the deployment of was initiated in June 2020, with a threat analysis
two River-class offshore-patrol vessels (OPVs) to the presented in November 2020 and most of the writing
56 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
completed in 2021. The document was intended to in air and missile defence. As a result, in July the
provide strategic guidance for EU activity in relation Commission proposed a regulation to establish the
to crisis management, resilience, military capability European Defence Industry Reinforcement through
development and multinational partnerships. Common Procurement Act (EDIRPA). EDIRPA is
However, despite last-minute edits and additions, meant to have a EUR500 million (USD528m) budget
the profound change to Europe’s security landscape between 2022 and 2024, and the plan is that it would
resulting from Russia’s war in Ukraine means that effectively subsidise EU member states’ procurement
the Strategic Compass cannot but look like it has from the EU budget. In the longer run, steps like these
been overtaken by events. Josep Borrell, EU High towards directly incentivising joint procurement
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and will inform and reinforce the European Defence
Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Investment Programme (EDIP), another proposal
Commission, wrote in its Foreword that the Compass the Commission planned to launch before the end of
should help to ‘turn the EU’s geopolitical awakening 2022. Overall, these initiatives are likely to encourage
into a more permanent strategic posture’. Initiatives more intra-EU collaborative defence development
outlined in the strategy include the establishment and procurement, objectives that are already features
of an EU Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC) to of the EDF and PESCO.
deliver a 5,000-strong crisis-management capability
for operations in non-permissive environments and Sub-regional defence: the V4 and the JEF
to be fully operational by 2025. It also called for the As well as national efforts and cooperation at the
development of an EU Space Strategy for Security NATO and EU level, European states also use mini-
and Defence, as well as for investment in common lateral and other sub-regional defence formats to
solutions for strategic enablers and in technology advance their defence-policy aims, although they
to drive defence innovation and next-generation have variable focus on the war in Ukraine. While the
capabilities, using the European Defence Fund (EDF) Visegrad Four (V4) seems largely to be continuing
and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). to implement existing work programmes with
The RDC is meant to be built on modified EU limited adjustments, others, like the UK-led JEF,
Battlegroups and forces and capabilities earmarked have a greater operational focus. For instance,
by member states. However, this approach has so the work programmes for the V4 presidencies
far only generated limited success in an EU context. by Hungary (2021–22) and Slovakia (2022–23)
For instance, EU Battlegroups have been fully reflected a focus on preparing the V4 Battlegroup
operational on paper since 2007 but have not been that is due to go on standby for EU operations
used once despite there, arguably, being no shortage in the first half of 2023. The Battlegroup will be
of crises. Nonetheless, a military rapid-response working on military-mobility projects within the
concept document was in the drafting stages in context of the Strategic Compass, while also scaling
mid-2022 to further inform RDC architecture and up joint training and exercise activity to improve
planning. As of summer 2022, the EU was also readiness and interoperability. In contrast, the
working on its first military strategy to assist the JEF nations (Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland,
planning of EU operations and deliver military- Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway,
specific guidance. Sweden and the UK) announced in March a set of
The return of war to Europe has triggered a enhanced exercises focused on the High North, the
raft of other initiatives that may generate some North Atlantic and the Baltic Sea, reflecting key
effect in the future, particularly in relation to areas of concern for their governments. In May,
the defence-industrial sector. In March 2022, the the Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ)
European Commission was tasked with assessing, based in Northwood, UK, began deploying forces
in coordination with the European Defence Agency, to Lithuania and Latvia to help coordinate the
European defence-investment gaps and outlining military activities of JEF nations in the Baltic Sea
measures to strengthen Europe’s defence-industrial (the decision to do so was made in February, just
base. The findings were presented on 18 May and before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine). Then, in July,
indicated that EU members should increase stocks JEF governments announced additional exercises
of weapons and munitions, replace remaining while Finland and Sweden awaited ratification of
Soviet-era equipment in their inventories and invest their NATO membership.
Europe 57
In 2002, France and Italy agreed to jointly develop and acquire a new generation of multi-mission frigates (European multi-
mission frigates, FREMM). Twenty-seven vessels were originally planned (17 French and ten Italian). While the different national
versions share a common basic hull form and major common components, they differ significantly in detail design, and each navy
operates different FREMM variants. The first vessel (for the French Navy) was launched in April 2010 and commissioned in
November 2012. France has successfully exported one FREMM to Morocco and another to Egypt, while Italy has delivered two
to Egypt and, in 2021, won an order for six from Indonesia. A much-modified version of the Italian FREMM was chosen by the US
Navy (USN) as the basis for its FFG(X) (subsequently reclassified FFG-62) new-generation small surface combatant (or frigate).
Europe
The USN plans to procure 20 of the vessels. The export successes of the FREMM family have been due largely to the fact that it
represents a modern, capable and proven design that also remains relatively cost-effective.
CAPTAS 4 2 x twin 324mm B-515 ASTT with 2 x quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block UMS 4110
variable-depth sonar MU90 lightweight torpedoes 3 long-range anti-ship missile (AShM) hull-mounted sonar
1 x 127/54 LW –
Capacity for two NH90 1 x 76/62 STRALES Vulcano 127mm gun
medium helicopters (Davide) 76mm gun
CAPTAS 4 2 x triple 324mm B-515 1 x quad lnchr with Otomat (Teseo) Mk2a long-range AShM UMS 4110 hull-
variable- ASTT with MU90 1 x quad lnchr with MILAS anti-submarine missile mounted sonar
depth sonar lightweight torpedo
CAPTAS 4 1 x 21-cell Mk 49 GMLS with 4 x quad lnchr with Naval Strike Missile
variable-depth sonar RIM-116C RAM Block II (RGM-184A) long-range AShM
Sources: IISS; Fincantieri, Naval Group, seaforces.org; navalanalyses.com; Congressional Research Service ©IISS
Europe 59
Europe
in March 2010 of the RAF’s existing Nimrod MR2 MPA fleet That time came in 2015, when the National Security
and the subsequent cancellation in the Strategic Defence Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review
Review of October that year of the replacement Nimrod announced that the UK would ‘buy nine new Maritime
MRA4 programme. Patrol Aircraft, based in Scotland, to protect our nuclear
The gap in capability that resulted from the Nimrod’s deterrent, hunt down hostile submarines and enhance
demise was widely criticised. The UK had been one of our maritime search and rescue’. There seems little doubt
the leading MPA operators globally. Critically, as far as that the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine the year
the government was concerned, the MRA4 programme before, and the fact that European states subsequently
had overrun and was over budget. Furthermore, there began reassessing the risk of a major conflict in Europe,
were doubts over whether the airframe would even be hastened this apparent U-turn. At the time, the UK
certified airworthy. However, concerns quickly emerged government did not confirm the preferred aircraft.
about the UK’s ability to sustain a comprehensive Speculation ranged from the Boeing P-8 Poseidon to the
maritime-surveillance picture amid reports of increased Airbus C295, to the Kawasaki P-1 and to uninhabited
Russian naval (and especially submarine) activity in and platforms, with these all offering differing levels of
around UK and NATO waters, particularly the challenge capability. The government finally committed publicly
of supporting and protecting UK ballistic-missile to the P-8 Poseidon in July 2016 when then-prime
submarines when transiting to and from their home base minister David Cameron made the announcement at the
in Scotland. Although the House of Commons Defence Farnborough international air show.
Project Seedcorn
The Nimrod MRA4 airframes were quickly broken up in In 2012, RAF personnel were sent to Naval Air Station
the first months of 2011, and over the next few years the Jacksonville, in Florida, to work with USN aircrew and
UK relied on other technical capabilities, such as signals mission specialists on the P-8 Poseidon, operating with the
intelligence, while allies also provided information as well USN’s Patrol Squadron 30 (VP-30) training establishment.
as, on occasion, deploying MPAs to the UK to support This was one year before the USN itself declared that the
maritime-surveillance operations. However, while Harvey’s Poseidon had reached IOC. RAF personnel comprised pilots,
remarks in 2012 indicated that officials had not ruled tactical coordinators and weapons-system operators.
out reinstating a dedicated maritime-patrol and anti- The year 2012 also saw UK personnel fly the P-8A during
submarine warfare capability, the UK MOD was taking Exercise Joint Warrior off Scotland. The programme even
steps to sustain the required skills under Project Seedcorn. resulted in an all-UK crew flying a US Poseidon.
Seedcorn began in 2012 and was renewed for a further Over the years, more personnel trained with US
three years in 2015. It saw UK personnel – many of whom forces, with some rising to become instructors in VP-30.
had worked on Nimrod – posted to Australia, Canada, New UK personnel were also posted to the USN’s VX-1 test and
Zealand and, most significantly, the US to maintain and evaluation squadron at Naval Air Station Patuxent River.
develop skills in maritime patrol, anti-submarine warfare, The effect of Seedcorn was broader, as the RAF reported in
anti-surface warfare and intelligence, surveillance and 2022 that UK personnel had also been involved in training
reconnaissance. These countries all operated the P-3 Orion, Australian, Canadian, New Zealand and US personnel. Bar
but importantly the US Navy (USN) was, by the early Canada, all these nations are, or will shortly be, Poseidon
2010s, in the initial stages of transitioning its capability to operators; Boeing is, meanwhile, offering the aircraft for
the new Boeing P-8 Poseidon, based on the 737 airliner. In Canada’s project to replace its CP-140 Aurora aircraft.
retrospect, the UK’s posting of personnel to the US provided From the mid-2010s, USN P-8s occasionally flew from
an indication of the UK’s likely direction of travel towards RAF Lossiemouth. This airbase, in northern Scotland,
regaining its MPA capability, in the form of the P-8A. had been earmarked by the UK MOD for investment to
60 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
accommodate the new aircraft and related facilities. agreement relating to maritime-patrol aircraft, with
The first aircraft to arrive in the UK were based at RAF Norway receiving its fifth and final P-8 in 2022. Germany
Kinloss (formerly the main Nimrod base) while works has also ordered the type and may well seek a similar
at Lossiemouth continued; Poseidon was moved to arrangement. Both of these nations, plus the US, are
Lossiemouth in October 2020. The UK’s P-8s arrived in likely to make use of Lossiemouth. In addition, Germany,
rapid succession. The ninth, and final, aircraft was flown Norway and the UK will all be looking to benefit in
in to Lossiemouth in January 2022. According to analysts, terms of support functions as well as the operational
this pace means that the RAF still lacks enough crew for advantages of using the same aircraft as the USN. Project
the fleet. Nonetheless, the RAF still plans to declare full Seedcorn is now being used to grow the UK’s capability
operational capability in October 2024. The P-8-related on the Boeing E-7A Wedgetail airborne early warning
facilities at Lossiemouth will also be of broader use. In and control aircraft. As of late 2022, personnel were
2018, Norway and the UK announced a cooperation embedded with the Royal Australian Air Force.
15
12
Germany
9 Netherlands
Italy
6
UK
3 France
Spain
0 Poland
-3
2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027
Increase
Albania
USD0.29bn Serbia
USD1.22bn
Lithuania Malta
USD1.59bn USD0.09bn Netherlands
USD15.23bn
Montenegro
USD0.10bn Hungary
Europe
Luxembourg USD2.99bn
USD0.44bn
Bulgaria
USD1.34bn
Slovakia
USD2.01bn
Germany
USD53.37bn
Spain
εUSD14.67bn
Sweden
USD8.07bn Belgium
Finland USD5.66bn
USD5.82bn
United Kingdom*
εUSD70.03bn
France
USD54.42bn
Italy
Estonia USD31.12bn
USD0.84bn Latvia
USD0.86bn
Denmark
USD5.06bn Poland
Iceland USD13.40bn Switzerland
Croatia Norway
USD0.04bn USD5.55bn
USD1.27bn Czech Republic USD7.43bn
Cyprus
USD0.50bn USD3.83bn
Austria
Ireland Romania
Portugal USD3.64bn
USD5.19bn Turkey
Decrease
USD2.59bn USD1.17bn
Bosnia & Herzegovina
USD6.19bn
USD0.17bn
% of GDP
1.0
shocks are better addressed by fiscal policy than
monetary policy, as the latter needs to be employed
to stem inflation. Countries in the region are using 0.5
monetary policy to stem rising inflation, with
the effect that interest rate increases will make 0.0
borrowing less manageable. 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
Inflation across the region was a concern even
before the February invasion. Rates increased globally ▲ Figure 4 Europe: regional defence spending as %
in 2021 due to higher energy costs, a recovery in of GDP (average)
demand and ongoing pandemic-related supply-chain
disruptions. Despite countries continuing to commit of fiscal pressure following the pandemic. However,
increasing amounts of funding to defence in 2021, Russia’s decision to invade Ukraine on 24 February
surging rates of inflation in all regions resulted in a caused a marked change of course. In the weeks and
negative global trend in real terms. The impact was months that followed, around 20 countries pledged to
more acute in 2022 as inflation soared, driven by the increase defence spending, though the relative scale
commodity crisis, supply disruptions and heightened – and timelines – differed. Announcements spanned
economic uncertainty resulting from the war in the region – from the UK, France, Germany and Italy
Ukraine. The disruption to energy supply caused the to Poland and Romania as well as most Nordic and
oil price to spike, after February, to levels in excess all Baltic states.
of USD100 per barrel. The US Energy Information The most notable uplift was the announcement on
Administration (EIA) expects the price of Brent crude 27 February by Chancellor Olaf Scholz that Germany
oil to average USD105 per barrel throughout 2022 and would establish a special fund for defence in 2022,
remain high at USD95 per barrel in 2023. amounting to EUR100 billion (USD106bn), and the
In its October 2022 World Economic Outlook defence budget would reach 2% of GDP ‘from now on’.
Update, the IMF revised upward its projection for The announcement came at the end of a period
global inflation in light of rising food and energy in which Germany’s defence spending had seen
prices and lingering supply–demand imbalances. increases averaging 4.4% in real terms since 2016.
The year saw several countries, particularly in Germany’s defence budget for 2022 was a 7.3%
Eastern Europe, face double-digit inflation rates. In increase over the 2021 figure, rising to EUR50.4bn
September 2022, rates reached 9.9% in the Eurozone (USD53.4bn). However, the financial plan to 2026,
and 10.1% in the UK. Policymakers in Europe now approved on 1 July 2022, shows spending remaining
face the challenge of easing the impact of higher flat at this level. As such, in order to reach 2% of GDP
inflation by managing effectively fiscal and monetary ‘from now on’, the defence budget will need to be
instruments, but without allowing wage–price spirals supplemented by the special fund if the core budget
(where the demand for higher wages drives up costs is not increased to meet the target.
for suppliers with these costs then passed on to the This presents a significant divergence from trend
consumer). Should wage–price spirals occur, inflation in Germany. Therefore, the uplift will have to be
will increase further. managed effectively to ensure that funds are allocated
according to strategic imperatives and managed well
Defence spending thereafter. Moreover, increased investment without
European defence spending grew significantly in a capability development plan raises questions over
2021, with regional spending increasing by 3.5% in real the ability of the armed forces and defence-industrial
terms, a rate higher than in any other region. Indeed, base to absorb new resources.
2021 was the seventh consecutive year of real growth. Details of the special fund (Sondervermögen
It had been projected that, in the short term, European Bundeswehr) were announced in June 2022. The
defence spending growth would be subdued in light EUR100bn (USD106bn) falls to EUR82bn (USD87bn)
Europe 63
Norway, 2.2% Other Northern announcing at the Madrid NATO Summit that
Sweden, 2.4%
Europe, 4.2% the country’s defence budget would reach 2.5% of
The Balkans, 1.2%
Other South-Eastern GDP by 2030. As part of her leadership campaign,
Europe, 1.9%
United Kingdom the target was increased further to 3% of GDP in
Turkey, 1.8% 20.9%
Other Southern the same time frame by the next leader in London,
Europe, 3.3%
prime minister Liz Truss, in July 2022. The viability
Spain, 4.4%
of this commitment was questionable given
other draws on public spending and caution was
Europe
Italy, 9.3% expressed at the time about the need for increases to
France be accompanied by greater oversight and targeted
16.2%
Other Central industrial development to help ensure higher
Europe, 5.4%
funding translated into improved capability.
Poland
4.0%
Netherlands, 4.5% Truss resigned in October 2022 and the 3%
Other Western commitment was not repeated by her successor,
Germany Europe, 2.2%
amount
15.9% Rishi Sunak, and his Chancellor Jeremy Hunt in the
Other Western Europe – Belgium, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg Autumn Statement, released on 17 November 2022.
Other Central Europe – Austria, Czech Republic, Hungary,
Slovakia, Switzerland Pursuing a more fiscally conservative path, the
Other Northern Europe – Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania target was reduced back to the NATO minimum of
Other Southern Europe – Cyprus, Greece, Malta, Portugal
The Balkans – Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, 2% of GDP. The statement did concede that defence
North Macedonia, Serbia, Slovenia spending needed to increase, but said that this would
Other South-Eastern Europe – Bulgaria, Romania
©IISS be considered as part of an update to the Integrated
Review. The outlook for defence spending in the UK
▲ Figure 5 Europe: defence spending by country and is therefore more subdued and likely to see cuts in
sub-region, 2022 real terms as inflation rates remain high.
Other notable announcements in the region
after VAT and the costs of interest on borrowing include the EUR700 million (USD740m) increase
are taken into account. Air procurement takes up in Finland’s 2022 defence budget, with EUR2.2bn
40.8% of the fund with major programmes being (USD2.3bn) also added for defence over the 2023–26
the Eurofighter and F-35 combat aircraft, the Future fiscal plan first published in April 2022, the USD340m
Combat Air System (FCAS), heavy transport uplift to the Norwegian budget for border defence,
helicopters, uninhabited systems, space surveillance and sizeable uplifts in Estonia and Lithuania as both
and ground-based air defence. A significant 25.3% move towards their goal of spending 2.5% of GDP.
of the funding is to be used for ‘management ability/ Latvia’s budget will rise from 2.2% of GDP to 2.5% in
digitisation’ procurement with programmes including 2025. Authorities in Italy have considered increasing
the digitisation of land-based operations, battle military spending by EUR1.5bn (USD1.6bn), with the
management systems, tactical wide area networks, longer-term goal to raise spending to 2% of GDP from
data centre networks and satellite communications. 1.4%. The right-wing coalition government, elected
Land procurement accounts for 20.3%, with this in September 2022, stated in their election manifesto
covering the retrofitting of all remaining Puma that the country would respect NATO commitments,
infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) in the first phase as including the pledge to increase defence spending to
well as a successor IFV. Naval procurement comprises 2% of GDP, but progress is likely to be slow in light of
only 10.8% with major programmes including K130 economic realities.
corvettes, F126 frigates, the Type-212CD diesel-electric In March 2022, the Polish government announced
submarine being jointly developed with Norway, its intention to increase the defence budget from
the Future Naval Strike Missile and the submarine- 2.1% to 3% of GDP in 2023. The official budget for
launched Interactive Defence and Attack System for 2023 was approved in August and enacted this uplift
Submarines, which is being developed by Diehl and with an increase in defence funding from PLN58bn
ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems and is designed to (USD13.4bn) to PLN97bn (USD20.8bn); this will bring
defeat airborne anti-submarine warfare threats. the budget to 2.8% of GDP. In addition, in March
The UK also pledged to increase funding for the president signed into law homeland-defence
defence, with then-prime minister Boris Johnson legislation (the Law on the Defence of the Fatherland).
64 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Slovenia Luxembourg
2022 defence budget: 2022 defence budget:
USD0.9bn / 1.4% GDP USD0.4bn / 0.5% GDP
16 March 2022 – Minister of 24 June 2022 – Minister of
Defence Matej Tonin: defence Defence François Bausch:
budget will reach 2% of GDP budget will increase to 1%
by 2030. of GDP by 2028.
United Kingdom
2022 defence budget: USD70bn / 2.2% GDP
30 June 2022 – Then-prime minister
Boris Johnson: defence budget will increase to
2.5% of GDP by 2030. Liz Truss pledge to reach
3% of GDP while briefly Prime Minister not
reiterated by her replacement, Rishi Sunak.
Netherlands
2022 defence budget: USD15.2bn / 1.5% GDP
7 March 2022 – Prime Minister
Mark Rutte: the Netherlands is already working
towards a 2% of GDP goal and will now look
at implementing further increases to defence.
Slovakia
2022 defence budget: USD2.0bn / 1.8% GDP
12 July 2022 – Minister of Defence
Jaroslav Nad: first draft of 2023 budget
increases defence budget to 2% of GDP.
This established an Armed Forces Support Fund. having remained steady at 30% for the previous five
It will be funded through the National Economy Bank years. This is notwithstanding the extra-budgetary
(BGK), a state development bank designed to support Armed Forces Support Fund that will be used for the
national economic and industrial growth, with up to acquisition of foreign equipment.
PLN40bn (USD8.5bn) made available to fund foreign With defence spending increasing swiftly and
acquisitions for defence. In July, Poland signed a significantly, there is a sharpening focus on the
major procurement deal with South Korea for up to absorptive capacity of domestic defence industries.
1,000 Hyundai Rotem K2 Black Panther main battle Related to this, there are now questions over the
Europe
tanks, 672 Hanwha Defense K9 Thunder 155 mm self- amount that countries will invest in developing their
propelled artillery systems and 48 KAI FA-50 Fighting domestic defence sector or whether the immediacy
Eagle light fighter ground-attack aircraft. of the security threat posed by Russia will lead some
Defence investments across Europe will increase to simply buy off-the-shelf to speed up capability
significantly over the next decade if all of the acquisition. That said, a balanced combination of both
announced increases occur. The average allocation is perhaps necessitated by the fragmented nature of
of GDP to defence among European NATO members the European defence-industrial base. As one example,
would reach an estimated 1.8–1.9% of GDP by 2032, Poland’s deal with South Korea includes technology
up from 1.6% in 2022 and 1.3% back in 2014. transfer and local production.
Despite these announcements, in 2022 European Looking beyond the immediate efforts to raise
defence spending was still effectively flat in real defence spending, Russia’s actions have refocused
terms, due to soaring inflation rates. Spending attention on how best to achieve scalable agile
uplifts are set to continue into the 2020s and will be production and establish increased stockpiles with
more effective as inflation abates. However, they will more strategic positioning across NATO: both require
be tempered by other public-spending constraints, more weapons systems, such as missiles and other
not least the higher costs of debt servicing as interest munitions. It is likely, therefore, that higher sales in the
rates increase. short term will focus on upgrades and modifications
to existing equipment in order to ensure readiness
Defence industry and sustainment.
The challenges facing aerospace and defence supply The replacement of equipment donated to
chains sharpened from 2021–22 due to labour Ukraine is both a driver and a concern for defence
shortages and disruptions to global shipping caused industry. For some states, particularly those in the
by ongoing COVID-19-related lockdowns in China, east, donating equipment designed in the Soviet-era
as well as Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. – even if this was later upgraded – creates an
They have been exacerbated by the higher cost of raw opportunity to modernise their inventory, and an
materials, components, energy and labour, which opportunity for defence industry. For others, such as
have driven up costs of production. the UK, it raises questions over the cost of resupply
Countries like the UK have made adjustments and the industrial capacity to do so. In 2022, the
within their defence budgets to accommodate for UK donated lethal equipment, including NLAW
inflation, setting aside funding to cover cost uplifts. and Javelin anti-armour systems, multiple-launch
But any further disruption to supply chains or rocket systems and Starstreak air-defence systems,
increased costs for raw materials and components and non-lethal equipment, including helmets,
will create further inflationary pressure. Higher body armour and night vision goggles. Replacing
costs for skilled personnel will also push up equipment creates extra demand for defence firms
industry expenses, which will feed through to in Europe. In June, the UK defence secretary held
higher contract values. talks with defence suppliers over how to increase
The primary focus for defence establishments, production. However, rising inflation and the
amid the wave of defence spending increases, is on higher factor input costs of raw materials will make
equipment modernisation and enhancing overall it difficult to rapidly increase capacity, adding to
capability. As such, the proportion of European the challenges for scalable and agile production. As
defence budgets devoted to investments is set to a result, it may become more expensive to replace
increase. A key example is Poland, where the amount equipment, creating further upward pressure on
allocated to capital spending will jump to 40% in 2023, defence spending.
66 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
value of both contracts is USD6.06bn. Contracts are Against this backdrop, new investments in the
also expected for the licensed production of further air force seem less ambitious. Seeking a replacement
vehicles after 2026. These will be more advanced for its ageing fleet of Soviet-era MiG-29 Fulcrum and
versions, tailored to Polish needs and dubbed K2PL Su-22 Fitter combat aircraft, in September Poland
and K9PL. It is noteworthy that the government signed a contract worth approximately USD3.02bn
highlighted security of supply issues in justifying for 48 FA-50 Fighting Eagle multi-role aircraft as part
the choice of South Korea as a strategic partner. This of its broader partnership with South Korea. The first
suggests that the bilateral defence relationship may batch of 12 FA-50s will be delivered in 2022–23 in a
Europe
be driven, at least in part, by a view that South Korean baseline lead-in jet-trainer configuration. This will be
munitions and spares could be useful should the war followed by 32 upgraded FA-50PL aircraft from 2025–
in Europe escalate. 28, including features such as an active electronically
In May, Poland sent a letter of request to the scanned array radar and designed to serve in both
US regarding the potential acquisition of up to air-to-air and ground-attack roles.
500 M142 HIMARS launchers. This would equal
80 standard US Army batteries and, if the contract Force transformation
were to proceed at this scale, could be worth well The scale of the investment in new capabilities is
over USD10bn. However, in October, Poland signed accompanied by an ambitious plan to increase the
a framework contract for the delivery of 288 K239 armed forces to 300,000 personnel by 2035. This total
Chunmoo launchers from South Korea in 2023–28, is intended to comprise around 187,000 professionals
stating that the US would be unable to deliver (as of 2022, this number stood at approximately
the desired number of HIMARS systems in this 114,000), augmented by 50,000 voluntary Territorial
timeframe. In July, Poland secured an agreement Defence Force personnel (32,000 as of the end of
for the delivery in 2023–24 of 116 M1A1 SA Abrams 2021) and a further 50,000 personnel recruited under
MBTs from US Army stocks. The main motivation a new type of one-year service. While this plan may
behind the Abrams decision was to quickly fill the resemble conscription, with troops undergoing
gap in Poland’s armoured brigades; it will be partly one month of basic training and up to 11 months of
financed by the US through the Foreign Military specialist training, the roles are salaried (troops will
Financing system. Meanwhile, Poland’s 2021 request be paid more than conscripts of previous years) and
for 250 M1A2 SEPv3 Abrams remains on track. are designed for volunteers only.
General Dynamics Land Systems said in August that The new personnel plan stems from the decision
it had received the order. The same month saw an to establish two more divisions (making six divisions
Abrams Tank Training Academy open in Poland. in total) and to strengthen existing mechanised
In a move to strengthen close-air-support divisions with an additional armoured brigade
capability, hitherto reliant on some Soviet-era Mil each. These are understood to be key assumptions
Mi-24 helicopters, Poland announced in September of Poland’s ‘Model 2035’ concept, which is
its interest in purchasing 96 AH-64E Apache attack informing modernisation and transformation
helicopters. A letter of request was sent to the US plans. The process of establishing the fifth division
and included a proposal to lease US Army-owned began in September. It will be deployed in eastern
helicopters until the new helicopters could be Poland, between the 16th Mechanised Division,
delivered. It is difficult to estimate the total value which is generally focused towards the north and
of the programme, but it could be in the region of northeast (including the Suwalki Gap and the
USD12–15bn. A smaller contract, worth USD1.7bn, border with Russia’s Kaliningrad exclave), and the
was signed in July with Italian firm Leonardo for 18th Mechanised Division, which is responsible
the acquisition of 32 AW149 multi-role helicopters for defending eastern and southeastern Poland.
(with some close-air-support capability). Intelligence, The latter unit is still being developed and will be
surveillance and reconnaissance capability will be equipped with the M1A1 SA and M1A2 SEPv3
augmented with MQ-9A Reaper systems, which were Abrams MBTs and, in the future, the AH-64 Apache –
leased in October from the US as a ‘bridging’ option, in effect resembling US Army structures. The intent
enabling both the rapid provision of a new capability is for the unit to provide defence and deterrence
and the establishment of a training package, in against potential Russian–Belarussian operations
advance of the acquisition process. from the direction of Brest, in Belarus.
68 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Europe
offsets, into the Armaments Agency (AU). The reform is intended to simplify procedures and responsibilities.
The government originally wanted the organisation to control the state-owned defence conglomerate
Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa (PGZ), though this idea was shelved. Since its inception in January, the AU has
already overseen the signing of significant import contracts such as the USD13.35bn package of equipment
with South Korea and the USD1.15bn deal for M1A2 SEPv3 Abrams main battle tanks (MBT) with General
Dynamics. These deals all include significant work for local industry.
TEMPEST COLLABORATION
JULY
The United Kingdom said that, by 2027, it aims to fly the test demonstrator of its Future Combat Air System
(FCAS) programme, also known as Tempest. It also outlined a roadmap for a strategic partnership with
Japan’s F-X programme, with the nature of the bilateral collaboration between the Tempest/F-X projects
to be decided before the end of 2022. Both countries already cooperate on multiple aerospace research
projects including a new air-to-air missile (JNAAM), sensors (JAGUAR) and propulsion systems. Italy and
Sweden also participate in the Tempest programme, which is led by BAE Systems and involves Rolls-Royce
and the UK divisions of Leonardo and MBDA. Tempest and F-X are intended to start replacing the Typhoon
and the F-2 from the late 2030s.
Spain maintains a sophisticated defence-industrial base, (to be converted into the MRTT configuration in 2023–25),
largely centred on aerospace systems through part-ownership 36 H135 light transport helicopters (with an additional 59 in
of European defence giant Airbus. Spain’s state-owned future), 20 Eurofighter combat aircraft and four C295 light
industrial holding company, the Sociedad Estatal de transport aircraft. Contracts have been signed for all, apart
Participaciones Industriales (SEPI), holds 4.1% of Airbus from the C295s. Also, Spain is participating with other European
shares, though the governments of France and Germany Union members in Phase II of the Future Combat Air System
hold more, at 10.9% each. In the 2010s, Spain’s aerospace (FCAS) programme, the Tiger MkIII attack helicopter project
Europe
procurement was generally limited to small-scale contracts, and the Medium-Altitude Long-Endurance Remotely Piloted
mostly due to budgetary constraints caused by delays to long- Aircraft System (MALE RPAS) uninhabited aerial vehicle (UAV)
running international projects. However, once the economic venture. These will secure substantial local workshare into the
impact of the coronavirus pandemic became clear, the 2020s and beyond. Although Spain has denied claims that it is
government signed several large deals that are partly intended interested in the F-35, speculation persists that the air force
to support the aerospace sector. After Airbus announced would like to acquire these to replace its F/A-18 Hornets.
redundancies in Spain, in 2020, the government agreed to Following Germany’s decision to acquire the F-35, any Spanish
buy a number of aircraft in order to reinforce the industrial purchase would likely add to French unease over its partners’
base. Madrid agreed to acquire three A330 transport aircraft commitment to the FCAS programme.
Europe
Def bdgt [a] EUR 3.55bn 3.45bn 3.39bn Armoured
USD 4.20bn 3.64bn 1 (4th) armd inf bde (1 recce/SP arty bn, 1 tk bn, 2 armd
USD1=EUR 0.84 0.95 inf bn, 1 spt bn)
[a] Includes military pensions Mechanised
Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 1 (3rd) mech inf bde (1 recce/SP arty bn, 3 mech inf bn,
3.56 1 cbt engr bn, 1 spt bn)
Light
1 (7th) lt inf bde (1 recce bn, 3 inf bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 spt bn)
2.56
2008 2015 2022 1 (6th) mtn inf bde (3 mtn inf bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 spt bn)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Population 8,913,088 ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
MBT 56 Leopard 2A4
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus IFV 112 Ulan
Male 7.2% 2.4% 2.6% 3.2% 24.5% 9.0% APC 153
Female 6.8% 2.3% 2.6% 3.1% 24.6% 11.5% APC (T) 32 BvS-10
APC (W) 121: 71 Pandur; 50 Pandur EVO
Capabilities AUV 216: 66 Dingo 2; 150 IVECO LMV
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
Austria remains constitutionally non-aligned, but is an EU member ARV 65: 27 4KH7FA-SB Greif (11 more in store);
and actively engaged in the EU’s CSDP. Defence-policy objec- 28 Dingo 2 ARV; 10 M88A1
tives are based on the 2013 National Security Strategy, the 2014 NBC VEHICLES 12 Dingo 2 AC NBC
Defence Strategy and the 2017 Military Strategy, including pro-
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
viding military capabilities to maintain sovereignty and territorial
integrity, to enable military assistance to the civil authorities and
MSL • MANPATS Bill 2 (PAL 2000)
to participate in crisis-management missions. Authorities are ARTILLERY 105
now shifting emphasis from international operations to home- SP 155mm 48 M109A5ÖE
land defence, and capabilities needed to counter hybrid threats MOR 120mm 57 sGrW 86 (40 more in store)
at home. Assets for international deployments may eventually be
embedded in the EUFOR Crisis Response Operation Core. In June Air Force 2,800
2021, plans to streamline Ministry of Defence structures were The Air Force is part of Joint Forces Comd and consists of
announced. Implementation began in May 2022. There is a plan 2 bde; Air Support Comd and Airspace Surveillance Comd
to group Cyber, CIS and EW capabilities together in one director-
ate. While not a NATO member, Austria joined NATO’s Partnership FORCES BY ROLE
for Peace framework in 1995. A September 2019 defence ministry FIGHTER
report defined recapitalisation requirements until 2030. It warned 2 sqn with Eurofighter Typhoon
that the gap between requirements and available resources ISR
was growing and would ultimately undermine the ability of the 1 sqn with PC-6B Turbo Porter
armed forces to implement its missions. The level of ambition for TRANSPORT
crisis response is to be able to deploy and sustain a minimum (on 1 sqn with C-130K Hercules
average) of 1,100 troops. The September 2019 report also called TRAINING
for the Eurofighter fleet to be upgraded rather than replaced. In
1 trg sqn with PC-7 Turbo Trainer
October 2022, plans were mooted to procure a small number of
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
additional Eurofighters, two-seaters from the German inventory,
and upgrade the existing fleet. There is cooperation with Italy over 2 sqn with Bell 212 (AB-212)
helicopter procurement. Austria’s defence-industrial base is com- 1 sqn with OH-58B Kiowa
prised of some 100 companies with significant niche capabilities 1 sqn with S-70A Black Hawk
and international ties in the areas of weapons and ammunitions, 2 sqn with SA316/SA319 Alouette III
communications equipment and vehicles. AIR DEFENCE
2 bn
ACTIVE 23,300 (Land Forces 13,000 Air 2,800 1 radar bn
Support 7,500)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Conscript liability 6 months recruit trg, 30 days reservist refresher
AIRCRAFT 13 combat capable
trg for volunteers; 120–150 days additional for officers, NCOs and
specialists. Authorised maximum wartime strength of 55,000 FTR 13 Eurofighter Typhoon (Tranche 1)
74 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR (Operation Althea) Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
167; 1 inf bn HQ; 1 inf coy; 1 hel unit
Male 8.8% 2.9% 2.9% 3.1% 23.0% 8.7%
CYPRUS: UN • UNFICYP 3
Female 8.4% 2.7% 2.8% 3.0% 22.8% 11.0%
LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 171; 1 log coy
MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 5; UN • MINUSMA 2 Capabilities
MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 4 In July 2016, the government published its Strategic Vision for
Defence for 2030. This was updated in June 2022, when the Secu-
SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 244; 1 recce coy; 1 mech inf coy;
rity/Service, Technology, Ambition, Resilience (STAR) Plan was
1 log coy; UN • UNMIK 1 approved by parliament. A month later, in July, a new military pro-
WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 4 gramming law was approved which heralded increased defence
budgets out to 2030. These are intended to address three key areas:
to increase personnel numbers, strengthen the defence technologi-
cal and industrial base, and deliver major equipment investments.
Recruitment and retention criteria are under scrutiny, after retire-
ments and establishment reductions in recent decades. Invest-
ments are planned for the motorised brigade, medical support
and mobility, with over half of the STAR Plan’s investments slated
for the land domain. There is focus on ‘dual capability’ investments
that can used in contingencies at home as well as for miliary opera-
tions. A Cyber Command was inaugurated in October, falling under
the authority of the military intelligence service. NATO, EU and UN
membership are central to defence policy. Belgium often cooper-
ates with neighbours and has committed with Denmark and the
Netherlands to form a composite combined special-operations
command. The air force is forming a joint A400M unit with Luxem-
bourg. Investment projects include fighter aircraft, frigates, mine-
countermeasures vessels (being procured jointly with the Neth-
erlands), UAVs and land-combat vehicles. The army has ordered
French Griffon and Jaguar wheeled armoured vehicles as well as the
US JLTV. CAESAR NG self-propelled artillery pieces are being pro-
cured and will likely arrive from 2027. The air force has selected the
F-35 to replace its F-16s and deliveries are planned from 2023, with
IOC expected in 2025. It is also procuring UAVs and is looking to
buy light utility, heavy transport and search-and-rescue helicopters.
Belgium has an advanced, export-focused defense industry, focus-
ing on components and subcontracting, though in FN Herstal it has
one of the world’s largest manufacturers of small arms.
Europe 75
Europe
SPECIAL FORCES EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 spec ops regt (1 SF gp, 1 cdo bn, 1 para bn, 1 sigs gp) AIRCRAFT 53 combat capable
MANOEUVRE FTR 53: 44 F-16AM Fighting Falcon; 9 F-16BM
Mechanised Fighting Falcon
1 mech bde (1 ISR bn; 3 mech bn; 2 lt inf bn; 1 arty bn; TPT 8: Heavy 6 A400M; PAX 2 Falcon 7X (VIP, leased)
2 engr bn; 2 sigs gp; 2 log bn) TRG 32: 9 SF-260D; 23 SF-260M
COMBAT SUPPORT HELICOPTERS
1 CIMIC gp ASW 4 NH90 NFH (opcon Navy)
1 EOD unit TPT 11: Medium 4 NH90 TTH; Light 7 AW109 (ISR)
1 MP coy (7 more in store)
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
1 log bn AAM • IR AIM-9M Sidewinder; IIR AIM-9X Sidewinder
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE II; ARH AIM-120B AMRAAM
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES BOMBS
ASLT 18 Piranha III-C DF90 Laser-guided: GBU-10/-12 Paveway II; GBU-24 Paveway III
RECCE 30 Pandur Recce Laser & INS/GPS-guided: GBU-54 Laser JDAM
IFV 19 Piranha III-C DF30 (dual-mode)
APC • APC (W) 78: 64 Piranha III-C; 14 Piranha III-PC (CP) INS/GPS guided: GBU-31 JDAM; GBU-38 JDAM;
AUV 655: 219 Dingo 2 (inc 52 CP); 436 IVECO LMV GBU-39 Small Diameter Bomb
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
AEV 14: 6 Pionierpanzer 2 Dachs; 8 Piranha III-C Medical Service 1,450
ARV 13: 4 Pandur; 9 Piranha III-C
FORCES BY ROLE
VLB 4 Leguan
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
MSL • MANPATS Spike-MR 4 med unit
ARTILLERY 60 1 fd hospital
TOWED 105mm 14 LG1 MkII EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
MOR 46: 81mm 14 Expal; 120mm 32 RT-61 ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
APC • APC (W) 10: 4 Pandur (amb); 6 Piranha III-C (amb)
Naval Component 1,400 AUV 10 Dingo 2 (amb)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 2
DEPLOYMENT
FFGHM 2 Leopold I (ex-NLD Karel Doorman) with 2 quad
lnchr with RGM-84 Harpoon AShM, 1 16-cell Mk 48 mod DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN •
1 VLS with RIM-7P Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 twin 324mm MONUSCO 1
SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Goalkeeper CIWS, IRAQ: Operation Inherent Resolve 6; NATO • NATO
1 76mm gun (capacity 1 med hel) Mission Iraq 7
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS
PCC 2 Castor (FRA Kermorvan mod) LITHUANIA: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 150;
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 1 mech inf coy with Piranha DF30/DF90
MHC 5 Flower (Tripartite) MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 15; UN • MINUSMA 53
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 2
MEDITERRANEAN SEA: NATO • SNMCMG 2: 50; 1 MHC
AGOR 1 Belgica
AXS 1 Zenobe Gramme MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 1
MOZAMBIQUE: EU • EUTM Mozambique 3
Air Component 4,900 ROMANIA: NATO • Enhanced Vigilance Activities 250;
FORCES BY ROLE 1 mech inf coy with Piranha IIIC
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK/ISR
4 sqn with F-16AM/BM Fighting Falcon
SEARCH & RESCUE FOREIGN FORCES
1 sqn with NH90 NFH United States US European Command: 1,150
76 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus Air Force and Air Defence Brigade 800
Male 6.8% 2.3% 2.9% 3.2% 26.6% 7.0% FORCES BY ROLE
Female 6.4% 2.2% 2.7% 2.9% 26.8% 10.2% HELICOPTER
1 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); Mi-8MTV Hip;
Capabilities Mi-17 Hip H
1 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H Huey II); Mi-8 Hip;
The armed forces’ primary goals are to defend territorial integ-
rity and contribute to peacekeeping missions and potential tasks SA-341H/SA-342L Gazelle (HN-42/45M)
relating to aid to the civil authorities. Bosnia-Herzegovina joined AIR DEFENCE
NATO’s Partnership for Peace in 2006 and a Membership Action 1 AD bn
Plan was presented in 2010. Its aspiration to join NATO has been EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
delayed due to unresolved defence-property issues, and con- AIRCRAFT
tinuing ethnic tensions have seen the ethnic Serb community FGA (7 J-22 Orao in store)
threaten to withdraw from national structures including the
ATK (6 J-1 (J-21) Jastreb; 3 TJ-1(NJ-21) Jastreb all in store)
armed forces. The country is reforming its armed forces and mod-
ernising its equipment in accordance with its Defence Review,
ISR (2 RJ-1 (IJ-21) Jastreb* in store)
Development and Modernisation Plan for 2017–27 and its NATO TRG (1 G-4 Super Galeb (N-62)* in store)
aspirations. The armed forces are professional and represent all HELICOPTERS
three ethnic groups. However, low salaries may negatively affect MRH 9: 4 Mi-8MTV Hip; 1 Mi-17 Hip H; 1 SA-341H
recruitment and retention. Bosnia-Herzegovina contributes to EU, Gazelle (HN-42); up to 3 SA-342L Gazelle (HN-45M)
NATO and UN missions, but the armed forces have no capacity to TPT 17: Medium 8 Mi-8 Hip Light 9: 6 Bell 205 (UH-1H
deploy independently and self-sustain beyond national borders. Iroquois) (of which 2 MEDEVAC); 3 Bell 205 (UH-1H
The inventory comprises mainly ageing Soviet-era equipment, Huey II) (1 UH-1H Huey II in store)
though some new helicopters have been procured from the US.
AIR DEFENCE
Bosnia-Herzegovina has little in the way of a domestic defence
industry, with only the capability to produce small arms, ammuni-
SAM
tion and explosives. Short-range 20 2K12 Kub (RS-SA-6 Gainful)
Point-defence 9K34 Strela-3 (RS-SA-14 Gremlin);
ACTIVE 10,500 (Armed Forces 10,500) 9K310 Igla-1 (RS-SA-16 Gimlet)
GUNS • TOWED 40mm 47: 31 L/60, 16 L/70
RESERVE 6,000 (Armed Forces 6,000)
Hungary 192; 1 inf coy requested also from Israel and the US. In 2022, Bulgaria estab-
Ireland 5 lished and led a NATO multinational battle group. In an attempt
Italy 346; 1 inf bn HQ; 1 inf coy; 1 ISR coy to cope with personnel shortfalls, the military retirement age
and salaries have been increased, yet several roles needed to
Macedonia, North 1 strengthen the armed forces remain understrength. Training is
Poland 38 understood to be prioritised for units intended for international
Portugal 1 operations and those with certain readiness levels declared to
Romania 203; 1 inf coy NATO and the EU. Bulgaria regularly trains and exercises with
Slovakia 53 NATO partners and regional allies. There are also plans for acqui-
sitions to enable the formation of battalion battlegroups within
Slovenia 16
Europe
its mechanised brigades. The navy is looking to procure a multi-
Spain 3 purpose patrol vessel and modernise its frigates to boost its pres-
Switzerland 20 ence in the Black Sea. T-72 modernisation is underway, and the
Turkey 242; 1 inf coy local upgrade of 40 T-72s for the ground forces is expected to be
complete in 2023, with this including upgraded battle manage-
ment systems. Bulgaria’s defence industry exports small arms but
Bulgaria BLG has limited capacity to design and manufacture platforms.
Bulgarian Lev BGN 2021 2022 2023 ACTIVE 36,950 (Army 17,000 Navy 4,450 Air 8,500
GDP BGN 133bn 157bn Central Staff 7,000)
USD 80.3bn 85.0bn
RESERVE 3,000 (Joint 3,000)
per capita USD 11,746 12,505
Growth % 4.2 3.9
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
Inflation % 2.8 12.4
Def exp [a] BGN 2.11bn 2.48bn
Army 17,000
USD 1.28bn 1.34bn
FORCES BY ROLE
Def bdgt [b] BGN 2.10bn 2.48bn 2.97bn
MANOEUVRE
USD 1.27bn 1.34bn
Reconnaissance
USD1=BGN 1.65 1.85 1 recce bn
[a] NATO figure Mechanised
[b] Excludes military pensions 2 mech bde (4 mech inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn,
Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 1 log bn, 1 SAM bn)
1730 Light
1 mtn inf regt
565 COMBAT SUPPORT
2008 2015 2022 1 arty regt (1 fd arty bn, 1 MRL bn)
1 engr regt (1 cbt engr bn, 1 ptn br bn, 1 engr spt bn)
Population 6,873,253
1 NBC bn
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
1 log regt
Male 7.3% 2.6% 2.5% 2.7% 25.4% 8.3%
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Female 6.9% 2.4% 2.3% 2.4% 24.9% 12.3%
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
MBT 90 T-72M1/M2†
Capabilities IFV 160: 90 BMP-1; 70 BMP-23
The armed forces’ main priority is defending state sovereignty and APC 120
territorial integrity. The Programme 2032 long-term development APC (T) 100 MT-LB
plan was adopted in 2021, involving significant re-equipment and APC (W) 20 BTR-60
modernisation and a focus on artificial intelligence and cyber capa-
AUV 44: 17 M1117 ASV; 27 Plasan SandCat
bility. Bulgaria signed a ten-year Defence Cooperation Roadmap
with the US in 2020 to assist force development. There are several ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
bilateral defence cooperation agreements with regional states. AEV MT-LB
Bulgaria’s airspace is protected by joint activities with NATO’s ARV T-54/T-55; MTP-1; MT-LB
Air Policing Mission, due to the country’s limited numbers of VLB BLG67; TMM
combat aircraft. In September, the defence ministry announced ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
it had allocated funds to purchase a further eight F-16C/Ds, on MSL
top of the eight agreed earlier. These aircraft are not expected
SP 24 9P148 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel)
to arrive until 2025. Bulgaria’s MiG-29s are due for retirement
in 2023, and the government in October said it was looking at MANPATS 9K111 Fagot (RS-AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1
options to improve their availability, including by securing addi- Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel); (9K11 Malyutka (RS-AT-3
tional engines from Poland. The government also received offers Sagger) in store)
for interim combat aircraft from Sweden and France, with offers GUNS 126: 85mm (150 D-44 in store); 100mm 126 MT-12
78 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Europe
Def exp [a] HRK 8.67bn 9.37bn
MANOEUVRE
USD 1.36bn 1.32bn Armoured
Def bdgt [b] HRK 8.99bn 9.07bn 8.43bn 1 armd bde (1 tk bn, 2 armd inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 ADA
USD 1.41bn 1.27bn bn, 1 cbt engr bn)
USD1=HRK 6.36 7.13 Mechanised
[a] NATO figure 1 mech bde (3 mech inf bn, 1 lt mech inf bn, 1 fd arty bn,
1 ADA bn, 1 cbt engr bn)
[b] Includes military pensions
Other
Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 1 inf trg regt
1209
COMBAT SUPPORT
1 arty/MRL regt
620 1 engr regt
2008 2015 2022
1 NBC bn
Population 4,188,853 1 sigs bn
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus 1 log regt
AIR DEFENCE
Male 7.3% 2.5% 2.8% 3.1% 23.5% 9.2%
1 ADA regt
Female 6.8% 2.3% 2.6% 2.9% 24.0% 13.0%
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
Capabilities MBT 74 M-84
Principal tasks for the armed forces include defending national IFV 102 M-80
sovereignty and territorial integrity as well as tackling terrorism APC 184
and contributing to international peacekeeping missions. The APC (T) 11: 7 BTR-50; 4 OT M-60
defence ministry is working on a new long-term development plan APC (W) 132: 6 BOV-VP; 126 Patria AMV (incl variants)
and a new defence strategy. Croatia reformed its armed forces, to PPV 41: 21 Maxxpro Plus; 20 RG-33 HAGA (amb)
create a small professional force, prior to joining NATO in 2009. AUV 133: 10 IVECO LMV; 123 M-ATV
There have been recent moves to improve conditions of service ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
and to increase the proportion of the budget focused on equip- ARV 22: 12 JVBT-55A; 1 M-84AI; 1 WZT-2; 2 WZT-3;
ment investment. Zagreb has defence cooperation agreements 5 Maxxpro Recovery
with Bosnia-Herzegovina, Hungary and Romania, and person- VLB 5 MT-55A
nel frequently train with regional and international allies. Croatia MW 4 MV-4
hosts the NATO Multinational Special Aviation Programme and ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL
training centre and participates in EU and NATO missions, includ- SP 20 BOV-1
ing NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence in Poland. The inventory MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger); 9K111
is mainly composed of ageing Soviet-era equipment. In May 2021, Fagot (RS-AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1 Konkurs (RS-AT-5
Croatia announced the purchase of second-hand Rafale F3-R fight- Spandrel); 9K115 Metis (RS-AT-7 Saxhorn)
ers from France. Maintenance personnel were training in France as ARTILLERY 157
of November 2022, with pilot training expected to start in 2023. SP 21: 122mm 8 2S1 Gvozdika; 155mm 13 PzH 2000
The army will re-equip with Bradley IFVs, acquired from the US, and TOWED 122mm 24 D-30
the year saw a modest boost to rotary-wing capability with the
MRL 122mm 18: 6 M91 Vulkan; 12 BM-21 Grad
US donation of two UH-60M helicopters. The authorities are also
MOR 94: 82mm 54 LMB M96; 120mm 40 M-75/UBM 52
looking to acquire short- and medium-range air-defence systems.
AIR DEFENCE
Croatia has a small defence industry, focused on small arms,
SAM • Point-defence 9+: 3 9K35 Strela-10M3
ammunition, explosives and naval systems.
(RS-SA-13 Gopher); 6 9K35 Strela-10CRO; 9K310 Igla-1
ACTIVE 16,700 (Army 11,100 Navy 1,650 Air 1,600 (RS-SA-16 Gimlet)
Joint 2,350) GUNS SP 20mm 6 BOV-3 SP
Conscript liability Voluntary conscription, 8 weeks
Navy 1,650
RESERVE 21,000 (Army 21,000) Navy HQ at Split
80 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
the procurement of H145M helicopters from France. Cyprus has little Maritime Wing
in the way of a domestic defence industry, with no ability to design
and manufacture modern equipment. However, the government is FORCES BY ROLE
looking for opportunities to cooperate with defence firms in Greece. COMBAT SUPPORT
1 (coastal defence) AShM bty with MM40 Exocet AShM
ACTIVE 12,000 (National Guard 12,000) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 250 PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 6
Conscript liability 15 months PCC 2: 1 Alasia (ex-OMN Al Mabrukha) with 1 hel
RESERVE 50,000 (National Guard 50,000) landing platform; 1 OPV 62 (ISR Sa’ar 4.5 derivative)
Reserve service to age 50 (officers dependent on rank; PBF 4: 2 Rodman 55; 2 Vittoria
Europe
military doctors to age 60) COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM 3 MM40 Exocet
Air Wing
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
HELICOPTERS
National Guard 12,000 (incl conscripts) ATK 11 Mi-35P Hind E (offered for sale)
FORCES BY ROLE MRH 7: 3 AW139 (SAR); 4 SA342L1 Gazelle (with
SPECIAL FORCES HOT for anti-armour role)
1 comd (regt) (1 SF bn)
MANOEUVRE Paramilitary 250
Armoured
1 armd bde (2 armd bn, 1 armd inf bn) Maritime Police 250
Mechanised EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
4 (1st, 2nd, 6th & 7th) mech bde PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 10
Light PBF 5: 2 Poseidon; 1 Shaldag; 2 Vittoria
1 (4th) lt inf bde PB 5 SAB-12
2 (2nd & 8th) lt inf regt
COMBAT SUPPORT
DEPLOYMENT
1 arty comd (8 arty bn)
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 2
1 (3rd) spt bde
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE FOREIGN FORCES
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
Argentina UNFICYP 251; 2 inf coy; 1 hel flt
MBT 134: 82 T-80U; 52 AMX-30B2
Austria UNFICYP 3
RECCE 79 EE-9 Cascavel
IFV 43 BMP-3 Brazil UNFICYP 2
APC 294 Canada UNFICYP 1
APC (T) 168 Leonidas Chile UNFICYP 6
APC (W) 126 VAB (incl variants) Ghana UNFICYP 1
AUV 8 BOV M16 Milos Greece Army: 950
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES Hungary UNFICYP 13
ARV 2+: 2 AMX-30D; BREM-80U India UNFICYP 1
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE Norway UNFICYP 2
MSL
Pakistan UNFICYP 3
SP 33: 15 EE-3 Jararaca with Milan; 18 VAB with HOT
RCL 106mm 144 M40A1 Paraguay UNFICYP 12
GUNS • TOWED 100mm 6 M-1944 Russia UNFICYP 6
ARTILLERY 412 Serbia UNFICYP 8
SP 155mm 48: 24 NORA B-52; 12 Mk F3; 12 Zuzana Slovakia UNFICYP 300; 2 inf coy; 1 engr pl
TOWED 60: 105mm 48 M-56; 155mm 12 TR-F-1 United Kingdom 2,260; 2 inf bn; 1 hel sqn with 4 Bell 412
MRL 22: 122mm 4 BM-21; 128mm 18 M-63 Plamen Twin Huey • Operation Inherent Resolve (Shader) 500: 1 FGA
MOR 282: 81mm 170 E-44 (70+ M1/M9 in store); sqn with 10 Typhoon FGR4; 1 A330 MRTT Voyager KC3;
120mm 112 RT61 2 C-130J-30 Hercules • UNFICYP (Operation Tosca) 253: 2
AIR DEFENCE inf coy
SAM 22+
Medium-range 4 9K37M1 Buk M1-2 (RS-SA-11 Gadfly)
Short-range 18: 12 Aspide; 6 9K331 Tor-M1 (RS-
TERRITORY WHERE THE GOVERNMENT
SA-15 Gauntlet) DOES NOT EXERCISE EFFECTIVE CONTROL
Point-defence Mistral Data here represents the de facto situation on the northern
GUNS • TOWED 60: 20mm 36 M-55; 35mm 24 GDF-003 section of the island. This does not imply international
(with Skyguard) recognition as a sovereign state.
82 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
Czech Republic CZE
Army ε3,000 Czech Koruna CZK 2021 2022 2023
FORCES BY ROLE GDP CZK 6.11tr 6.89tr
MANOEUVRE USD 282bn 296bn
Light
per capita USD 26,849 28,095
5 inf bn
Growth % 3.5 1.9
7 inf bn (reserve)
Inflation % 3.8 16.3
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE Def exp [a] CZK 84.9bn 89.2bn
MSL • MANPATS Milan USD 3.91bn 3.83bn
RCL • 106mm 36 Def bdgt [b] CZK 85.4bn 89.1bn 112bn
ARTILLERY • MOR • 120mm 73 USD 3.94bn 3.83bn
USD1=CZK 21.68 23.30
Gendarmerie & Paramilitary [a] NATO figure
Armed Police ε150 [b] Includes military pensions
FORCES BY ROLE Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015)
SPECIAL FORCES 2.95
1 (police) SF unit
1.73
Coast Guard 2008 2015 2022
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Population 10,705,384
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 6
PCC 5: 2 SG45/SG46; 1 Rauf Denktash; 2 US Mk 5
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
PB 1
Male 7.7% 2.5% 2.4% 2.8% 25.1% 8.8%
Female 7.3% 2.4% 2.2% 2.6% 24.2% 12.1%
FOREIGN FORCES
TURKEY Capabilities
Army ε33,800
The ‘Long Term Outlook for Defence 2035’ and the ‘Czech Armed
FORCES BY ROLE Forces Development Concept 2030’, both published in 2019, dis-
1 corps HQ; 1 SF regt; 1 armd bde; 2 mech inf div; cussed the evolving security environment, among other issues. In
1 mech inf regt; 1 arty regt; 1 avn comd January 2022, the defence ministry released a priorities list that
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE included recruiting more personnel, a commitment to spend 2%
of GDP on defence by 2025, to streamline the acquisition process
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
and to establish an investment fund for strategic modernisation
MBT 287 M48A5T1
projects by 2024. After Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine,
IFV 145 ACV AIFV Prague announced a boost to defence spending and has donated
APC • APC (T) 488: 70 ACV AAPC (incl variants); a significant amount of materiel to Kyiv. In response, allies have
418 M113 (incl variants) donated equipment to the Czech armed forces including, from
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE Germany, 14 Leopard 2A4 MBTs. A Defence Cooperation Agree-
MSL ment was agreed with the US in April 2022. The US has granted
SP 66 ACV TOW funds under the Foreign Military Financing programme in part to
MANPATS Milan help replace equipment donated to Ukraine. Modernisation pri-
RCL 106mm 219 M40A1 orities include infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) for a heavy brigade,
self-propelled howitzers, multi-role helicopters, transport aircraft,
ARTILLERY 656
short-range air-defence systems and UAVs. In July, the govern-
SP 155mm 178: 30 M44T; 144 M52T1; 4 T-155 Firtina ment cancelled a tender for new IFVs, and opened negotiations
TOWED 84: 105mm 36 M101A1; 155mm 36 M114A2; with Sweden for the CV90. Prague has entered into negotiations
203mm 12 M115 with the US to acquire 24 F-35s as a long-term replacement for its
MRL 122mm 18 T-122 leased Gripen combat aircraft, and it is reported that the ministry
MOR 376: 81mm 171; 107mm 70 M30; 120mm 135 HY-12 is looking to acquire Heron 1 UAVs from Israel. The armed forces
Europe 83
Europe
Czech national reinforced air-defence system. The air force
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE also provides CAS for army SAR, and performs a tpt role
FORCES BY ROLE
Army 14,700 FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
FORCES BY ROLE 1 sqn with Gripen C/D
MANOEUVRE 1 sqn with L-159 ALCA; L-159T1*
Reconnaissance TRANSPORT
1 ISR/EW regt (1 recce bn, 1 EW bn, 1 ISR UAV bn) 2 sqn with A319CJ; C295M/MW; CL-601 Challenger;
Armoured L-410FG/UVP-E Turbolet
1 (7th) mech bde (1 tk bn, 2 armd inf bn, 1 mot inf bn) TRAINING
Mechanised 1 sqn with L-159 ALCA; L-159T1*; L-159T2*
1 (4th) rapid reaction bde (2 mech inf bn, 1 mot inf bn) ATTACK HELICOPTER
Airborne 1 sqn with Mi-24/Mi-35 Hind D/E
1 AB regt TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
COMBAT SUPPORT 1 sqn with Mi-17 Hip H; Mi-171Sh
1 (13th) arty regt (2 arty bn) 1 sqn with Mi-8 Hip; Mi-17 Hip H; PZL W-3A Sokol
1 engr regt (2 engr bn, 1 EOD bn) AIR DEFENCE
1 CBRN regt (2 CBRN bn) 1 (25th) SAM regt (2 AD gp)
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 log regt (2 log bn, 1 maint bn)
AIRCRAFT 38 combat capable
Active Reserve FGA 14: 12 Gripen C; 2 Gripen D
ATK 16 L-159 ALCA
FORCES BY ROLE
TPT 15: Light 12: 4 C295M; 2 C295MW; 2 L-410FG
COMMAND
14 (territorial defence) comd Turbolet; 4 L-410UVP-E Turbolet; PAX 3: 2 A319CJ; 1 CL-
MANOEUVRE 601 Challenger
Armoured TRG 8: 5 L-159T1*; 3 L-159T2*
1 armd coy HELICOPTERS
Light ATK 17: 7 Mi-24 Hind D; 10 Mi-35 Hind E
14 inf coy (1 per territorial comd) (3 inf pl, 1 cbt spt pl, MRH 5 Mi-17 Hip H
1 log pl) TPT • Medium 30: 4 Mi-8 Hip; 16 Mi-171Sh; 10 PZL
W3A Sokol
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIR DEFENCE • SAM
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
Point-defence 9K35 Strela-10 (RS-SA-13 Gopher); 9K32
MBT 30 T-72M4CZ (up to 89 T-72M1 in store)
Strela-2‡ (RS-SA-7 Grail) (available for trg RBS-70
RECCE 50: 34 BPzV Svatava; 8 Pandur II (KBV-PZ);
gunners); RBS-70
8 Pandur II (KBV-PZLOK)
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
IFV 227: 120 BMP-2; 107 Pandur II (incl 17 CP, 14
comms, 4 amb); (up to 98 BMP-1; 65 BMP-2 all in store) AAM • IR AIM-9M Sidewinder; ARH AIM-120C-5
APC • PPV 1 Titus AMRAAM
AUV 141: 21 Dingo 2; 120 IVECO LMV BOMBS
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES Laser-guided: GBU-12/-16 Paveway II
AEV 4 Pandur II (KOT-Z)
ARV 13+: 10 VPV-ARV (12 more in store); VT-55A; Other Forces 6,050
3 VT-72M4 FORCES BY ROLE
VLB 6 MT-55A (3 more in store) SPECIAL FORCES
MW Bozena 5; UOS-155 Belarty 1 SF gp
NBC VEHICLES BRDM-2RCH MANOEUVRE
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE Other
MSL • MANPATS 9K111-1 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel); 1 (presidential) gd bde (2 bn)
FGM-148 Javelin; Spike-LR 1 (honour guard) gd bn (2 coy)
84 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Europe
AUV 158: 84 Eagle IV; 59 Eagle V; 15 HMT-400
1 sqn with AS550 Fennec (ISR)
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
TRANSPORT
AEV 3 Wisent
1 sqn with C-130J-30 Hercules; CL-604 Challenger
ARV 8 Wisent
(MP/VIP)
VLB 6 BRP-1 Biber
TRAINING
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
1 unit with MFI-17 Supporter (T-17)
MSL • MANPATS Spike-LR2
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
RCL 84mm Carl Gustaf
AIRCRAFT 50 combat capable
ARTILLERY 50
FTR 44: 34 F-16AM Fighting Falcon; 10 F-16BM
SP 155mm 15 CAESAR 8×8
Fighting Falcon (30 operational)
MOR 35: TOWED 120mm 20 Soltam K6B1; SP 120mm
FGA 6 F-35A Lightning II
15 Piranha V with Cardom-10 TPT 8: Medium 4 C-130J-30 Hercules; PAX 4 CL-604
AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence FIM-92 Stinger Challenger (MP/VIP)
TRG 27 MFI-17 Supporter (T-17)
Navy 2,250 HELICOPTERS
Three naval squadrons, headquartered at naval bases in ASW 9 MH-60R Seahawk
Frederikshavn and Korsør SAR 8 AW101 Merlin
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE MRH 8 AS550 Fennec (ISR) (4 more non-operational)
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 5 TPT • Medium 6 AW101 Merlin
DESTROYERS • DDGHM 3 Iver Huitfeldt with 4 quad AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
lnchr with RGM-84L Harpoon Block II AShM, 4 8-cell Mk AAM • IR AIM-9L Sidewinder; IIR AIM-9X Sidewinder
41 VLS (to be fitted with SM-2 SAM), 2 12-cell Mk 56 II; ARH AIM-120B AMRAAM
VLS with RIM-162B ESSM SAM, 2 twin 324mm TT with BOMBS
MU90 LWT, 1 Millennium CIWS, 2 76mm guns (capacity Laser-guided GBU-24 Paveway III
Laser & INS/GPS-guided EGBU-12 Paveway II
1 AW101 Merlin/MH-60R Seahawk hel)
INS/GPS guided GBU-31 JDAM
FRIGATES • FFGHM 2 Absalon (flexible support ships)
with 4 quad lnchr with RGM-84L Harpoon Block II Control and Air Defence Group
AShM, 3 12-cell Mk 56 VLS with RIM-162B ESSM SAM, 1 Control and Reporting Centre, 1 Mobile Control and
2 twin 324mm TT with MU90 LWT, 2 Millennium CIWS, 1 Reporting Centre. 4 Radar sites
127mm gun (capacity 2 AW101 Merlin/MH-60R Seahawk
hel; 2 LCP, 7 MBT or 40 vehicles; 130 troops) Special Operations Command
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 12 FORCES BY ROLE
PSOH 4 Thetis 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 MH-60R Seahawk) SPECIAL FORCES
PSO 3 Knud Rasmussen with 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing 1 SF unit
platform (ice-strengthened hull) 1 diving unit
PCC 5 Diana (1 other non-operational)
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 6 Reserves
MCI 4 MSF Mk I
MSD 2 Holm Home Guard (Army) 34,400 reservists (to age 50)
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 12 2 (local) def region
ABU 2 Gunnar Thorson (primarily used for Home Guard (Navy) 5,300 reservists (to age 50)
MARPOL duties)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AE 1 Sleipner PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 30
AGS 2 Holm PB 30: 18 MHV800; 12 MHV900
AKL 2 Seatruck
AX 1 Søløven (DNK Flyvefisken) Home Guard (Air Force) 4,500 reservists (to age 50)
AXL 2 Holm EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AXS 2 Svanen AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 2 BN-2A Islander
86 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE DEPLOYMENT
Reconnaissance IRAQ: Operation Inherent Resolve 10 • NATO Mission Iraq 40
1 recce coy LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 1
Light
3 inf bn MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 10; UN • MINUSMA 2
4 (territorial) inf bn MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 3
COMBAT SUPPORT MOZAMBIQUE: EU • EUTM Mozambique 1
1 arty bn
1 AT coy
Europe
1 cbt engr bn
FOREIGN FORCES
AIR DEFENCE All NATO Enhanced Forward Presence unless stated
1 AD bn Denmark 155; 1 tk sqn
France 219; 1 inf coy
Navy 300; 100 conscript (total 400) Germany NATO Baltic Air Policing: 150;
4 Eurofighter Typhoon
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
United Kingdom 1,750; 1 armd BG; 1 lt inf BG; 1 SP arty
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 2 Roland
bty; 1 MRL bty; 1 cbt engr coy
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 4:
MCCS 1 Tasuja (ex-DNK Lindormen)
MHC 3 Admiral Cowan (ex-UK Sandown) Finland FIN
Euro EUR 2021 2022 2023
Air Force 400
FORCES BY ROLE GDP EUR 251bn 266bn
TRANSPORT USD 298bn 281bn
1 sqn with M-28 Skytruck per capita USD 53,774 50,818
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER Growth % 3.0 2.1
1 sqn with R-44 Raven II Inflation % 2.1 6.5
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Def bdgt [a] EUR 5.00bn 5.51bn 6.62bn
AIRCRAFT USD 5.91bn 5.82bn
TPT • Light 2 M-28 Skytruck
USD1=EUR 0.84 0.95
TRG 1+ L-39C Albatros (leased)
[a] Includes military pensions
HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 2 R-44 Raven II
Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015)
Other 1,300; 800 conscript (total 2,100) 5.42
intends to increase the number of personnel in the defence forces. (CP); 48 XA-203 Sisu; 62 AMV (XA-360)
There are plans to boost readiness by increasing the number of AUV 6 SISU GTP (in test)
reservists participating in refresher training. In December 2021 the ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
F-35 was selected for the air force’s HX Fighter Program to replace AEV 5 Dachs
its F/A-18s. Under the Squadron 2020 project, the navy will replace
ARV 36: 9 BPz-2; 15 MTP-LB; 12 VT-55A
patrol boats and minelayers with corvette-sized vessels. Finland’s
defence industry consists largely of privately owned SMEs, concen- VLB 31: 12 BLG-60M2; 10 Leopard 2L AVLB; 9 SISU Leguan
trating on niche products for international markets, but it also fea- MW 6+: Aardvark Mk 2; KMT T-55; 6 Leopard 2R CEV;
tures some internationally competitive larger companies produc- RA-140 DS
ing wheeled armoured vehicles and turreted mortar systems. ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
MSL • MANPATS NLAW; Spike-MR; Spike-LR
ACTIVE 19,250 (Army 13,400 Navy 3,150 Air 2,700)
ARTILLERY 682
Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 2,700
Conscript liability 165, 255 or 347 days (latter for NCOs, officers or SP 122mm 59: 23 K9 Thunder; 36 2S1 Gvozdika (PsH 74)
those on ‘especially demanding’ duties) TOWED 288: 122mm 234 D-30 (H 63); 155mm 54 K 83/
GH-52 (K 98)
RESERVE 238,000 (Army 185,000 Navy 24,000 MRL 56: 122mm 34 RM-70; 227mm 22 M270 MLRS
Air 29,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 12,000 MOR 279+: 81mm Krh/71; 120mm 261 Krh/92; SP 120mm
18,000 reservists a year conduct refresher training: total obligation
18 XA-361 AMOS
80 days (150 for NCOs, 200 for officers) between conscript service
and age 50 (NCOs and officers to age 60) HELICOPTERS
MRH 7: 5 Hughes 500D; 2 Hughes 500E
TPT • Medium 20 NH90 TTH
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES
ISR
Army 4,400; 9,000 conscript (total 13,400) Medium 11 ADS-95 Ranger
FORCES BY ROLE AIR DEFENCE
Finland’s army maintains a mobilisation strength of about SAM 60+
285,000. In support of this requirement, two conscription Short-range 44: 20 Crotale NG (ITO 90); 24 NASAMS
cycles, each for about 9,000 conscripts, take place each year. II FIN (ITO 12)
After conscript training, reservist commitment is to the age of Point-defence 16+: 16 ASRAD (ITO 05); FIM-92 Stinger
60. Reservists are usually assigned to units within their local
(ITO 15); RBS 70 (ITO 05/05M)
geographical area. All service appointments or deployments
GUNS 407+: 23mm ItK 95/ZU-23-2 (ItK 61); 35mm GDF-
outside Finnish borders are voluntary for all members of the
005 (ItK 88); SP 35mm 7 Leopard 2 ITK Marksman
armed services. All brigades are reserve based
Europe
AShM 4 RBS15K
ARTY • 130mm 30 K-53tk (static) DEPLOYMENT
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
MSL • MANPATS Spike (used in AShM role) IRAQ: Operation Inherent Resolve 75; 1 trg team; NATO •
NATO Mission Iraq 5
Air Force 2,050; 1,000 conscript (total 3,050) LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 161; 1 inf coy
3 Air Comds: Satakunta (West), Karelia (East), Lapland (North) MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 12; UN • MINUSMA 4
FORCES BY ROLE MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 14
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
MOZAMBIQUE: EU • EUTM Mozambique 4
2 sqn with F/A-18C/D Hornet
ISR SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 20
1 (survey) sqn with Learjet 35A SOMALIA: EU • EUTM Somalia 12
TRANSPORT UNITED KINGDOM: Operation Interflex 20 (UKR trg)
1 flt with C295M
4 (liaison) flt with PC-12NG
TRAINING France FRA
1 sqn with Hawk Mk50/51A/66* (air-defence and Euro EUR 2021 2022 2023
ground-attack trg)
GDP EUR 2.50tr 2.63tr
1 unit with G-115EA
USD 2.96tr 2.78tr
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
per capita USD 45,188 42,330
AIRCRAFT 107 combat capable
FGA 62: 55 F/A-18C Hornet; 7 F/A-18D Hornet Growth % 6.8 2.5
ELINT 1 C295M Inflation % 2.1 5.8
TPT • Light 11: 2 C295M; 3 Learjet 35A (survey; ECM Def exp [a] EUR 47.8bn 49.6bn
trg; tgt-tow); 6 PC-12NG USD 56.6bn 52.4bn
TRG 73: 28 G-115EA; 29 Hawk Mk50/51A*; 16 Hawk Mk66* Def bdgt [b] EUR 49.7bn 51.5bn 55.1bn
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES USD 58.8bn 54.4bn
AAM • IR AIM-9 Sidewinder; IIR AIM-9X Sidewinder USD1=EUR 0.84 0.95
ARH AIM-120C AMRAAM
[a] NATO figure
ALCM • Conventional AGM-158 JASSM
[b] Includes pensions
BOMBS
Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015)
INS/GPS-guided GBU-31 JDAM; AGM-154C JSOW
51.7
the end of 2022. France plays a leading military role in the EU, NATO Paramilitary
and the UN, and maintains globally deployed forces. In 2018, Paris
launched the European Intervention Initiative, in order to foster a Gendarmerie 40
common strategic culture and develop the ability to jointly deploy
quickly in case of crises. France is also expanding its capabilities in
Space
non-traditional domains, having set up a space command, devel-
oped a space strategy, formalised an offensive cyber doctrine and EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
in February 2022 adopted a seabed warfare strategy. Deployments SATELLITES 13
abroad have demonstrated the ability to support expeditionary COMMUNICATIONS 4: 2 Syracuse-3 (designed to inte-
forces independently, although some strategic and intra-theatre grate with UK Skynet & ITA Sicral); 1 Syracuse-4;
military air-transport requirements have been dependent on allies 1 Athena-Fidus (also used by ITA)
and external contractors. In October 2021, the French armed forces ISR 6: 1 CSO-1; 1 CSO-2; 1 Helios 2A; 1 Helios 2B;
issued a new ‘Strategic Outlook’ document, illustrating a sharp- 2 Pleiades
ened focus on improved readiness for high-intensity warfare. The
ELINT/SIGINT 3 CERES
2019-25 Military Planning Law sought to increase the maintenance
budget and accelerate modernisation to, among other concerns,
mitigate the effect of operations on equipment availability in light Army 114,800
of lessons from overseas deployments. The 2022 RNS discussed Regt and BG normally bn size
issues relating to weapons stocks, security of supply and industrial FORCES BY ROLE
capacity, in light of the war in Ukraine. In 2022, France reorganised COMMAND
its presence in the Sahel, effectively leaving Mali, and transferred
1 corps HQ (CRR-FR)
some forces to Niger. France has a sophisticated defence industry,
2 div HQ
exemplified by companies such as Dassault, MBDA and Nexter,
with most procurements undertaken domestically. France has MANOEUVRE
called for greater European defence-industrial cooperation and Reconnaissance
aims to increase its exports to Europe. It is also seeking to invest in 1 recce regt
future technologies and supports start-ups and innovation in the Armoured
defence realm. 1 (2nd) armd bde (2 tk regt, 3 armd inf regt, 1 SP arty
regt, 1 engr regt)
ACTIVE 203,250 (Army 114,800 Navy 34,850 1 (7th) armd bde (1 tk regt, 1 armd BG, 3 armd inf regt,
Air 40,200, Other Staffs 13,400) Gendarmerie & 1 SP arty regt, 1 engr regt)
Paramilitary 100,500 1 armd BG HQ (UAE)
RESERVE 41,150 (Army 25,750 Navy 5,400 Air 5,300 Mechanised
1 (6th) lt armd bde (2 armd cav regt, 1 armd inf regt, 1
Other Staffs 4,700) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 30,300
mech inf regt, 1 mech inf regt, 1 SP arty regt, 1 engr regt)
1 (FRA/GER) mech bde (1 armd cav regt, 1 mech inf regt)
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE 1 mech regt HQ (Djibouti)
Light
Strategic Nuclear Forces 1 (27th) mtn bde (1 armd cav regt, 3 mtn inf regt, 1 arty
regt, 1 engr regt)
Navy 2,200 3 inf regt (French Guiana & French West Indies)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 1 inf regt HQ (New Caledonia)
SUBMARINES • STRATEGIC 4 2 inf bn HQ (Côte d’Ivoire & Gabon)
SSBN 4 Le Triomphant with 16 M51 SLBM with 6 TN- Air Manoeuvre
75 nuclear warheads, 4 single 533mm TT with SM39 1 (11th) AB bde (1 armd cav regt, 4 para regt, 1 arty regt,
Exocet AShM/F17 mod 2 HWT 1 engr regt, 1 spt regt)
AIRCRAFT • FGA 20 Rafale M F3 with ASMPA msl 1 AB regt (La Réunion)
Amphibious
Air Force 1,800 1 (9th) amph bde (2 armd cav regt, 1 armd inf regt,
2 mech inf regt, 1 SP arty regt, 1 engr regt)
Air Strategic Forces Command Other
FORCES BY ROLE 4 SMA regt (French Guiana, French West Indies &
STRIKE Indian Ocean)
1 sqn with Rafale B with ASMPA msl 3 SMA coy (French Polynesia, Indian Ocean &
1 sqn with Rafale B with ASMPA msl (forming) New Caledonia)
TANKER COMBAT SUPPORT
2 sqn with A330 MRTT; C-135FR; KC-135 Stratotanker 1 MRL regt
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 2 engr regt
AIRCRAFT 20 combat capable 2 EW regt
FGA 20 Rafale B 1 int bn
TKR/TPT 15: 5 A330 MRTT; 10 C-135FR 1 CBRN regt
TKR 3 KC-135 Stratotanker 5 sigs regt
Europe 91
Europe
1 SAM regt Nuclear Forces with 16 M51 SLBM with 6 TN-75 nuclear
warheads, 4 single 533mm TT with SM39 Exocet AShM/
Special Operation Forces 2,200 F17 mod 2 HWT
FORCES BY ROLE TACTICAL • SSN 5
SPECIAL FORCES 4 Rubis (1 more severely damaged by fire) with 4 single
2 SF regt 533mm TT with SM39 Exocet AShM/F17 mod 2 HWT
HELICOPTER 1 Suffren with 4 single 533mm TT with MdCN (SCALP
1 hel regt Naval) LACM/SM39 Exocet AShM/Artémis (F-21) HWT
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 22
Reserves 25,750 reservists AIRCRAFT CARRIERS • CVN 1 Charles de Gaulle with
Reservists form 79 UIR (Reserve Intervention Units) of 4 8-cell Sylver A43 VLS with Aster 15 SAM, 2 sextuple
about 75 to 152 troops, for ‘Proterre’ – combined land Sadral lnchr with Mistral SAM (capacity 30 Rafale M
projection forces bn, and 23 USR (Reserve Specialised FGA ac, 2 E-2C Hawkeye AEW&C ac, 8 AS365 Dauphin/
Units) of about 160 troops, in specialised regt
NH90 NFH hel)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE DESTROYERS • DDGHM 4
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES 2 Aquitaine (FREMM FREDA) with 2 quad lnchr with
MBT 215 Leclerc MM40 Exocet Block 3 AShM, 4 8-cell Sylver A50 VLS
ASLT 245 AMX-10RC
with Aster 15 SAM/Aster 30 SAM, 2 twin 324mm
RECCE 64: 24 EBRC Jaguar; 40 ERC-90D Sagaie
B-515 ASTT with MU90 LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity
IFV 706: 599 VBCI VCI; 107 VBCI VPC (CP)
1 NH90 NFH hel)
APC 2,499
2 Forbin with 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block
APC (T) 49 BvS-10
APC (W) 2,430: 373 VBMR Griffon; ε2,000 VAB; 3 AShM, 4 8-cell Sylver A50 VLS with Aster 30
57 VAB VOA (OP) SAM, 2 8-cell Sylver A50 VLS with Aster 15 SAM, 2
PPV 20 Aravis twin 324mm ASTT with MU90 LWT, 2 76mm gun
AUV 1,503: 1,416 VBL/VB2L; 72 VBL Ultima; 15 (capacity 1 NH90 NFH hel)
VBMR-L Serval FRIGATES 17
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES FFGHM 11:
AEV 110: 38 AMX-30EBG; 72 VAB GE 4 Aquitaine (FREMM ASM) with 2 8-cell Sylver
ARV 44: 27 AMX-30D; 17 Leclerc DNG; VAB-EHC A70 VLS with MdCN (SCALP Naval) LACM, 2
VLB 48: 20 EFA; 18 PTA; 10 SPRAT quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 3 AShM, 2
MW 16+: AMX-30B/B2; 4 Buffalo; 12 Minotaur 8-cell Sylver A43 VLS with Aster 15 SAM, 2 twin
NBC VEHICLES 26 VAB NRBC 324mm B-515 ASTT with MU90 LWT, 1 76mm gun
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL (capacity 1 NH90 NFH hel)
SP 177: 64 VAB Milan; 113 VAB with MMP 2 Aquitaine (FREMM ASM) with 2 8-cell Sylver A70
MANPATS Eryx; FGM-148 Javelin; Milan; MMP VLS with MdCN (SCALP Naval) LACM, 2 quad
ARTILLERY 245+ lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 3 AShM, 2 8-cell
SP 155mm 90: 32 AU-F-1; 58 CAESAR Sylver A50 VLS with Aster 15 SAM/Aster 30 SAM,
TOWED 155mm 12 TR-F-1
2 twin 324mm B-515 ASTT with MU90 LWT, 1
MRL 227mm 11 M270 MLRS
76mm gun (capacity 1 NH90 NFH hel)
MOR 132+: 81mm LLR 81mm; 120mm 132 RT-F-1
3 La Fayette with 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 13: 5 PC-6B Turbo Porter;
Block 3 AShM, 1 octuple lnchr with Crotale SAM, 1
5 TBM-700; 3 TBM-700B
HELICOPTERS 100mm gun (capacity 1 AS565SA Panther hel)
ATK 67: 20 Tiger HAP (to be upgraded to HAD); 2 La Fayette with 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet
47 Tiger HAD Block 3 AShM, 2 sextuple Sadral lnchr with
MRH 104: 18 AS555UN Fennec; 86 SA341F/342M Gazelle Mistral 3 SAM, 1 100mm gun (capacity 1 AS565SA
(all variants) Panther hel)
TPT 167: Heavy 8 H225M Caracal (CSAR); Medium 124: FFH 6 Floreal with 1 100mm gun (fitted for but not
24 AS532UL Cougar; 2 EC225LP Super Puma; 52 NH90 with 1 twin Simbad lnchr with Mistral SAM) (capacity 1
TTH; 46 SA330 Puma; Light 35 H120 Colibri (leased) AS565SA Panther hel)
92 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Europe
5 sqn with CN235M; SA330 Puma; AS555 Fennec (Dji- AIR DEFENCE • SAM 60: Long-range 40 SAMP/T;
bouti, French Guiana, French Polynesia, Indian Ocean Short-range 20 Crotale NG
& New Caledonia) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
TANKER AAM • IR R-550 Magic 2; IIR Mica IR; ARH Meteor;
1 sqn with A330 MRTT Mica RF
TANKER/TRANSPORT ASM AASM; Apache
1 sqn with C-135FR; KC-135 Stratotanker LACM
TRANSPORT Nuclear ASMPA
1 VIP sqn with A310-300; A330 Conventional SCALP EG
2 sqn with A400M BOMBS
1 sqn with C-130H/H-30 Hercules Laser-guided: GBU-12/-16 Paveway II
1 sqn with C-130H/H-30/J-30 Hercules; KC-130J Hercules
Laser & INS/GPS-guided GBU-49 Enhanced Paveway II
1 sqn (joint FRA-GER) with C-130J-30 Hercules; KC-
130J Hercules Security and Intervention Brigade
2 sqn with CN235M
FORCES BY ROLE
1 sqn with Falcon 7X (VIP); Falcon 900 (VIP); Falcon 2000
SPECIAL FORCES
3 flt with TBM-700A
3 SF gp
1 gp with DHC-6-300 Twin Otter
MANOEUVRE
TRAINING
Other
1 OCU sqn with Mirage 2000D
24 protection units
1 OCU sqn with Rafale B/C
30 (fire fighting and rescue) unit
1 OCU sqn with SA330 Puma; AS555 Fennec
1 (aggressor) sqn with Alpha Jet* Reserves 5,300 reservists
4 sqn with Alpha Jet*
1 sqn with Grob G120A-F Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 100,500
2 sqn with Grob G120A-F; PC-21
1 sqn with EMB-121 Gendarmerie 100,500; 30,300 reservists
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
2 sqn with AS555 Fennec ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
2 sqn with AS332C/L Super Puma; SA330 Puma; H225M APC • APC (W) 80: 60 VXB-170 (VBRG-170); 20 VAB
ISR UAV ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm some
1 sqn with MQ-9A Reaper PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 43
AIR DEFENCE PB 42: 1 Armoise; 2 Athos; 4 Géranium; 3 Maroni; 24
3 sqn with Crotale NG; SAMP/T VCSM; 9 VSMP
1 sqn with SAMP/T HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 60: 25 AS350BA Ecureuil;
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 20 H135; 15 H145
SATELLITES see Space
AIRCRAFT 261 combat capable DEPLOYMENT
FTR 34: 27 Mirage 2000-5; 7 Mirage 2000B
FGA 155: 65 Mirage 2000D; 51 Rafale B; 39 Rafale C BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR (Operation Althea) 5
(Rafale being upgraded to F3-R standard) BURKINA FASO: 300; 1 SF gp; 1 C-130H; 1 DHC-6-300;
ISR 2 Beech 350ER King Air 2 Tiger; 3 AS532UL Cougar; 2 H225M; 2 SA342 Gazelle
ELINT 2 C-160G Gabriel (ESM)
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: 160; EU • EUTM RCA 13;
AEW&C 4 E-3F Sentry
UN • MINUSCA 5
TKR 3 KC-135 Stratotanker
TKR/TPT 17: 5 A330 MRTT; 10 C-135FR; 2 KC-130J Hercules CHAD: 1,500; 1 mech inf BG; 1 FGA det with 3 Mirage 2000D;
TPT 114: Heavy 19 A400M; Medium 16: 5 C-130H 1 tkr/tpt det with 1 A330 MRTT; 1 C-130H; 2 CN235M
Hercules; 9 C-130H-30 Hercules; 2 C-130J-30 Hercules; CÔTE D’IVOIRE: 900; 1 inf bn; 1 (army) hel unit with 2
Light 70: 1 Beech 350i King Air; 19 CN235M-100; 8 SA330 Puma; 2 SA342 Gazelle; 1 (air force) hel unit with 1
CN235M-300; 5 DHC-6-300 Twin Otter; 22 EMB-121 AS555 Fennec
94 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
CYPRUS: Operation Inherent Resolve 30: 1 Atlantique-2 UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: 700: 1 armd BG (1 tk coy, 1
arty bty); Leclerc; CAESAR; • Operation Inherent Resolve
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • (Chammal); 1 FGA sqn with 7 Rafale F3
MONUSCO 4
WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 3
DJIBOUTI: 1,500; 1 combined arms regt with (2 recce sqn, 2
inf coy, 1 arty bty, 1 engr coy); 1 hel det with 4 SA330 Puma;
3 SA342 Gazelle; 1 LCM; 1 FGA sqn with 4 Mirage 2000-5; 1
FOREIGN FORCES
SAR/tpt sqn with 1 CN235M; 3 SA330 Puma Germany 400 (GER elm Eurocorps)
Singapore 200; 1 trg sqn with 12 M-346 Master
EGYPT: MFO 1
ESTONIA: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence (Operation
Lynx) 219; 1 lt inf coy
Germany GER
FRENCH GUIANA: 2,100: 2 inf regt; 1 SMA regt; 2 PCO; 1
tpt sqn with 3 CN235M; 5 SA330 Puma; 4 AS555 Fennec; 3 Euro EUR 2021 2022 2023
gendarmerie coy; 1 AS350BA Ecureuil; 1 H145 GDP EUR 3.60tr 3.81tr
FRENCH POLYNESIA: 950: 1 inf bn; 1 SMA coy; 1 naval USD 4.26tr 4.03tr
HQ at Papeete; 1 FFH; 1 PSO; 1 PCO; 1 AFS; 3 Falcon 200 per capita USD 51,238 48,398
Gardian; 1 SAR/tpt sqn with 2 CN235M; 3 SA330 Puma Growth % 2.6 1.5
FRENCH WEST INDIES: 1,000; 1 inf regt; 2 SMA regt; 2 FFH; Inflation % 3.2 8.5
1 AS565SA Panther; 1 SA319 Alouette III; 1 naval base at Fort Def exp [a] EUR 53.0bn 55.6bn
de France (Martinique); 4 gendarmerie coy; 1 PCO; 1 PB; 2 USD 62.8bn 58.8bn
AS350BA Ecureuil Def bdgt [b] EUR 46.9bn 50.5bn 58.6bn
GABON: 350; 1 inf bn USD 55.5bn 53.4bn
GERMANY: 2,000 (incl elm Eurocorps and FRA/GER bde); USD1=EUR 0.84 0.95
1 (FRA/GER) mech bde (1 armd cav regt, 1 mech inf regt) [a] NATO figure
GULF OF GUINEA: Operation Corymbe 1 LHD [b] Includes military pensions
IRAQ: Operation Inherent Resolve 6; NATO • NATO Mission Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015)
Iraq 3 47.8
In July 2020, the government launched a new voluntary conscript Air Manoeuvre
initiative, with 1,000 posts, focused on homeland-security tasks. 1 (rapid reaction) AB div (1 SOF bde (3 SOF bn); 1 AB
Volunteers serve for seven months plus five months as reservists bde (2 recce coy, 2 para regt, 2 cbt engr coy); 1 atk hel
over the course of six years. This is in addition to the existing volun- regt; 2 tpt hel regt; 1 sigs coy)
tary conscript model that requires between seven and 23 months COMBAT SUPPORT
of military service. In September 2022, Germany set up a Territorial
1 engr bn(-) (Joint GER-UK unit)
Operations Command to strengthen the armed forces’ homeland
security functions and take on command-and-control functions EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
for forces deployed in Germany. The armed forces are struggling ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
to improve readiness levels in light of increasing demands on MBT 321: 223 Leopard 2A5/A6; 98 Leopard 2A7/2A7V
NATO’s eastern flank. Germany is scheduled to again become the (55 Leopard 2A4 in store)
Europe
lead nation for NATO’s Very High Readiness Joint Task Force land RECCE 220 Fennek (incl 24 engr recce, 50 fires spt)
component in 2023, with the earmarked units prioritised for mod- IFV 680: 258 Marder 1A3/A4; 72 Marder 1A5; 350 Puma
ernisation and upgrades. Germany has indicated that it intends to APC 812
provide, from 2025, some 30,000 personnel and some 85 vessels APC (T) 112: 75 Bv-206S; 37 M113 (inc variants)
and aircraft at 30 days’ notice for NATO’s New Force Model, agreed
APC (W) 700: 341 Boxer (inc variants); 359 TPz-1 Fuchs
at the Alliance’s 2022 Madrid summit. Shortages of spare parts
and maintenance problems are reported in all three services. Ger-
(inc variants)
many’s defence-industrial base is able to design and manufacture AUV 683: 247 Dingo 2; 363 Eagle IV/V; 73 Wiesel 1 Mk20
equipment to meet requirements across all military domains, with (with 20mm gun)
strengths in land and naval systems. The government is pursuing a ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
policy of closer defence-industrial cooperation in Europe. AEV 51 Dachs
ARV 170: 95 BPz-2 1; 75 BPz-3 Büffel
ACTIVE 183,150 (Army 62,950 Navy 15,900 Air VLB 59: 22 Biber; 7 Leopard 2 with Leguan; 30 M3
27,200 Joint Support Service 27,900 Joint Medical MW 30: 6 Fuchs KAI; 24 Keiler
Service 19,850 Cyber 14,250 Other 15,100) NBC VEHICLES 44 TPz-1 Fuchs NBC
Conscript liability Voluntary conscription only. Voluntary conscripts
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL
can serve up to 23 months
SP 102 Wiesel ATGM with TOW or MELLS
RESERVE 32,650 (Army 7,600 Navy 1,450 Air 3,750 MANPATS Milan; Spike-LR (MELLS)
Joint Support Service 12,500 Joint Medical Service ARTILLERY 245
4,000 Cyber 1,350 Other 2,000) SP 155mm 109 PzH 2000
MRL 227mm 38 M270 MLRS
MOR 98: 120mm 58 Tampella; SP 120mm 40 M113
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE with Tampella
HELICOPTERS
Space ATK 51 Tiger
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE TPT 102: Medium 82 NH90; Light 20: 13 H135; 7 H145 (SAR)
SATELLITES 8 UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES
COMMUNICATIONS 2 COMSATBw (1 & 2) ISR 123: Medium 35 KZO; Light 87 LUNA
ISR 6: 1 SARah; 5 SAR-Lupe AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • ASM HOT; PARS 3 LR
Europe
Army 24,700; 1 HQ (US Army Europe & Africa
Joint Medical Services 19,850 (USAREUR-AF) at Wiesbaden; 1 arty comd; 1 SF gp; 1
FORCES BY ROLE recce bn; 1 mech bde(-); 1 fd arty bn; 1 MRL bde (3 MRL
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT bn); 1 (cbt avn) hel bde; 1 (cbt avn) hel bde HQ; 1 int bde;
4 med regt 1 MP bde; 1 sigs bde; 1 spt bde; 1 (MDTF) cbt spt bde(-);
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 1 SAM bde; 2 (APS) armd bde eqpt set; M1A2 SEPv2/
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES v3 Abrams; M3A3 Bradley; M2A3 Bradley; M1296 Stryker
APC • APC (W) 109: 72 Boxer (amb); 37 TPz-1 Fuchs (amb) Dragoon; M109A6; M119A3; M777A2; M270A1; M142
AUV 42 Eagle IV/V (amb) HIMARS; AH-64D Apache; CH-47F Chinook; UH-60L/M
Black Hawk; HH-60M Black Hawk; M902 Patriot PAC-3;
Cyber & Information Command 14,250 M1097 Avenger; M-SHORAD
Navy 400
FORCES BY ROLE
COMBAT SUPPORT USAF 13,400; 1 HQ (US Air Forces Europe & Africa) at
4 EW bn Ramstein AB; 1 HQ (3rd Air Force) at Ramstein AB; 1
6 sigs bn FGA wg at Spangdahlem AB with (1 FGA sqn with 24
F-16C Fighting Falcon); 1 tpt wg at Ramstein AB with 14
C-130J-30 Hercules; 2 Gulfstream V (C-37A); 5 Learjet 35A
DEPLOYMENT (C-21A); 1 B-737-700 (C-40B)
BALTIC SEA: NATO • SNMCMG 1: 100; 1 MHO; 1 AORL USMC 550
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR • Operation Althea 55
ESTONIA: NATO • Baltic Air Policing 150; Greece GRC
4 Eurofighter Typhoon
Euro EUR 2021 2022 2023
FRANCE: 400 (incl GER elm Eurocorps)
GDP EUR 183bn 210bn
IRAQ: Operation Inherent Resolve 80; NATO • NATO
USD 216bn 222bn
Mission Iraq 15
per capita USD 20,263 20,876
JORDAN: Operation Inherent Resolve 150; 1 A400M Growth % 8.3 5.2
LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 82; 1 FSGM Inflation % 0.6 9.2
LITHUANIA: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 1,000; Def exp [a] EUR 6.76bn 7.45bn
1 mech inf bde HQ; 1 armd inf BG with Leopard 2A6; USD 8.01bn 7.87bn
Fennek; Marder 1A3; Boxer Def bdgt [b] EUR 6.50bn 7.44bn 5.25bn
MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 55; UN • MINUSMA 490; 1 sy USD 7.69bn 7.87bn
coy; 1 hel sqn with 5 CH-53G; 1 UAV sqn USD1=EUR 0.84 0.95
MEDITERRANEAN SEA: NATO • SNMG 2: 40; 1 AOR [a] NATO figure
[b] Includes military pensions
NIGER: Operation Gazelle 200 (trg)
Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015)
POLAND: 95 (GER elm MNC-NE)
7.95
SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 68
SLOVAKIA: NATO • Enhanced Vigilance Activities 480; 4.58
1 inf coy; 1 SAM bty with M902 Patriot PAC-3 2008 2015 2022
Europe
8 arty bn PCO 8:
4 AD bn 2 Armatolos (DNK Osprey) with 1 76mm gun
HELICOPTER 2 Kasos (DNK Osprey derivative) with 1 76mm gun
1 hel bn 4 Machitis with 1 76mm gun
PBF 4 Aeolos (ex-US Mk V FPB)
Navy 14,300; 2,400 conscript (total 16,700) PB 6: 3 Andromeda (NOR Nasty); 2 Stamou; 1 Tolmi
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 3
SUBMARINES • SSK 10: MHO 3: 1 Evropi (ex-UK Hunt); 2 Evniki (ex-US Osprey)
3 Poseidon (GER Type-209/1200) with 8 single 533mm TT AMPHIBIOUS
with SUT HWT LANDING SHIPS • LST 5 Chios (capacity 4 LCVP; 300
1 Poseidon (GER Type-209/1200) (fitted with AIP tech- troops) with 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform
nology) with 8 single 533mm TT with UGM-84C LANDING CRAFT 15
Harpoon Block 1B AShM/SUT HWT LCU 5
2 Glavkos (GER Type-209/1100) with 8 single 533mm TT LCA 7
with UGM-84C Harpoon Block 1B AShM/SUT HWT LCAC 3 Kefallinia (Zubr) with 2 AK630 CIWS (capacity
4 Papanikolis (GER Type-214) (fitted with AIP) with 8 either 3 MBT or 10 APC (T); 230 troops)
single 533mm TT with UGM-84C Harpoon Block 1B LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 27
AShM/SUT HWT ABU 2
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 13 AG 5: 3 Atlas I; 2 Pandora
FRIGATES • FFGHM 13: AGOR 1 Naftilos
4 Elli Batch I (ex-NLD Kortenaer Batch 2) with 2 quad AGS 2: 1 Stravon; 1 Pytheas
lnchr with RGM-84C/G Harpoon Block 1B/G AShM, AORH 1 Prometheus (ITA Etna) with 1 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS
1 octuple Mk 29 GMLS with RIM-7M/P Sea Sparrow AORL 1 Axios (ex-GER Luneburg)
SAM, 2 twin 324mm SVTT Mk 32 mod 9 ASTT with AOT 4 Ouranos
Mk 46 mod 5 LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS, 1 76mm AWT 6 Kerkini
gun (capacity 2 Bell 212 (AB-212) hel or 1 S-70B AXS 5
Seahawk hel)
2 Elli Batch II (ex-NLD Kortenaer Batch 2) with 2 quad
Coastal Defence
lnchr with RGM-84C/G Harpoon Block 1B/G AShM, EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 octuple Mk 29 GMLS with RIM-7M/P Sea Sparrow COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM 2 MM40 Exocet
SAM, 2 twin 324mm SVTT Mk 32 mod 9 ASTT with
Mk 46 mod 5 LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS, 2 76mm
Naval Aviation
gun (capacity 2 Bell 212 (AB-212) hel or 1 S-70B FORCES BY ROLE
Seahawk hel) ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE
3 Elli Batch III (ex-NLD Kortenaer Batch 2) with 2 quad 1 div with S-70B Seahawk; Bell 212 (AB-212) ASW
lnchr with RGM-84C/G Harpoon Block 1B/G AShM, 1 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
octuple Mk 29 lnchr with RIM-7P Sea Sparrow SAM, AIRCRAFT 1 combat capable
2 twin 324mm SVTT Mk 32 mod 9 ASTT with Mk 46 ASW 1 P-3B Orion (4 P-3B Orion in store
LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity undergoing modernisation)
2 Bell 212 (AB-212) hel) HELICOPTERS
4 Hydra (GER MEKO 200) with 2 quad lnchr with ASW 14: 3 Bell 212 (AB-212) ASW; 11 S-70B Seahawk
RGM-84G Harpoon Block 1G AShM, 1 16-cell Mk AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
48 mod 2 VLS with RIM-162C ESSM SAM, 2 triple ASM AGM-114 Hellfire
324mm SVTT Mk 32 mod 5 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 2 AShM AGM-119 Penguin
Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 S-70B
Seahawk ASW hel) Air Force 18,800; 3,000 conscripts (total 21,800)
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 36
PCGM 7 Roussen (Super Vita) with 2 quad lnchr with Tactical Air Force
MM40 Exocet Block 3 AShM (of which 2 still fitted with FORCES BY ROLE
Block 2), 1 21-cell Mk 49 GMLS with RIM-116 RAM SAM, FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
1 76mm gun 1 sqn with F-4E Phantom II
100 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Europe
Def exp [a] HUF 928bn 958bn FORCES BY ROLE
USD 3.06bn 2.81bn
SPECIAL FORCES
Def bdgt [b] HUF 794bn 1.02tr 1.58tr
1 SF bde (4 spec ops bn)
USD 2.62bn 2.99bn
MANOEUVRE
USD1=HUF 303.14 340.84
[a] NATO figure Reconnaissance
[b] Includes military pensions 1 ISR regt
Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) Mechanised
2.58 1 (5th) mech inf bde (3 mech inf bn, 1 cbt engr coy,
1 sigs coy, 1 log bn)
0.98
2008 2015 2022 1 (25th) mech inf bde (1 tk bn; 2 mech inf bn, 1 arty bn,
1 AT bn, 1 log bn)
Population 9,699,577
COMBAT SUPPORT
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus 1 engr regt
Male 7.4% 2.7% 2.7% 3.0% 23.6% 8.3% 1 EOD/rvn regt
Female 7.0% 2.5% 2.5% 2.9% 24.2% 13.2% 1 CBRN bn
1 sigs regt
Capabilities
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
Hungary published a new National Security Strategy in April
2020 and a new National Military Strategy in June 2021. The strat- 1 log regt
egy documents speak of a deteriorating security environment, EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
marked by great-power competition and an increasing military
component. The security strategy also characterises mass migra- ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
tion as a key concern for Hungary. Hungary is implementing MBT 56: 12 Leopard 2A4HU; 44 T-72M1
the Zrinyi 2026 national-defence and armed-forces modernisa-
IFV 121: 120 BTR-80A/AM; 1 KF41 Lynx (in test)
tion plan. Second editions of the doctrines on SOF, CBRN and
CIMIC were published in 2021. A new Cyber- and Information APC 322
Operations Centre was established in January 2022, and a Mili- APC (W) 260 BTR-80
tary Cyberspace Operations Doctrine was published in 2022. A
PPV 62: 50 Ejder Yalcin 4×4 (Gidran); 12 MaxxPro Plus
doctrine for NEO operations is expected in 2023. Hungary coor-
dinates policy with other member states of the Visegrád Group, ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
including on defence, and hosts the NATO Centre of Excellence AEV 5 BAT-2
for Military Medicine. The armed forces participate in interna-
tional crisis-management missions, notably in the Balkans and ARV 9: 1 BPz-3 Buffel; 8 VT-55A
Iraq, but have very limited organic capacity to deploy forces VLB 8 BLG-60; MTU; TMM
beyond national borders. Announced equipment-modernisation
NBC VEHICLES 14 BTR-80M-NBC
priorities focus on individual-soldier equipment and fixed- and
rotary-wing aircraft. While the air-force-related elements of Zrinyi ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
2026 had been a focus of attention, and current air procure- MSL • MANPATS 9K111 Fagot (RS-AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-
ments include transport and trainer aircraft, at the end of 2018
the ministry also initiated land procurements, including for main 1 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel)
battle tanks (Leopard 2A7), Lynx IFVs and PzH2000 self-propelled ARTILLERY 33
artillery. PzH 2000 deliveries began in mid-2022. Hungary’s
SP 155mm 2 PzH 2000
defence-industrial base is limited, though the defence ministry
has set up an inter-ministerial working group to boost domestic TOWED 152mm 31 D-20
capacity in the small-arms sector. In 2020, a new defence pro- MOR 82mm
curement agency, reporting to the national armaments director,
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PBR 4
began its work and is intended to coordinate defence and secu-
rity acquisitions. MINE COUNTERMEASURES • MSR 3 Nestin
102 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Europe
Def bdgt [a] EUR 1.07bn 1.11bn 1.17bn Mechanised
USD 1.27bn 1.17bn 1 mech inf coy
USD1=EUR 0.84 0.95 Light
[a] Includes military pensions and capital expenditure 1 inf bde (1 cav recce sqn, 4 inf bn, 1 arty regt (3 fd arty
Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) bty, 1 AD bty), 1 fd engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 MP coy, 1
1.22 tpt coy)
1 inf bde (1 cav recce sqn, 3 inf bn, 1 arty regt (3 fd arty
0.99
bty, 1 AD bty), 1 fd engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 MP coy, l
2008 2015 2022 tpt coy)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Population 5,275,004 ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
RECCE 6 Piranha IIIH 30mm
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
APC 101
Male 10.6% 3.2% 3.0% 2.9% 23.5% 6.6% APC (W) 74: 56 Piranha III; 18 Piranha IIIH
Female 10.1% 3.1% 3.0% 2.9% 23.3% 7.7% PPV 27 RG-32M
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTURCTURE
Capabilities MSL • MANPATS FGM-148 Javelin
The armed forces’ core mission is defending the state against RCL 84mm Carl Gustaf
armed aggression. A 2015 White Paper broadened the scope of the ARTILLERY 131
national-security risk assessment beyond military and paramilitary TOWED • 105mm 23: 17 L118 Light Gun; 6 L119
threats, noting inter- and intra-state conflict, cyber-attacks, terror- Light Gun
ism, emergencies and natural disasters, among others. A White Paper MOR 108: 81mm 84 Brandt; 120mm 24 Ruag M87
update was issued in 2019 and Ireland’s next strategy document AIR DEFENCE
is intended be a Strategic Defence Review. Ireland is active in EU SAM • Point-defence RBS-70
defence cooperation and continues to contribute to multinational
operations. A Commission on the Defence Forces report, published Reserves 1,400 reservists
in February 2022, looked to address immediate requirements and
set a longer-term vision beyond 2030. In July, the government FORCES BY ROLE
decided to move to ‘Level of Ambition 2’, as set out in the Commis- MANOEUVRE
sion’s capability framework. This will build on ‘current capability to Reconnaissance
address specific priority gaps in [Ireland’s] ability to deal with an 1 (integrated) armd recce sqn
assault on Irish sovereignty and to serve in higher intensity Peace 2 (integrated) cav sqn
Support Operations.’ Spending will rise and personnel numbers Mechanised
are to increase by 2,000 above the current establishment. A High 1 (integrated) mech inf coy
Level Action Plan detailed government responses to recommenda- Light
tions in the Commission report and an implementation report was
14 (integrated) inf coy
expected by end-2022. The Commission recommended the creation
of a Chief of Defence post and that the air corps and naval service COMBAT SUPPORT
become services on a level with the army. Early actions for late 2022 4 (integrated) arty bty
include planning for military radar capabilities, including primary 2 engr gp
radar and the establishment of an Office of Reserve Affairs intended 2 MP coy
to develop a regeneration plan for the Reserve Defence Force. A 3 sigs coy
2020–24 Equipment Development Plan indicated priorities includ- COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
ing a mid-life upgrade for Piranha armoured personnel carriers and 2 med det
the two Roisin-class offshore patrol ships. Other stated priorities
2 tpt coy
include the procurement of two C295 maritime patrol aircraft and
upgrades to the 84mm anti-tank system. In 2023, the country will
receive two ex-New Zealand coastal patrol craft to replace decom- Naval Service 750
missioned vessels. Ireland has a small, specialist defence industry EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
focused on areas including drivetrain technologies for land systems. PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 6
PSO 6: 2 Roisin (of which 1 in refit) with 1 76mm gun;
ACTIVE 8,200 (Army 6,750 Navy 750 Air 700)
4 Samuel Beckett with 1 76mm gun
RESERVE 1,600 (Army 1,450 Navy 150) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AXS 2
104 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Air Corps 700 2017 has deployed to Latvia as part of the Enhanced Forward Pres-
ence. The EUNAVFOR-MED force is headquartered in Rome, while
2 ops wg; 2 spt wg; 1 trg wg; 1 comms and info sqn
the US Navy 6th Fleet is based in Naples. The country takes part
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE in and hosts NATO and other multinational exercises, continues
AIRCRAFT to support NATO, EU and UN operations abroad and is planning
MP 2 CN235 MPA to increasingly focus on Europe’s southern flank. Force mobility is
TPT • Light 5: 1 Learjet 45 (VIP); 4 PC-12NG enabled by a fleet of medium transport aircraft and tankers, and
TRG 8 PC-9M there are plans to procure fixed-wing aircraft to support special
forces. The White Paper and the latest multi-year planning docu-
HELICOPTERS:
ment detailed upgrades to main battle tanks and infantry fighting
MRH 6 AW139 vehicles as well as the procurement of armoured fighting vehicles
TPT • Light 2 H135 (incl trg/medevac) to replace the Dardo and the M113s. The expected retirement of
much of the naval fleet has triggered a long-term replacement
plan which includes the acquisition of two attack submarines and
DEPLOYMENT two next-generation destroyers to replace the ageing Luigi Durand
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR (Operation Althea) 5 de la Penne-class vessels as well as eight new offshore patrol
vessels. F-35As have been ordered for the air force and F-35Bs for
LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 338; 1 mech inf bn(-) both the air force and naval aviation, some of which have been
MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 20; UN • MINUMSA 12 already delivered. Italy signed a MoU with UK and Sweden relat-
ing to the development of the UK-led Tempest programme and in
MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 12
2022 increased the funds allocated for the project. Italy takes part
SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 13 in European defence-industrial cooperation activities, including
PESCO projects, and has an advanced defence industry capable
SYRIA/ISRAEL: UN • UNDOF 130; 1 inf coy
of producing equipment across all domains. There are particular
strengths in shipbuilding and in aircraft and helicopter manufac-
Italy ITA turing. The country hosts Europe’s F-35 final assembly and check-
out facility at Cameri.
Euro EUR 2021 2022 2023
ACTIVE 161,050 (Army 93,100 Navy 28,700
GDP EUR 1.78tr 1.89tr
Air 39,250) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 176,100
USD 2.10tr 2.00tr
per capita USD 35,473 33,740 RESERVES 17,900 (Army 13,400 Navy 4,500)
Growth % 6.6 3.2
Inflation % 1.9 8.7 ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
Def exp [a] EUR 28.0bn 28.8bn
USD 33.2bn 30.4bn Space
Def bdgt [b] EUR 28.3bn 29.4bn 27.9bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
SATELLITES 8
USD 33.5bn 31.1bn
COMMUNICATIONS 3: 1 Athena-Fidus (also used by
USD1=EUR 0.84 0.95
FRA); 2 Sicral
[a] NATO figure ISR 7: 4 Cosmo (Skymed); 2 Cosmo SG; 1 OPTSAT-3000
[b] Includes military pensions
Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) Army 93,100
29.9 Regt are bn sized
FORCES BY ROLE
24.9 COMMAND
2008 2015 2022 1 (NRDC-ITA) corps HQ (1 spt bde, 1 sigs regt, 1 spt regt)
MANOEUVRE
Population 61,095,551
Mechanised
1 (Vittorio Veneto) div (1 (Ariete) armd bde (1 cav regt, 2
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus tk regt, 1 armd inf regt, 1 SP arty regt, 1 cbt engr regt,
Male 6.3% 2.4% 2.4% 2.6% 24.4% 10.1% 1 log regt); 1 (Pozzuolo del Friuli) amph bde (1 cav regt,
Female 6.0% 2.4% 2.4% 2.6% 25.4% 12.9% 1 amph regt, 1 arty regt, 1 cbt engr regt, 1 log regt); 1
(Folgore) AB bde (1 cav regt, 3 para regt, 1 arty regt, 1
Capabilities cbt engr regt, 1 log regt); 1 (Friuli) air mob bde (1 air
mob regt, 2 atk hel regt))
Italy is concerned by security challenges in the Euro-Atlantic
1 (Acqui) div (1 (Pinerolo) mech bde (1 cav regt, 3 armd inf
environment, as well as from Europe’s southern flank. A defence
regt, 1 fd arty regt, 1 cbt engr regt, 1 log regt); 1 (Grana-
White Paper was issued in 2015. The latest three-year defence
plan for 2022–24 outlined modernisation goals. Command struc- tieri) mech bde (1 cav regt, 2 mech inf regt); 1 (Garibaldi
ture reforms are intended to improve cross-domain command Bersaglieri) mech bde (1 cav regt, 1 tk regt, 2 armd inf
and control. In July 2021, Italy issued its first directive for defence regt, 1 SP arty regt, 1 cbt engr regt, 1 log regt); 1 (Aosta)
industrial policy. Italy has taken part in NATO’s air-policing mis- mech bde (1 cav regt, 1 armd inf regt, 2 mech inf regt,
sions in the Baltic states, Iceland and Romania and since early 1 fd arty regt, 1 cbt engr regt, 1 log regt); 1 (Sassari) lt
Europe 105
mech bde (1 armd inf regt, 2 mech inf regt, 1 cbt engr Navy 28,700
regt, 1 log regt)) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Mountain SUBMARINES • SSK 8:
1 (Tridentina) mtn div (2 mtn bde (1 cav regt, 3 mtn 4 Pelosi (imp Sauro, 3rd and 4th series) with 6 single
inf regt, 1 arty regt, 1 mtn cbt engr regt, 1 spt bn, 1 533mm TT with A184 mod 3 HWT
log regt)) 4 Salvatore Todaro (Type-212A) (fitted with AIP) with 6
COMBAT SUPPORT single 533mm TT with Black Shark HWT
1 arty comd (1 arty regt, 1 MRL regt, 1 NBC regt) PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 18
1 AD comd (3 SAM regt) AIRCRAFT CARRIERS • CVS 2:
1 engr comd (2 engr regt, 1 ptn br regt)
Europe
1 Cavour with 4 8-cell Sylver A43 VLS with Aster 15
1 EW/sigs comd (1 EW/ISR bde (1 CIMIC regt, 1 EW regt, SAM, 2 76mm guns (capacity mixed air group of 20
1 int regt, 1 STA regt); 1 sigs bde with (7 sigs regt)) AV-8B Harrier II; F-35B Lightning II; AW101 Merlin;
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT NH90; Bell 212)
1 log comd (3 log regt, 4 med unit) 1 G. Garibaldi with 2 octuple Albatros lnchr with
HELICOPTER Aspide SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk 46 LWT
1 hel bde (3 hel regt) (capacity mixed air group of 18 AV-8B Harrier II;
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AW101 Merlin; NH90; Bell 212)
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES DESTROYERS • DDGHM 4:
MBT 150: 149 C1 Ariete; 1 C1 Ariete AMV (in test) 2 Andrea Doria with 2 quad lnchr with Otomat (Teseo)
ASLT 262: 255 B1 Centauro; 7 Centauro II Mk2A AShM, 6 8-cell Sylver A50 VLS with Aster
IFV 434: 165 VCC-80 Dardo; 269 VBM 8×8 Freccia (incl 20 15/Aster 30 SAM, 2 single 324mm B-515 ASTT with
CP and 44 with Spike-LR) MU90 LWT, 3 76mm guns (capacity 1 AW101 Merlin/
APC 380 NH90 hel)
APC (T) 148 Bv-206S 2 Luigi Durand de la Penne (ex-Animoso) with 2 quad
APC (W) 199 Puma 6×6 lnchr with Otomat (Teseo) Mk2A AShM/Milas A/S
PPV 33 VTMM Orso (incl 16 amb) msl, 1 Mk 13 mod 4 GMLS with SM-1MR Block VI
AUV 1,842: 10 Cougar; 1,798 IVECO LMV (incl 82 amb); SAM, 1 octuple Albatros lnchr with Aspide SAM, 2
34 IVECO LMV 2 triple 324mm B-515 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 127mm
AAV 15: 14 AAVP-7; 1 AAVC-7 gun, 3 76mm guns (capacity 1 NH90 or 2 Bell 212
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES (AB-212) hel)
FRIGATES 12
AEV 25 Dachs; M113
FFGHM 10:
ARV 70: 69 BPz-2; 1 AAVR-7
4 Bergamini (GP) with 2 quad lnchr with Otomat
VLB 30 Biber
(Teseo) Mk2A AShM, 2 8-cell Sylver A50 VLS with
MW 34: 6 Buffalo; 3 Miniflail; 25 VTMM Orso
Aster 15/Aster 30 SAM, 2 triple 324mm B-515 ASTT
NBC VEHICLES 14: 5 VBR NBC; 9 VBR NBC Plus
with MU90 LWT, 1 127mm gun, 1 76mm gun
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
(capacity 2 AW101/NH90 hel)
MSL • MANPATS Spike
4 Bergamini (ASW) with 2 twin lnchr with Otomat
ARTILLERY 769
(Teseo) Mk2A AShM, 2 twin lnchr with MILAS A/S
SP 155mm 67 PzH 2000
msl, 2 8-cell Sylver A50 VLS with Aster 15/Aster
TOWED 173: 105mm 25 Oto Melara Mod 56; 155mm 148
30 SAM, 2 triple 324mm B-515 ASTT with MU90
FH-70 LWT, 2 76mm gun (capacity 2 AW101/NH90 hel)
MRL 227mm 21 M270 MLRS 2 Maestrale with 4 single lnchr with Otomat (Teseo)
MOR 508: 81mm 283 Expal; 120mm 204: 62 Brandt; 142 Mk2 AShM, 1 octuple Albatros lnchr with Aspide
RT-61 (RT-F1) SP 120mm 21 VBM 8×8 Freccia SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 6: 3 Do-228 (ACTL-1); 46 LWT, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 NH90 or 2 Bell
3 P.180 Avanti 212 (AB-212) hel)
HELICOPTERS FFH 2 Paolo Thaon di Revel (Pattugliatori Polivalenti
ATK 35 AW129CBT Mangusta d’Altura (PPA)) with 1 127mm gun, 1 76mm gun
MRH 14 Bell 412 (AB-412) Twin Huey (capacity 2 NH90 or 1 AW101)
TPT 144: Heavy 16 CH-47F Chinook; Medium 56 NH90 PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 16
TTH (UH-90A); Light 72: 2 AW169LUH (UH-169B); 29 PSOH 10:
Bell 205 (AB-205); 28 Bell 206 Jet Ranger (AB-206); 13 Bell 4 Cassiopea with 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Bell 212 (AB-
212 (AB-212) 212) hel
AIR DEFENCE 4 Comandante Cigala Fuligosi with 1 76mm gun (capacity
SAM 20+ 1 Bell 212 (AB-212)/NH90 hel)
Long-range 20 SAMP/T 2 Sirio (capacity 1 Bell 212 (AB-212) or NH90 hel)
Point-defence FIM-92 Stinger PB 6: 2 Angelo Cabrini; 4 Esploratore
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 10
ASM Spike-ER MHO 10: 8 Gaeta; 2 Lerici
106 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Europe
AEW&C 3 Gulfstream G550 CAEW SPECIAL FORCES
TKR/TPT 4 KC-767A 1 spec ops gp (GIS)
TPT 78: Medium 33: 11 C-130J Hercules (5+ KC-130J
tanker pods); 10 C-130J-30 Hercules; 12 C-27J Spartan; Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 176,100
Light 37: 17 P-180 Avanti; 20 S-208 (liaison); PAX 8: 3
A319CJ; 2 Falcon 50 (VIP); 2 Falcon 900 Easy; 1 Falcon Carabinieri 108,000
900EX (VIP) The Carabinieri are organisationally under the MoD.
TRG 115: 21 MB-339A; 28 MB-339CD*; 16 MB-339PAN They are a separate service in the Italian Armed Forces
(aerobatics); 2+ M-345; 22 M-346; 26 SF-260EA as well as a police force with judicial competence
HELICOPTERS
MRH 54: 13 AW139 (HH-139A/VH-139A); 2 MD-500D Mobile and Specialised Branch
(NH-500D); 39 MD-500E (NH-500E) FORCES BY ROLE
CSAR 12 AW101 (HH-101A) MANOEUVRE
SAR 17 AW139 (HH-139B) Other
TPT • Light 14 Bell 212 (HH-212)/AB-212 ICO 1 (mobile) paramilitary div (1 bde (1st) with
UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES 12 (1 horsed cav regt, 11 mobile bn); 1 bde (2nd) with
CISR • Heavy 6 MQ-9A Reaper (unarmed) (1 (1st) AB regt, 2 (7th & 13th) mobile regt))
ISR • Heavy 6 RQ-1B Predator HELICOPTER
AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Short-range SPADA 1 hel gp
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AAM • IR AIM-9L Sidewinder; IIR IRIS-T; ARH AIM-
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
120C AMRAAM; Meteor
APC • APC (T) 3 VCC-2
ARM AGM-88 HARM
AUV 30 IVECO LMV
LACM SCALP EG/Storm Shadow
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 66
BOMBS
Laser-guided Lizard 2 AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light: 2 P.180 Avanti
Laser & INS/GPS-guided GBU-49 Enhanced Paveway II; HELICOPTERS
GBU-54 Laser JDAM MRH 15 Bell 412 (AB-412)
INS/GPS-guided GBU-31/-32/-38 JDAM; GBU-39 Small TPT • Light 31: 19 AW109; 2 AW109E; 2 AW139;
Diameter Bomb 8 MD-500D (NH-500D)
Customs 68,100
Joint Special Forces Command (COFS)
(Servizio Navale Guardia Di Finanza)
Army EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
FORCES BY ROLE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 166
SPECIAL FORCES PCO 2 Monti (Damen Stan Patrol 5509)
1 SF regt (9th Assalto paracadutisti) PCF 1 Antonio Zara
1 STA regt PBF 140: 19 Bigliani; 5 Corrubia; 9 Mazzei; 79 V-2000;
1 ranger regt (4th Alpini paracadutisti) 12 V-5000; 6 V-6000; 10 V-7000
COMBAT SUPPORT PB 23 Buratti
1 psyops regt LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AX 1 Giorgio Cini
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
AIRCRAFT
1 spec ops hel regt
MP 8: 4 ATR-42-500MP; 4 ATR-72-600 (P-72B)
Navy (COMSUBIN) TPT • Light 2 P.180 Avanti
FORCES BY ROLE HELICOPTERS
SPECIAL FORCES TPT • Light 53: 10 AW109N; 17 AW139; 6 AW169M;
1 SF gp (GOI) 8 Bell 412HP Twin Huey; 4 MD-500MC (NH-500MC);
1 diving gp (GOS) 8 MD-500MD (NH-500MD)
108 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
LEBANON: MIBIL 22; UN • UNIFIL 868; 1 mech bde HQ; Population 1,842,226
1 mech inf bn; 1 MP coy; 1 sigs coy; 1 hel sqn
LIBYA: MIASIT 160; 1 inf coy; 1 CRBN unit; 1 trg unit Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 9; UN • MINUSMA 2 Male 7.8% 2.6% 2.3% 2.6% 24.0% 7.2%
Female 7.3% 2.4% 2.1% 2.4% 25.3% 14.1%
MEDITERRANEAN SEA: EU • EUNAVFOR MED: 70;
1 PSOH; NATO • SNMG 2: 170; 1 FFGHM; NATO •
SNMCMG 2: 50; 1 MHO
Capabilities
MOZAMBIQUE: EU • EUTM Mozambique 15 Latvia has small armed forces focused on maintaining national
sovereignty and territorial integrity and the country depends on
NIGER: MISIN 220; 1 inf coy; 1 engr unit; 1 CRBN unit; NATO membership as a security guarantor. Russia is Latvia’s over-
1 med coy; 1 trg unit; 1 ISR unit riding security concern. In the wake of the February 2022 invasion
PERSIAN GULF: EMASOH 150; 1 FFGHM of Ukraine, Latvia boosted defence spending and transferred mili-
tary equipment to Ukraine. A national service law was approved in
POLAND: NATO • Baltic Air Policing: 135;
September 2022 and will take effect in January 2023. Two intakes
4 Eurofighter Typhoon are planned annually. Males between 18-27 will be obliged to
SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 715; 1 arty regt BG HQ; 1 serve, with females serving voluntarily. Posts will be filled by vol-
Carabinieri unit unteers but from late 2023 any unfilled quota will be filled com-
pulsorily. Service will last for 11 months. The September 2020 State
SOMALIA: EU • EUTM Somalia 150
Defence Concept highlighted challenges including from new tech-
WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 2 nologies and low military spending in Europe, and the resulting
effect on capabilities and crisis response. It emphasised societal
FOREIGN FORCES resilience and comprehensive defence as well as the significance
of a NATO presence in the region. The NATO battlegroup based
United States US European Command: 13,050 in Latvia, present since 2017 as part of the Alliance’s Enhanced
Army 4,250; 1 AB bde(-) Forward Presence, was bolstered in 2022. Latvia is also a member
Navy 3,600; 1 HQ (US Naval Forces Europe-Africa of the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force. There is no capacity to
(NAVEUR-NAVAF)/6th Fleet) at Naples; 1 ASW Sqn independently deploy and sustain forces beyond national bound-
with 5 P-8A Poseidon at Sigonella aries, although the armed forces have taken part in NATO and EU
missions. Improvements are being made to logistics and procure-
USAF 4,800; 1 FGA wg with (2 FGA sqn with 21
ment systems. A National Cyber Security Center is planned to be
F-16C/D Fighting Falcon at Aviano; 1 CSAR sqn with
established in January 2023 under the auspices of the Ministry of
8 HH-60G Pave Hawk); 1 CISR UAV sqn with MQ-9A
Defence. Capability-development plans include medium-range air
Reaper at Sigonella; 1 ISR UAV flt with RQ-4B Global defence (jointly with Estonia), rocket artillery and coastal defence.
Hawk at Sigonella Acquisition requirements include air, land and naval systems,
USMC 400; 1 tpt sqn with 6 MV-22B Osprey; 2 KC- transport assets and ammunition. Latvia has only a niche defence-
130J Hercules industrial capability, with cyber security a focus.
Europe 109
ACTIVE 6,600 (Army 1,800 Navy 500 Air 500 Joint LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 1
Staff 2,300 National Guard 1,200 Other 300) AXL 1 Varonis (comd and spt ship, ex-NLD)
Europe
SPECIAL FORCES Main tasks are airspace control and defence, maritime and
1 SF unit land SAR and air transportation
COMBAT SUPPORT
FORCES BY ROLE
1 MP bn
TRANSPORT
1 (mixed) tpt sqn with An-2 Colt; Mi-17 Hip H
Army 1,800 AIR DEFENCE
FORCES BY ROLE 1 AD bn
MANOEUVRE 1 radar sqn (radar/air ctrl)
Mechanised AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 4 An-2 Colt
1 mech inf bde (2 mech inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 cbt spt bn (1 HELICOPTERS • MRH 2 Mi-17 Hip H
recce coy, 1 engr coy, 1 AD coy), 1 CSS bn HQ) AIR DEFENCE
SAM • Point-defence FIM-92 Stinger; RBS-70
National Guard 1,200; 10,000 part-time GUNS • TOWED 40mm 24 L/70
(11,200 total)
FORCES BY ROLE Gendarmerie & Paramilitary
SPECIAL FORCES
1 SF unit State Border Guard
MANOEUVRE EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Light PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 3
1 (2nd) inf bde (4 inf bn; 1 engr bn) PB 3: 1 Valpas (ex-FIN); 1 Lokki (ex-FIN); 1 Randa
3 (1st, 3rd & 4th) inf bde (3 inf bn; 1 sy bn; 1 spt bn) HELICOPTERS
COMBAT SUPPORT TPT • Light 6: 2 AW109E Power; 2 AW119Kx; 2 Bell
1 cyber unit 206B (AB-206B) Jet Ranger II
1 NBC coy
1 psyops pl DEPLOYMENT
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
IRAQ: Operation Inherent Resolve 1; NATO • NATO
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES Mission Iraq 1
MBT 3 T-55 (trg)
RECCE 170 FV107 Scimitar (incl variants) MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 5; UN • MINUSMA 1
APC • APC(W) 8 Patria 6×6 MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 1
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 136; 1 inf coy
MANPATS Spike-LR
RCL 84mm Carl Gustaf; 90mm Pvpj 1110
ARTILLERY 112
FOREIGN FORCES
SP 155mm 59 M109A5ÖE All NATO Enhanced Forward Presence/Enhanced
TOWED 100mm (23 K-53 in store) Vigilance Activities unless stated
MOR 53: 81mm 28 L16; 120mm 25 M120 Albania 21; 1 EOD pl
Canada 639; 1 mech inf bn HQ; 1 mech inf coy(+); 1 cbt spt
Navy 500 (incl Coast Guard) coy; 1 spt coy;
Naval Forces Flotilla separated into an MCM squadron and Czech Republic 81; 1 mor pl
a patrol-boat squadron. LVA, EST and LTU have set up a Denmark 803; 1 mech inf bn
joint naval unit, BALTRON, with bases at Liepaja, Riga, Italy 250; 1 armd inf coy
Ventspils (LVA), Tallinn (EST), Klaipeda (LTU). Each nation Macedonia, North 9
contributes 1–2 MCMVs Montenegro 11
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Poland 177; 1 tk coy
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 5 Slovakia 152; 1 arty bty
PB 5 Skrunda (GER Swath) Slovenia 42
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 4 Spain 504; 1 armd inf coy(+); 1 arty bty; 1 cbt engr coy;
MCCS 1 Vidar (ex-NOR) 1 SAM bty
MHO 3 Imanta (ex-NLD Alkmaar/Tripartite) United States US European Command: 800; 1 AB bn
110 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Europe
MRH 3 AS365M3 Dauphin (SAR) Norway 270; 1 armd inf coy(+)
TPT • Medium 3 Mi-8 Hip (tpt/SAR)
AIR DEFENCE • SAM 4+
Short-range 4 NASAMS III Luxembourg LUX
Point-defence FIM-92 Stinger; RBS-70 Euro EUR 2021 2022 2023
GDP EUR 73.3bn 77.7bn
Special Operation Force
USD 86.8bn 82.2bn
FORCES BY ROLE
SPECIAL FORCES per capita USD 136,701 127,673
1 SF gp (1 CT unit; 1 Jaeger bn, 1 cbt diver unit) Growth % 6.9 1.6
Inflation % 3.5 8.4
Logistics Support Command 1,400 Def exp [a] EUR 341m 464m
FORCES BY ROLE USD 404m 490m
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT Def bdgt EUR 348m 420m 543m
1 log bn
USD 412m 444m
USD1=EUR 0.84 0.95
Training and Doctrine Command 1,500
[a] NATO figure
FORCES BY ROLE
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)
1 trg regt 388
small but advanced space industry and some foreign defence firms
have a presence, but the country is otherwise reliant on imports. Macedonia, North MKD
A strategy for defence industry, innovation and research is to be
Macedonian Denar MKD 2021 2022 2023
developed as part of the new defence guidelines.
GDP MKD 723bn 821bn
ACTIVE 410 (Army 410) Gendarmerie & USD 13.9bn 14.1bn
Paramilitary 600 per capita USD 6,714 6,816
Growth % 4.0 2.7
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Inflation % 3.2 10.6
Def exp [a] MKD 10.6bn 13.7bn
Army 410 USD 204m 235m
FORCES BY ROLE Def bdgt MKD 10.8bn 13.3bn
MANOEUVRE
USD 207m 229m
Reconnaissance
2 recce coy (1 to Eurocorps/BEL div, 1 to NATO pool of USD1=MKD 52.07 58.21
deployable forces) [a] NATO figure
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES 182
AUV 48 Dingo 2
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE 106
MSL • MANPATS NLAW; TOW 2008 2015 2022
ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm 6+
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Heavy 1 A400M Population 2,130,936
HELICOPTERS • MRH 2 H145M (jointly operated
with Police) Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Male 8.3% 2.8% 3.4% 3.7% 25.2% 6.5%
Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 600 Female 7.8% 2.6% 3.1% 3.5% 24.8% 8.3%
Gendarmerie 600
Capabilities
DEPLOYMENT The armed forces’ primary goals are safeguarding the state’s terri-
torial integrity and sovereignty, as well as contributing to opera-
IRAQ: NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 1 tions under the EU, NATO and UN umbrellas. North Macedonia
LITHUANIA: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 6 formally became NATO’s 30th member on 27 March 2020. In the
same month, it enacted a new Defence Strategy with a focus on
MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 21; UN • MINUSMA 2
capability development, and improved planning based on NATO
MEDITERRANEAN SEA: EU • EUNAVFOR MED 2 Merlin and EU standards, among other areas. A 2019–2028 Defence Capa-
IIIC (leased) bility Development Plan (DCDP) consolidated long-term develop-
ment goals aimed at developing collective defence, cooperative
security and crisis-management capabilities. A Mid-Term Defence
Capabilities Development Plan, adopted in January 2020, is
intended to help implement the DCDP. The 2022 annual procure-
ment plan, adopted in April, noted government-to-government
contracts relating to JLTV vehicles, 105mm artillery systems,
VSHORAD systems, and the overhaul of utility helicopters, among
other matters. Work on MoD restructuring is under way. The armed
forces are fully professional and the country aims to train all units,
particularly those with deployable capability, to NATO standards.
A number of units are earmarked for participation in NATO-led
operations, The armed forces have increased their participation
in NATO joint exercises since joining the Alliance. Participation in
international peacekeeping missions has increased logistics capa-
bility. The country has modest maritime and air wings, and relies
on Soviet-era equipment. There is little in the way of a domes-
tic defence industry, with no ability to design and manufacture
modern equipment.
Europe
1 sigs coy)
COMBAT SUPPORT
Police 7,600 (some 5,000 armed)
1 engr bn incl 2 SF units
1 MP bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 sigs bn ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT APC • APC (T) M113; APC (W) BTR-80; TM-170
1 log bde (3 log bn) Heimlin
AUV Ze’ev
Reserves
HELICOPTERS
FORCES BY ROLE
MRH 1 Bell 412EP Twin Huey
MANOEUVRE Light
TPT 3: Medium 1 Mi-171; Light 2: 1 Bell 206B (AB-
1 inf bde
206B) Jet Ranger II; 1 Bell 212 (AB-212)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
IFV 11: 10 BMP-2; 1 BMP-2K (CP) DEPLOYMENT
APC 198
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR (Operation Althea) 1
APC (T) 46: 9 Leonidas; 27 M113; 10 MT-LB
APC (W) 152: 56 BTR-70; 12 BTR-80; 84 TM-170 Hermelin CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: EU • EUTM RCA 1
AUV 2 Cobra IRAQ: NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 4
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
MSL • MANPATS Milan LATVIA: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 9
RCL 82mm M60A LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 3
ARTILLERY 131
SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 65
TOWED 70: 105mm 14 M-56; 122mm 56 M-30
M-1938
MRL 17: 122mm 6 BM-21; 128mm 11 Malta MLT
MOR • 120mm 44
Euro EUR 2021 2022 2023
Marine Wing GDP EUR 14.7bn 16.2bn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE USD 17.4bn 17.2bn
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 2
per capita USD 33,667 32,912
PB 2 Botica†
Growth % 10.3 6.2
Aviation Brigade Inflation % 0.7 5.9
FORCES BY ROLE Def bdgt [a] EUR 71.8m 82.7m 73.9m
TRAINING USD 85.0m 87.4m
1 flt with Z-242; Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); Bell 206B USD1=EUR 0.84 0.95
ATTACK HELICOPTER [a] Excludes military pensions
1 sqn with Mi-24V Hind E
Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
78
1 sqn with Mi-8MTV Hip; Mi-17 Hip H
AIR DEFENCE
47
1 AD bn
2008 2015 2022
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT Population 464,186
TPT • Light 1 An-2 Colt
TRG 5 Z-242 Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
HELICOPTERS
Male 7.5% 2.3% 2.7% 3.5% 24.2% 10.2%
ATK 2 Mi-24V Hind E (8: 2 Mi-24K Hind G2; 6 Mi-24V
Hind E in store) Female 7.0% 2.2% 2.5% 3.1% 22.8% 12.0%
114 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Capabilities DEPLOYMENT
The principal roles for the armed forces are maintaining external
LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 9
security and support for civil emergencies and the police. There is
also focus on maritime security in the Mediterranean. The Armed
Forces of Malta Strategy Paper 2016–2026 laid out defence-policy
objectives, including operational and organisational reforms. Malta
Montenegro MNE
is neutral but is a member of NATO’s Partnership for Peace pro- Euro EUR 2021 2022 2023
gramme. The country also participates in bilateral and multilateral
GDP EUR 4.96bn 5.80bn
exercises. Although deployment capacity is limited, Malta has con-
tributed to European missions. Italy has assisted Malta in meeting USD 5.87bn 6.13bn
some security requirements, including air surveillance, while the per capita USD 9,433 9,850
European Internal Security Fund is funding some modernisation. Growth % 13.0 7.2
Although there is some shipbuilding and ship-repair activity and a
Inflation % 2.4 12.8
small aviation-maintenance industry, these are not defence-specific
and Malta relies on imports to equip its armed forces. Def exp [a] EUR 77.0m 94.7m
USD 91.2m 100m
ACTIVE 1,700 (Armed Forces 1,700)
Def bdgt [b] EUR 77.0m 94.7m 113m
RESERVE 260 (Volunteer Reserve Force 110 USD 91.2m 100m
Individual Reserve 150) USD1=EUR 0.84 0.95
[a] NATO figure
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE [b] Includes military pensions
Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)
Armed Forces of Malta 1,700 80
FORCES BY ROLE
SPECIAL FORCES 44
1 SF unit 2008 2015 2022
MANOEUVRE Population 604,966
Light
1 (1st) inf regt (3 inf coy, 1 cbt spt coy)
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
COMBAT SUPPORT
1 (3rd) cbt spt regt (1 cbt engr sqn, 1 EOD sqn, 1 maint sqn) Male 9.3% 3.1% 3.3% 3.1% 22.9% 7.4%
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT Female 8.7% 2.9% 3.1% 2.9% 23.6% 9.5%
1 (4th) CSS regt (1 CIS coy, 1 sy coy)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Capabilities
ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm L16 According to its defence strategy, Montenegro intends to develop
AIR DEFENCE • GUNS 14.5mm 1 ZPU-4 an integrated defence system, capable of defending and pre-
serving independence, sovereignty and national territory. A key
Maritime Squadron 500 concern of the authorities is integrating Montenegro into relevant
Organised into 5 divisions: offshore patrol; inshore pa- NATO and EU structures. A NATO member since 2017, Montenegro
trol; rapid deployment and training; marine engineering; has accepted NATO’s capability targets and has been aligning its
and logistics defence-planning process with NATO standards. Reform and pro-
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE fessionalisation of the armed forces have been slow, and develop-
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 8 ments have been focused on structural issues around improving
PCO 1 Emer recruitment, outflow and professional development. The armed
PCC 1 Diciotti (ITA Saettia mod) with 1 hel forces are not designed to have an expeditionary capability, and as
landing platform such have little logistics capability to support deployments beyond
national borders. Personnel have deployed to EU, UN- and NATO-
PB 6: 4 Austal 21m; 2 Marine Protector
led operations, although a planned increased in Montenegro’s
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AAR 2 Cantiere Vittoria
small contribution to KFOR stalled due to internal opposition;
Air Wing similar debates are reportedly taking place as authorities look to
discuss what role Montenegro should play in NATO crisis response
1 base party. 1 flt ops div; 1 maint div; 1 integrated log
activities. Podgorica intends to replace ageing Soviet-era equip-
div; 1 rescue section
ment. Procurement priorities include light and medium helicop-
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ters and light armoured vehicles, as well as improved communi-
AIRCRAFT cations capacities in accordance with NATO standards. A contract
TPT • Light 5: 3 Beech 200 King Air (maritime patrol); for 67 Oshkosh 4x4 JLTVs is expected to be fulfilled by 2023; the
2 BN-2B Islander first vehicles arrived in October 2020. Future plans include the
TRG 3 Bulldog T MK1 formation of a special-forces unit and an intelligence unit in the
HELICOPTERS MRH 6: 3 AW139 (SAR); 3 SA316B land forces. The country’s defence industry is capable of producing
Alouette III small arms and ammunition.
Europe 115
ACTIVE 2,350 (Army 1,275 Navy 350 Air Force 225 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Other 500) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 4,100 AIRCRAFT • TRG (4 G-4 Super Galeb non-operational;
4 Utva-75 non-operational)
RESERVE 2,800 HELICOPTERS
MRH 16: 1 Bell 412EP Twin Huey; 2 Bell 412EPI Twin
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Huey; 13 SA341/SA342L (HN-45M) Gazelle
TPT • Light 2 Bell 505 Jet Ranger X
Army 1,275
FORCES BY ROLE Gendarmerie & Paramilitary ε4,100
MANOEUVRE
Europe
Reconnaissance Special Police Units ε4,100
1 recce coy
Light DEPLOYMENT
1 mot inf bn
LATVIA: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 11
COMBAT SUPPORT
1 cbt spt bn MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 2
1 sigs coy SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 1
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
1 med bn
1 spt bn Multinational Organisations
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES Capabilities
APC • APC (W) 8 BOV-VP M-86 The following represent shared capabilities held
AUV 20 JLTV by contributors collectively rather than as part of
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE national inventories
SP 9 BOV-1
MSL • MANPATS 9K111 Fagot (RS-AT-4 Spigot);
9K111-1 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel) ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
ARTILLERY 135
TOWED 122mm 12 D-30 NATO AEW&C Force
MRL 128mm 18 M-63/M-94 Plamen Based at Geilenkirchen (GER). Original participating
MOR 105: 82mm 73; 120mm 32 countries (BEL, CAN, DNK, GER, GRC, ITA, NLD, NOR,
PRT, TUR, US) have been subsequently joined by five more
Reserve (CZE, ESP, HUN, POL, ROM)
FORCES BY ROLE FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL
Light 1 sqn with B-757 (trg); E-3A Sentry (NATO standard)
2 inf bn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
COMBAT SUPPORT
AIRCRAFT
1 arty bn
AEW&C 16 E-3A Sentry (NATO standard)
Navy 350 TPT • PAX 1 B-757 (trg)
1 Naval Cmd HQ with 4 operational naval units (patrol
boat; coastal surveillance; maritime detachment; and SAR)
NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance
with additional sigs, log and trg units with a separate Based at Sigonella (ITA)
coastguard element. Some listed units are in the process of EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
decommissioning UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ISR • Heavy 5 RQ-4D Phoenix
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PCF 2
Rade Končar† NATO Multinational Multi-Role Tanker
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AXS 1 Jadran† Transport Fleet (MMF)
Based at Eindhoven (NLD). Six participating countries
Air Force 225 (BEL, CZE, GER, NLD, NOR & LUX)
Golubovci (Podgorica) air base under army command EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
FORCES BY ROLE AIRCRAFT • TKR/TPT 7 A330 MRTT
TRAINING
1 (mixed) sqn with G-4 Super Galeb; Utva-75 Strategic Airlift Capability
(none operational) Heavy Airlift Wing based at Papa air base (HUN). 12
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER participating countries (BLG, EST, FIN, HUN, LTU, NLD,
1 sqn with SA341/SA342L Gazelle NOR, POL, ROM, SVN, SWE, US)
116 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Europe
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
RECCE 197 Fennek LCVP 12 Mk5
IFV 117 CV9035NL (32 more in store) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 9
APC • APC (W) 200 Boxer (8 driver trg; 52 amb; 36 CP; AGS 3: 1 Hydrograaf; 2 Snellius
92 engr; 12 log) AK 1 Pelikaan
AUV 248: 98 Bushmaster IMV; 150 Fennek AKR 1 New Amsterdam (capacity 200 containers and 300
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES vehs) (leased)
AEV 10+: Dachs; 10 Kodiak AORH 1 Karel Doorman with 2 Goalkeeper CIWS (capacity
ARV 25+: BPz-2; 25 BPz-3 Büffel 6 NH90/AS532 Cougar or 2 CH-47F Chinook hel; 2 LCVP)
VLB 22: 16 Leopard 1 with Legaun; 2 Leopard 2 with Leguan; AS 1 Mercuur
4 MLC70 with Leguan AXL 1 Van Kingsbergen
MW Bozena AXS 1 Urania
NBC VEHICLES 6 TPz-1 Fuchs NBC
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
Marines 2,650
MSL • MANPATS Spike-MR FORCES BY ROLE
ARTILLERY 122 SPECIAL FORCES
SP 155mm 21 PzH 2000 (27 more in store) 1 SF gp (1 SF sqn, 1 CT sqn)
MOR 101: 81mm 83 L16/M1; 120mm 18 Brandt MANOEUVRE
AIR DEFENCE • SAM 42+ Amphibious
Long-range 18 M902 Patriot PAC-3 2 mne bn
Short-range 6 NASAMS II 1 amph aslt gp
Point-defence 18+: FIM-92 Stinger; 18 Fennek with FIM- COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
92 Stinger 1 spt gp (coy)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Navy 7,350 (incl Marines) ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE APC • APC (T) 65 BvS-10 Viking (incl 20 CP)
SUBMARINES 4 ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
SSK 4 Walrus with 4 single 533mm TT with Mk 48 ARV 8: 4 BvS-10; 4 BPz-2
ADCAP mod 7 HWT MED 4 BvS-10
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 6 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
DESTROYERS • DDGHM 4: MSL • MANPATS Spike-MR
3 De Zeven Provinciën with 2 quad lnchr with RGM- ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm 12 L16/M1
84C Harpoon Block 1B AShM, 5 8-cell Mk 41 VLS AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence FIM-92 Stinger
with SM-2 Block IIIA/RIM-162B ESSM SAM, 2 twin
324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Air Force 6,400
Goalkeeper CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 NH90 hel) FORCES BY ROLE
1 De Zeven Provinciën with 2 quad lnchr with RGM- FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
84C Harpoon Block 1B AShM, 5 8-cell Mk 41 VLS 1 sqn with F-16AM/BM Fighting Falcon
with SM-2 Block IIIA/RIM-162B ESSM SAM, 2 twin 1 sqn with F-35A Lightning II
324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 2 1 sqn (converting) with F-35A Lightning II
Goalkeeper CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 NH90 hel) ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE/SEARCH & RESCUE
FRIGATES • FFGHM 2 Karel Doorman with 2 quad 1 sqn with NH90 NFH
lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon Block 1B AShM, 1 16-cell TANKER/TRANSPORT
Mk 48 mod 1 VLS with RIM-7P Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 twin 1 sqn with C-130H/H-30 Hercules
324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Goalkeeper 1 sqn with Gulfstream IV
CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 NH90 hel) TRAINING
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 1 OEU sqn with F-35A Lightning II
PSOH 4 Holland with 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 NH90 hel) 1 sqn with PC-7 Turbo Trainer
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 6 1 hel sqn with AH-64D Apache; CH-47D Chinook (based
MHO 6 Alkmaar (Tripartite) at Fort Hood, TX)
118 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
early 2022, with the F-35 taking over responsibility for air defence. ARTILLERY 167
New submarines are being procured as part of a strategic partner- SP 155mm 24 K9 Thunder
ship with Germany. There are plans to strengthen Brigade North MOR 143: 81mm 115 L16; SP 81mm 28: 16 CV9030; 12
with new equipment and manoeuvre and support units. In June M125A2
2018, it was announced that a planned upgrade to Norway’s main-
AIR DEFENCE
battle-tank fleet would be pushed to the mid-2020s. Norway has
an advanced and diverse defence-industrial base with a high per- SAM • Medium-range NASAMS III
centage of SMEs and a mix of private and state-owned companies.
Navy 2,350; 2,250 conscripts (total 4,600)
ACTIVE 25,400 (Army 8,300 Navy 4,600 Air 4,300 Joint Command – Norwegian National Joint Headquarters.
Central Support 7,400 Home Guard 800) The Royal Norwegian Navy is organised into five elements
Europe
Conscript liability 19 months maximum. Conscripts first serve 12 under the command of the Chief of the Navy: the fleet
months from 19–28, and then up to 4–5 refresher training periods (Marinen), the Coast Guard (Kystvakten), the recruit training
until age 35, 44, 55 or 60 depending on rank and function. Con-
school (KNM Harald Haarfagre), the naval medical branch
scription was extended to women in 2015
and the naval bases (Haakonsvern and Ramsund)
RESERVE 40,000 (Home Guard 40,000) FORCES BY ROLE
Readiness varies from a few hours to several days MANOEUVRE
Reconnaissance
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE 1 ISR coy (Coastal Rangers)
COMBAT SUPPORT
Army 3,900; 4,400 conscript (total 8,300) 1 EOD pl
The armoured infantry brigade – Brigade North – trains EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
new personnel of all categories and provides units for SUBMARINES 6
international operations. At any time around one-third of SSK 6 Ula with 8 single 533mm TT with SeaHake
the brigade will be trained and ready to conduct operations. (DM2A3) HWT
The brigade includes one high-readiness armoured PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 4
battalion (Telemark Battalion) with combat-support and FFGHM 4 Fridtjof Nansen with Aegis C2 (mod), 2 quad
combat-service-support units on high readiness lnchr with NSM AShM, 1 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with RIM-
162A ESSM SAM, 2 twin 324mm ASTT with Sting Ray
FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE mod 1 LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 med hel)
Reconnaissance PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 13
1 armd recce bn (forming) PSOH 1 Nordkapp with 1 57mm gun (capacity 1 med tpt hel)
1 ISR bn PCFG 6 Skjold with 8 single lnchr with NSM AShM,
1 (GSV) bn (1 (border) recce coy, 1 ranger coy, 1 spt coy, 1 76mm gun
1 trg coy) PBF 6 CB90N (capacity 20 troops)
Armoured MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 4
1 armd inf bde (2 armd bn, 1 lt inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 engr MSC 2 Alta with 1 twin Simbad lnchr with Mistral SAM
bn, 1 MP coy, 1 CIS bn, 1 spt bn, 1 med bn) MHC 2 Oksoy with 1 twin Simbad lnchr with Mistral SAM
Light LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 6
1 lt inf bn (His Majesty The King’s Guards) AGI 1 Marjata IV
AGS 2: 1 HU Sverdrup II; 1 Eger (Marjata III) with 1 hel
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
landing platform
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
AORH 1 Maud (BMT Aegir) (capacity 2 med hel)
MBT 36 Leopard 2A4 (16 more in store)
AXL 2 Reine
RECCE 21 CV9030
IFV 91: 76 CV9030N; 15 CV9030N (CP) Coast Guard
APC 390
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
APC (T) 315 M113 (incl variants)
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 12
APC (W) 75 XA-186 Sisu/XA-200 Sisu/XA-203 (amb)
PSOH 2: 1 Jan Mayen (capacity 2 med hel); 1 Nordkapp
AUV 165: 20 Dingo 2; 25 HMT Extenda; 120 IVECO LMV
with 1 57mm gun (capacity 1 med tpt hel)
(36 more in store)
PSO 5: 3 Barentshav; 1 Harstad; 1 Svalbard with 1 57mm
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
gun, 1 hel landing platform
AEV 34+: 20 CV90 STING; 8 M113 AEV; NM109; 6
PCC 5 Nornen
Wisent-2
ARV 12: 6 BPz-2; 6 Wisent-2 LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • ATF 2 Jarl (leased)
VLB 36: 26 Leguan; 1+ Leopard 2 with Leguan; 9 Leopard 1
MW 9 910 MCV-2 Air Force 2,900; 1,400 conscript (total 4,300)
NBC VEHICLES 6 TPz-1 Fuchs NBC Joint Command – Norwegian National HQ
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE FORCES BY ROLE
MANPATS FGM-148 Javelin FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
RCL 84mm Carl Gustaf 2 sqn with F-35A Lightning II
120 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
MARITIME PATROL
1 sqn with P-3C Orion; P-8A Poseidon
DEPLOYMENT
SEARCH & RESCUE CYPRUS: UN • UNFICYP 2
1 sqn with Sea King Mk43B; AW101 EGYPT: MFO 3
TRANSPORT IRAQ: Operation Inherent Resolve 60; 1 trg unit; NATO •
1 sqn with C-130J-30 Hercules NATO Mission Iraq 2
TRAINING
JORDAN: Operation Inherent Resolve 20
1 sqn with MFI-15 Safari
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER LITHUANIA: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 270;
2 sqn with Bell 412SP Twin Huey 1 armd inf coy(+); CV9030
AIR DEFENCE MALI: UN • MINUSMA 29
2 bn with NASAMS III MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 13
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE BALTIC SEA: NATO • SNMG 1: 50; 1 AORH
AIRCRAFT 45 combat capable SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 15
FGA 37 F-35A Lightning II
ASW 8: 3 P-3C Orion; 5 P-8A Poseidon
TPT • Medium 4 C-130J-30 Hercules
FOREIGN FORCES
TRG 16 MFI-15 Safari United States US European Command 1,100; 1 (USMC)
MEU eqpt set; 1 (APS) 155mm SP Arty bn eqpt set
HELICOPTERS
ASW (13 NH90 NFH in store)
SAR 19: 9 AW101; 10 Sea King Mk43B Poland POL
MRH 18: 6 Bell 412HP; 12 Bell 412SP
Polish Zloty PLN 2021 2022 2023
AIR DEFENCE
SAM • Medium-range NASAMS III GDP PLN 2.62tr 3.09tr
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES USD 679bn 716bn
AAM • IR AIM-9L Sidewinder; IIR AIM-9X Sidewinder II; per capita USD 17,946 19,023
IRIS-T; ARH AIM-120B AMRAAM; AIM-120C AMRAAM Growth % 5.9 3.8
BOMBS Inflation % 5.1 13.8
Laser-guided EGBU-12 Paveway II Def exp [a] PLN 58.3bn 73.9bn
INS/GPS guided JDAM USD 15.1bn 17.1bn
Def bdgt [b] PLN 51.8bn 57.8bn 97.4bn
Special Operations Command (NORSOCOM) USD 13.4bn 13.4bn
FORCES BY ROLE USD1=PLN 3.86 4.31
SPECIAL FORCES [a] NATO figure
1 (armed forces) SF comd (2 SF gp)
[b] Includes military pensions
1 (navy) SF comd (1 SF gp)
Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 11.9
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PBF 2 IC20M
6.80
Central Support, Administration and 2008 2015 2022
Command 5,850; 1,550 conscripts (total 7,400)
Population 38,093,101
Central Support, Administration and Command includes
military personnel in all joint elements and they are Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
responsible for logistics and CIS in support of all forces in
Male 7.6% 2.4% 2.5% 3.0% 24.8% 8.1%
Norway and abroad
Female 7.1% 2.3% 2.4% 2.9% 25.1% 11.9%
will deliver funds additional to the base defence budget. The EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
government continues to pursue a goal of permanently station- ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
ing US troops in the country. The US Army’s V Corps Headquarters
(Forward) was established in Poznań at the end of 2020. There are
MBT 647: 10 K2; 108 Leopard 2A4 (being upgraded to
ambitious plans to boost personnel numbers to 300,000 by 2035, 2PL); 105 Leopard 2A5; 34 Leopard 2PL; 28 M1A2 SEPv2
including 50,000 to be recruited under a new salaried one-year Abrams (on loan for trg) up to 232 PT-91 Twardy; 130
service scheme. This stems from plans to set up an additional T-72A/T-72M1/M1R
heavy division in the east. Acquisition reform has been under way
for some time and a central armaments agency was established RECCE 407: 282 BRDM-2; 38 BWR-1 (being upgraded);
in January 2022. A technical-modernisation plan, covering the 87 BRDM-2 R5
period 2021–35, was released in October 2019, which extended IFV 1,567: up to 1,212 BMP-1; 4 Borsuk (in test); 351
Europe
the planning horizon from ten to 15 years. Ambitious modernisa-
Rosomak IFV
tion plans are underway. F-35As are due to arrive from 2024, and
land forces capabilities will be boosted by the arrival of Abrams APC 450
main battle tanks. In 2022 agreements were signed with South APC (T) 6 WDSz (OP)
Korea for the procurement of FA-50 combat aircraft, K2 MBTs and APC (W) 344: 300 Rosomak APC (incl variants);
K9 self-propelled artillery pieces. Chunmoo MRLs will be bought,
44 AWD RAK (arty CP)
alongside US HIMARS systems. Warsaw continues plans to
strengthen its domestic defence-industrial base, much of which PPV 100 Maxxpro
is now consolidated in the state-owned holding company PGZ, AUV 255: 210 Cougar; 45 M-ATV
using technology transfers and international partnering, such as ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
the deals with South Korea. Beyond PGZ, several international
defence companies have subsidiaries in Poland.
AEV 106+: IWT; 65 MT-LB AEV; 33 Rosomak WRT;
8 MID Bizon
ACTIVE 114,050 (Army 58,500 Navy 6,000 Air Force ARV 122: 28 BPz-2; 68 MT-LB ARV; 26 WZT-3M
14,300 Special Forces 3,150 Territorial 3,800 Joint VLB 119: 4 Biber; 103 BLG67M2; 12 MS-20 Daglezja
28,300) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 14,300 MW 27: 17 Bozena 4; 6 ISM Kroton; 4 Kalina SUM
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE MSL • MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger);
9K111 Fagot (RS-AT-4 Spigot); Spike-LR
Army 58,500 ARTILLERY 773
FORCES BY ROLE SP 424: 122mm up to 227 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 111 M-77
COMMAND
Dana; 155mm 86: 24 K9A1; 62 Krab
elm 1 (MNC NE) corps HQ
MRL 122mm 179: up to 75 BM-21; 29 RM-70; 75 WR-40
MANOEUVRE
Reconnaissance Langusta
3 recce regt MOR 170: 120mm 80: 15 2B11; 65 M120; SP 120mm 90
Armoured SMK120 RAK
1 (11th) armd cav div (2 armd bde, 1 mech bde, 1 arty HELICOPTERS
regt) ATK 28 Mi-24D/V Hind D/E
Mechanised
MRH 64: 7 Mi-8MT Hip; 3 Mi-17 Hip H; 1 Mi-17AE Hip
1 (12th) mech div (2 mech bde, 1 (coastal) mech bde, 1
(aeromedical); 5 Mi-17-1V Hip; 16 PZL Mi-2URP Hoplite;
arty regt)
1 (16th) mech div (1 armd bde, 2 mech bde, 1 arty regt, 24 PZL W-3W/WA Sokol; 8 PZL W-3PL Gluszec (CSAR)
1 AT regt) TPT 37: Medium 12: 6 Mi-8T Hip; 2 PZL W-3AE Sokol
1 (18th) mech div (1 armd bde, 2 mech bde, 1 log regt) (aeromedical); 4 S-70i Black Hawk; Light 25 PZL Mi-2 Hoplite
Air Manoeuvre UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES 6
1 (6th) AB bde (3 para bn) CISR • Medium 6 Bayraktar TB2
1 (25th) air cav bde (2 air cav bn, 2 tpt hel bn, 1 (casevac)
AIR DEFENCE
med unit)
SAM 166+
COMBAT SUPPORT
2 engr regt Short-range 23: 3 CAMM (Narew); 20 2K12 Kub (RS-
2 ptn br regt SA-6 Gainful)
2 chem def regt Point-defence 143+: 64 9K33 Osa-AK (RS-SA-8 Gecko);
COMBAT SUPPORT GROM; Piorun; 79 Poprad
2 log bde SPAAGM 23mm 20 ZSU-23-4MP Biala
HELICOPTER GUNS 345
1 (1st) hel bde (2 atk hel sqn with Mi-24D/V Hind D/E, 1
SP 23mm 2 ZSU-23-4
CSAR sqn with Mi-24V Hind E; PZL W-3PL Gluszec; 2
ISR hel sqn with Mi-2URP; 2 hel sqn with Mi-2) TOWED 23mm 343: 268 ZU-23-2; 75 ZUR-23-2KG
AIR DEFENCE Jodek-G (with GROM msl)
3 AD regt BOMBS • Laser-guided MAM-C/L
122 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Navy 6,000 TPT • Light 7: 4 PZL Mi-2 Hoplite; 1 PZL W-3A; 2 PZL-
W-3T
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
SUBMARINES • SSK 1 Orzeł (ex-FSU Kilo)† with 6 single
533mm TT each with 53-65KE HWT/TEST-71ME Air Force 14,300
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 2 FORCES BY ROLE
FFH 2 Pułaski (ex-US Oliver Hazard Perry) (of which 1 FIGHTER
used as training ship) with 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 2 sqn with MiG-29A/UB Fulcrum
ASTT with MU90 LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS, 1 76mm FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
gun (capacity 2 SH-2G Super Seasprite ASW hel) 3 sqn with F-16C/D Block 52+ Fighting Falcon
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 5 FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK/ISR
CORVETTES • FSM 1 Kaszub with 2 quad lnchr with 2 sqn with Su-22M-4 Fitter
9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-N-5 Grail) SAM, 2 twin 533mm SEARCH AND RESCUE
ASTT with SET-53 HWT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 1 sqn with Mi-2; PZL W-3 Sokol
1 76mm gun TRANSPORT
PSO 1 Ślązak (MEKO A-100) with 1 76mm gun, 1 hel 1 sqn with C-130H/E; M-28 Bryza
landing platform 1 sqn with C295M; M-28 Bryza
PCFGM 3 Orkan (ex-GDR Sassnitz) with 1 quad lnchr TRAINING
with RBS15 Mk3 AShM, 1 quad lnchr (manual aiming) 1 sqn with PZL-130 Orlik
1 sqn with M-346
with 9K32 Strela-2M (RS-SA-N-5 Grail) SAM, 1 AK630
1 hel sqn with SW-4 Puszczyk
CIWS, 1 76mm gun
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 21
1 (Spec Ops) sqn with Mi-17 Hip H
MCCS 1 Kontradmiral Xawery Czernicki
1 (VIP) sqn with Mi-8 Hip; W-3WA Sokol
MCO 2 Kormoran II
AIR DEFENCE
MHO 1 Krogulec
1 bde with S-125 Newa SC; S-200C Vega (RS-SA-5 Gammon)
MSI 17: 1 Gopło; 12 Gardno; 4 Mamry
AMPHIBIOUS 8 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
LANDING SHIPS • LSM 5 Lublin (capacity 9 tanks; 135 AIRCRAFT 94 combat capable
troops) FTR 28: 22 MiG-29A Fulcrum; 6 MiG-29UB Fulcrum
LANDING CRAFT • LCU 3 Deba (capacity 50 troops) FGA 66: 36 F-16C Block 52+ Fighting Falcon; 12 F-16D
Block 52+ Fighting Falcon; 12 Su-22M4 Fitter; 6 Su-
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 26
22UM3K Fitter
AGI 2 Moma
TPT 50: Medium 7: 2 C-130H Hercules; 5 C-130E Hercules;
AGS 8: 2 Heweliusz; 4 Wildcat 40; 2 (coastal)
Light 39: 16 C295M; 10 M-28 Bryza TD; 13 M-28 Bryza PT;
AORL 1 Bałtyk
PAX 4: 2 Gulfstream G550; 2 B-737-800 (VIP)
AOL 1 Moskit
TRG 40: 12 M-346; 28 PZL-130 Orlik
ARS 4: 2 Piast; 2 Zbyszko
HELICOPTERS
ATF 8: 6 Bolko (B860); 2 H960
MRH 8 Mi-17 Hip H
AX 1 Wodnik with 1 twin AK230 CIWS
TPT 65: Medium 29: 9 Mi-8 Hip; 10 PZL W-3 Sokol; 10
AXS 1 Iskra
PZL W-3WA Sokol (VIP); Light 36: 14 PZL Mi-2 Hoplite;
COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM 12 NSM
22 SW-4 Puszczyk (trg)
AIR DEFENCE
Naval Aviation 1,300
SAM 18
FORCES BY ROLE Long-range 1 S-200C Vega (RS-SA-5 Gammon)
ANTI SUBMARINE WARFARE/SEARCH & RESCUE Short-range 17 S-125 Newa SC
1 sqn with Mi-14PL Haze A; Mi-14PL/R Haze C GUNS • TOWED 23mm 12 Pilica (with Piorun msl)
1 sqn with PZL W-3RM Anakonda; SH-2G Super Sea- AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
sprite AAM • IR AIM-9 Sidewinder; R-60 (RS-AA-8 Aphid);
MARITIME PATROL R-73 (RS-AA-11A Archer); R-27T (RS-AA-10B Alamo);
1 sqn with An-28E/RM Bryza IIR AIM-9X Sidwinder II; ARH AIM-120C AMRAAM
TRANSPORT ASM AGM-65J/G Maverick; Kh-25 (RS-AS-10 Karen); Kh-
1 sqn with An-28TD; M-28B TD Bryza 29 (RS-AS-14 Kedge)
1 sqn with An-28TD; M-28B; PZL Mi-2 Hoplite; PZL ALCM • Conventional AGM-158 JASSM
W-3T/A
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Special Forces 3,150
AIRCRAFT FORCES BY ROLE
MP 10: 8 An-28RM Bryza; 2 An-28E Bryza SPECIAL FORCES
TPT • Light 4: 2 An-28TD Bryza; 2 M-28B TD Bryza 3 SF units (GROM, FORMOZA & cdo)
HELICOPTERS COMBAT SUPPORT/
ASW 8: 6 Mi-14PL Haze; 2 SH-2G Super Seasprite 1 cbt spt unit (AGAT)
SAR 8: 2 Mi-14PL/R Haze C; 4 PZL W-3RM Anakonda; COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
2 PZL W-3WA RM Anakonda 1 spt unit (NIL)
Europe 123
Europe
Def exp [a] EUR 3.30bn 3.33bn
Border Guards 14,300 USD 3.90bn 3.52bn
Ministry of Interior Def bdgt EUR 2.48bn 2.45bn 2.58bn
USD 2.93bn 2.59bn
Maritime Border Guard 2,000 USD1=EUR 0.84 0.95
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE [a] NATO figure
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 18
Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015)
PCC 2 Kaper 2.84
PBF 6: 2 Strażnik; 4 IC16M
PB 10: 2 Wisłoka; 2 Baltic 24; 1 Project MI-6 2.30
AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 2008 2015 2022
UCAC 2 Griffon 2000TDX
Population 10,242,081
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
DEPLOYMENT
MSL • MANPATS Milan; TOW BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR (Operation Althea) 1
RCL • 84mm Carl Gustaf CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: EU • EUTM RCA 14; UN
ARTILLERY • MOR 30+: 81mm some; 120mm 30 • MINUSCA 196; 1 AB coy
IRAQ: Operation Inherent Resolve 30
Naval Aviation
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 11
HELICOPTERS • ASW 5: 4 Lynx Mk95 (Super Lynx); MEDITERRANEAN SEA: NATO • SNMCMG 2: 40; 1 PSO
Europe
1 Lynx Mk95A (Super Lynx) MOZAMBIQUE: EU • EUTM Mozambique 120
SOMALIA: EU • EUTM Somalia 2
Air Force 5,950
FORCES BY ROLE
FOREIGN FORCES
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
United States US European Command: 250; 1 spt facility
2 sqn with F-16AM/BM Fighting Falcon
at Lajes
MARITIME PATROL
1 sqn with P-3C Orion
ISR/TRANSPORT Romania ROM
1 sqn with C295M
Romanian Leu RON 2021 2022 2023
COMBAT SEARCH & RESCUE
GDP RON 1.18tr 1.40tr
1 sqn with with AW101 Merlin
TRANSPORT USD 284bn 300bn
1 sqn with C-130H/C-130H-30 Hercules per capita USD 14,795 15,619
1 sqn with Falcon 50 Growth % 5.9 4.8
TRAINING Inflation % 5.0 13.3
1 sqn with AW119 Koala Def exp [a] RON 22.0bn 26.4bn
1 sqn with TB-30 Epsilon USD 5.29bn 5.64bn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Def bdgt [b] RON 23.1bn 24.3bn
AIRCRAFT 35 combat capable USD 5.56bn 5.19bn
FTR 30: 26 F-16AM Fighting Falcon; 4 F-16BM Fighting Falcon USD1=RON 4.16 4.68
ASW 5 P-3C Orion [a] NATO figure
ISR: 7: 5 C295M (maritime surveillance), 2 C295M [b] Includes military pensions
(photo recce) Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015)
TPT 13: Medium 5: 2 C-130H Hercules; 3 C-130H-30 Hercules 4.35
(tpt/SAR); Light 5 C295M; PAX 3 Falcon 50 (tpt/VIP)
TRG 16 TB-30 Epsilon 2.00
HELICOPTERS 2008 2015 2022
TPT 17: Medium 12 AW101 Merlin (6 SAR, 4 CSAR, 2
Population 18,519,899
fishery protection); Light 5 AW119 Koala
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
AAM • IR AIM-9L/I Sidewinder; ARH AIM-120C
Male 8.1% 2.7% 2.5% 2.3% 23.7% 9.0%
AMRAAM
ASM AGM-65A Maverick Female 7.7% 2.5% 2.5% 2.3% 23.9% 12.8%
AShM AGM-84A Harpoon
BOMBS
Capabilities
Laser & INS/GPS-guided GBU-49 Enhanced Paveway II Romania’s armed forces are structured around territorial defence,
INS/GPS guided GBU-31 JDAM support to NATO and EU missions, and contributing to regional
and global stability and security. According to the National Defence
Strategy 2020–2024, principal security threats include Russia’s
Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 24,700 increased presence in the Black Sea, hybrid warfare, cyber-attacks,
terrorism and the economic impact of the coronavirus pandemic.
National Republican Guard 24,700 Under the Armata 2040 project, authorities are looking to moder-
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE nise and upgrade the armed forces to NATO standards. A defence
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 32 budget increase was announced in March 2022. Bucharest has
signed defence cooperation agreements with regional allies and, in
PBF 12
the aftermath of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, bolstered coop-
PB 20 eration with the US, France, and regional allies in the Bucharest Nine
HELICOPTERS • MRH 7 SA315 Lama organisation. There is a strategic partnership with the US. Romania
126 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
hosts the Aegis Ashore ballistic-missile-defence system at Deveselu. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
In May 2022, NATO’s multinational Battle Group Forward Presence 3 spt bn
achieved initial operational capability. Led by France, this unit is AIR DEFENCE
based at Cincu. Elements of the US Army’s Task Force Cougar started 3 AD regt
to arrive at Mihail Kogalniceanu air base in early 2022. There is
broad training with NATO and regional allies, and Romania contrib- EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
utes to EU and NATO missions. The inventory is mainly composed ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
of Soviet-era equipment, which is seen as a factor-limiting capa- MBT 377: 220 T-55AM; 103 TR-85; 54 TR-85 M1
bility. Though Romanian airspace benefits from NATO’s Enhanced IFV 241: 41 MLI-84 (incl CP); 101 MLI-84M Jderul;
Air Policing mission, in May 2022 the authorities indicated a plan 99 Piranha V
to extend the service life of the ageing MiG-21 Lancer aircraft by APC 749
approximately a year, following delays in transitioning to the F-16.
APC (T) 76 MLVM
Romania has received a number of F-16s, purchased from Portu-
APC (W) 613: 69 B33 TAB Zimbru; 37 Piranha IIIC;
gal, and in 2023 is expected to receive the first batch of F-16s pur-
chased from Norway. Acquisition plans include armoured vehicles, 354 TAB-71 (incl variants); 153 TAB-77 (incl variants)
air-defence radars, surface-to-air missiles and corvettes. The Naval PPV 60 Maxxpro
Strike Missile will be procured for coastal defence from 2024, while AUV 480 TABC-79 (incl variants)
Bucharest has received the first elements of the HIMARS system ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
ordered in 2018. The country’s defence industry has struggled since ARV 55: 3 MLI-84M TEHEVAC; 8 TERA-71L; 44
1989. Current production focuses on small arms and ammunition. TERA-77L
However, Bucharest has agreed a contract with General Dynamics VLB 43 BLG-67
to produce locally a new batch of Piranha V armoured vehicles, and
NBC VEHICLES 109 RCH-84
with Airbus to produce H215 helicopters. Bucharest continues to
look for opportunities to boost its defence industry through offset ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
agreements and technology transfers. MSL
SP 158: 12 9P122 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger); 98 9P133
ACTIVE 71,500 (Army 35,500 Navy 6,800 Air 11,700 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger); 48 9P148 Konkurs (RS-
Joint 17,500) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 57,000 AT-5 Spandrel)
MANPATS Spike-LR
RESERVE 55,000 (Joint 55,000) GUNS
SP 100mm (23 SU-100 in store)
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE TOWED 100mm 218 M-1977
ARTILLERY 1,136
Army 35,500 SP 122mm 40: 6 2S1 Gvodzika; 34 Model 89
Readiness is reported as 70–90% for NATO-designated TOWED 447: 122mm 96 (M-30) M-1938 (A-19); 152mm
forces (1 div HQ, 1 mech bde, 1 inf bde & 1 mtn inf bde) 351: 247 M-1981; 104 M-1985
and 40–70% for other forces MRL 206: 122mm 170: 134 APR-40; 36 LAROM; 227mm
FORCES BY ROLE 36 M142 HIMARS
COMMAND MOR 443: SP 82mm 177: 92 TAB-71AR; 85 TABC-79AR;
2 div HQ (2nd & 4th) 120mm 266 M-1982
elm 1 div HQ (MND-SE) AIR DEFENCE
SPECIAL FORCES SAM 96
1 SF bde (2 SF bn, 1 para bn, 1 log bn) Short-range 48: 32 2K12 Kub (RS-SA-6 Gainful); 16
MANOEUVRE 9K33 Osa (RS-SA-8 Gecko)
Reconnaissance Point-defence 48 CA-95
1 recce bde GUNS 65+
2 recce regt SP 35mm 41 Gepard
Mechanised TOWED 24+: 14.5mm ZPU-2; 35mm 24 GDF-003;
5 mech bde (1 tk bn, 2 mech inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 AD bn, 57mm S-60
1 log bn)
1 (MNB-SE) mech inf bde (2 armd inf bn, 1 inf bn, 1 arty Navy 6,800
bn, 1 AD bn, 1 log bn) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Light PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 3
2 mtn inf bde (3 mtn inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 AD bn, 1 log bn) FFGH 1 Marasesti with 4 twin lnchr with P-22 (RS-SS-N-
COMBAT SUPPORT 2C Styx) AShM, 2 triple 533mm ASTT with 53–65 HWT,
1 MRL bde (3 MRL bn, 1 STA bn, 1 log bn) 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 4 AK630M CIWS, 2 twin
2 arty regt 76mm guns (capacity 2 SA-316 (IAR-316) Alouette III hel)
1 engr bde (4 engr bn, 1 ptn br bn, 1 log bn) FFH 2 Regele Ferdinand (ex-UK Type-22), with 2 triple
2 engr bn STWS Mk.2 324mm TT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 SA330
3 sigs bn (IAR-330) Puma)
1 CIMIC bn PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 24
1 MP bn CORVETTES 4
3 CBRN bn FSH 2 Tetal II with 2 twin 533mm ASTT with SET-53M
Europe 127
HWT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 FGA 22: 6 MiG-21 Lancer B; 16 MiG-21 Lancer C
76mm gun (capacity 1 SA316 (IAR-316) Alouette III hel) ISR 2 An-30 Clank
FS 2 Tetal I with 2 twin 533mm ASTT with SET-53M TPT • Medium 12: 7 C-27J Spartan; 4 C-130B Hercules;
HWT, 2 RBU 2500 Smerch 1 A/S mor, 2 AK230 CIWS, 2 1 C-130H Hercules
twin 76mm guns TRG 32: 10 IAR-99*; 10 IAR-99C Soim*; 12 Yak-52 (Iak-52)
PCFG 3 Zborul with 2 twin lnchr with P-22 (RS-SS-N-2C HELICOPTERS
Styx) AShM, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun MRH 29: 21 IAR-330 SOCAT Puma; 8 SA316B Alouette III
PCFT 3 Naluca with 4 single 533mm ASTT (IAR-316B)
PCR 8: 5 Brutar II with 2 BM-21 MRL, 1 100mm gun; TPT • Medium 24: 12 SA330L Puma (IAR-330L);
3 Kogalniceanu with 2 BM-21 MRL, 2 100mm guns 12 SA330M Puma (IAR-330M)
Europe
PBR 6 VD141 (ex-MSR now used for river patrol) AIR DEFENCE • SAM 17
MINE WARFARE 11 Long-range 8 M903 Patriot PAC-3 MSE
MINE COUNTERMEASURES 10 Medium-range 13: 5 S-75M3 Volkhov (RS-SA-2 Guideline);
MSO 4 Musca with 2 RBU 1200 Uragan A/S mor, 8 MIM-23 Hawk PIP III
2 AK230 CIWS AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
MSR 6 VD141 AAM • IR AIM-9M Sidewinder; R-73 (RS-AA-11A
MINELAYERS • ML 1 Corsar with up to 120 mines, Archer); R-550 Magic 2; Python 3 IIR AIM-9X Sidewinder
2 RBU 1200 Uragan A/S mor, 2 AK230 CIWS II; ARH AIM-120C AMRAAM
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 8 ASM Spike-ER
AE 2 Constanta with 2 RBU 1200 Uragan A/S mor, BOMBS
2 AK230 CIWS, 2 twin 57mm guns Laser-guided GBU-12 Paveway;
AGOR 1 Corsar Laser & INS/GPS-guided GBU-54 Laser JDAM
AGS 2: 1 Emil Racovita; 1 Catuneanu INS/GPS guided GBU-38 JDAM
AOL 1 Tulcea
ATF 1 Grozavu Gendarmerie & Paramilitary ε57,000
AXS 1 Mircea
Gendarmerie ε57,000
Naval Infantry Ministry of Interior
FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE DEPLOYMENT
Light
1 naval inf regt BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR (Operation Althea)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 203; 1 inf coy
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: EU • EUTM RCA 13
AUV 14: 11 ABC-79M; 3 TABC-79M DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN •
MONUSCO 8
Air Force 11,700 INDIA/PAKISTAN: UN • UNMOGIP 2
FORCES BY ROLE
IRAQ: Operation Inherent Resolve 30; NATO • NATO
FIGHTER
Mission Iraq 170
2 sqn with MiG-21 Lancer C
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 25; UN • MINUSMA 5
1 sqn with with F-16AM/BM Fighting Falcon MOZAMBIQUE: EU • EUTM Mozambique 6
GROUND ATTACK
SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 65; UN • UNMIK 1
1 sqn with IAR-99 Soim*
TRANSPORT SOMALIA: EU • EUTM Somalia 5
1 sqn with An-30 Clank; C-27J Spartan SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 6
1 sqn with C-130B/H Hercules
TRAINING
FOREIGN FORCES
1 sqn with IAR-99 Soim*
1 sqn with SA316B Alouette III (IAR-316B); Yak-52 (Iak-52) Canada NATO Air Policing: 170; 6 F/A-18A Hornet (CF-18AM)
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER Belgium NATO Enhanced Vigilance Activities: 250; 1
2 (multi-role) sqn with IAR-330 SOCAT Puma mech inf coy
2 sqn with SA330L/M Puma (IAR-330L/M) France NATO Enhanced Vigilance Activities: 750; 1 armd
AIR DEFENCE BG; 1 SAM bty with SAMP/T
1 AD bde Netherlands NATO Enhanced Vigilance Activities: 200;
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 air mob inf coy
1 engr spt regt Poland NATO MNB-SE 220; 1 mech inf coy; Rosomak
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE United States US European Command: 4,000; 1 air aslt bde
AIRCRAFT 59 combat capable with M119A3; M777A2; 1 Aegis Ashore BMD unit with 3
FTR 17: 14 F-16AM Fighting Falcon; 3 F-16BM Fighting Falcon 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with SM-3
128 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Europe
Long-range 4 FK-3 (HQ-22)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Short-range 15: 6 S-125M Neva-M (RS-SA-3 Goa); 9
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 4
2K12 Kub (RS-SA-6 Gainful)
PBR 4: 3 Type-20; 1 Jadar
Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-7 Grail)‡; 9K310
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 4
Igla-1 (RS-SA-16 Gimlet)
MSI 4 Nestin with 1 quad lnchr with 9K32 Strela-2M
SPAAGM 30mm 6 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (RS-SA-22 Greyhound)
(RS-SA-N-5 Grail) SAM
AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT GUNS • TOWED 40mm 24 Bofors L/70
LCVP 4 Type-22 (1 more non-operational) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 3 AAM • IR R-60 (RS-AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (RS-AA-11A
AG 1 Šabac (deguassing vessel also used for patrol Archer); SARH R-27ER (RS-AA-10C Alamo); ARH R-77
and troop transport) (capacity 80 troops) (RS-AA-12 Adder)
AGF 1 Kozara ASM AGM-65 Maverick; A-77 Thunder; Kh-29T (RS-AS-
AOL 1 14B Kedge)
All under Kosovo Force (KFOR) command unless Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
otherwise specified Male 7.7% 2.5% 2.6% 3.0% 25.5% 7.2%
Albania 61 Female 7.3% 2.4% 2.5% 2.8% 25.7% 10.9%
Armenia 40
Austria 244; 1 recce coy; 1 mech inf coy; 1 log coy • Capabilities
UNMIK 1 obs Slovakia is looking to modernise its armed forces and replace
Bulgaria 30 obsolete equipment while contributing to international crisis-
Canada 5 management missions. A defence White Paper in September 2016
set out security priorities and a plan to increase defence capa-
Croatia 147; 1 inf coy; 1 hel flt with Mi-8 bilities. In 2017, the government approved a Long-Term Defence
Czech Republic 8 • UNMIK 2 obs Development Plan. A new national-security strategy and a new
Denmark 35 defence strategy were drafted in 2020 and adopted by parliament
in January 2021. A NATO and EU member state, Slovakia cooper-
Finland 20
ates closely with the Visegrád Group, and there are reports that the
Germany 68 country is considering forming a collective fighter jet pilot train-
Greece 113; 1 inf coy ing programme. Bratislava has signed an agreement to enable
Hungary 469; 1 inf coy (KTM) air policing and closer integration of air-defence capabilities. A
Defence Cooperation Agreement was signed with the United
Ireland 13
States in February 2022 and funds were allocated to Slovakia under
Italy 715; 1 arty regt BG HQ; 1 Carabinieri unit the Foreign Military Financing Programme to help the country
Latvia 136; 1 inf coy replace part of the military equipment sent to Ukraine since the
Lithuania 1 Russian invasion. Germany is planning to supply 15 Leopard 2A4
MBTs, after Slovakia sent Infantry Fighting Vehicles to Ukraine. The
Macedonia, North 65 air force is in the process of procuring new jet trainers in prepa-
Moldova 41 • UNMIK 1 obs ration for the delivery of its F-16s, expected between 2023 and
Montenegro 1 2024. US Patriot air defence systems arrived, after Slovakia donated
S-300s to Ukraine. As part of plans to improve mechanised capabil-
Poland 247; 1 inf coy • UNMIK 2 obs
ities, agreements were signed in 2022 for the acquisition of Patria
Romania 65 • UNMIK 1 obs 8x8 armoured vehicles. CV90s will be delivered between 2025
Slovenia 97; 1 mot inf coy; 1 MP unit; 1 hel unit and 2028. Slovakia has deployed a company-sized unit to NATO’s
Sweden 3 Enhanced Forward Presence in Latvia and stood up the EFP Battle-
group Slovakia to assist in defending NATO’s eastern flank. In June
Switzerland 186; 1 inf coy; 1 engr pl; 1 hel flt with AS332 2021, Slovakia began planning for upgrades to Sliaĉ air base, which
Turkey 335; 1 inf coy • UNMIK 2 obs is to become the main operating base for the F-16, and pilot train-
Ukraine 40 ing began in April in the US. Part of Slovakia’s defence-industrial
base is organised within the state-controlled holding company
United Kingdom 41
DMD Group, including KONSTRUKTA Defence, which produces
United States 561; elm 1 ARNG inf bde HQ; 1 ARNG inf land systems. Other companies focus on maintenance, repair and
bn; 1 hel flt with UH-60 overhaul services.
Europe 131
ACTIVE 17,950 (Army 10,300 Air 4,000 Central Air Force 4,000
Staff 3,650) FORCES BY ROLE
FIGHTER
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE 1 sqn with MiG-29AS/UBS Fulcrum
TRANSPORT
Central Staff 3,650 1 flt with C-27J Spartan
FORCES BY ROLE 1 flt with L-410FG/T Turbolet
SPECIAL FORCES TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
Europe
1 (5th) spec ops bn 1 sqn with Mi-17 Hip H
1 sqn with UH-60M Black Hawk
Army 10,300 TRAINING
FORCES BY ROLE 1 sqn with L-39CM/ZAM Albatros*
MANOEUVRE AIR DEFENCE
Armoured 1 bde with 2K12 Kub (RS-SA-6 Gainful)
1 (2nd) armd bde (1 recce bn, 1 tk bn, 2 armd inf bn, EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 mixed SP arty bn) AIRCRAFT 19 combat capable
Mechanised FTR 11: 9 MiG-29AS Fulcrum; 2 MiG-29UBS Fulcrum;
1 (1st) mech bde (3 armd inf bn, 1 MRL bn, 1 engr bn, TPT 5: Medium 2 C-27J Spartan; Light 3: 1 L-410FG
1 NBC bn) Turbolet; 2 L-410T Turbolet; (4 L-410UVP Turbolet in store)
COMBAT SUPPORT TRG 8: 6 L-39CM Albatros*; 2 L-39ZAM Albatros* (1 more
1 MP bn in store)
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT HELICOPTERS
1 spt bde (2 log bn, 1 maint bn, 1 spt bn) ATK (15: 5 Mi-24D Hind D; 10 Mi-24V Hind E all in store)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE MRH 13 Mi-17 Hip H (incl 4 SAR)
ARMOURED FIGHITING VEHICLES TPT • Medium 9 UH-60M Black Hawk
MBT 30 T-72M AIR DEFENCE • SAM
RECCE 18 BPsVI Short-range 2K12 Kub (RS-SA-6 Gainful)
IFV 216: 108 BMP-1; 91 BMP-2; 17 BVP-M AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
APC 101+ AAM • IR R-60 (RS-AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (RS-AA-11A
APC (T) 72 OT-90 Archer); SARH R-27R (RS-AA-10A Alamo)
APC (W) 22: 7 OT-64; 15 Tatrapan (6×6)
PPV 7+ RG-32M
DEPLOYMENT
AUV IVECO LMV
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR (Operation Althea) 53
ARV MT-55; VT-55A; VT-72B; WPT-TOPAS CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: EU • EUTM RCA 2
VLB AM-50; MT-55A
CYPRUS: UN • UNFICYP 300; 2 inf coy; 1 engr pl
MW Bozena; UOS-155 Belarty
IRAQ: NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 5
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
SP 9S428 with Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger) on BMP-1; LATVIA: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 152; 1 arty
9P135 Fagot (RS-AT-4 Spigot) on BMP-2; 9P148 Konkurs bty with M-2000 Zuzana
(RS-AT-5 Spandrel) on BRDM-2 MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 4
MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger); 9K111-1
MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 2
Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel)
RCL 84mm Carl Gustaf
ARTILLERY 60 FOREIGN FORCES
SP 30: 152mm 3 M-77 Dana; 155mm 27: 16 M-2000 All under NATO Enhanced Vigilance Activities
Zuzana; 11 Zuzana-2 Czech Republic 400; 1 mech inf bn HQ; 1 mech inf coy
MRL 30: 122mm 4 RM-70; 122/227mm 26 RM-70/85 Germany 480; 1 inf coy; 1 SAM bty with M902 Patriot PAC-3
MODULAR Netherlands 125; 1 SAM bty with M902 Patriot PAC-3
AIR DEFENCE Slovenia 101; 1 lt inf coy
SAM • Point-defence 9K310 Igla-1 (RS-SA-16 Gimlet) United States 400; 1 SAM bty with M902 Patriot PAC-3
132 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
Slovenia SVN
Euro EUR 2021 2022 2023 Army 6,400
GDP EUR 52.2bn 58.8bn FORCES BY ROLE
Regt are bn sized
USD 61.8bn 62.2bn
SPECIAL FORCES
per capita USD 29,298 29,469 1 SF unit (1 spec ops coy, 1 CSS coy)
Growth % 8.2 5.7 MANOEUVRE
Inflation % 1.9 8.9 Mechanised
Def exp [a] EUR 645m 699m 1 (1st) mech inf bde (1 mech inf regt, 1 mtn inf regt,
USD 763m 739m 1 cbt spt bn (1 ISR coy, 1 arty bty, 1 engr coy, 1 MP coy,
1 CBRN coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 SAM bty))
Def bdgt [b] EUR 706m 835m 939m
1 (72nd) mech inf bde (2 mech inf regt, 1 cbt spt bn (1 ISR
USD 836m 883m coy, 1 arty bty, 1 engr coy, 1 MP coy, 1 CBRN coy, 1 sigs
USD1=EUR 0.84 0.95 coy, 1 SAM bty))
[a] NATO figure COMBAT SUPPORT
[b] Includes military pensions 1 EW coy
Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
783 1 log bde (1 log regt, 1 maint regt (1 tk coy), 1 med regt)
Reserves
396
2008 2015 2022
FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
Population 2,101,208 Mountain
2 inf regt (territorial – 1 allocated to each inf bde)
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Male 7.5% 2.4% 2.4% 2.6% 25.5% 9.7% ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
Female 7.2% 2.2% 2.2% 2.3% 23.5% 12.5% MBT 14 M-84 (trg role) (32 more in store)
APC 115+:
Capabilities APC (W) 115: 85 Pandur 6×6 (Valuk); 30 Patria 8×8 (Svarun)
PPV Cougar 6×6 JERRV
Since joining NATO and the EU in 2004, territorial defence and the AUV 38 JLTV
ability to take part in peace-support operations have been central ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
to Slovenia’s defence strategy. In January 2020, the defence minis- ARV VT-55A
try published a White Paper and in February 2022 authorised the VLB MT-55A
Long-Term Development Programme for the Slovenian Armed NBC VEHICLES 10 Cobra CBRN
Forces 2022-35. Subsequently, the government in April adopted
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
a Medium-Term Development Programme to serve as the guiding
MSL • MANPATS Spike MR/LR
document for defence programming and planning. Defence
ARTILLERY 68
spending is increasing. Short term plans are focused on develop-
TOWED • 155mm 18 TN-90
ing a medium infantry battalion (rather than two battalion groups
MOR 50+: 82mm M-69; 120mm 50 MN-9/M-74
originally envisaged) and equipped with IFVs and combat support
AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence 9K338 Igla-S (RS-
and combat service support. In September, the country withdrew
from an MOU for the acquisition of 45 Boxer armoured vehicles.
SA-24 Grinch)
Fixed-wing and rotary-wing transport capabilities are modestly
improving with new acquisitions and upgrades. There are plans
Army Maritime Element 130
to establish a cyber reserve force. Slovenia has donated military FORCES BY ROLE
equipment to Ukraine, reportedly including MBTs. Slovenia acts SPECIAL FORCES
as the framework nation for the NATO Mountain Warfare Centre 1 SF unit
of Excellence and in 2023 will provide units to the NATO VJTF. EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Italy and Hungary currently provide air policing capability under PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 2
NATO arrangements. The country has contributed to EU, NATO PCC 1 Triglav III (RUS Svetlyak)
and UN operations. Slovenia participates in NATO’s Enhanced PBF 1 Super Dvora MkII
Forward Presence, where it contributes to the Canadian-led battle-
group in Latvia and to the newly-formed battlegroup in Slovakia. Air Element 600
Its defence industry relies heavily on exports for its revenue and FORCES BY ROLE
focuses on personal equipment, small arms and ammunition, and TRANSPORT
CBRN protection and detection. 1 sqn with Falcon 2000EX; L-410 Turbolet; PC-6B Turbo Porter
ACTIVE 6,400 (Army 6,400) TRAINING
1 unit with Bell 206 Jet Ranger (AB-206); PC-9M*;
RESERVE 750 (Army 750) Z-143L; Z-242L
Europe 133
Europe
HELICOPTERS EU and UN operations abroad, and hosts one of NATO’s two Com-
MRH 8: 5 Bell 412EP Twin Huey; 2 Bell 412HP Twin bined Air Operations Centres. The armed forces are well trained and
Huey; 1 Bell 412SP Twin Huey there is a routine exercise programme for both domestic and mul-
tinational exercises. The country’s equipment and logistics-support
TPT 8: Medium 4 AS532AL Cougar; Light 4 Bell 206 Jet capability appears to be sufficient to meet its national commitments
Ranger (AB-206) and contribution to NATO operations and exercises. Equipment-
modernisation plans include modernisation of army Chinook heli-
copters and Eurofighter combat aircraft, the acquisition of four
DEPLOYMENT S-80 submarines, new 8x8 armoured vehicles, and two military-
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR (Operation Althea) 16 communications satellites. Spain participates in the Future Combat
Air System (FCAS) project together with France and Germany. Spain’s
IRAQ: Operation Inherent Resolve 3 defence industry manufactures across all domains and exports glob-
LATVIA: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 42 ally, with major firms including state-owned shipbuilder Navantia,
Airbus and Santa Barbara Sistemas, belonging to General Dynamics
LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 1 European Land Systems. The industry is largely integrated within the
MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 9 European defence-industrial manufacturing base.
MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 3 ACTIVE 124,150 (Army 71,900 Navy 20,500 Air 20,350
SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 97; 1 mot inf coy; 1 MP unit; 1 Joint 11,400) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 75,800
hel unit RESERVE 14,700 (Army 8,550 Navy 3,100 Air 2,550
SLOVAKIA: NATO • Enhanced Vigilance Activities 101; 1 Other 500)
lt inf coy
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
Spain ESP
Space
Euro EUR 2021 2022 2023 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
GDP EUR 1.21tr 1.32tr SATELLITES 3
USD 1.43tr 1.39tr COMMUNICATIONS 2: 1 Spainsat; 1 Xtar-Eur
per capita USD 30,090 29,198 ISR 1 Paz
Growth % 5.1 4.3
Army 71,900
Inflation % 3.1 8.8
The Land Forces High Readiness HQ Spain provides one
Def exp [a] EUR 12.5bn 13.1bn
NATO Rapid Deployment Corps HQ (NRDC-ESP)
USD 14.8bn 13.9bn
FORCES BY ROLE
Def bdgt [b] EUR 12.8bn ε13.9bn ε17.5bn COMMAND
USD 15.1bn ε14.7bn 1 corps HQ (CGTAD/NRDC-ESP) (1 int regt, 1 MP bn)
USD1=EUR 0.84 0.95 2 div HQ
[a] NATO figure SPECIAL FORCES
1 comd (3 spec ops bn, 1 int coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn)
[b] Includes military pensions
MANOEUVRE
Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015)
Reconnaissance
14.6
1 armd cav regt (2 armd recce bn)
Mechanised
9.60 2 (10th & 11th) mech bde (1 armd regt (1 armd recce bn,
2008 2015 2022
1 tk bn), 1 mech inf regt (1 armd inf bn, 1 mech inf bn),
Population 47,163,418 1 lt inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 AT coy, 1 AD coy, 1 engr bn,
1 int coy, 1 NBC coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn)
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus 1 (12th) mech bde (1 armd regt (1 armd recce bn, 1 tk bn),
1 mech inf regt (1 armd inf bn, 1 mech inf bn), 1 mtn
Male 7.0% 2.7% 2.5% 2.4% 25.5% 8.7%
inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 AT coy, 1 AD coy, 1 engr bn, 1 int
Female 6.7% 2.6% 2.4% 2.4% 25.6% 11.5%
coy, 1 NBC coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn)
134 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
1 (1st) mech bde (1 armd regt (1 armd recce bn, 1 tk bn), TOWED 268: 105mm 204: 56 L118 Light Gun; 148 Model
1 armd inf regt (1 armd inf bn), 1 SP arty bn, 1 AT coy, 56 pack howitzer; 155mm 64 SBT 155/52 SIAC
1 AD coy, 1 engr bn, 1 int coy, 1 NBC coy, 1 sigs coy, MOR 1,189: 81mm 777; SP 81mm 10 VAMTAC with
1 log bn) Cardom 81mm; 120mm 402
2 (2nd/La Legion & 7th) lt mech bde (1 armd recce bn,
COASTAL DEFENCE • ARTY 155mm 19 SBT 155/52 APU
1 mech inf regt (2 mech inf bn), 1 lt inf bn, 1 fd arty bn,
SBT V07
1 AT coy, 1 AD coy, 1 engr bn, 1 int coy, 1 NBC coy,
1 sigs coy, 1 log bn) HELICOPTERS
Mountain ATK 18 Tiger HAD-E
1 mtn comd (1 mtn inf regt (1 mtn inf bn, 1 mtn inf coy); TPT 84: Heavy 17: 13 CH-47D Chinook (HT-17D); 4 CH-
1 mtn inf bn) 47F Chinook; Medium 48: 16 AS332B Super Puma (HU-21);
Air Manoeuvre
12 AS532UL Cougar; 6 AS532AL Cougar; 14 NH90 TTH;
1 (6th) bde (1 recce bn, 2 para bn, 1 lt inf bn, 1 fd arty bn,
1 AT coy, 1 AD coy, 1 engr bn, 1 int coy, 1 NBC coy, Light 19: 3 Bell 212 (HU.18); 16 H135 (HE.26/HU.26)
1 sigs coy, 1 log bn) UAV • ISR • Medium 6: 2 Searcher MkII-J (PASI); 4
Other Searcher MkIII (PASI)
1 (Canary Islands) comd (1 lt inf bde (2 mech inf regt AIR DEFENCE
(1 mech inf bn), 1 lt inf regt (1 lt inf bn), 1 fd arty regt,
SAM 79+
1 AT coy, 1 engr bn, 1 int coy, 1 NBC coy, 1 sigs coy,
1 log bn); 1 EW regt; 1 spt hel bn; 1 AD regt) Long-range 18 M901 Patriot PAC-2
1 (Balearic Islands) comd (1 inf regt (1 lt inf bn)) Medium-range 40 MIM-23B I-Hawk Phase III
2 (Ceuta and Melilla) comd (1 recce regt, 1 mech inf bn, 1 Short-range 21: 8 NASAMS; 13 Skyguard/Aspide
inf bn, 1 arty regt (1 fd arty bn, 1 ADA bn), 1 engr bn, Point-defence Mistral
1 sigs coy, 1 log bn)
GUNS • TOWED 35mm 67: 19 GDF-005; 48 GDF-007
COMBAT SUPPORT
1 arty comd (1 arty regt; 1 MRL regt; 1 coastal arty regt) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • ASM Spike-ER
1 engr comd (2 engr regt, 1 bridging regt)
1 EW/sigs bde (2 EW regt, 3 sigs regt) Navy 20,500 (incl Naval Aviation and Marines)
1 NBC regt EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 info ops regt (1 CIMIC bn; 1 Psyops bn)
SUBMARINES 2
1 int regt
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT SSK 2 Galerna with 4 single 533mm TT with F17 mod
1 log bde (5 log regt; 1 tpt regt; 1 med regt (1 log bn, 2 HWT
2 med bn, 1 fd hospital bn)) PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 11
HELICOPTER DESTROYERS • DDGHM 5 Alvaro de Bazan with Aegis
1 hel comd (1 atk hel bn, 2 spt hel bn, 1 tpt hel bn, 1 sigs
Baseline 5 C2, 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84F Harpoon Block
bn, 1 log unit (1 spt coy, 1 supply coy))
1D AShM, 6 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with SM-2 Block IIIA/
AIR DEFENCE
1 AD comd (3 SAM regt, 1 sigs unit) RIM-162B ESSM SAM, 2 twin 324mm SVTT Mk 32 mod
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 9 ASTT with Mk 46 mod 5 LWT, 1 127mm gun (capacity
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES 1 SH-60B Seahawk ASW hel)
MBT 327: 108 Leopard 2A4; 219 Leopard 2E FRIGATES • FFGH 6 Santa Maria with 1 Mk 13 GMLS
ASLT 84 B1 Centauro with RGM-84C Harpoon Block 1B AShM, 2 triple 324mm
RECCE 187 VEC-M1
SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 mod 5 LWT, 1 Meroka
IFV 225: 204 Pizarro; 21 Pizarro (CP)
APC 903 mod 2B CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 SH-60B Seahawk
APC (T) 473: 20 Bv-206S; 453 M113 (incl variants) ASW hel)
APC (W) 320 BMR-600/BMR-600M1 AMPHIBIOUS
PPV 110 RG-31 PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 3:
AUV 258 IVECO LMV
LHD 1 Juan Carlos I (capacity 18 hel or 10 AV-8B FGA
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
AEV 27 CZ-10/25E; 1 Pizarro CEV (Castor) (in test) ac; 4 LCM-1E; 42 APC; 46 MBT; 900 troops)
ARV 51: 16 Leopard REC; 5 BMR REC; 4 Centauro REC; 14 LPD 2 Galicia (capacity 6 Bell 212 or 4 SH-3D Sea King
Maxxpro MRV; 12 M113 hel; 4 LCM or 2 LCM & 8 AAV; 130 APC or 33 MBT;
VLB 15 M60 AVLB 540 troops)
MW 6 Husky 2G
LANDING CRAFT • LCM 12 LCM 1E
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
MSL • MANPATS Spike-LR; TOW LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 2
ARTILLERY 1,552 AORH 2: 1 Patino (capacity 3 Bell 212 or 2 SH-3D Sea King
SP 155mm 95 M109A5 hel); 1 Cantabria (capacity 3 Bell 212 or 2 SH-3D Sea King hel)
Europe 135
Maritime Action Force 1 mne bde (1 recce unit, 1 mech inf bn, 2 inf bn, 1 arty
bn, 1 log bn)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Other
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 23
1 sy bde (5 mne garrison gp)
PSOH 6 Meteoro (Buques de Accion Maritima) with
1 76mm gun EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PSO 5: 3 Alboran each with 1 hel landing platform; ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
2 Descubierta with 1 76mm gun APC • APC (W) 34: 32 Piranha IIIC; 1 Piranha IIIC
PCO 4 Serviola with 1 76mm gun (amb); 1 Piranha IIIC EW (EW)
PCC 3 Anaga with 1 76mm gun AAV 18: 16 AAV-7A1/AAVP-7A1; 2 AAVC-7A1 (CP)
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
Europe
PB 4: 2 P-101; 2 Toralla
PBR 1 Cabo Fradera AEV 4 Piranha IIIC
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 6 ARV 3: 1 AAVR-7A1; 1 M88; 1 Piranha IIIC
MHO 6 Segura ARTILLERY 30
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 30 SP 155mm 6 M109A2
AGI 1 Alerta TOWED 105mm 24 Model 56 pack howitzer
AGOR 2 (with ice-strengthened hull, for polar research ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
duties in Antarctica) MSL • MANPATS Spike-LR; TOW-2
AGS 3: 2 Malaspina; 1 Castor AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence Mistral
AKR 1 Ysabel
AP 1 Contramaestre Casado with 1 hel landing platform Air Force 20,350
ASR 1 Neptuno The Spanish Air Force is organised in 3 commands –
ATF 3: 1 Mar Caribe; 1 Mahon; 1 La Grana General Air Command, Combat Air Command and Canary
AXL 10: 6 Contramaestre; 4 Guardiamarina Islands Air Command
AXS 8 FORCES BY ROLE
FIGHTER
Naval Aviation 850 2 sqn with Eurofighter Typhoon
FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 5 sqn with F/A-18A/B MLU Hornet (EF-18A/B MLU)
1 sqn with AV-8B Harrier II Plus MARITIME PATROL
ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE 1 sqn with P-3A/M Orion
1 sqn with SH-60B/F Seahawk ISR
TRANSPORT 1 sqn with Beech C90 King Air
1 (liaison) sqn with Cessna 550 Citation II; Cessna 650 1 sqn with Cessna 550 Citation V; CN235 (TR-19A)
Citation VII SEARCH & RESCUE
TRAINING 1 sqn with AS332B/B1 Super Puma; CN235 VIGMA
1 sqn with Hughes 500MD8 1 sqn with AS332B Super Puma; CN235 VIGMA; H215
1 flt with TAV-8B Harrier (AS332C1) Super Puma
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with C-212 Aviocar; CN235 VIGMA
1 sqn with Bell 212 (HU-18) TANKER/TRANSPORT
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 1 sqn with A400M
AIRCRAFT 13 combat capable FGA 13: 12 AV-8B TRANSPORT
Harrier II Plus; 1 TAV-8B Harrier (on lease from USMC) 1 VIP sqn with A310; Falcon 900
TPT • Light 4: 3 Cessna 550 Citation II; 1 Cessna 650 1 sqn with A400M
Citation VII 1 sqn with C-212 Aviocar
HELICOPTERS 2 sqn with C295
ASW 18: 12 SH-60B Seahawk; 6 SH-60F Seahawk 1 sqn with CN235
MRH 9 Hughes 500MD TRAINING
TPT • Light 7 Bell 212 (HA-18) 1 OCU sqn with Eurofighter Typhoon
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES 1 OCU sqn with F/A-18A/B (EF-18A/B MLU) Hornet
AAM • IR AIM-9L Sidewinder; ARH AIM-120 1 sqn with Beech F33C Bonanza
AMRAAM 1 sqn with C-212 Aviocar
ASM AGM-65G Maverick; AGM-114K/R Hellfire II 1 sqn with PC-21
AShM AGM-119 Penguin 1 sqn with T-35 Pillan (E-26)
2 (LIFT) sqn with F-5B Freedom Fighter
Marines 5,350 1 hel sqn with H120 Colibri
FORCES BY ROLE 1 hel sqn with S-76C
SPECIAL FORCES TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
1 spec ops bn 1 sqn with AS332M1 Super Puma; AS532UL Cougar (VIP)
MANOEUVRE ISR UAV
Amphibious 1 sqn with MQ-9A Reaper (forming)
136 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Europe
Def bdgt SEK 71.2bn 79.9bn 94.0bn MANOEUVRE
USD 8.30bn 8.07bn Reconnaissance
USD1=SEK 8.58 9.89 1 recce bn
Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) Armoured
7.75 5 armd bn
1 armd BG
5.40 Mechanised
2008 2015 2022 1 mech bn
Light
Population 10,483,647
1 mot inf bn
1 lt inf bn
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Air Manoeuvre
Male 8.9% 2.9% 2.9% 3.3% 22.7% 9.6% 1 AB bn
Female 8.4% 2.7% 2.6% 3.1% 21.9% 11.0% Other
1 sy bn
Capabilities COMBAT SUPPORT
Sweden’s armed forces remain configured for territorial defence 2 arty bn
and there has been growing concern over Russia’s military activ- 2 engr bn
ity in the Baltic area. There has also been a focus on increasing 2 MP coy
cooperation with neighbours and NATO in recent years. Sweden 1 CBRN coy
applied for NATO membership in May 2022, three months after COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Sweden also plans to 1 tpt coy
increase its defence budget to 2% of GDP. Under the 2021–25
AIR DEFENCE
defence bill, which was presented in October 2020, Sweden had
2 AD bn
already envisaged increased spending. Measures to enhance soci-
etal resilience and the ability to deal with civil emergencies have
Reserves
also been announced. In July 2019, Sweden joined the UK-led
Tempest project for a future combat aircraft, and in 2022 signed a FORCES BY ROLE
mutual security agreement with the UK. Concerns over readiness MANOEUVRE
levels have led to greater cooperation with NORDEFCO. In May Other
2018, Sweden, Finland and the US signed a statement of intent 40 Home Guard bn
to develop closer cooperation on exercises and interoperability. EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Sweden has started to re-garrison the island of Gotland, and is
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
in the process of establishing five new regiments which will raise
MBT 120 Leopard 2A5 (Strv 122)
and train new infantry battalions. Readiness challenges in the air
force triggered a discussion about extending the service life of the IFV 411: 369 CV9040 (Strf 9040; incl 54 CP); 42 Epbv 90 (OP)
JAS-39C Gripens beyond their intended 2026 retirement date, not APC 1,064
least since the air force was slated to receive a lower number of APC (T) 389: 239 Pbv 302 (incl variants); 150 BvS-10 MkII
JAS-39Es than requested. Air defence has been boosted in recent APC (W) 315+: some Bastion APC; 34 XA-180 Sisu
years with the acquisition of the Patriot system. The country’s (Patgb 180); 20 XA-202 Sisu (Patgb 202); 148 XA-203
export-oriented defence industry is privately owned and capable Sisu (Patgb 203); 113 Patria AMV (XA-360/Patgb 360)
of meeting most of the armed forces’ equipment needs, including PPV 360 RG-32M
for advanced combat aircraft and conventional submarines.
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
ACTIVE 14,600 (Army 6,850 Navy 2,350 Air 2,700 AEV 6 Pionierpanzer-3 Kodiak (Ingbv 120)
Other 2,950) Voluntary Auxiliary Organisations ARV 40: 14 Bgbv 120; 26 Bgbv 90
21,200 VLB 3 Brobv 120
MW 33+: Aardvark Mk2; 33 Area Clearing System
Conscript liability 4–11 months, depending on branch (selec-
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
tive conscription; 4,000 in total, gender neutral)
MSL • MANPATS NLAW; RBS-55
RESERVE 10,000 RCL 84mm Carl Gustaf
138 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Europe
4 med coy ground forces and for stronger cyber capabilities. The approach to
1 tpt coy readiness is changing to a flexible model in which different units
are called up for active service gradually and on different timelines.
A multi-stage selection process for aircraft to replace the F-5 Tiger
DEPLOYMENT II and F/A-18 Hornet was completed in June 2021 and the F-35A
was chosen. The life of the Hornet fleet has been extended until
INDIA/PAKISTAN: UN • UNMOGIP 4
2030. This was approved by parliament in September 2022, after
IRAQ: Operation Inherent Resolve 2; NATO • NATO which the contract was signed. Plans for a referendum on the
Mission Iraq 1 F-35 procurement gathered the required number of signatures
KOREA, REPUBLIC OF: NNSC • 5 but were withdrawn after the government indicated it would not
diverge from the procurement timetable. The fighter-acquisition
MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 8; UN • MINUSMA 184; 1 int coy programme was capped at CHF6 billion in May 2019 and has been
MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 7 separated from the ground-based air-defence procurement. Pre-
viously both programmes were linked. Other priorities include
SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 3
upgrades to Switzerland’s air-surveillance systems and to transport
SOMALIA: EU • EUTM Somalia 5 helicopters. Switzerland’s defence industry has limited design and
UNITED KINGDOM: Operation Interflex 45 (UKR trg) manufacturing capabilities, with recognised capacity in the land-
vehicles sector, which has links to North American firms.
WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 1
ACTIVE 19,550 (Armed Forces 19,550)
Switzerland CHE Conscript liability 260–600 compulsory service days depending on
rank. 18 or 23 weeks’ training (depending on branch) generally at
Swiss Franc CHF 2021 2022 2023 age 20, followed by 6 refresher trg courses (3 weeks each). Alterna-
tive service available
GDP CHF 731bn 766bn
USD 800bn 807bn RESERVE 123,450
per capita USD 92,249 92,434
Civil Defence 73,000 (51,000 Reserve)
Growth % 4.2 2.2
Inflation % 0.6 3.1
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
Def bdgt [a] CHF 5.20bn 5.27bn 5.30bn
USD 5.69bn 5.55bn
Armed Forces 3,100 active; 16,450 conscript
USD1=CHF 0.91 0.95
(19,550 total)
[a] Includes military pensions
Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) Operations Command 72,600 on mobilisation
5.64 4 Territorial Regions. With the exception of military
police all units are non-active
4.61 FORCES BY ROLE
2008 2015 2022
COMMAND
Population 8,508,698 4 regional comd
SPECIAL FORCES
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus 2 SF bn
Male 8.0% 2.5% 2.7% 3.0% 24.6% 8.6% MANOEUVRE
Female 7.5% 2.4% 2.6% 3.0% 24.6% 10.6% Armoured
2 (1st & 11th) bde (1 recce bn, 1 tk bn, 2 armd inf bn,
Capabilities 1 SP arty bn, 1 engr bn, 1 sigs bn)
Mechanised
The conscript-based armed forces are postured for territorial
1 (4th) bde (2 recce bn, 2 SP arty bn, 1 ptn br bn)
defence and limited participation in international peace-support
operations. The government has begun to reduce its armed forces,
Light
reflecting an assessment that in the militia-based system not all 10 inf bn
personnel would realistically be available for active service. With 7 mtn inf bn
permanent neutrality a core feature of foreign and security policy, 1 mtn inf unit
140 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Europe
Def exp [a] TRY 117bn 138bn
USD 13.1bn 8.2bn
Space
Def bdgt [b] TRY 84.6bn 104bn 206bn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
USD 9.55bn 6.19bn
SATELLITES • ISR 2 Gokturk-1/2
USD1=TRY 8.87 16.74
[a] NATO figure Army ε260,200 (incl conscripts)
[b] Includes funding for Undersecretariat of Defence Industries; FORCES BY ROLE
Defence Industry Support Fund; TUBITAK Defense Industries R&D COMMAND
Institute (SAGE); and military pensions
4 army HQ
Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 9 corps HQ
16.30 SPECIAL FORCES
8 cdo bde
8.61 1 mtn cdo bde
2008 2015 2022 1 cdo regt
Population 83,047,706
MANOEUVRE
Armoured
1 (52nd) armd div (2 armd bde, 1 mech bde)
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
7 armd bde
Male 11.5% 4.0% 3.9% 3.7% 23.0% 4.1% Mechanised
Female 11.0% 3.8% 3.7% 3.6% 22.7% 4.9% 2 (28th & 29th) mech div
14 mech inf bde
Capabilities Light
1 (23rd) mot inf div (3 mot inf regt)
Turkey has large, generally well-equipped armed forces that are
primarily structured for national defence. Much recent activity 7 mot inf bde
has focused on internal security and cross-border operations in COMBAT SUPPORT
response to the continuing wars in Syria and Libya. The conflict 2 arty bde
with Kurdish armed groups continues. The armed forces’ 2033 stra- 1 trg arty bde
tegic plan aims to modernise military equipment and force struc- 6 arty regt
tures. Turkey is a NATO member and has provided access to its air- 2 engr regt
space and facilities for operations in Iraq and Syria. However, rela- AVIATION
tionships with NATO allies have come under pressure after Ankara’s 4 avn regt
decision to procure the Russian-made S-400 air-defence system, 4 avn bn
its operations in northern Syria, rising tensions with Greece in the
eastern Mediterranean Sea, its role in Libya and its position regard- EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ing the fighting in recent years between Armenia and Azerbaijan. ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
Following an attempted coup in July 2016, Ankara dismissed large MBT 2,378: 316 Leopard 2A4 (being upgraded); 170
numbers of officers from the armed forces. The armed forces train Leopard 1A4; 227 Leopard 1A3; 100 M60A1; 650 M60A3
regularly, including with NATO allies. While key subcomponents TTS; 165 M60TM Firat; 750 M48A5 T2 Patton
are still often imported, a number of locally developed equipment IFV 645 ACV AIFV
designs are in production. Efforts are under way to increase mili- APC 6,403
tary exports and Turkey has secured markets in Azerbaijan, Paki- APC (T) 3,579: 823 ACV AAPC; 2,813 M113/M113A1/
stan and Ukraine, as well as a number of African states, successfully M113A2
offering cost-effective assets in specific sectors. The US govern- APC (W) 57 Pars 6×6 (incl variants)
ment terminated Turkey’s participation in the F-35 programme
PPV 2,710: 360 Edjer Yalcin 4×4; ε2,000 Kirpi/Kirpi-II;
after deliveries under the S-400 contract began in 2019. Turkey is
ε350 Vuran
also developing a domestic fighter aircraft but is dependent on
collaboration with external defence companies. The president
AUV 1,450: ε250 Akrep; 800+ Cobra; ε400 Cobra II
has authority over defence procurement and control over Turkey’s ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
top defence companies. Turkey has signed defence-cooperation AEV 12+: AZMIM; 12 M48 AEV; M113A2T2
agreements with a focus on exports and technology transfer, in an ARV 150: 12 BPz-2; 105 M48T5; 33 M88A1
effort to boost its national defence industry and achieve defence- VLB 88: 36 Leguan; 52 Mobile Floating Assault Bridge
industrial autonomy. MW 14+: 4 Husky 2G; 10 Kirpi PMKI; Tamkar; Bozena
142 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
AMPHIBIOUS ISR
LANDING SHIPS • LST 5: 1 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon
2 Bayraktar with 2 Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 1 hel 1 unit with King Air 350
landing platform (capacity 20 MBT; 250 troops) AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL
1 Osmangazi with 1 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS (capacity 4 1 sqn (forming) with B-737 AEW&C
LCVP; 17 tanks; 980 troops; 1 hel landing platform) EW
2 Sarucabey with 1 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS (capacity 11 1 unit with CN235M EW
tanks; 600 troops; 1 hel landing platform) SEARCH & RESCUE
LANDING CRAFT 38 1 sqn with AS532AL/UL Cougar
LCT 21: 2 C-120/130; 11 C-140; 8 C-151 TANKER
Europe
LCM 9: 1 C-310; 8 LCM 8 1 sqn with KC-135R Stratotanker
LCVP 8 Anadolu 16m TRANSPORT
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 37 1 sqn with A400M; C-160D Transall
ABU 2: 1 AG5; 1 AG6 with 1 76mm gun 1 sqn with C-130B/E Hercules
AGI 1 Ufuk (MILGEM) (capacity 1 S-70B Seahawk hel) 1 (VIP) sqn with Cessna 550 Citation II (UC-35); Cessna
AGS 2: 1 Cesme (ex-US Silas Bent); 1 Cubuklu 650 Citation VII; CN235M; Gulfstream 550
AOR 2 Akar with 1 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS, 1 hel landing 3 sqn with CN235M
platform 10 (liaison) flt with Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); CN235M
AOT 3: 2 Burak; 1 Yuzbasi Gungor Durmus with 1 hel TRAINING
landing platform 1 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon
AOL 1 Gurcan 1 sqn (display team) with NF-5A-2000/NF-5B-2000
AP 1 Iskenderun Freedom Fighter
ASR 3: 1 Alemdar with 1 hel landing platform; 2 Isin II 1 sqn with MFI-395 Super Mushshak; SF-260D
ATF 9: 1 Akbas; 1 Degirmendere; 1 Gazal; 1 Inebolu; 5 Onder 1 sqn with Hurkus-B; KT-IT
AWT 3 Sogut 1 sqn with T-38A/M Talon
AXL 8 1 sqn with T-41D Mescalero
AX 2 Pasa (ex-GER Rhein) COMBAT/ISR UAV
1 sqn with Akinci
Marines 3,000 AIR DEFENCE
FORCES BY ROLE 4 bn with S-400 (RS-SA-21 Growler)
MANOEUVRE 4 sqn with MIM-14 Nike Hercules
Amphibious 2 sqn with Rapier
1 mne bde (3 mne bn; 1 arty bn) 8 (firing) unit with MIM-23 Hawk
MANOEUVRE
Naval Aviation Air Manoeuvre
FORCES BY ROLE 1 AB bde
ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
2 sqn with Bell 212 ASW (AB-212 ASW); S-70B AIRCRAFT 295 combat capable
Seahawk FTR 16: up to 10 NF-5A-2000 Freedom Fighter (display
1 sqn with ATR-72-600; CN235M-100; TB-20 Trinidad team); up to 6 NF-5B-2000 Freedom Fighter (display team)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE FGA 279: 19 F-4E Phantom 2020; 27 F-16C Fighting Falcon
AIRCRAFT 4 combat capable Block 30; 162 F-16C Fighting Falcon Block 50; 14 F-16C
ASW 4 ATR-72-600 Fighting Falcon Block 50+; 8 F-16D Block 30 Fighting
MP 6 CN235M-100 Falcon; 33 F-16D Fighting Falcon Block 50; 16 F-16D
TPT • Light 7: 3 ATR-72-600; 4 TB-20 Trinidad Fighting Falcon Block 50+
HELICOPTERS ISR 9: 5 Beech 350 King Air; 3 C-160D Transall; 1 CN235M
ASW 33: 9 Bell 212 ASW (AB-212 ASW); 24 S-70B Seahawk (Open Skies)
UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES 20 EW 2 C-160D Transall
CISR 20: Heavy 9: 3 Aksungur; 8 Anka-S; Medium 9 SIGINT 3 CN235M
Bayraktar TB2 AEW&C 4 B-737 AEW&C
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES TKR 7 KC-135R Stratotanker
ASM AGM-114M Hellfire II TPT 84: Heavy 10 A400M; Medium 24: 6 C-130B Hercules;
BOMBS • Laser-guided MAM-C/L 13 C-130E Hercules; 5 C-160D Transall; Light 49: 2 Cessna
550 Citation II (UC-35 - VIP); 2 Cessna 650 Citation VII; 45
Air Force ε50,000 CN235M; PAX 1 Gulfstream 550
2 tac air forces (divided between east and west) TRG 174: 4 Hurkus-B; 39 KT-IT; 3 MFI-395 Super Mushshak;
FORCES BY ROLE 33 SF-260D; 70 T-38A/M Talon; 25 T-41D Mescalero
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK HELICOPTERS
1 sqn with F-4E Phantom 2020 TPT 35: Medium 20: 6 AS532AL Cougar (CSAR); 14
8 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon AS532UL Cougar (SAR); Light 15 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois)
144 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Europe
Def exp [a] GBP 52.3bn 53.9bn 22,700, Navy 5,750, Air 6,300); Volunteer Reserve
USD 71.9bn 67.7bn 35,250 (Army 28,350, Navy 3,650, Air 3,250);
Def bdgt [b] GBP 51.5bn ε55.7bn Sponsored Reserve 1,950)
Includes both trained and those currently under training within
USD 70.9bn ε70.0bn the Regular Forces, excluding university cadet units
USD1=GBP 0.73 0.80
[a] NATO figure
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
[b] Includes total departmental expenditure limits; costs of
military operations; Armed Forces Pension Service; military aid to
Ukraine; and external income earned by the MoD Strategic Forces 1,000
Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015)
74.3 Royal Navy
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
60.3 SUBMARINES • STRATEGIC
2008 2015 2022 SSBN 4 Vanguard with 16 UGM-133A Trident II D-5/
D-5LE nuclear SLBM, 4 533mm TT with Spearfish
Population 67,791,400 HWT (recent deployment practice of no more than
8 missiles/40 warheads per boat; each missile could
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus carry up to 12 MIRV; some Trident D-5 capable of being
Male 8.7% 2.9% 3.0% 3.4% 23.1% 8.6% configured for sub-strategic role)
Female 8.3% 2.8% 3.1% 3.4% 22.5% 10.2% MSL • SLBM • Nuclear 48 UGM-133A Trident II D-5
arty regt; 1 cbt engr regt); 1 (11th) inf bde (2 inf bn); 1 engr APC 796
bde (1 CBRN regt, 2 EOD regt, 1 (MWD) EOD search APC (T) 409 FV430 Bulldog (incl variants)
regt, 1 engr regt, 1 (air spt) engr regt, 1 log regt); 1 int bn; 1 PPV 387 Mastiff (6×6)
log bde (2 log regt; 2 maint bn); 1 med bde (2 fd hospital)) AUV 1,588: 399 Foxhound; 138 FV103 Spartan; 63 FV105
1 inf bn (London) Sultan (CP); 17 Spartan Mk2; 4 Sultan Mk2 (CP); 197 Jackal;
1 inf bn (Brunei) 110 Jackal 2; 130 Jackal 2A; 380 Panther CLV; 150 Ridgback
Air Manoeuvre ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
1 (16th) air aslt bde (1 recce pl, 2 para bn, 1 air aslt bn, 1 inf AEV 88: 56 Terrier; 32 Trojan
bn, 1 fd arty regt, 1 cbt engr regt, 1 log regt, 1 med regt) ARV 243: 80 Challenger ARRV; 12 FV106 Samson; 5 Samson
Other Mk2; 105 FV512 Warrior; 41 FV513 Warrior
1 inf bn (trials gp) MW 64 Aardvark
COMBAT SUPPORT VLB 68: 35 M3; 33 Titan
1 (6th) cbt spt div (1 ranger bde (4 ranger bn); 1 ISR gp (1 NBC VEHICLES 8 TPz-1 Fuchs NBC
EW regt, 1 int bn, 2 ISR UAV regt); 1 (77th) info ops bde
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL
(3 info ops gp, 1 spt gp, 1 engr spt/log gp))
SP Exactor-2 (Spike NLOS)
1 (geographic) engr regt
MANPATS FGM-148 Javelin; NLAW
1 engr bn(-) (joint GER-UK unit)
ARTILLERY 598
1 MP bde (2 MP regt)
SP 155mm 89 AS90
1 sigs bde (1 EW regt, 2 sigs regt; 1 (ARRC) spt bn)
TOWED 105mm 114 L118 Light Gun
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
1 log bde (3 log regt; 1 maint regt) MRL 227mm 35 M270B1 MLRS
MOR 81mm 360 L16A1
Reserves AMPHIBIOUS • LCM 3 Ramped Craft Logistic
AIR DEFENCE • SAM 60+
Army Reserve 28,350 reservists Short-range CAMM (Land Ceptor)
The Army Reserve (AR) generates individuals, sub-units Point-defence 60 FV4333 Stormer with Starstreak;
and some full units. The majority of units are subordin- Starstreak (LML)
ate to regular-formation headquarters and paired with UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES • ISR • Medium 13
one or more regular units
Watchkeeper (34 more in store)
FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE Joint Helicopter Command
Reconnaissance
Tri-service joint organisation including Royal Navy, Army
1 recce regt
and RAF units
Armoured
1 armd regt Army
Light
FORCES BY ROLE
1 inf bde (2 recce regt, 8 inf bn)
HELICOPTER
7 inf bn
1 bde (1 atk hel regt (2 sqn with AH-64E Apache; 1 trg
Air Manoeuvre
1 para bn sqn with AH-64D/E Apache); 1 atk hel regt (2 sqn with
COMBAT SUPPORT AH-64D Apache); 1 regt (2 sqn with AW159 Wildcat
3 arty regt AH1; 1 trg sqn with AW159 Wildcat AH1); 1 regt (1
1 STA regt sqn with SA341B Gazelle AH1); 1 (spec ops) sqn with
1 MRL regt AS365N3; SA341B Gazelle AH1; 1 sqn with Bell 212
3 engr regt (Brunei); 1 flt with SA341B Gazelle AH1 (Canada); 1
1 EOD regt maint regt)
4 int bn TRAINING
4 sigs regt 1 hel regt (1 sqn with AH-64E Apache; 1 sqn with AS350B
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT Ecureuil; 1 sqn with Bell 212; SA341B Gazelle AH1)
11 log regt
3 maint regt Army Reserve
3 med regt FORCES BY ROLE
9 fd hospital HELICOPTER
AIR DEFENCE 1 hel regt (4 sqn personnel only)
1 AD regt
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Royal Navy
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES FORCES BY ROLE
MBT 227 Challenger 2 ATTACK HELICOPTER
RECCE 145: 117 FV107 Scimitar; 28 Scimitar Mk2 1 lt sqn with AW159 Wildcat AH1
IFV 388+: 388 FV510 Warrior; FV511 Warrior (CP); FV514 TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
Warrior (OP); FV515 Warrior (CP) 2 sqn with AW101 Merlin HC4/4A
Europe 147
Europe
AMPHIBIOUS
HELICOPTERS
ATK 50: 25 AH-64D Apache; 25 AH-64E Apache PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 2
MRH 56: 5 AS365N3; 34 AW159 Wildcat AH1; 17 LPD 2 Albion with 2 Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS
SA341B Gazelle AH1 (capacity 2 med hel; 4 LCU or 2 LCAC; 4 LCVP; 6 MBT;
TPT 114: Heavy 60: 38 CH-47D Chinook HC6A; 14 CH- 300 troops) (of which 1 at extended readiness)
47F Chinook HC6; 8 CH-47SD Chinook HC5; Medium 42: LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 4
25 AW101 Merlin HC4/4A; 17 SA330 Puma HC2; Light 12: AGB 1 Protector with 1 hel landing platform
9 AS350B Ecureuil; 3 Bell 212
AGS 3: 1 Scott with 1 hel landing platform; 1 Echo with 1
Royal Navy 33,750 hel landing platform; 1 Magpie
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT FALKLAND ISLANDS: 1,200: 1 inf coy(+); 1 sigs unit; 1
1 med sqn AD det with CAMM (Land Ceptor); 1 PSO; 1 ftr flt with 4
1 (air movements) sqn Typhoon FGR4; 1 tkr/tpt flt with 1 A330 MRTT Voyager; 1
1 (HQ augmentation) sqn A400M; 1 hel flt with 2 Chinook
1 (C-130 Reserve Aircrew) flt
GERMANY: 185
UK Special Forces GIBRALTAR: 600 (including Royal Gibraltar regt); 1 PSO;
Includes Royal Navy, Army and RAF units 2 PBI
FORCES BY ROLE IRAQ: Operation Shader 100; NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 12
Europe
SPECIAL FORCES
1 (SAS) SF regt KENYA: BATUK 350; 1 trg unit
1 (SBS) SF regt KUWAIT: Operation Shader 50; 1 CISR UAV sqn with 8 MQ-
1 (Special Reconnaissance) SF regt 9A Reaper
1 SF BG (based on 1 para bn)
AVIATION LIBYA: UN • UNSMIL (Operation Tramal) 1
1 wg (includes assets drawn from 3 Army hel sqn, 1 MALI: UN • MINUSMA (Operation Newcombe) 256; 1
RAF tpt sqn and 1 RAF hel sqn) recce regt(-)
COMBAT SUPPORT
1 sigs regt NEPAL: 60 (Gurkha trg org)
NIGERIA: 80 (trg team)
Reserve
OMAN: 90
FORCES BY ROLE
SPECIAL FORCES PACIFIC OCEAN: 60; 2 PSO
2 (SAS) SF regt
POLAND: Army 250; 1 tk sqn with Challenger 2; 1 SAM bty
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE with CAMM (Land Ceptor); NATO • Enhanced Forward
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES Presence 129; 1 recce sqn
AUV 24 Bushmaster IMV
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL QATAR: 200; 1 FGA sqn with 12 Typhoon FGR4
MANPATS FGM-148 Javelin; NLAW SAUDI ARABIA: 50 (radar det)
SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 41
DEPLOYMENT
SOMALIA: 65 (trg team); UN • UNSOM (Operation Praiser)
ASCENSION ISLAND: 20 2; UN • UNSOS (Operation Catan) 10
ATLANTIC (NORTH)/CARIBBEAN: 140; 1 PSO; 1 AOEH SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS (Operation Vogul) 4
ATLANTIC (SOUTH): 40; 1 PSO UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: 200; 1 tpt/tkr flt with C-17A
BAHRAIN: Operation Kipion 1,000; 1 FFGHM; 2 MCO; 2 Globemaster; A400M Atlas; A330 MRTT Voyager (on rotation)
MHC; 1 LSD; 1 naval facility
BELIZE: BATSUB 12 FOREIGN FORCES
BRITISH INDIAN OCEAN TERRITORY: 40; 1 navy/marine det Canada Air Task Force Prestwick (ATF-P) 55; 3 C-130J-30
BRUNEI: 2,000; 1 (Gurkha) lt inf bn; 1 jungle trg centre; 1 Hercules (CC-130J); Operation Unifier 170 (UKR trg)
hel sqn with 3 Bell 212 Denmark Operation Interflex 120 (UKR trg)
Finland Operation Interflex 20 (UKR trg)
BULGARIA: NATO • Enhanced Vigilance Activities 120; 1
lt mech inf coy Lithuania Operation Interflex 15 (UKR trg)
Netherlands Operation Interflex 90 (UKR trg)
CANADA: BATUS 400; 1 trg unit; 1 hel flt with SA341
Gazelle AH1 New Zealand Operation Interflex 149 (UKR trg)
Sweden Operation Interflex 45 (UKR trg)
CYPRUS: 2,260; 2 inf bn; 1 SAR sqn with 4 Bell 412 Griffin
United States
HAR-2; 1 radar (on det); Operation Shader 450: 1 FGA sqn
with 10 Typhoon FGR4; 1 A330 MRTT Voyager; 2 C-130J-30 US European Command: 10,000; 1 FGA wg at RAF
Hercules; UN • UNFICYP (Operation Tosca) 253; 2 inf coy Lakenheath (2 FGA sqn with 23 F-15E Strike Eagle, 1
FGA sqn with 21 F-35A Lightning II; 1 FGA sqn with F-35
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN •
Lightning II (forming)); 1 ISR sqn at RAF Mildenhall with
MONUSCO 3
OC-135/RC-135; 1 tkr wg at RAF Mildenhall with 15 KC-
EGYPT: MFO 2 135R/T Stratotanker; 1 spec ops gp at RAF Mildenhall (1 sqn
ESTONIA: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence with 8 CV-22B Osprey; 1 sqn with 8 MC-130J Commando II)
(Operation Cabrit) 1,750; 1 armd BG; 1 inf BG; 1 SP arty bty; • US Strategic Command: 1 AN/FPS-132 Upgraded Early
1 MRL bty; 1 cbt engr coy Warning Radar and 1 Spacetrack radar at Fylingdales Moor
150 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Chapter Five
70 20 Global
Russia total
1,190,000 20,773,950
60
15
Ukraine
50 688,000
USDbn, constant 2015
Year-on-year % change
10
Azerbaijan 64,050
40
5 Uzbekistan 48,000
30 Belarus 47,950
0 Armenia 42,900
20
Kazakhstan 39,000
-5
10 Turkmenistan 36,500
Central Asia: medium and light transport air fleets, 2014–22* Ukraine’s artillery transformation
Light Transport Aircraft Medium Transport Aircraft 2021
The chaotic collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 was being used to drill newly mobilised Russian troops.
followed by the creation of 15 new states from the But the Belarusian armed forces themselves stayed
former Soviet republics. These states continued to out of the fight, instead serving a useful purpose for
count large numbers of Russians within their new Moscow by ‘fixing’ elements of Ukraine’s forces on
borders. Ethnic tensions, often accompanied by its northern border as well as reportedly supplying
friction with Moscow, are a legacy of the Soviet equipment to Russia.
empire’s dissolution. Russia’s full-scale invasion Sporadic fighting also recurred in September
of Ukraine has roots in the break-up of the Soviet 2022 between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the
Union. More broadly, though, the war is the most disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenia
egregious example of the problematic relations is a member of the Russian-led Collective Security
between Russia and what it sometimes refers to as Treaty Organization (CSTO), and Azerbaijan is a
its ‘near abroad’. It also owes much to the failure of former member, but Moscow has been unable to
Russia’s efforts during 2021 and earlier to exercise force a lasting peace between the two. September
influence over those parts of Ukraine it did not 2022 also saw border clashes between two other
already control, as well as its government, and to CSTO members: Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The
Vladimir Putin’s world view, made apparent in his latter dispute also stems from contested territory and
July 2021 extended text entitled ‘On the Historical the lack of an agreed border. Both countries have also
Unity of Russians and Ukrainians’. In this document, suffered from internal upheaval. In Tajikistan a civil
Putin described Russians and Ukrainians as ‘one war began in the immediate aftermath of the collapse
people’. However, the invasion has served only to of the Soviet Union, lasting from 1992 to 1997, that
cement Ukraine’s identity as an independent state. also involved Russian ground forces. Kyrgyzstan,
Moscow’s travails in its ill-judged and ill-executed meanwhile, has seen three revolutions in the past
invasion, furthermore, will make relationships with two decades.
its other neighbouring countries more problematic. Perhaps the most notable shift has been in
The war on Ukraine has led to a decline in Russia’s Moscow’s relationships with Kazakhstan and
influence over many of them and may inhibit its Uzbekistan. In recent years, Kazakhstan has started
ability to manage regional disputes. to modernise its armed forces, with its land forces
The most westerly of the former Soviet republics introducing equipment of Turkish origin and even
that remains outside NATO is Moldova. The country’s signing an agreement with Turkey in late 2022 to
pro-European government is struggling with develop ‘long-term strategic cooperation’. In January,
pro-Russian opposition and allegations of Russian in the wake of fomented protests designed to unseat
disinformation operations. The government declared him, Kazakhstan’s President Qasym-Jomart Toqaev
a state of emergency on the same day as Russia’s 2022 requested assistance from the CSTO. Russia deployed
invasion of Ukraine, with which it shares a border. elements of its airborne forces to secure Toqaev
Russian ground forces remain in the pro-Moscow in power. Toqaev has not, however, supported
Moldovan breakaway region of Transnistria because Russia’s war in Ukraine. Indeed, Kazakhstan sent
of a civil war in 1992. Russia has hinted that it could humanitarian aid to Ukraine, and in June Toqaev
use its forces in Transnistria against Ukraine. On 23 refused to recognise – in Putin’s presence – the
June 2022 Moldova gained candidate status from the independence of the Luhansk and Donetsk ‘people’s
European Union, in response to Russia’s aggression republics’; the foreign minister of Uzbekistan was
against Ukraine. Kyiv was also given candidate reported as using a similar formulation in March,
status at the same time. Meanwhile, Belarus has been though he was out of office by mid-year. Regardless,
pulled further into Russia’s orbit. At the start of the Russia’s influence over its former republics – it retains
year, Belarus was complicit in Russia’s invasion, military installations in some – cannot be taken for
and by the end of the year its training grounds were granted by Moscow. Moreover, Russia’s remaining
Russia and Eurasia 153
influence in Central Asia must also contend with and a push on multiple axes by ground forces
the financial heft of China, with Beijing building from the north, the east and the south. However,
economic ties with all the former Soviet republics in the campaign was flawed before its execution.
the region. There were poor intelligence assessments of the
attitudes of the Ukrainian population, combined
RUSSIA with an underestimation of the combat capability of
Ukraine’s armed forces and an overestimation of the
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has proven capability of the Russian armed forces. Russia hoped
a defining event for the Russian armed forces, 14 for a swift victory; its forces were not prepared for
years after they fought an unsatisfactory short war the long haul.
against Georgia and subsequently launched the At the start of the war, Russia’s advances lacked
‘New Look’ military-modernisation process. The the massed artillery fires traditionally associated with
Kharkiv
Slavutych Chernihiv
Kherson fell
on 2 March
SOUTHERN MD
AND SEPARATIST
Myokaliv FORCES
Snake Island:
Russian controlled territory captured by the Crimea: illegally
Russian Navy on annexed by Russia
February 24th in 2014
Sources: UK MOD, IISS, Institute for the Study of War; militaryland.net © IISS
Map 3 Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine: April–October 2022
Chernihiv Chernihiv
1 Missile attack on CGHM Moskva, flagship of Russia’s Black Sea 31 October: UkraineSumy
makes rapid progress in the Sumy
30 September: Ukrainian advances make progress.
Fleet, which sinks on 14 April. northern
Kyiv sector and pushes to Kherson in the south. Kyiv
Kharkiv Kharkiv
2 Ukrainian forces surrendered at Mariupol on 20 May,
after having been besieged since February. C C
Izium Izium
3 After months of resistance against Russian forces, Ukrainian
armed forces withdrew from Severodonetsk on 24 June and
S S
from Lysychansk on 3 July.
4 Ukrainian forces re-occupied Snake Island on 4 July after an
intense campaign to evict Russian forces, who left on 30 June. Kherson E
Mariupol Kherson E Mariupol
S S
5 On 9 August, at least eight aircraft were destroyed at Saki
airbase, likely by Ukrainian missiles. Odesa S Odesa S
6 8 October, suspected Ukrainian forces attack and severely
6
damage the Kerch bridge between Russia and occupied Crimea. 4 5
Russian controlled territory Ukrainian counterattacks Russian line of advance: C Central MD Grouping A Southern MD and Airborne Grouping
Contested territory E Eastern MD Grouping S Southern MD Grouping
Nuclear Power Plant Sources: UK MOD; IISS; Institute for the Study of War, ACLED W Western MD Grouping © IISS
Russia and Eurasia 155
Moreover, Russia’s forces have had to take account The way Russia has employed its precision-
of large-scale personnel losses, including among the guided weapons, coupled with problems in
more experienced personnel that participated in increasing production, means there was by late year a
the opening phase of the invasion. The subsequent lack of such systems, while there have been reliability
inflow of reservists, and later of mobilised personnel, issues with those in the inventory. Russia’s defence
has exposed weaknesses in training, with many industry may have been slowly improving, but it
newly arrived personnel seemingly lacking both remains bedevilled by inefficiencies. These include
adequate equipment and enough ammunition, multiple plants producing varied types of combat
amidst infrastructure that appears to be failing to aircraft. In terms of personnel, it has an ageing
cope with the increased number of trainees. And workforce and – while there is little firm information
the war has highlighted long-standing problems on their background beyond some reporting – the
related to command and control at both junior and flight of thousands of Russians from the country after
higher command levels, with inflexibility proving an February will not help matters. There also appears to
important weakness. have been a failure to appreciate the need for near-real
There are indications of some adaptation time intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
following the initial failings of the campaign. (ISR), integrated with the targeting cycle. And in late
Commanders were replaced and there has been a summer, when Ukrainian forces employed offensive
move to improve and unify operational command manoeuvre operations in regaining swathes of
and control; once Ukrainian forces had defeated territory in the north and south, Russia’s troops did
Russia’s push to Kyiv, forces were redeployed to not have an answer either tactically or operationally.
Ukraine’s east. Subsequently, Russian forces were While these are issues recognised by many in
concentrated on two axes, with efforts focused on the the armed forces and in the defence industry, they
two ‘self-proclaimed’ Luhansk and Donetsk people’s appear not to be acknowledged within decision-
republics (LPR and DPR). Russian tactics were making circles, which remain conservative in
also revised, with far greater reliance on artillery. nature. Moreover, Moscow’s practice of simply
However, this has highlighted another challenge replacing senior staff, or moving commanders from
relating to ammunition supply. Estimates by some one military district to another, has not addressed
analysts suggest Russian forces have at times the underlying issues of leadership culture in
expended more than ten times the ammunition on the Russian armed forces. A rigidly hierarchical
a daily basis compared to the Ukrainians and, while structure remains embedded in military education
it is difficult to verify such claims, it is clear that the and tradition. Also, continued revelations of
supply of ammunition became a more significant entrenched corruption in the armed forces will
factor as 2022 wore on. almost certainly not help to improve mutual trust;
Initial Russian operations included heliborne in advanced Western armed forces this is seen as a
assaults, and these seemed to follow the pattern of key feature in assisting effective military leadership
recent experimentation with such capability, but at all levels. Achieving change in Russia will
Russia’s drills had not adequately prepared its require political will, combined with fundamental
forces for actions against a determined and well- improvements in education and training.
armed opponent. And though the air war has been
immensely destructive for Ukraine, Russia’s relatively Ground Forces, Airborne Forces and
haphazard application of airpower, including missile Naval Infantry
strikes, did not allow it to gain control of the air. These Russia’s initial invasion employed around 75% of
failures forced Russia’s helicopters and ground-attack its total deployable ground-combat forces. Many of
aircraft to adopt unconventional weapons-release the formations engaged in February suffered heavy
tactics, its fixed-wing aircraft to engage targets from attrition in the months that followed. This initially
greater range and commanders to use large numbers forced the Russian armed forces to turn to a variety
of long-range stand-off weapons. And both Russian of sources to find new personnel in order to sustain
and Ukrainian helicopters and ground-attack aircraft operations, including reservists, mercenaries and
have, at least close to the front lines, been flown at conscripts from the Donetsk and Luhansk regions,
extremely low-level in order to minimise the threat before ultimately opting for widespread mobilisation
from air defences. in Russia. Older armoured fighting vehicles and
Russia and Eurasia 157
artillery pieces were taken out of store and reactivated political leadership, it is unclear what alternative
to replace combat losses. These measures have, for approaches might realistically be adopted in
now, proved just about sufficient to maintain an ‘army their stead. Both a larger, conscript-based, mass-
in being’ in Ukraine. However, attempts to generate mobilisation model and a substantially smaller
the operational and strategic reserve forces needed to higher-quality force would pose problems in terms
restart large-scale offensive operations on the ground of both resourcing and sustainment. Such a model
appear to have been repeatedly thwarted by the may also not fit with the Russian government’s
battlefield pressure applied by Ukrainian forces. It is apparent objectives.
likely that Ukrainian forces will try to maintain this In the short term, the prospects for the project
pressure, looking to prevent Russia gaining the space to deliver new equipment to the ground forces is
to reset its forces before spring 2023. unclear. Armata remains in test, and other equipment
The current focus on short-term operational that has arrived during the last decade, such as
Russia has long held ambitions to recapitalise its bomber (VKS) Future Long-Range Aviation Complex (PAK DA) project.
fleets, but efforts so far have been piecemeal. Ambition has A prototype of this design, almost certainly a subsonic
risked overreaching capacity in industrial, technical and low-observable flying wing, could be flown possibly by the
economic terms. As of 2022, Moscow was following three middle of this decade. Meanwhile, after a three-decade gap
paths simultaneously: upgrading current types, restarting in production, the first new-build Tu-160 was flown for the
manufacture of one design, and supporting the research and first time at the beginning of 2022. The modernised Tu-160M is
development of a new bomber. The Tupolev Tu-22M3 Backfire C, being built at the Gorbunov production site in Kazan, and the
Tu-95MS Bear H and Tu-160 Blackjack A are all the subject of design to meet the PAK DA requirement will likely be built
upgrade programmes, while the last is also re-entering there too. However, it remains unclear whether Russia has
production as the Tu-160M Blackjack B. Tupolev is also the economic and industrial capacity to sustain all its
working on the Item 80 design to meet the Aerospace Forces’ currently planned bomber projects.
Next-generation Blackjack
The Tu-160M draws on upgrade programmes implemented for the Blackjack A, but with a new airframe and aerostructures.
The VKS has ten aircraft on order for delivery by 2027, and a notional ambition to field up to 50 Tu-160Ms by the mid-2030s.
©IISS
Russia and Eurasia 159
control at the tactical level to make better use of its US had been described as only a ‘rival’. The 2022
artillery. Even when operating the same Soviet-era document was also more ideological, with echoes of
equipment, Ukraine’s use of artillery has generally Soviet-era rhetoric. Maritime dominance was held
been more effective than Russia’s. This is likely to be the aim of the US, with the additional goal
down to a closer linkage and better use of ISR-roled of reducing Russia’s ability to exploit and develop
uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs), combined maritime resources. The doctrine also recognised
with the adoption of digital tactical command and the challenge of Russia’s lack of overseas naval
control systems. bases, and the sanctions-based constraints on its
shipbuilding capacity.
Inadequate command and control Nonetheless, the document identified building
The repeated setbacks have also prompted numerous ‘modern aircraft carriers’ as a priority. But the
changes in the military leadership, and the failures practicality of this is a different matter: for years,
its Mediterranean presence and to reinforce its forces ambition outlined in the new maritime doctrine only
in the Black Sea itself. served to highlight the fitful and accident-prone
The most attention-grabbing Russian naval modernisation of the sole aircraft carrier, Admiral
setback was the sinking of the then Black Sea Fleet Kuznetsov; the timing of its completion was uncertain
flagship, the Project 1164 Slava-class cruiser Moskva. as was the vessel’s likely combat effectiveness even if
Poor operational tactics in the use of the vessel and it does return to the fleet.
questions over the readiness and effectiveness of
both the crew and the ship’s systems appear to have DEFENCE ECONOMICS
contributed to the sinking. This raises new questions
over the combat effectiveness of the other large legacy Russia
Soviet-era surface combatants on which the Russian Assessments of Russian defence spending in 2022
fleet continues to rely for the bulk of its blue-water have to consider the situation before the start of the
operations and power-projection missions. ‘special military operation’ against Ukraine on 24
The navy also lost a Project 1171 Alligator-class February 2022, and the circumstances after that date.
landing ship alongside in the port of Berdyansk in After growing by 2.3% on average in 2017–19, the
March 2022 plus a number of minor war vessels in economic fallout of the coronavirus pandemic caused
different attacks. The attack with uncrewed air and a 2.7% contraction in Russia’s real GDP in 2020. The
surface vehicles at the end of October on the naval base economic recovery got off to a strong start in 2021,
at Sevastopol appeared to cause damage to the new with real GDP growing by 4.7%, but, following the
Black Sea Fleet flagship, the Project 11356 Grigorovich- invasion of February 2022, contractions of 3.4% and
class frigate Admiral Makarov. Again, Ukraine’s use of 2.3% are projected for 2022 and 2023.
novel capabilities and combinations of capabilities, After increasing rapidly in the early years (2011–
as well as audacious tactics, has hampered Black 15) of the State Armament Programme (SAP) to 2020,
Sea Fleet operations. That said, the Russian Navy military expenditure slowed and declined in real
continued to display an ability to conduct operations terms in 2016–18 before recovering to a modest extent
on a global basis. These included several, albeit in 2019. Growth in real terms in 2019 and 2020 was
relatively limited, joint manoeuvres with the Chinese followed by a decline in 2021 when inflation rose to
navy in the Western Pacific, including in the waters 6.7% from an average of 3.6% in 2017–20. With the
around Japan. exception of 2020, when Russian GDP dipped amid
There were a number of important additions to the coronavirus pandemic, the proportion of GDP
the submarine-fleet inventory. The second Project allocated to total military spending fell below 4% in
955A Borey-A nuclear-powered ballistic-missile recent years until the revised 2022 budget following
submarine (SSBN) and the second Project 08851 the invasion of Ukraine.
Yasen-M nuclear-powered guided-missile submarine, The scale of the annual state defence order (SDO)
which were commissioned at the end of 2021, have for 2021 and 2022 has not been revealed but appears to
both joined the Pacific Fleet, boosting its capabilities. be approximately RUB1.5 trillion (USD21.4 billion) in
A third Project 08551 Yasen-M was undergoing sea both years, which means it is declining in real terms.
trials in mid-2022. July saw the commissioning of Monitoring Russian military spending in 2022
the new nuclear-powered special-mission submarine was complicated by a Ministry of Finance decision to
Belgorod, although there remains continuing limit the publication of data on the implementation
uncertainty over the operational status of the of the federal budget and, from April, only provide
Poseidon nuclear-powered and potentially nuclear- figures for total income and expenditure. The Federal
tipped large uninhabited underwater vehicle that it is Treasury initially followed suit but later resumed
designed to carry. The final Project 941UM Typhoon- publication of detailed figures, issuing a report of
class SSBN, which had for some time essentially been spending during the first half of the year and then
a reserve asset for training and trials, now appears to in July. During January–July, Russia’s core ‘National
have been retired. Defence’ budget amounted to RUB2.89tr (USD41.3bn),
Otherwise, additions to the fleet have been more than 19% of total budget expenditure,
limited, reflecting the continuing poor performance compared with the 14.8% set out in budget law for
of the naval-industrial base. This has no doubt been 2022. Total military spending amounted to RUB3.68tr
exacerbated by additional Western sanctions. The (USD52.6bn), almost one-quarter of the total and an
Russia and Eurasia 161
Increase
Kazakhstan
USD1.88bn
Tajikistan
USD0.11bn
Russia*
USD87.91bn
Belarus
USD0.82bn
Georgia Azerbaijan
USD0.34bn USD2.64bn
Decrease
*Total defence expenditure (in line with NATO definition) based on official budget data given in 2023 budget.
Kyrgyzstan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan **Official 2022 budget. Actual spending expected to be much higher. The official 2023 defence budget of
n.k n.k n.k UAH1.14tr (USD31bn) is almost 9 times the 2022 official level. Significant real cut in 2022 due to 21% inflation rate.
[1] Map illustrating 2022 planned defence-spending levels (in USDbn at market
Real % Change (2021–22) exchange rates), as well as the annual real percentage change in planned
More than 20% increase Between 0% and 3% decrease defence spending between 2021 and 2022 (at constant 2015 prices and exchange
Between 10% and 20% increase Between 3% and 10% decrease rates). Percentage changes in defence spending can vary considerably from
year to year, as states revise the level of funding allocated to defence. Changes
Between 3% and 10% increase Between 10% and 20% decrease indicated here highlight the short-term trend in planned defence spending
Between 0% and 3% increase More than 20% decrease between 2021 and 2022. Actual spending changes prior to 2021, and projected
spending levels post-2022, are not reflected.
ε Estimate Spending 2% of GDP or above Insufficient data
©IISS
▲ Map 4 Russia and Eurasia: regional defence spending (USDbn, %ch yoy)1
estimated 4.5% of GDP. However, this total did not pressure from sanctions and living standards were
reflect the full cost to Russia of the war with Ukraine, being depressed. Beyond equipment and operational
as the evidence suggested that various aspects of costs, Russia was also reportedly seeking to increase
the conflict were funded from other sections of the the size of its armed forces.
budget. The share of GDP was probably nearer to The submission of the draft Russian 2023 budget
6–7% at a time when the Russian economy was under to the State Duma on 30 September did offer more
transparency in revealing that, as expected, final
▼ Figure 8 Russia: defence expenditure as % of GDP allocations for defence in 2022 were much higher
than initially budgeted. The original core 2022 budget
5 of RUB3.50tr (USD50.0bn) was revised upward to
4.03
3.84
4.04 4.12 RUB4.68tr (USD66.9bn), with corresponding total
4 3.78 3.71
military expenditure increasing from an estimated
RUB4.98tr (USD71.1bn) to RUB6.15tr (USD87.9bn).
3
Using purchasing-power-parity rates of conversion
% of GDP
with the core budget held at RUB4.98tr (USD71.1bn) Russia to curtail this test schedule. Deployment
and total funding reaching an estimated RUB6.65tr looks more likely in late 2023 or 2024. Testing of
(USD95.0bn). the new Tsirkon hypersonic missile for surface
ships and submarines continues, with optimistic
Weapons procurement claims that it will enter service in 2022–23. While
Due to the war and the imposition of sanctions, it was reported last year that a contract had been
less information is available on the development signed with Almaz-Antey for the delivery of ten
and procurement of new weapons than in previous new S-500 air-defence systems, scheduled to start
years. But the limited evidence suggests that many in the first half of 2022, there have been no reports
new systems are behind schedule and the rate of of its deployment. Still, there have been claims that
production of the latest weapons and other military some elements of it are in production. The medium-
hardware has fallen. The fulfilment of the main range S-350 Vityaz (RS-SA-28) air-defence system
success indicator used, the share of modern weapons is reported to have been first deployed in 2020, but
in the active stock of the armed forces, is now less the available evidence suggests that very few have
frequently cited. entered service. Only six ‘fifth generation’ Su-57
The SDO is now based on the SAP to 2027. Felon fighters had been supplied by September 2022
President Vladimir Putin signed off on it in early under the present contract, and the rate of production
2018, with total funding of approximately USD19tr is such that the supply of a planned 76 by the end
plus an additional USD1tr for infrastructure relating of 2027 is beginning to look in doubt. Development
to the deployment of new systems. It is claimed that of the new Checkmate fighter continues, with a first
work is under way on its successor for 2024–33, but no flight test planned for 2024. But it remains unclear
details have been provided. Its drafting must now be who will buy it, as the Russian air force appears to
extremely difficult given the current highly uncertain have no interest in acquiring the aircraft.
military and economic circumstances, rendering any Naval deliveries have been limited in 2022 and
forecasting and planning highly problematic. include the new strategic Borey-A-class submarine
However, some details of new systems have Knyaz Oleg; the multi-role Yasen-M (Severodvinsk
become available. Former chief of Roscosmos II) boat Krasnoyarsk; and two Project 677 Lada-class
Dmitri Rogozin in early 2022 claimed that the new, (Petersburg) diesel-electric submarines, Kronstadt
long-overdue Sarmat heavy intercontinental ballistic and Velikiye Luki. The Project 09582 special-purpose
missile would be deployed by the end of 2022, though submarine Belgorod was handed over to the navy
it had only had one flight test, in April, and will in July 2022 and will enter service with the Pacific
need more than that (some analysts estimate at least Fleet. It is associated with the future Poseidon
ten) before it can be approved for service, though nuclear-powered and potentially nuclear-tipped
it remains unclear whether war exigencies will lead large uninhabited underwater vehicle still under
Russia and Eurasia 163
development. The main new surface ships will be the delivery numbers. Moreover, as stocks of imported
Project 22350 (Gorshkov) frigate Admiral Golovko, likely systems and components have become exhausted,
to be the first ship equipped with the Tsirkon missile, the manufacture of some products has come to a
and the Project 20380 (Steregushchiy II) corvette halt. They include the Ansat helicopter, which has
Rezkiy. As for the Admiral Kuznetsov aircraft carrier a Pratt & Whitney power unit, and the Czech L-410
under repair and limited modernisation, delays keep small transport plane assembled in Russia, which has
arising and it is now unlikely that it will return to General Electric turboprop engines.
service before the end of 2024. There is little evidence Analysis of Russian weapons captured in
of anything but very limited building of the new Ukraine has revealed extensive use of foreign
Armata tank and some Russian military specialists electronic components. Now that sanctions on
think that it will never enter serial production given integrated circuits and many other components
its high unit cost and considerations that it would have been tightened, there is a question as to the
Table 10 Russia: Volume of military-technical cooperation and arms exports (USD billion, current)
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
FSVTS military-technical cooperation 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.2 15.6 14.6
Inc ‘Rosoboronexport’ 13.0 13.4 13.7 11.0 13.0 (13.0)1
TsAMTO arms sales 11.2 12.0 14.3 12.4 11.1
% of world arms sales 14.1 14.8 18.7 15.5 13.0
1. Rosoboronexport’s claimed approximate total, possibly overstated. FSVTS: Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation. TsAMTO: Centre for
the Analysis of the World Trade in Arms, Moscow. The centre measures all arms exports in terms of current US dollars. Note, the centre has revised its
data for 2016–19 on the basis of new information presenting a slightly more modest volume for Russia.
course by the war and sanctions. Given the scale the Russian media that the fulfilment of some export
of equipment losses during the war, it may prove contracts is being delayed – aircraft for Algeria and
necessary to increase the state defence order over the artillery systems for Vietnam being examples – to
next few years, reducing the scope for diversification. prioritise production for the domestic armed forces,
There have been mounting reports that the while the Philippines cancelled a contract for 16
defence industry is facing a shortage of labour, Mi-17 helicopters to avoid US sanctions.
especially personnel with higher education, Indeed, Russia has been resorting to arms imports
including IT specialists. In June 2022, Borisov said to meet urgent needs posed by its invasion of
that about 400,000 workers were needed, including Ukraine, particularly Iranian Shahed 136 direct-attack
120,000 graduates. Meeting this challenge may well munitions. Russia seriously lags in strike uninhabited
necessitate increased salaries and wages. aerial vehicle development. It is held back by an
inability to develop and manufacture in quantity
Arms exports suitable small piston engines, with their import
In recent years, the value of Russian arms exports has blocked by sanctions. There have also been claims
been maintained at a stable level, notwithstanding that North Korea has sent munitions but, contrary to
the imposition of sanctions on some countries opting the expectations of some commentators, there is no
to buy weapons from Russia and the impact of the evidence of China supplying weapons to Russia.
coronavirus pandemic. In fact, the volume of sales
increased in 2020. Russia’s own measure of export Regional defence economics
volumes relates to so-called military-industrial The war in Ukraine has had a dramatic economic
cooperation, which includes sales of weapons and impact on countries in Central Asia. Inflation rates,
other military equipment, components, licence sales, already high in 2021, rose even further in all countries
repairs, servicing and training. The annual volume is primarily due to increased food prices. Balancing this
reported by the Federal Service for Military-Technical are the ‘unexpected spillovers’ that the IMF identifies
Cooperation (FSVTS). The valuation of Russian as the relocation of workers and firms from Russia
arms exports is becoming more complex, as there is with associated money and capital inflows which
increasing reliance on payment in national currencies strengthened the consumption component of GDP.
rather than US dollars and on non-transparent barter Furthermore, the spike in oil prices has bolstered
and offset deals. the revenues of the oil exporters in the region –
Russia’s share of the global arms market has Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. The
been declining when valued in current US dollars. short-term outlook, however, does face downside
Prospects for 2022 are uncertain. Speaking in August, risks through the exposure of these economies to
Aleksandr Mikheev, head of Rosoboronexport, said that of Russia. Several countries rely on remittances,
that sales had reached USD5.4bn, suggesting that the primarily from Russia, which are threatened by the
annual total may turn out to be less than in 2021. Some impact of sanctions on Russia’s economy and indeed
potential purchases appear to be on hold as importers the cost of war. Russian real GDP is estimated to
fear falling foul of US sanctions. A deal with Turkey have contracted by 3.4% in 2022 with a further 2.3%
to buy a second batch of S-400 (RS-SA-21 Growler) contraction in 2023.
air-defence systems has been signed in principle, but Defence spending in the region is difficult
the issue of part localisation of production in Turkey to ascertain for certain countries – for example
has not been resolved. There have been reports in Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan – but of the countries
Russia and Eurasia 165
that The Military Balance assesses, it is evident that there moves to empower and strengthen resilience in local
has been strong growth in recent years. Armenia’s administrations and develop civil-defence measures
defence budget has grown from USD435m in 2017 were also important. The 2016 Strategic Defence
to USD749m in 2022 and is projected to increase Bulletin outlined reform plans and guided the
to USD1.1bn in 2023. As a proportion of GDP, the strategic development of the armed forces. Defence
country allocated 4.4% on average to defence between assistance by Western states since 2014 significantly
2017 and 2022, spiking to 5.57% in 2023. Growth is also aided the development of institutions by boosting
evident in Azerbaijan where spending increased from capability in areas such as cyber security and
USD1.5bn in 2017 to USD2.6bn in 2022 and reaching supplying limited amounts of military equipment,
USD3.1bn in 2023, thus maintaining a 3:1 ratio with including Javelin anti-armour systems and counter-
Armenia’s defence budget over this period. Growth battery radars.
in Kazakhstan’s budget has also been significant, Defence education has also been important. Since
Ukraine inherited a large fleet of main battle tanks (MBTs) from the former Soviet army, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union
in December 1991. (Ukraine had earlier declared independence in August 1991.) This fleet included examples of all three of the
major Soviet MBT families in frontline service in 1991: the T-64, T-72, and T-80. Ukraine’s post-Soviet inventory has included a
notably large fleet of T-64 series vehicles, as the primary factory for the construction of T-64s – and the home of its design
bureau – was (and still is) located in Kharkiv. The country has continued to develop upgrades for all three of these Soviet-era
MBT families, with the most recent examples shown below. The heritage of the T-72AMT and T-64BM2 Bulat is readily apparent;
the base-T-84, meanwhile, is a variant of the Soviet T-80 and was designed in Kharkiv in the 1990s. Prior to Russia’s full-scale
invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, these upgrades were principally carried out at the Kharkiv, Kyiv, and Lviv Armoured Plants.
Combat losses, and vehicles captured from Russian forces and received from Eastern European operators of Soviet-era tank
fleets, mean that Ukraine’s tank fleet is now in transition, while authorities look to improve overall capability with more modern
armour, including from foreign suppliers.
T-64BM2 Bulat
Upgrades:
Thermal-imaging gunner’s sight
Improved fire-control systems
Nizh explosive reactive armour
Bar armour
Upgraded 1,000 hp engine
Improved communications
and GPS systems
T-84 Oplot-M
Upgrades:
New welded turret
Thermal-imaging gunner’s sight
Thermal-imaging commander’s
panoramic periscope
Improved fire-control systems
Duplet explosive reactive armour
Varta soft-kill active protection system
Upgraded 1,200 hp engine
Auxiliary power unit
T-72AMT
Upgrades:
Improved
fire-control systems
Nizh explosive
reactive armour
Bar armour
Improved
communications
and GPS systems
©IISS
Russia and Eurasia 167
Western training personnel. The European Union also around the supply of transport vehicles. The civilian
launched a training initiative in October that will see car market has become the main source for increasing
Ukrainian personnel trained in Germany and Poland. the mobility of these formations. Here, too, private
funding has been vital. Limited funds, even before
Adaptation and innovation this latest invasion, meant that the Ukrainian forces
During 2022, the Ukrainian armed forces that had were already using pickups, jeeps, minibuses and
developed since 2014 blunted Russia’s attempt to minivans, as well as cars. This was partly down to
seize the capital and occupy other cities, including insufficient funds to acquire more suitable vehicles,
Kharkiv and Mykolaiv. The post-2014 Ukrainian but also the limited availability of four-wheel-drive
forces, which had been developed for what Kyiv vehicles on the second-hand market, including in
termed anti-terrorist operations and, after 2018, joint- Europe. Dry conditions during the offensive in
forces operations, were in 2022 faced with a different Kharkiv somewhat hid the weaknesses of such
have said that the limited numbers of artillery to actively search for enemy armoured vehicles using
pieces, coupled with ammunition challenges and mobile teams with four-wheel-drive vehicles and
the wide operational front, have caused Ukraine’s buggies employing anti-armour weapons, including
artillery forces to be dispersed, with engagements the Stugna-P, Corsar, 9K111 Fagot (RS-AT-4 Spigot)
conducted by small units rather than batteries and and the Western-supplied FGM-148 Javelin. At the
higher formations. In these instances, accuracy was same time, the groups use grenade launchers and
of increased importance and, even in distributed NLAWs in close combat.
operations, the arrival of more precise artillery
pieces from abroad has helped decentralised Aviation
operations to remain effective. Precision-guided Although Russia has proven unable to establish
Western-made projectiles such as the GPS-guided control of the air, its aerospace forces and missile
M982 Excalibur and SMArt 155, suitable for newly strikes have forced Ukraine’s aviation forces to
supplied 155mm systems, are said to have been disperse in order to survive, in turn increasing
particularly important. Given the central role of supply and maintenance demands. Although
rocket artillery to the capabilities of both Russia Ukraine has lost a number of aircraft and helicopters,
and Ukraine, the arrival in Kyiv’s inventory of the it has succeeded in maintaining a level of effective
M142 HIMARS and M270 MLRS systems has been capability. Western-supplied equipment has been
important. Ukraine’s widespread use of GMLRS important. Although there has been no supply of
missiles has turned these systems into a key part of Soviet-era aircraft, weapons have been sent, including
offensive operations and, because of the increased AGM-88 HARM anti-radiation missiles, which
range they offer over Ukraine’s legacy systems, has have been employed by Ukrainian aircraft against
enabled Ukrainian forces to hold at risk Russian Russian air defences. Moreover, Ukraine managed
command posts, supply depots and other targets to retain some S-300 and Buk air-defence systems
previously out of range. It has also reportedly and has used them to defend rear areas. This has
enabled Ukraine to assign to these assets some tasks led Russia to largely abandon attempts to penetrate
previously performed by tactical aircraft. deep into Ukrainian airspace with crewed aircraft
and switch to stand-off munitions; in turn, Russia’s
Anti-armour weapons frequent use of systems like cruise missiles (along
Western deliveries of anti-armour weapons have with increasingly effective Ukrainian defences) has
expanded Ukraine’s inventories of these systems, reduced the available numbers of these systems. This
ranging from lightweight disposable grenade pattern was established before the receipt of modern
launchers to more advanced NLAWs and Javelins; Western surface-to-air missiles, such as NASAMS and
small numbers of the latter had been supplied IRIS-T. On the battlefield, man-portable air-defence
after 2018. Some Ukrainian specialists claim that systems (MANPADs) have become Ukraine’s
the outcome of this has been a significant loss of primary air-defence assets. Indeed, the threat from
Russian armour as well as an apparent shift in the MANPADS has forced tactical adaptation on both
way these forces operate, now looking to avoid close- sides, with ground-attack aircraft and helicopters
quarters battle and instead focusing on long-range having to not only fly extremely low but also adopt
engagements, often from concealed locations. In novel ‘lofted launch’ tactics for unguided missiles,
turn, this has encouraged Ukrainian anti-tank units reducing the effectiveness of these attacks.
Russia and Eurasia 169
Canada
Croatia
Czech Republic
Denmark
Estonia
France
Germany
Greece
Italy
Latvia
Lithuania
Macedonia,
North
Netherlands
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
United Kingdom
United States
*crew operated
RESERVE
Armenia ARM Some mobilisation reported, possibly 210,000 with military service
within 15 years
Armenian Dram AMD 2021 2022 2023
GDP AMD 6.98tr 8.04tr
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
USD 13.9bn 17.7bn
per capita USD 4,701 5,972
Army ε40,000
Growth % 5.7 7.0
FORCES BY ROLE
Inflation % 7.2 8.5
SPECIAL FORCES
Def bdgt [a] AMD 312bn 340bn 501bn 1 SF bde
USD 622m 749m MANOEUVRE
USD1=AMD 501.36 454.30 Mechanised
[a] Includes imported military equipment, excludes military 1 (Special) corps (1 recce bn, 1 tk bn(-), 5 MR regt, 1 sigs
pensions bn, 1 maint bn)
ARTILLERY troops. The forces remain conscript-based and train regularly with
TOWED 122mm some D-30 other CSTO partners. As of the fourth quarter of 2022, Belarus had
MRL 122mm some BM-21 Grad not imposed mobilisation, despite the war on its borders. There
AIR DEFENCE has been increased emphasis on the training of territorial-defence
troops to allow them to operate more effectively with the regular
SAM
forces. There is a small heavy-airlift fleet that could be supple-
Short-range 9K331 Tor-M1 (RS-SA-15 Gauntlet)
mented by civil transport aircraft, and Minsk has a special-forces
Point-defence 9K33 Osa (RS-SA-8 Gecko); 9K310 Igla-1 brigade trained for the air-assault role. There is no requirement to
(RS-SA-16 Gimlet); 9K38 Igla (RS-SA-18 Grouse) independently deploy and sustain the armed forces, but it could
GUNS be possible for elements assigned to the CSTO. Russia continues to
SP 23mm ZSU-23-4 be Minsk’s main defence-equipment supplier. There is a renewed
TOWED 23mm ZU-23-2 emphasis on air defence, with Minsk expressing interest in 2021 in
acquiring additional systems from Russia. The local defence indus-
try manufactures vehicles, guided weapons and electronic-warfare
FOREIGN FORCES systems, among other equipment. However, there is no capacity
Russia 1,960; 1 MR bde(-) (peacekeeping) to design or manufacture modern combat aircraft. The sector also
FORCES BY ROLE
Georgia GEO SPECIAL FORCES
1 SF bde
Georgian Lari GEL 2021 2022 2023 MANOEUVRE
GDP GEL 60.2bn 73.5bn Mechanised
USD 18.7bn 25.2bn 1 (4th) mech inf bde (1 armd bn, 2 mech inf bn, 1 SP
per capita USD 5,014 6,770 arty bn)
Light
Growth % 10.4 9.0
1 (1st) inf bde (1 mech inf bn, 3 inf bn)
Inflation % 9.6 11.6
1 (2nd) inf bde (3 inf bn, 1 fd arty bn)
Def bdgt GEL 900m 918m 1.26bn 1 (3rd) inf bde (3 inf bn, 1 SP arty bn)
USD 279m 314m Amphibious
FMA (US) USD 35m 25m 25m 2 mne bn (1 cadre)
USD1=GEL 3.22 2.92 COMBAT SUPPORT
1 (5th) arty bde (1 fd arty bn; 1 MRL bn)
HELICOPTERS
ATK 6 Mi-24 Hind Kazakhstan KAZ
TPT 18: Medium 17 Mi-8T Hip; Light 1+ Bell 205
Kazakhstani Tenge KZT 2021 2022 2023
(UH-1H Iroquois) (up to 8 more in store)
UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES GDP KZT 84.0tr 103tr
ISR • Medium 1+ Hermes 450 USD 197bn 224bn
AIR DEFENCE • SAM per capita USD 10,306 11,591
Medium-range 9K37 Buk-M1 (RS-SA-11 Gadfly) (1–2 bn) Growth % 4.1 2.5
Point-defence 8 9K33 Osa-AK (RS-SA-8B Gecko) (two Inflation % 8.0 14.0
bty); 9K33 Osa-AKM (6–10 updated SAM systems) Def bdgt KZT 655bn 859bn
USD 1.54bn 1.88bn
National Guard 1,600 active reservists opcon USD1=KZT 425.91 457.73
Army Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015)
FORCES BY ROLE 1.85
MANOEUVRE
Light 1.11
2 inf bde 2008 2015 2022
Population 19,398,331
Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 5,400
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Border Police 5,400
Male 12.5% 3.6% 3.1% 3.7% 21.4% 3.2%
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Female 13.2% 3.4% 3.0% 3.6% 23.4% 5.8%
HELICOPTERS
TPT • Medium 3 Mi-8MTV-1 Hip Capabilities
Coast Guard Kazakhstan’s October 2017 military doctrine indicates a change
in focus from countering violent extremism towards a wider
HQ at Poti. The Navy was merged with the Coast concern for border security and hybrid threats. In 2022, this
Guard in 2009 under the auspices of the Georgian doctrine was updated by consolidating the authority of the presi-
Border Police, within the Ministry of the Interior dent’s office, enhancing the capabilities of the National Guard
to respond to domestic disorder, strengthening of cyber and
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE information capabilities across all security agencies, and creating
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 24 a new military territorial directorate. Kazakhstan entered a bilat-
PCC 2 Ochamchira (ex-US Island) eral military agreement with Uzbekistan in September 2017 to
PBF 7: 4 Ares 43m; 1 Kaan 33; 1 Kaan 20; 1 Project cooperate on training and education, countering violent extrem-
ism and reducing militant movements in their region. There has
205P (Stenka)
traditionally been a close defence relationship with Russia, rein-
PB 15: 1 Akhmeta; 2 Dauntless; 2 Dilos (ex-GRC); 1 forced by CSTO and SCO membership. Moscow operates a radar
Kutaisi (ex-TUR AB 25); 2 Point; 7 Zhuk (3 ex-UKR) station at Balkash. In January 2022, Russian troops led a brief
CSTO mission to the country following anti-government protests.
Kazakhstan takes part in regional and CSTO exercises, including
DEPLOYMENT anti-terror drills. However, Kazakhstan also in 2022 sent humani-
tarian aid to Ukraine and did not recognise the independence of
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: EU • EUTM RCA 35
the Luhansk and Donetsk ‘people’s republics.’ By regional stan-
MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 1 dards, the armed forces are relatively sizeable and well equipped,
following the acquisition of significant amounts of new and
TERRITORY WHERE THE GOVERNMENT upgraded materiel in recent years, primarily from Russia.
Russia has supplied Kazakhstan with S-300PS self-propelled
DOES NOT EXERCISE EFFECTIVE CONTROL surface-to-air missile systems as part of a Joint Air-Defence
Following the August 2008 war between Russia and Agreement, boosting its long-range air-defence capability.
Kazakhstan is expanding its indigenous defence industry, and
Georgia, the areas of Abkhazia and South Ossetia declared joint ventures and the production of rotary-wing and medium-
themselves independent. Data presented here represents lift fixed-wing aircraft are envisaged with European companies.
the de facto situation and does not imply international In 2021 following a two-day summit of the CSTO and in light of
recognition as sovereign states. instability in Taliban-led Afghanistan, it was announced that
Kazakhstan’s military-industrial complex will be used to expand
the CSTO’s defense capabilities. However, Kazakhstan announced
FOREIGN FORCES in August 2022 that it would suspend arms exports for one year.
Russia ε4,000; 1 mil base at Gudauta (Abkhazia) with 1 ACTIVE 39,000 (Army 20,000 Navy 3,000 Air 12,000
MR bde(-); 1 SAM regt with S-300PS; 1 mil base at Djava/ MoD 4,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 31,500
Tskhinvali (S. Ossetia) with 1 MR bde(-) Conscript liability 12 months (due to be abolished)
Russia and Eurasia 179
HELICOPTERS
ATK 32: 20 Mi-24V Hind (some upgraded); 12 Mi- Kyrgyzstan KGZ
35M Hind
Kyrgyzstani Som KGS 2021 2022 2023
MRH 26: 20 Mi-17V-5 Hip; 6 Mi-171Sh Hip
GDP KGS 723bn 853bn
TPT 16: Heavy 4 Mi-26 Halo; Light 12: 4 Bell 205
(UH-1H Iroquois); 8 H145 USD 8.54bn 9.75bn
UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES per capita USD 1,283 1,435
CISR • Heavy 2 Wing Loong (GJ-1) Growth % 3.7 3.8
AIR DEFENCE • SAM Inflation % 11.9 13.5
Long-range 43+: 3 S-200 Angara (RS-SA-5 Gammon); Def bdgt KGS n.k n.k
40+ S-300PS (RS-SA-10B Grumble) USD n.k n.k
Medium-range 15: 3 9K317M2 Buk-M2E (RS-SA-17 USD1=KGS 84.69 87.45
Grizzly); 12 S-75M Volkhov (RS-SA-2 Guideline)
Short-range 3+: some 2K12 Kub (RS-SA-6 Gainful); Population 6,071,750
3 S-125-1T
Point-defence 9K35 Strela-10 (RS-SA-13 Gopher) Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES Male 15.3% 4.2% 3.7% 4.1% 19.2% 2.4%
AAM • IR R-27T (RS-AA-10B Alamo); R-60 (RS-AA-8 Female 14.5% 4.0% 3.6% 4.0% 21.0% 3.9%
Aphid); R-73 (RS-AA-11A Archer); SARH R-27ER
(RS-AA-10C Alamo); R-27R (RS-AA-10A Alamo); R-33 Capabilities
(RS-AA-9A Amos); ARH R-77 (RS-AA-12A Adder – on Kyrgyzstan has started to expand its ties with its neighbours on
MiG-31BM) issues such as defence-industrial cooperation, though it remains
ASM Kh-25 (RS-AS-10 Karen); Kh-29 (RS-AS-14 Kedge) generally dependent on Russian assistance for its defence require-
ARM Kh-27 (RS-AS-12 Kegler); Kh-58 (RS-AS-11 Kilter) ments. Kyrgyzstan is a member of both the CSTO and the SCO.
However, Kyrgyzstan cancelled CSTO command staff exercises
at the last minute in 2022 following heightened border tensions
Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 31,500 with Tajikistan. Moscow maintains a military presence, including
a squadron of Su-25SM ground-attack aircraft at Kant air base,
National Guard ε20,000
which it has leased since 2003. Plans were reported in 2020 to
Ministry of Interior add air-defence systems and UAVs to the Russian air base. In 2020,
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Kyrgyzstan increased its annual fees, reportedly because Russian
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLE forces are using more land than outlined in the 2003 agreement.
APC Talks are ongoing over a possible second Russian base. Joint train-
ing is held with regional countries, including on anti-terror drills,
APC (W) Kamaz-43629 Vystrel
but combat readiness remains an issue. In 2021, Indian and Kyrgyz
PPV Ural-VV special forces held the eighth iteration of bilateral exercises that
AIRCRAFT focus on high-altitude and mountain operations in the broader
TPT • Medium 1 Y-8F-200WA context of counter-terrorism missions. Kyrgyzstan has a limited
capability to deploy externally, and personnel have been deployed
State Security Service 2,500 to OSCE and UN missions. The armed forces possess ageing land
equipment and limited air capabilities, relying instead on Russian
Border Service ε9,000 support, training and deployments. There is little local defence
Ministry of Interior industry, although in 2018 Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan discussed
defence-industrial cooperation. Defence ties with India have
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
increased and a joint working group has been formed on defence
AIRCRAFT 6: Light 5: 3 An-26 Curl; 1 An-74T; 1 An- cooperation. Reports in 2019 that India might provide a credit line
74TK; PAX 1 SSJ-100 to enable Kyrgyzstan to make defence purchases have yet to tran-
HELICOPTERS • TPT • Medium 15: 1 Mi-171; 14 spire. Reports in 2020 indicated discussions with Russia over the
Mi-171Sh transfer of air-defence equipment and helicopters.
approved in March 2020, covering the period to 2030, with a Air Force 600 (incl 250 conscripts)
review of the goals to be concluded by the end of 2022. There is
FORCES BY ROLE
an emphasis on improving land forces mobility and in developing TRANSPORT
more capable ground-based air defence. The services exercise reg- 1 sqn with An-2 Colt; Mi-8MTV-1/PS Hip; Yak-18
ularly with NATO states. Moldova has no requirement or capability AIR DEFENCE
to independently deploy and support its forces overseas, though 1 regt with S-125M1 Neva-M1 (RS-SA-3 Goa)
personnel again deployed to the NATO-led KFOR mission during
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
2022. The country has no defence-industrial capabilities beyond AIRCRAFT
the basic maintenance of front-line equipment. The country aims TPT • Light 3: 2 An-2 Colt; 1 Yak-18 Max
to move to an all-professional army and end conscription. The goal HELICOPTERS
of achieving this by the end of 2021, however, was not met. TPT • Medium 6: 2 Mi-8PS Hip; 4 Mi-8MTV-1 Hip
AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Short-range 3 S-125M1 Neva-M1
ACTIVE 5,150 (Army 3,250 Air 600 Logistic Support
(RS-SA-3 Goa)
1,300) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 900
Conscript liability 12 months (3 months for university graduates) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 900
RESERVE 58,000 (Joint 58,000) Special Police Brigade 900
Ministry of Interior
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
DEPLOYMENT
Army 1,300; 1,950 conscript (total 3,250) CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 4
FORCES BY ROLE LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 4
SPECIAL FORCES
MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 1
1 SF bn
SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 41; UN • UNMIK 1
MANOEUVRE
Light SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 3
3 mot inf bde
1 lt inf bn TERRITORY WHERE THE GOVERNMENT
Other DOES NOT EXERCISE EFFECTIVE CONTROL
1 gd bn Data presented here represents the de facto situation
COMBAT SUPPORT in the territory of Transnistria and does not imply
1 arty bn international recognition.
1 engr bn
1 NBC coy FOREIGN FORCES
1 sigs bn Russia ε1,500 (including 400 peacekeepers); 7 Mi-24 Hind/
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Mi-8 Hip
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
APC 153
APC (T) 61: 9 BTR-D; 52 MT-LB (variants)
APC (W) 92: 12 BTR-80; 80 TAB-71
ABCV 44 BMD-1
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
MSL • MANPATS 9K111 Fagot (RS-AT-4 Spigot);
9K111-1 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel)
RCL 73mm SPG-9
GUNS 100mm 31 MT-12
ARTILLERY 219
TOWED 67: 122mm 16 M-30 (M-1938); 152mm 51: 20
2A36 Giatsint-B; 31 D-20
GUN/MOR • SP 120mm 9 2S9 NONA-S
MRL 220mm 11 9P140 Uragan
MOR 132: 82mm 75 BM-37; 120mm 57: 50 M-1989; 7
PM-38
AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 39: 23mm 28 ZU-23;
57mm 11 S-60
Russia and Eurasia 183
Point-defence 800+: 400 9K33M3 Osa-AKM (RS-SA-8B is possibly withdrawn; AShM capability
Gecko); 400 9K35M3 Strela-10 (RS-SA-13 Gopher); 9K310 unconfirmed), 4 single 650mm TT with 65-73 HWT
Igla-1 (RS-SA-16 Gimlet); 9K34 Strela-3 (RS-SA-14 2 Schuka (Project 671RTMK (Victor III)) with 4 single
Gremlin); 9K38 Igla (RS-SA-18 Grouse); 9K333 Verba 533mm TT with 53-65K HWT/SET-65K HWT/
(RS-SA-29 Gizmo); 9K338 Igla-S (RS-SA-24 Grinch) USET-80K Keramika HWT (unclear if dual-capable
SPAAGM 30mm 250+ 2K22M Tunguska (RS-SA-19 Grison) 3M14 (RS-SS-N-30A Sagaris) has replaced 3M10
GUNS Granat (RS-SS-N-21 Sampson) nuclear LACM
SP 23mm ZSU-23-4 which is possibly withdrawn; AShM capability
TOWED 23mm ZU-23-2; 57mm S-60 unconfirmed), 2 single 650mm TT with 65-73 HWT
3 Schuka-B (Project 971 (Akula I)) (5 more non-
Navy ε145,000 (incl conscripts) operational, return to service significantly delayed)
with 4 single 533mm TT with 53-65K HWT/TEST-
4 major fleet organisations (Northern Fleet, Pacific Fleet,
71M HWT/USET-80K Keramika HWT (unclear
Baltic Fleet, Black Sea Fleet) and Caspian Sea Flotilla
if dual-capable 3M14 (RS-SS-N-30A Sagaris) has
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE replaced 3M10 Granat (RS-SS-N-21 Sampson)
SUBMARINES 51 nuclear LACM which is possibly withdrawn; AShM
STRATEGIC • SSBN 11: capability unconfirmed), 4 single 650mm TT with 65-
6 Delfin (Project 667BDRM (Delta IV)) with 16 73 HWT/RPK-7 (RS-SS-N-16 Stallion) ASW msl
R-29RMU2 Sineva/R-29RMU2.1 Layner (RS-SS-N-23 2 Schuka-B (Project 971/09711 (Akula II)) with 4
Skiff) nuclear SLBM, 4 single 533mm TT with 53-65K single 533mm TT with 53-65K HWT/TEST-71M
HWT/SET-65K HWT/USET-80K Keramika HWT HWT/USET-80K Keramika HWT (unclear if dual-
3 Borey (Project 955 (Dolgorukiy)) with 16 Bulava capable 3M14 (RS-SS-N-30A Sagaris) has replaced
(RS-SS-N-32) nuclear SLBM, 6 single 533mm TT with 3M10 Granat (RS-SS-N-21 Sampson) nuclear LACM
USET-80K Keramika HWT/UGST Fizik HWT which is possibly withdrawn; AShM capability
2 Borey-A (Project 955A) with 16 Bulava (RS-SS-N-32) unconfirmed), 4 single 650mm TT with 65-73
nuclear SLBM, 6 single 533mm TT with USET-80K HWT/RPK-7 (RS-SS-N-16 Stallion) ASW msl
Keramika HWT/UGST Fizik HWT (1 Barracuda (Project 945 (Sierra I)) (in reserve)
TACTICAL 40 with 6 single 533mm TT with TEST-71M
SSGN 9: HWT/USET-80K Keramika HWT (unclear if
6 Antey (Project 949A (Oscar II)) (2 more non- dual-capable 3M14 (RS-SS-N-30A Sagaris) has
operational, in long-term refit) with 24 single replaced 3M10 Granat (RS-SS-N-21 Sampson)
SM-225A lnchr with 3M45 Granit (RS-SS-N-19 nuclear LACM which is possibly withdrawn;
Shipwreck) dual-capable AShM, 2 single 650mm TT AShM capability unconfirmed))
each with T-65 HWT/RPK-7 (RS-SS-N-16 Stallion) SSK 21:
ASW msl, 4 single 553mm TT with 53-65K HWT/ 10 Paltus (Project 877 (Kilo)) (1 more non-operational, in
SET-65K HWT/USET-80K Keramika HWT long-term refit) with 6 single 533mm TT with 53-65K
1 Yasen (Project 885 (Severodvinsk I)) with 8 4-cell HWT/TEST-71M HWT/USET-80K Keramika HWT
SM-346 VLS with 3M14K (RS-SS-N-30A Sagaris) 10 Varshavyanka (Project 06363 (Improved Kilo)) with 6
dual-capable LACM/3M54K1 (RS-SS-N-27) single 533mm TT with 3M14K Kalibr-PL (RS-SS-N-
30A Sagaris) dual-capable LACM/3M54K (RS-SS-N-
AShM/3M54K (RS-SS-N-27B Sizzler) AShM/3M55
27B Sizzler) AShM/3M54K1 (RS-SS-N-27) AShM/53-
Oniks (RS-SS-N-26 Strobile) AShM (3M54K/K1
65K HWT/TEST-71M HWT/USET-80K Keramika
operational status unclear); 10 single 533mm TT
HWT (3M54K/K1 operational status unclear)
with USET-80K Keramika HWT/UGST Fizik HWT
1 Lada (Project 677 (Petersburg)) (in test) with 6 single
2 Yasen-M (Project 08851 (Severodvinsk II)) with
533mm TT with 3M14K Kalibr-PL (RS-SS-N-30A
8 4-cell SM-346 VLS with 3M14K (RS-SS-N-
Sagaris) dual-capable LACM/3M54K (RS-SS-N-
30A Sagaris) dual-capable LACM/3M54K1
27B Sizzler) AShM/3M54K1 (RS-SS-N-27) AShM/
(RS-SS-N-27) AShM/3M54K (RS-SS-N-27B Sizzler) USET-80K Keramika HWT (3M54K/K1 operational
AShM/3M55 Oniks (RS-SS-N-26 Strobile) AShM status unclear)
(3M54K/K1 operational status unclear); up to 10 PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 31
single 533mm TT with UGST Fizik HWT AIRCRAFT CARRIERS • CV 1 Admiral Kuznetsov (in
SSN 10: extended refit) with 12 single SM-233A lnchr with 3M45
1 Kalmar (Project 667BDR (Delta III)) with 2 single Granit (RS-SS-N-19 Shipwreck) AShM, 24 8-cell 3S95 VLS
400mm TT with SET-72 LWT, 4 single 533mm with 3K95 Kinzhal (RS-SA-N-9 Gauntlet) SAM, 2 RBU
TT with 53-65K HWT/SET-65K HWT/USET-80K 12000 Udav 1 A/S mor, 8 3M87 Kortik CIWS with 9M311
Keramika HWT (re-roled SSBN) SAM (RS-CADS-N-1), 6 AK630M CIWS (capacity 18–24
2 Kondor (Project 945A (Sierra II)) with 4 single Su-33 Flanker D/MiG-29KR/KUBR Ftr/FGA ac; 15 Ka-27
533mm TT with TEST-71M HWT/USET-80K Helix ASW hel, 2 Ka-31R Helix AEW hel)
Keramika HWT (unclear if dual-capable 3M14 CRUISERS 3:
(RS-SS-N-30A Sagaris) has replaced 3M10 Granat CGHMN 1 Orlan (Project 11442 (Kirov I)) (1 other non-
(RS-SS-N-21 Sampson) nuclear LACM which operational; undergoing extensive refit and planned
Russia and Eurasia 187
to return to service in 2023) with 20 single SM-233 2 12-cell 3S90.1 VLS with 9M317 Yezh (RS-SA-N-
lnchr with 3M45 Granit (RS-SS-N-19 Shipwreck) AShM, 7B) SAM/9M317M Yezh (RS-SA-N-7C) SAM, 2 twin
6 6-cell B-203A VLS with S-300F Fort (RS-SA-N-6 DTA-53-11356 533mm TT with 53-65K HWT/SET-
Grumble) SAM, 6 6-cell B-203A VLS with S-300FM 65K HWT, 1 RBU 6000 A/S mor, 2 AK630 CIWS,
Fort-M (RS-SA-N-20 Gargoyle) SAM, 16 8-cell 3S95 1 100mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-27 Helix ASW hel)
VLS with 3K95 Kinzhal (RS-SA-N-9 Gauntlet) SAM, 1 Jastreb (Project 11540 (Neustrashimyy)) (1 other
2 quintuple 533mm TT with RPK-6M Vodopad-NK non-operational, in long-term refit) with 2 quad
(RS-SS-N-16 Stallion) A/S msl, 1 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S lnchr with 3M24 Uran (RS-SS-N-25 Switchblade)
mor, 2 RBU 1000 Smerch 3 A/S mor, 6 3M87 Kortik CIWS AShM, 4 8-cell 3S95 VLS with 3K95 Kinzhal
with 9M311 SAM (RS-CADS-N-1), 1 twin 130mm gun (RS-SA-N-9 Gauntlet), 6 single 533mm ASTT with
(capacity 3 Ka-27 Helix ASW hel) RPK-6M Vodopad-NK (RS-SS-N-16 Stallion) A/S msl,
CGHM 2 Atlant (Project 1164 (Slava)) with 8 twin
1 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 2 3M87 Kortik
SM-248 lnchr with 3M70 Vulkan (RS-SS-N-12 mod
CIWS with 9M311 SAM (RS-CADS-N-1), 1 100mm
2 Sandbox) AShM, 8 octuple VLS with S-300F Fort
gun (capacity 1 Ka-27 Helix ASW hel)
(RS-SA-N-6 Grumble) SAM/S-300FM Fort M (RS-
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 128 1 Ovod-1 (Project 1234.1 (Nanuchka III)) with 4 quad
CORVETTES 42 lnchr with 3M24 Uran (RS-SS-N-25 Switchblade)
FSGM 14 AShM, 1 twin lnchr with 4K33 Osa-M (RS-SA-N-4
9 Buyan-M (Project 21631 (Sviyazhsk)) with 1 Gecko) SAM, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun
8-cell 3S14 UKSK VLS with 3M14T Kalibr-NK PCFG 23:
(RS-SS-N-30A Sagaris) dual-capable LACM/3M54T 5 Molnya (Tarantul II) with 2 twin lnchr with P-22
(RS-SS-N-27B Sizzler) AShM/3M54T1 (RS-SS-N-27) Termit-R (RS-SS-N-2D Styx) AShM, 2 AK630M
AShM/3M55 Oniks (RS-SS-N-26 Strobile) AShM CIWS, 1 76mm gun
(3M54T/T1 operational status unclear), 2 sextuple 17 Molnya (Tarantul III) with 2 twin lnchr with 3M80
3M47 Gibka lnchr with Igla-1M (RS-SA-N-10 Moskit (RS-SS-N-22 Sunburn) AShM, 2 AK630M
Grouse) SAM, 1 AK630M-2 CIWS, 1 100mm gun CIWS, 1 76mm gun
1 Karakurt (Project 22800 (Uragan)) with 1 8-cell 3S14
1 Molnya (Tarantul III) with 2 twin lnchr with 3M80
UKSK VLS with 3M14T Kalibr-NK (RS-SS-N-30A
Moskit (RS-SS-N-22 Sunburn) AShM, 1 3K89 Palash
Sagaris) dual-capable LACM/3M54T (RS-SS-N-27B
(RS-CADS-N-2) CIWS, 1 76mm gun
Sizzler) AShM/3M54T1 (RS-SS-N-27) AShM/3M55
PCM 3 Buyan (Project 21630 (Astrakhan)) with 1
Oniks (RS-SS-N-26 Strobile) AShM (3M54T/T1
sextuple lnchr with 3M47 Gibka lnchr with Igla-1M
operational status unclear), 2 Pantsir-M with 57E6
(RS-SA-N-10 Grouse) SAM, 1 A-215 Grad-M 122mm
SAM, 1 76mm gun
1 Project 11661K (Gepard I) with 2 quad lnchr with MRL, 1 100mm gun
3M24 Uran (RS-SS-N-25 Switchblade) AShM, 1 twin PCF 1 Molnya (Tarantul III) with 2 AK630M CIWS, 1
ZIF-122 lnchr with 4K33 Osa-M (RS-SA-N-4 Gecko) 76mm gun
SAM, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun PBF 14: 12+ Raptor (capacity 20 troops); 2 Mangust
1 Project 11661K (Gepard II) with 1 8-cell VLS with PBR 4 Shmel with 1 17-cell BM-14 MRL, 1 76mm gun
3M14T Kalibr-NK (RS-SS-N-30A Sagaris) dual- PB 27 Grachonok
capable LACM/3M54T (RS-SS-N-27B Sizzler) MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 43
AShM/3M54T1 (RS-SS-N-27) AShM/3M55 Oniks MCC 6 Alexandrit (Project 12700)
(RS-SS-N-26 Strobile) AShM (3M54T/T1 operational MHI 7 Sapfir (Project 10750 (Lida)) with 1 AK630 CIWS
status unclear), 1 3M89 Palash CIWS with 9M337 MHO 2 Rubin (Project 12660 (Gorya)) with 2 quad lnchr
Sosna-R SAM (RS-CADS-N-2), 1 76mm gun with 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-N-5 Grail) SAM, 1 AK630
2 Sivuch (Project 1239 (Dergach)) with 2 quad lnchr CIWS, 1 76mm gun
with 3M80 Moskit (RS-SS-N-22 Sunburn) AShM, 1 MSC 20: 19 Yakhont (Project 1265 (Sonya)) with 4 AK630
twin ZIF-122 lnchr with 4K33AM Osa-MA2 (RS- CIWS (some with 2 quad lnchr with 9K32 Strela-2
SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun (RS-SA-N-5 Grail) SAM); 1 Korund-E (Project 1258E
FSG 2 Karakurt (Project 22800 (Uragan)) with 1 8-cell (Yevgenya))
3S14 VLS with 3M14T Kalibr-NK (RS-SS-N-30A MSO 8: 7 Akvamaren-M (Project 266M (Natya)); 1 Agat
Sagaris) dual-capable LACM/3M54T (RS-SS-N-27B (Project 02668 (Natya II)) (all with 2 quad lnchr (manual
Sizzler) AShM/3M54T1 (RS-SS-N-27) AShM/3M55 aiming) with 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-N-5 Grail) SAM, 2
Oniks (RS-SS-N-26 Strobile) AShM (3M54T/T1 RBU 1200 Uragan A/S mor, 2 twin AK230 CIWS
operational status unclear), 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 AMPHIBIOUS
76mm gun LANDING SHIPS • LST 20:
FSM 26: 12 Project 775 (Ropucha I/II) with 2 twin 57mm guns
2 Albatros (Project 1124 (Grisha III)) with 1 twin ZIF- (capacity either 10 MBT and 190 troops or 24 APC
122 lnchr with 4K33 Osa-M (RS-SA-N-4 Gecko)
(T) and 170 troops)
SAM, 2 twin 533mm DTA-53-1124 ASTT, 2 RBU
3 Project 775M (Ropucha III) with 2 AK630 CIWS, 1
6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 1 twin 57mm gun
76mm gun (capacity either 10 MBT and 190 troops
18 Albatros (Project 1124M (Grisha V)) with 1 twin
or 24 APC (T) and 170 troops)
ZIF-122 lnchr with 4K33 Osa-M (RS-SA-N-4
3 Tapir (Project 1171 (Alligator)) with at least 2 twin
Gecko) SAM, 2 twin 533mm DTA-53-1124 ASTT,
lnchr with 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-N-5 Grail) SAM, 2
1 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1
76mm gun twin 57mm guns (capacity 20 tanks; 300 troops)
6 Project 1331M (Parchim II) with 2 quad lnchr with 2 Project 11711 (Gren) with 1 AK630M-2 CIWS, 2
9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-N-5 Grail) SAM, 2 twin AK630M CIWS (capacity 1 Ka-29 Helix B hel; 13
533mm ASTT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 1 MBT/36 AFV; 300 troops)
AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun LANDING CRAFT 26
PSOH 4 Project 22160 (Bykov) with 1 76mm gun (capacity LCM 24: 8 Akula (Project 1176 (Ondatra)) (capacity 1
1 Ka-27 Helix ASW hel) MBT); 5 Dyugon (Project 21820) (capacity 5 APC or
PCGM 10: 100 troops); 11 Serna (Project 11770) (capacity 2 APC
9 Ovod-1 (Project 1234.1 (Nanuchka III)) with 2 triple or 100 troops)
lnchr with P-120 Malakhit (RS-SS-N-9 Siren) AShM, LCAC 2 Zubr (Project 12322 (Pomornik)) with 2 22-cell
1 twin ZIF-122 lnchr with 4K33 Osa-M (RS-SA-N-4 140mm MS-227 Ogon MRL, 2 AK630 CIWS (capacity
Gecko) SAM, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun 230 troops; either 3 MBT or 10 APC(T))
Russia and Eurasia 189
Spiral 2); 9M120-1 Vikhr (RS-AT-16 Scallion) SA-18 Grouse); 9K333 Verba (RS-SA-29 Gizmo); 9K338 Igla-S
AShM Kh-22 (RS-AS-4 Kitchen); Kh-31A/AM (RS-AS- (RS-SA-24 Grinch); 9K34 Strela-3 (RS-SA-14 Gremlin)
17B/D Krypton); Kh-32 (RS-AS-4A mod); Kh-35U (RS- GUNS • SP 23mm 150 BTR-ZD
AS-20 Kayak)
LACM Special Operations Forces ε1,000
Nuclear Kh-55SM (RS-AS-15B Kent); Kh-102 (RS-AS- FORCES BY ROLE
23B Kodiak) SPECIAL FORCES
Conventional Kh-101 (RS-AS-23A Kodiak); Kh-555 (RS- 2 SF unit
AS-22 Kluge)
BOMBS Railway Forces ε29,000
INS/GLONASS-guided KAB-500S 4 regional commands
Laser-guided KAB-500L; KAB-1500L
FORCES BY ROLE
TV-guided Ghaem-5; KAB-500KR; KAB-1500KR; KAB-
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
500OD; UPAB 1500
10 (railway) tpt bde
TAJIKISTAN: ε3,000; 1 (201st) mil base with 1 MR bde(-); reports in 2021 of agreements on security cooperation with Iran.
1 hel sqn with 4 Mi-24P Hind; 4 Mi-8MTV Hip; 2 Mi- Border deployments have been stepped up recently in response
8MTV-5-1 Hip; 1 SAM bn with 8 S-300PS to concerns about regional and border security and terrorism.
In late 2016, a Military Cooperation Plan was signed with Russia.
UKRAINE: Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk & Zaporizhzhia:
Moscow has indicated that Tajikistan is to receive military equip-
ε150,000; Crimea: ε25,000; 1 recce bde, 2 naval inf bde(-); ment, including aircraft. Some personal equipment has been
1 air aslt regt(-); 1 arty bde; 1 NBC regt; 1 AShM bde with donated by the US. Barring maintenance facilities, Tajikistan has
3K60 Bal; 3K55 Bastion; 1 FGA regt with Su-24M/MR; Su- only minimal defence-industrial capacity, though in 2022, Iran
30SM; 1 FGA regt with Su-27SM/SM3; Su-30M2; 1 atk regt reportedly opened a UAV production line in the country.
with Su-24M/Su-25SM; 1 atk/tpt hel regt; 1 ASW hel regt;
2 AD regt with S-400; Pantsir-S1; 1 Fleet HQ located at ACTIVE 8,800 (Army 7,300 Air Force/Air Defence
Sevastopol; 2 radar stations located at Sevastopol (Dnepr 1,500) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 7,500
system) and Mukachevo (Dnepr system) Conscript liability 24 months
WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 13 RESERVE 20,000 (Army 20,000)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Uzbekistan, but has limited capacity to deploy externally and
AIRCRAFT maintains no international deployments. In October 2019, in Saint
TPT • Light 1 Tu-134A Crusty Petersburg, Turkmenistan and four other Caspian littoral states
TRG 4+: 4 L-39 Albatros; some Yak-52 signed a memorandum of understanding on military cooperation,
HELICOPTERS among other discussions, including on maritime security. There are
ATK 4 Mi-24 Hind plans to strengthen the border guard with new equipment and
TPT • Medium 11 Mi-8 Hip/Mi-17TM Hip H facilities. Plans to bolster the naval forces have resulted in some
procurements, leading to a modest improvement in the naval
Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 7,500 presence in the Caspian Sea. There has been limited procurement
of systems such as UAVs, including from China and Turkey. A 2021
Internal Troops 3,800 military parade also featured a range of new military equipment,
including C-27J Spartan, EMB-314 Super Tucano and and M-346FA
National Guard 1,200 aircraft and Bayraktar TB2 UAVs. Apart from maintenance facilities,
Turkmenistan has little domestic defence industry, but is building
Emergencies Ministry 2,500 a number of patrol vessels of Turkish design under licence.
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE TRANSPORT
MSL 1 sqn with An-26 Curl; Mi-8 Hip; Mi-24 Hind
SP 58+: 8 9P122 Malyutka-M (RS-AT-3 Sagger on BRDM- TRAINING
2); 8 9P133 Malyutka-P (RS-AT-3 Sagger on BRDM-2); 2 1 unit with EMB-314 Super Tucano*
9P148 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel on BRDM-2); 36 9P149 1 unit with L-39 Albatros
Shturm (RS-AT-6 Spiral on MT-LB); 4+ Baryer (on Karakal) AIR DEFENCE
MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger); 9K111 1 bty with FD-2000 (CH-SA-9)
Fagot (RS-AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 1 bty with KS-1C (CH-SA-12)
Spandrel); 9K115 Metis (RS-AT-7 Saxhorn) 3 bty with S-125 Neva-M1 (RS-SA-3 Goa)
GUNS 100mm 60 MT-12/T-12 1 bty with S-125 Pechora-2M (RS-SA-26)
ARTILLERY 769 2 bty with S-200 Angara (RS-SA-5 Gammon)
SP 122mm 40 2S1 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
TOWED 457: 122mm 350 D-30; 130mm 6 M-46; 152mm AIRCRAFT 65 combat capable
101: 17 D-1; 72 D-20; 6 2A36 Giatsint-B; 6 2A65 Msta-B FTR 24: 22 MiG-29A/S Fulcrum; 2 MiG-29UB Fulcrum
GUN/MOR 120mm 17 2S9 NONA-S ATK 31: 19 Su-25 Frogfoot; 12 Su-25MK Frogfoot
MRL 158: 122mm 92: 18 9P138; 70 BM-21 Grad; 4 BM-21A; TPT 5: Medium 2 C-27J Spartan; Light 3: 1 An-26 Curl;
RM-70; 220mm 60 9P140 Uragan; 300mm 6 9A52 Smerch 2 An-74TK Coaler
MOR 97: 82mm 31; 120mm 66 M-1938 (PM-38) TRG 12: 5 EMB-314 Super Tucano*; 5 M-346FA*;
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS 2 L-39 Albatros
HELICOPTERS
SRBM • Conventional 16 9K72 Elbrus (RS-SS-1C Scud B)
ATK 10 Mi-24P Hind F
AIR DEFENCE
MRH 2+ AW139
SAM
TPT 11+: Medium 8: 6 Mi-8 Hip; 2 Mi-17V-V Hip; Light
Short-range: FM-90 (CH-SA-4); 2K12 Kub (RS-
3+ AW109
SA-6 Gainful)
UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES
Point-defence 53+: 40 9K33 Osa (RS-SA-8 Gecko); 13
CISR 3+: Heavy CH-3A; WJ-600; Medium 3+ Bayraktar
9K35 Strela-10 mod (RS-SA-13 Gopher); 9K38 Igla (RS-
TB2
SA-18 Grouse); 9K32M Strela-2M (RS-SA-7 Grail)‡; ISR 3+: Medium 3+ Falco Light Orbiter-2
9K34 Strela-3 (RS-SA-14 Gremlin); Mistral (reported); LOITERING & DIRECT ATTACK MUNITIONS
QW-2 (CH-SA-8) Skystriker
GUNS 70 AIR DEFENCE • SAM
SP 23mm 48 ZSU-23-4 Long-range 18: 2 2K11 Krug (RS-SA-4 Ganef); 4 FD-2000
TOWED 22+: 23mm ZU-23-2; 57mm 22 S-60 (CH-SA-9); 12 S-200 Angara (RS-SA-5 Gammon);
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES Medium-range 8: 4 S-125 Pechora-2M (RS-SA-26); 4 KS-
ASM CM-502KG; AR-1 1A (CH-SA-12)
Short-range 12: 12 S-125M1 Neva-M1 (RS-SA-3 Goa);
Navy 500 some S-125-2BM Pechora
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 5 AAM • IR R-60 (RS-AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (RS-AA-11A Archer)
CORVETTES • FSGM 1 Deňiz Han with 4 twin lnchr BOMBS
with Otomat AShM, 1 16-cell CLA VLS with VL MICA, Laser-guided MAM-C; MAM-L
1 Roketsan ASW Rocket Launcher System A/S mor, 1
Gokdeniz CIWS, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 20,000
PCFG 2 Edermen (RUS Molnya) with 4 quad lnchr with
Internal Troops ε15,000
3M24E Uran-E (RS-SS-N-25 Switchblade) AShM, 2 AK630
CIWS, 1 76mm gun EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
PCGM 2 Arkadag (TUR Tuzla) with 2 twin lnchr with
IFV 2+ Lazar-3
Otomat AShM, 2 twin Simbad-RC lnchr with Mistral SAM,
APC • PPV 9: 4+ Survivor II; 5 Titan-DS
1 Roketsan ASW Rocket Launcher System A/S mor
AUV 4+ Plasan Stormrider
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT• AGHS 1 (Dearsan 41m)
Federal Border Guard Service ε5,000
Air Force 3,000 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
FORCES BY ROLE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
FIGHTER APC • PPV 8: 4+ Kirpi; 4+ Survivor II
2 sqn with MiG-29A/S/UB Fulcrum AUV 6+ Cobra
GROUND ATTACK ARTILLERY • MRL 122mm 4 BM-21A
1 sqn with Su-25 Frogfoot AIR DEFENCE
1 sqn with Su-25MK Frogfoot GUNS • TOWED • 23mm ZU-23-2
1 sqn with M-346FA* PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 33
Russia and Eurasia 201
PCGM 8 Arkadag (TUR Tuzla) with 2 twin lnchr in the near term, but it may have had an immediate propa-
with Otomat AShM, 2 twin Simbad-RC lnchr with ganda value. General mobilisation was declared on 24 February:
Mistral SAM, 1 Roketsan ASW Rocket Launcher 18–60-year-old men were not allowed to leave the country, while
System A/S mor women between 18–60 in certain professions also had to regis-
PBFG 6 Nazya (Dearsan 33) with 2 single lnchr with ter for military service. After the invasion, substantial numbers of
civilians volunteered for defence duties. At the outset of the war
Marte Mk2/N AShM
Ukraine’s equipment inventory consisted predominantly of Soviet-
PBF 18: 10 Bars-12; 5 Grif-T; 3 Sobol era weaponry, though more modern ground equipment from
PB 1 Point Western sources has increasingly supplemented the inventory.
AMPHIBIOUS • LCM 1 Dearsan LCM-1 After the February invasion there have been repeat deliveries of
HELICOPTERS Turkish-manufactured UAVs while numerous countries have pro-
MRH 2 AW139 vided portable anti-armour and anti-air weapons. Western states
TPT 3+: Medium some Mi-8 Hip; Light 3 AW109 have also started to provide heavier weapons, including main
battle tanks and artillery, as well as training on these systems. A
number of Western states are now offering training assistance to
Ukraine UKR Ukrainian troops in their own nations, with this ranging from basic
FOREIGN FORCES domestic industry and defence orders. The 2018 doctrine calls for
improvements to the domestic defence industry. In recent years,
Russia Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk & Zaporizhzhia,
Uzbekistan’s defence industry has showcased domestically pro-
ε150,000; Crimea: ε25,000; 1 recce bde(-), 2 naval inf bde(-);
duced light-armoured vehicles.
1 air aslt regt; 1 arty bde; 1 NBC bde; 1 AShM bde with 3K60
Bal; 3K55 Bastion; 1 FGA regt with Su-24M/MR; Su-30SM; ACTIVE 48,000 (Army 24,500 Air 7,500 Joint 16,000)
1 FGA regt with Su-27SM/SM3; Su-30M2; 1 atk regt with Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 20,000
Su-24M/Su-25SM; 1 atk sqn(-) with Su-34; 1 atk/tpt hel regt; Conscript liability 12 months
1 ASW hel regt; 1 AD regt with S-300PM; 1 AD regt with
S-400; 1 Fleet HQ located at Sevastopol; 2 radar stations
located at Sevastopol (Dnepr system) and Mukachevo ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
(Dnepr system)
Army 24,500
Uzbekistan UZB 4 Mil Districts; 2 op comd; 1 Tashkent Comd
MISSILE TECHNOLOGY:
ACCELERATING CHALLENGES
The IISS Strategic Dossier Missile Technology: Accelerating Challenges examines the ballistic-
and cruise-missile developments of the world’s most prominent users and producers; the impact
of development and procurement programmes on regional and strategic stability; the arms-
control processes designed to restrain proliferation; and the trajectory of future technological
developments, particularly Mach 5+ systems.
Missile Technology: Accelerating Challenges focuses on the missile forces of China, Russia and the
United States, given the quantitative and qualitative dimensions of their arsenals, and prominent
producers and operators of ballistic and cruise missiles in Asia, Europe and the Middle East.
The dossier examines the prospects for arms- and export-control mechanisms and confidence-
building measures in an increasingly competitive environment characterised by accelerating
proliferation and deteriorating global security.
Chapter Six
Asia
China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) held naval and air Concerns were raised in India about potential depen-
exercises to the north, southwest and east of Taiwan for dence on Russia for defence supplies. Deliveries of S-400
three days in early August 2022, at the time of the visit to systems continued, but only because of US congressional
Taiwan of then-speaker of the US House of Representa- support for ensuring ‘India’s immediate defense needs’
tives, Nancy Pelosi. After this, PLA assets have more fre- by waiving CAATSA sanctions in this specific case.
quently crossed the Taiwan Strait ‘median line’. Japan’s government completed reviews of its National
In China, 2022 saw continued deliveries of the Chengdu Security Strategy, National Defense Program Guide-
J-20 combat aircraft. Since at least 2021, the air force lines and Medium-Term Defense Program. Prime Min-
has been taking delivery of J-20s fitted with a do- ister Kishida Fumio set 2027 as a target for the defence
mestic afterburning turbofan, the Shenyang WS-10C, budget to reach 2% of GDP.
replacing the Russian Saturn AL-31F variant. The new Australian government announced a De-
China began fielding JL-3 (CH-SS-N-20) ballistic mis- fence Strategic Review to deliver recommendations in
siles on its submarines. According to the Pentagon, early 2023. Meanwhile, discussions continued with the
newer longer-ranged missiles like the JL-3 give ‘the UK and US over the provision of a new fleet of con-
PLAN the ability to target the continental United ventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines and
States from littoral waters.’ other advanced military capabilities.
By late October, North Korea had launched some 40 Overall regional defence budget growth was below
ballistic missiles – more than in any previous year. US trend in real terms compared to the previous decade.
and South Korean officials claimed that North Korea This is partially a result of constrained government
was in the final stages of planning its first nuclear test spending, but also related to the effect of inflation on
since 2017. the spending power of defence budgets.
India
Total Asian
1,463,700
spending
USD516bn
North
Korea
1,280,000
China
India Pakistan 651,800
44.2% Regional
South Korea 555,000 total
9,177,730
Vietnam 482,000
USD66.6bn
Indonesia 395,500
USD242.4bn
Thailand 360,850
Japan South Korea Australia
Myanmar 356,000
China
India
Japan
Myanmar
North Korea
Pakistan Advanced
Singapore Modern
Mixed
South Korea
Ageing
Taiwan Obsolescent
Obsolete
Thailand
Asia
0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500
*’Combat aircraft’ includes fighter, fighter ground-attack and attack aircraft
Asia
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February but India’s defence industry remains largely unable
2022 further complicated the challenges faced by to deliver advanced-weapons systems in significant
some Asia-Pacific defence establishments at a time numbers and on time. Speaking in July 2022, India’s
when the region’s security outlook was already chief of army staff, General Manoj Pande, stressed
deteriorating as a result of growing Chinese threats that India’s dependence on imported arms was ‘a
to Taiwan. Fears that developments in Ukraine might matter of concern’. Along with some other Asian
provide an opportunity for China to invade Taiwan countries, such as Myanmar, Vietnam was similarly
while the United States and other Western powers affected, and it seemed likely that the new obstacles
were distracted proved unrealistic in the short term, to importing Russian arms would reinforce Hanoi’s
but the war highlighted the danger of major inter- drive to widen the range of military equipment
state conflict resulting from the failure of diplomacy and technology it imports from other sources. The
and deterrence. In addition, Russia’s lack of success in ‘Vietnam Defence 2022’ exhibition scheduled for
its initial offensive and the successes of the Western- Hanoi in December 2022 seemed designed to attract a
backed Ukrainian armed forces provided reasons wide range of potential suppliers to Vietnam.
for Asia-Pacific armed forces to reassess their own
capabilities and requirements. Sino-Russian collaboration
Russian military equipment and technology have
Focus on dependence on Russian weapons been important for the modernisation of China’s
Almost immediately, the war in Ukraine posed People’s Liberation Army (PLA): key examples
challenges for Asian countries reliant on military during the last decade include Su-35 combat aircraft
equipment supplied by Russia. The considerable and S-400 air-defence systems, and assistance for
strengthening of US and European Union sanctions China’s development of a ballistic missile early-
against Russia’s defence-industrial sector following warning system. In the past two decades, however,
the invasion quickly affected India’s defence China’s defence industry has produced increasing
procurement. In May, New Delhi reportedly halted volumes of advanced equipment itself as part of
negotiations for additional Ka-31 naval airborne Beijing’s military modernisation ambitions. Indeed,
early-warning helicopters and suspended plans to since the 2014 crisis over Ukraine and the Western
upgrade Su-30MKI combat aircraft with Russian sanctions against Russia following its annexation of
assistance. Deliveries of S-400 systems continued, Crimea, bilateral defence-industrial interdependence
but only because of US congressional support has grown, with China becoming a vital source for
for ensuring ‘India’s immediate defense needs’ components that Russia cannot now obtain from
by waiving CAATSA (Countering American the West and, more importantly, a major partner in
Adversaries Through Sanctions Act) sanctions in this joint projects to develop air-defence systems and
specific case. Although important equipment has also engines for combat aircraft. The ‘no limits’ bilateral
recently come from contracts with French, UK and US relationship declared by the two countries’ leaders in
suppliers, there remain considerable dependencies early February 2022 may exaggerate the depth and
in all domains on Russian suppliers. Absent any potential of contemporary Sino-Russian relations,
significant weakening of sanctions, India will need to and a formal Sino-Russian military alliance or direct
consider alternative sources for some of its equipment Chinese military support for Russia’s war in Ukraine
purchases, as well as for spares and support for many both seem unlikely prospects. Nevertheless, the
of its Soviet- and Russian-origin systems, while bilateral partnership is now closer and includes an
bolstering its co-development and co-production of increasingly strong military dimension that goes
defence systems with foreign partners. India’s aim beyond defence-industrial cooperation. In October
remains to produce more defence materiel itself, and 2021, the Joint Sea–2021 bilateral exercise brought the
the government has redoubled its efforts in this area, two countries’ navies together in the Sea of Japan,
Asia 211
Military cooperation between China and Russia has increased of Japan, with limited instances in the Arabian Sea and Pacific
in recent years. Between 2013 and 2015, exercises took place Ocean. The joint exercises have not entered Japanese territorial
annually, but since then they have gradually increased in number. waters. While the two countries likely use this military cooperation
2022 saw the two countries’ military cooperation increase in as a form of political signalling, such as of their ‘no limits’ friendship
frequency with a number of joint air or naval patrols and joint following Russia’s war in Ukraine, the depth of this bilateral military
exercises. These have included airlift, manoeuvring and live-fire cooperation, including its utility in terms of developing combat
drills, predominantly taking place in and above waters to the west capability and interoperability, remains unclear.
RUSSIA
4 September
3 x FFGHM 1 x CGHM; 1 FFGHM; 1 x AORH
3 September
3 x FFGHM 1 x CGHM; 1 FFGHM; 1 x AORH
Sea of Japan
NORTH (East Sea)
KOREA
Asia
Pacific
Ocean
SOUTH
KOREA
JAPAN 27 September
East
China 1 x DDGHM;
Sea
3 x FFGHM
27 September
1 x CGHM; 1 x FFGHM; 1 x AORH
26 September
1 x CGHM; 1 x FFGHM; 1 x AORH
2022
Joint Aerial Patrol 2021 Counter-Piracy Exercise Joint Aerial Patrol 2022 Vostok 2022 Joint Naval Patrol
19 November 2021 21 January 2022 24 May 2022 1–7 September 2022 September 2022 (multiple dates)
Sea of Japan (East Sea) Arabian Sea Sea of Japan (East Sea) Sea of Japan (East Sea) Sea of Japan (East Sea);
Joint bomber patrol Joint cruise, SAR and Joint bomber patrol Maritime exercise Pacific Ocean
air movement exercise Maritime and live-fire exercise
©IISS
212 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
with the participating Chinese flotilla led by a Type- Major PLA naval and air exercises held to the
055 cruiser. In early September 2022, around 2,000 north, southwest and east of Taiwan for three days
Chinese personnel along with air, land and naval in early August 2022 were widely viewed as a
equipment took part in Russia’s Vostok 2022 exercise. measure of Beijing’s strong disapproval of Pelosi’s
In addition, in November 2021 and May 2022 the visit. However, the exercises, which were some of
Chinese and Russian air forces conducted their third the largest organised by the PLA in Taiwan’s vicinity,
and fourth ‘joint strategic patrols’ in the Asia-Pacific would have required months of planning and may
region. Nonetheless, how far these ties advance have been part of Beijing’s overall drive to improve
combat capability remains unclear. China’s military. It is also possible that the annual
August exercises were adapted in light of Pelosi’s
Defending Taiwan visit or that the PLA was executing a pre-planned
These developments occurred against the contingency response, or a blend of the two. Following
background of growing strategic tensions between the exercises, President Tsai Ing-wen identified flights
China on one side and the US and its allies on the by Chinese-operated uninhabited aerial vehicles
other. Chinese pressure on Taiwan increasingly made (UAVs) over the Kinmen and Matsu islands as
the island a focal point of these tensions. In March among Beijing’s ‘grey-zone tactics’. On 1 September,
2022, Commander of US Indo-Pacific Command Taiwan’s armed forces shot down an ‘unidentified
Admiral John Aquilino said that Russia’s actions had civilian drone’ that entered airspace near Shiyu, an
reinforced concerns that China might attack Taiwan islet in the Kinmen group only ten kilometres from
and called for the US to re-examine its policy of China’s coast. Meanwhile, the Biden administration –
‘strategic ambiguity’ towards defending the island. perhaps taking to heart early lessons from the war in
That policy broadly prevailed despite President Joe Ukraine – reinforced its encouragement of Taiwan’s
Biden’s indications during 2021–22 that the US was development of ‘asymmetric’ or ‘porcupine’ defence
willing to defend Taiwan militarily. Meanwhile, PLA capabilities suited to slowing down any Chinese
aircraft have continued to cross the notional ‘median invasion attempt. By September 2022, the US Defense
line’ in the Taiwan Strait. While Taipei claimed these Security Cooperation Agency was listing a number
flights were supposed to intimidate Taiwan and wear of approved sales of defence equipment and support
down its air defences’ effectiveness by provoking services to Taipei since Biden took office, the most
frequent alerts and scrambles, some of them may recent including contractor support for Taiwan’s
have had genuine training purposes or supported PAVE PAWS long-range surveillance radar system
PLA efforts to track US and other submarines. together with additional RGM-84L Harpoon Block
Nonetheless, these flights appear to have increased in II coastal-defence systems and AIM-9X Sidewinder
frequency after US House of Representatives Speaker II air-to-air missiles. However, these sales remain
Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan on 2 August. subject to congressional approval in the US.
of asymmetric capabilities; according to specialists, the forces shot down a PLA UAV, likely in an attempt to set a
US would prefer to see Taipei prioritise these. precedent against further provocation.
The PLA’s exercises following Speaker of the House Nevertheless, lessons learned from the war in Ukraine
Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taipei in August 2022 created a ‘new may be more helpful than any gleaned from the post-
normal’ for PLA activity across the strait. This has included Pelosi exercises. For instance, plans have been discussed
regular air and naval incursions across the Taiwan Strait to raise the duration of conscription from four months
‘median line’, which Beijing has said does not exist. to one year. Similarly, Taipei is developing a centralised
The PLA has also begun integrating uninhabited aerial approach to civil-defence preparedness. This has until
vehicles (UAVs) into its air defence identification zone now been a largely bottom-up process and a meagre area
incursions and has leveraged civilian UAV technology of work for few in Taiwanese civil society. Nonetheless,
to conduct surveillance of islands close to the Chinese these efforts remain nascent and, so far, Taiwan lacks the
mainland. On one such occasion, Taiwanese soldiers were same level of investment in civil defence that Ukraine
filmed throwing stones to ward off the UAV, apparently looked to develop following Russia’s 2014 assault and
uncertain of how to respond. Later, Taiwanese armed annexation of Crimea.
Japan and South Korea modernise at pace generation combat-aircraft programme with the
The war in Ukraine as well as Taiwan-related UK; additional F-35A and F-35B Lightning II fighter
developments influenced thinking about defence ground-attack aircraft; Joint Strike Missiles to arm
Asia
policy by the new Japanese government led by the F-35A; AGM-158B JASSM-ER air-to-surface
Kishida Fumio, who became prime minister in missiles; continued modifications to the two Izumo-
October 2021, reinforcing the view that a tougher class helicopter carriers to allow shipborne F-35B
posture was needed to deter ‘grey-zone’ coercion operations; large-scale production of indigenously
as well as larger-scale aggression. In November, the developed Type-12 coastal-defence missiles; and
Cabinet approved a supplementary budget which continued research on hypersonic missiles. In
boosted annual defence spending to JPY6.17 trillion addition, the Japan Self-Defense Forces continued
(USD48.1bn) for 2022. to strengthen their deterrent posture by establishing
In late 2021, Kishida’s administration started additional forces on Kyushu and the southwestern
reviewing the country’s National Security Strategy, island chain: during 2022, these were scheduled to
National Defense Program Guidelines and include surface-to-air- and anti-ship-missile as well
Medium-Term Defense Program. These reviews as electronic-warfare and radar units.
were completed at the end of 2022 and may yield Tokyo expressed concern over the new phase of
substantial increases in defence spending. In his North Korea’s ballistic-missile tests that started in
keynote address to the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue September 2021. These initially included tests of a
in June 2022, Kishida said that no military option, new submarine-launched ballistic missile but by
including ‘counter-strike capabilities’ to deter the end of the year there had also been claims of a
missile attacks, would be ruled out. Tokyo’s annual hypersonic-glide-vehicle test and an apparent land-
Defense of Japan White Paper, published in July attack cruise-missile launch. By late October 2022,
2022, said that Japan’s security environment was North Korea had launched some 40 ballistic missiles
‘growing increasingly severe at an unprecedented – more than in any previous year. While these
pace’, meaning Japan needed to strengthen its were predominantly shorter-range types, they also
defence capabilities ‘dramatically’. The White included – for the first time since 2017 – a series of
Paper emphasised Tokyo’s particular concern over intercontinental ballistic missile-related launches in
China’s efforts to ‘change the status quo by coercion March and May as well as an overflight of Japan by
in the East China Sea and South China Sea’, its a claimed new intermediate-range ballistic missile in
deepening ties ‘with Russia, an aggressor nation’, October. US and South Korean officials repeatedly
and Beijing’s threats to reunify with Taiwan ‘by claimed during 2022 that Kim Jong-un’s regime was
force’. In August the defence ministry requested a in the final stages of planning a seventh nuclear test,
budget for FY2023 that was 1.1% larger than that its first since 2017. Under President Yoon Suk-yeol,
for 2022 and included funding for a joint next- elected in May 2022, South Korea continued to
214 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
combine economic incentives and military deterrence Budgetary constraints slow Southeast Asian
in response to the missile and nuclear challenges capability improvements
from Pyongyang. However, the Yoon administration Southeast Asian states facing Chinese pressure on
was less conciliatory than its predecessor and their South China Sea interests continued efforts
stressed the development of independent national to enhance their naval and air capabilities. In the
military capabilities and strengthened military Philippines, a new administration led by President
cooperation with the US. In July, Yoon publicly Ferdinand Marcos Jr was elected in May 2022. A
emphasised the importance of South Korea’s ‘Kill spokesman for the country’s Department of National
Chain’ system, which would involve pre-emptive Defense emphasised in August that all major military-
strikes against key North Korean targets. The modernisation contracts agreed by the previous
president also announced that a joint-service administration would proceed. These included
Strategic Command would be established by 2024 the purchase of two multi-role missile-armed
to take responsibility for Seoul’s ‘three-axis’ strategic HDC-3100 frigates and six offshore patrol vessels
deterrence and defence, comprising ‘Kill Chain’ from South Korea, BrahMos anti-ship missiles from
and two other systems: Korea Massive Punishment India and additional S-70i helicopters from Poland.
and Retaliation (under which conventionally armed Nevertheless, because of budgetary constraints the
ballistic missiles would be launched in response new administration launched a review of the armed
to an attack by North Korea, potentially targeting forces’ modernisation programme and some projects
its senior leaders as well as nuclear and missile were halted, including mooted plans to acquire
installations and long-range artillery) and Korean Air conventionally-powered submarines.
and Missile Defense. Developing all three systems Although some domestic critics claimed that
will depend in large measure on South Korea’s space efforts to strengthen Indonesia’s navy and air force
and missile capabilities. The lifting of US-imposed were not effective responses to Beijing’s ‘grey-zone’
‘missile guidelines’ in 2021 has allowed Seoul to strategy in the South China Sea (which included a
accelerate its development of ballistic missiles with Chinese survey vessel mapping the seabed inside
two-ton warheads which could, in combination with Jakarta’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) for seven
enhanced surveillance, provide a powerful precision- weeks during 2021), Jakarta’s defence plans continued
strike capability. In July 2021, Seoul contracted the to be among Southeast Asia’s most expansive. In
US private-sector company SpaceX to launch five February 2022, defence minister Prabowo Subianto
surveillance satellites by 2025. Separately, in June, signed agreements with France covering the purchase
the Korea Aerospace Research Institute achieved its of 42 Rafale combat aircraft and two Scorpène-class
first satellite launch using the domestically produced submarines. These agreements represented significant
KSLV-2 rocket. changes in the country’s defence procurement: an
From 22 August to 1 September South Korean and earlier plan to buy Su-35 aircraft from Russia was
US forces held their largest joint exercise since 2017; apparently abandoned owing to fears over the
it was also the first in five years to involve joint field potential imposition of US sanctions, and it seemed
training, which had been paused due to the previous likely that Jakarta would cancel a project to acquire a
South Korean administration’s policy of seeking second batch of three Type 209/1400 submarines from
dialogue with Pyongyang and restrictions related to South Korea. Also in February, the US government
the coronavirus pandemic. Details of Exercise Ulchi conditionally approved the sale to Indonesia of
Freedom Shield were classified, but one significant up to 36 F-15EX aircraft. However, these major
feature was that for the first time the US Forces Korea procurement plans – combined with other recent
commander shared control with a South Korean contracts, including one for six FREMM and two
senior officer. The US has set such experience for Maestrale-class frigates ordered from Italy, and
South Korean military commanders as one of many another for two A400M transport aircraft – threatened
requirements to be fulfilled before South Korea to overwhelm Indonesia’s defence budget, which in
can assume command responsibility for its armed 2021 required a presidentially approved USD2.06
forces in wartime. During the exercise, President billion special supplement to cover equipment and
Yoon ordered the armed forces to accelerate their defence-industrial costs. By July 2022, it was reported
‘updating’ of operational plans to counter the North that the defence ministry was struggling to find the
Korean threat. funds to honour existing contracts.
Asia 215
Malaysia also experienced Beijing’s ‘grey-zone’ also faced re-equipment challenges. In January, the
tactics, particularly off the coasts of Sabah and Sarawak Cabinet approved in principle a plan to acquire four
states, such as in October 2021 when Chinese vessels F-35As in FY2023, to be followed by a further four of
including a survey ship entered its EEZ. However, the same type. However, in August objections from
there was no perceived acute threat to Malaysia’s Thailand’s House Budget Scrutiny Committee, in
security and continuing budgetary restrictions light of the country’s economic downturn, cut initial
impeded efforts to modernise its military capabilities. proposed procurement to two aircraft. Another
Procurement priorities remained confined to new light potential impediment was that the purchase needed
combat aircraft, long- and medium-range air defence approval from the US government: some analysts
radars, maritime patrol aircraft and medium-altitude thought this might not be granted because of
long-endurance UAVs, but near-term acquisitions Thailand’s close defence relations with China and the
mainly focused on less expensive equipment. In information-security requirements associated with
March 2022, defence minister Hishammuddin the sale of the F-35.
Hussein said that current procurement projects for A brief incursion by one of Myanmar’s combat
the army included armoured personnel carriers aircraft into Thai airspace in June highlighted the
for use by the Malaysian battalion with the United dangers that this neighbour’s internal conflict
Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, 155-millimetre posed for Thailand’s security, despite the generally
self-propelled howitzers, logistic-support bridges and equable relations between the two countries’
light anti-tank weapons. New naval equipment ‘in governments. Since May 2021, airstrikes and artillery
the pipeline’ included a second batch of three Littoral fire in Myanmar’s Kayin and Kayah states have also
Asia
Mission Ships, three AW139 utility helicopters and forced thousands of displaced people to cross the
‘about 13’ fast interceptor craft. Hishammuddin also border into Thailand. Meanwhile, fighting between
announced plans to acquire 24 new helicopters from forces loyal to the State Administration Council
2026 and highlighted the conversion of three CN235 (SAC) junta (including the Pyusawhti militias as well
transport aircraft to maritime patrol configuration as the Tatmadaw, Myanmar’s armed forces) and
with funding from the US government’s regional opposition groups comprising the People’s Defence
Maritime Security Initiative. Forces aligned with the pro-democracy National
Thailand is not a claimant in the South China Unity Government and some of the country’s ethnic
Sea but is concerned about the region’s increasingly armed organisations was increasingly widespread
tense maritime security environment and continues across the country. Economic weakness and the
efforts to enhance its naval capabilities. Submarine Tatmadaw’s preoccupation with internal-security
acquisition remains a priority, although this project threats meant that efforts to improve conventional
faces major challenges. Bangkok suspended plans military capabilities were no longer prioritised to
to buy two additional S26T Yuan-class submarines the extent they had been before the February 2021
on order from China (along with other defence- military coup. Until early 2022, the country’s main
equipment contracts) in April 2020 owing to the military-equipment suppliers had been Russia and
financial constraints imposed by the coronavirus Ukraine, and the war in Ukraine and international
pandemic. During March 2022, Thailand’s navy sanctions have raised questions over the durability
confirmed that construction in China of the first boat of these supplier relationships and where else
had stopped following Germany’s refusal – due to Myanmar might look for its defence equipment.
the EU’s arms embargo on Beijing – to supply the Although the Tatmadaw has a long-standing
MTU396 diesel engines needed to power its electric aversion to overly heavy reliance on Beijing, in
generators. It was reported that China had offered December 2021 Myanmar’s navy took delivery of
to transfer two ex-PLA Navy (PLAN) submarines an ex-PLAN Type-035B (Ming) submarine from
to Thailand instead, but naval acquisitions director- China. And reports indicated that Myanmar was
general Rear Admiral Apichai Sompolgrunk said strengthening its military relations with North
in April that, though it was too early to talk of Korea, though it was unclear what the implications
cancelling the contract, only the Yuan-class boat was might be in terms of equipment supplies.
acceptable. In August 2022, it was reported that the Nonetheless, there were reports in September that
China Shipbuilding & Offshore International Co. was Myanmar was to receive Su-30SM combat aircraft
offering replacement engines. Thailand’s air force from Russia, under a 2018 contract.
216 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Australia’s new government and defence policy The economic problems facing the Asia-Pacific
Although Australia had a new Labor government region are broadly similar to those faced elsewhere,
following elections in May 2022, there was though their impact varies. As much of the world
considerable continuity in defence policy. During adjusts to living with COVID-19, sporadic and severe
the election campaign, Labor indicated its support lockdowns have continued in China because of
for the then-government’s defence-spending Beijing’s then zero tolerance approach to outbreaks.
increases, [Labour have since released their own This in turn has had a significant impact on economic
budget in October] in the March 2022 budget; it also growth in Asia’s largest economy, with knock-on
agreed with the country’s major investments in new effects for the rest of the region. Similarly, the impact
frigates and nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs), of the war in Ukraine was initially less severe than
the latter to be provided through the trilateral in other regions, though increases in energy and food
AUKUS arrangement with the UK and US. However, prices within the region served to dampen demand,
these are long-term programmes (the first SSN not both directly and indirectly through their influence
being delivered until the mid-2040s, according to on both domestic and foreign consumers. Inflation
Richard Marles, the new defence minister) and began to rise through the second half of 2022, but it
the new government inherited a major challenge remains low in most Asian economies. In general,
in terms of how to improve Australia’s defence Asia’s commodity exporters find themselves in a
capability to deter fast-emerging threats during stronger position than its importers given these
the current decade. Responding to this challenge, pressures, though the negative effect upon growth is
in August the government announced a Defence expected to be felt throughout the region.
Strategic Review that will examine ‘force structure, Higher energy prices and other key commodities
force posture and preparedness, and investment have also had an immediate impact on government
prioritisation’ and deliver recommendations to the finances in a number of Asian states because of the
government in early 2023. The government is also tendency for the region’s emerging economies to
due to announce by March 2023 the type of SSN provide related subsidies to their populations. For
that Australia will acquire, and there may be a example, Indonesia initially earmarked USD10.2
decision by then on whether an interim non-nuclear billion for energy subsidies in its 2022 budget, but
submarine capability will be needed during by mid-year had been forced to increase this total to
the 2030s, pending the commissioning of SSNs. USD33.8bn. Wider inflationary pressures have had
Meanwhile, in late August, Marles announced that a similar impact in Malaysia, where the Ministry of
Australian submariners would train aboard British Finance announced in June that the overall subsidies
Astute-class SSNs.
Thailand, 1.2%
Indonesia, 1.8%
DEFENCE ECONOMICS Singapore, 2.3%
Other Southeast
Asia, 3.7%
Other Australasia, 0.7%
Macroeconomics Australia, 6.6%
While Asia’s recovery from the coronavirus Other South Asia
pandemic continued through 2022, GDP remained 1.2%
lower than pre-pandemic levels in two-thirds of Pakistan, 1.9%
the region’s economies, with mounting headwinds
India, 12.9% China
calling into doubt future prospects for growth. 47.0%
Real GDP growth had recovered to 6.5% in 2021. Other East Asia
0.0%
However, a new wave of infections and consequent
Taiwan, 3.1%
lockdowns, coupled with the impact of Russia’s
invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, quickly South Korea, 8.3%
saw expectations for 2022 diminished. In October Japan, 9.3%
2021, the IMF was forecasting real GDP growth
©IISS
of 5.7% for the Asia-Pacific in 2022, but this was Note: Analysis excludes Afghanistan, North Korea and Lao PDR.
% of GDP
placed considerable strain on government budgets 1.0
Defence spending
0.0
Against the backdrop of these mounting economic 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
and fiscal challenges, overall defence budget
growth in the region was significantly below trend ▲Note: Analysis excludes Afghanista, North Korea and Lao PDR.
Figure 11 Asia: regional defence spending as % of
in real terms compared to the previous decade. GDP (average)
This is partially a result of constrained government
spending, but also related to the effect of inflation
on the spending power of defence budgets. Where defence sector. Government officials stated that 25%
significant growth did occur, it was generally the of spending earmarked for this purpose in 2022–23
result of the approval of large special budgets for will be opened up to private industry. Most of this
defence, such as in Japan and Taiwan. This suggests amount had traditionally been funnelled through
Asia
that, as in Europe, strategic factors have enabled state-owned agencies like the Defence Research and
defence-spending trends to overcome wider Development Organisation.
budgetary constraints. However, trends are far from In Japan, the re-election of the Liberal Democratic
universal, with Southeast Asian budgets particularly Party in October 2021 also appears to have
likely to come under pressure in the short term reinvigorated efforts to raise defence spending.
as a result of fiscal consolidation and competing Having campaigned on a platform that included the
priorities for strained government resources. pledge to double defence spending as a proportion of
The limited real-terms growth in Asia-Pacific GDP to 2%, the Kishida government is now reportedly
military spending over the course of 2022 hides the working on ways to realise this ambition, or at least
fact that a number of countries announced significant heavily augment current resources for defence. In
increases to their defence budgets earlier in the year, the immediate term, this included the approval of
before inflationary pressures began to mount. In the ‘Defense-Strengthening Acceleration Package’,
February, India announced a 2022–23 defence budget which ostensibly added JPY773.8bn (USD6.0bn) to
of INR5.25 trillion (USD66.6bn), a 4.4% increase over the FY2022 budget in order to accelerate a number
the revised figure for 2021–22. Perhaps more crucially, of projects initially earmarked for inclusion in the
the new budget made progress in rebalancing resources FY2023 budget. In effect, this provided the Japan
towards modernisation, with the capital budget – Ministry of Defense with a 15.6% nominal uplift in
which provides funding for research and development spending for FY2022, a significant development for a
(R&D) and procurement – increasing by 12.7%. As country where annual increases in core spending have
recently as 2013–14, capital spend accounted for 31% of averaged less than 1% over the last decade. Reports
India’s budget. However, rising pay and pension costs, in late 2022 suggest that this practice of raising
combined with lower rates of top-line growth, saw that defence expenditure through the use of supplemental
share drop to 23% by 2018–19. The new budget takes appropriations is likely to be retained over the coming
the share of spending dedicated to capital investment years; it seems likely to be the main method used to
back to 29%, close to previous highs. raise spending towards 2% of GDP, a target that Prime
India’s new budget also continued the recent Minister Kishida Fumio is seeking to reach by 2027.
practice of prioritising domestic programmes and Taiwan’s use of supplemental budgets to bolster
suppliers within its procurement plans, with 68% defence spending was also expanded in 2022 with
of the capital budget earmarked for indigenous the approval of new special appropriation aimed at
manufacturers, up from 58% in 2021–22. The R&D enhancing navy and air force capabilities. Specifically,
budget is also being used to support the local the new budget will provide TWD237bn (USD8.1bn)
218 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Increase
Tonga
USD0.01bn
New Zealand
Timor-Leste USD3.35bn
USD0.04bn
Bangladesh
USD4.32bn
Maldives
USD0.10bn
Japan
USD48.08bn
Indonesia
USD9.07bn
Philippines
USD5.50bn Singapore
USD11.92bn
China
USD242.41bn
Papua New Guinea
USD0.10bn
Nepal
USD0.42bn
Malaysia South Korea
USD42.99bn Australia
USD4.15bn
USD33.84bn
Cambodia Vietnam
USD1.00bn εUSD6.04bn Pakistan
Fiji Mongolia
USD0.04bn USD9.77bn
USD0.09bn India Taiwan
USD66.65bn USD16.16bn
Sri Lanka Thailand
USD6.18bn Brunei
USD1.15bn
USD0.44bn
Decrease
Myanmar
Afghanistan North Korea Lao PDR USD1.88bn
n.k n.k n.k
[1] Map illustrating 2022 planned defence-spending levels (in USDbn at market
Real % Change (2021–22)
exchange rates), as well as the annual real percentage change in planned
More than 20% increase Between 0% and 3% decrease defence spending between 2021 and 2022 (at constant 2015 prices and exchange
Between 10% and 20% increase Between 3% and 10% decrease rates). Percentage changes in defence spending can vary considerably from
year to year, as states revise the level of funding allocated to defence. Changes
Between 3% and 10% increase Between 10% and 20% decrease indicated here highlight the short-term trend in planned defence spending
Between 0% and 3% increase More than 20% decrease between 2021 and 2022. Actual spending changes prior to 2021, and projected
spending levels post-2022, are not reflected.
ε Estimate Spending 2% of GDP or above Insufficient data
©IISS
between 2022 and 2026 for new ships, shore-based anti- overall defence spending for 2022 represents a 20.5%
ship missiles and air-defence systems that are set to increase in spending over the previous two years. This
be developed and manufactured by the local defence was followed in August by the announcement that
sector. This funding comes on top of the previously the Cabinet had approved a further large increase in
approved TWD247bn (USD8.5bn) special budget for core spending for 2023 which, when combined with
the procurement of 66 F-16V combat aircraft with ongoing special budget appropriations, will see a
a further TWD40bn (USD1.4bn) appropriated for further 19.6% increase next year.
this acquisition in 2022. When taken alongside the In May, Australia elected a Labor government
Ministry of National Defense’s annual core budget, for the first time in almost nine years. Initially
Asia 219
400 12
300 9
0 -1.8%
0
-100 -4.0% -3
-5.2%
-200 -6
South Asia East Asia Southeast Asia Australasia
▲ Figure 12 Asia: sub-regional real-terms defence-spending growth, 2021–22 (USDbn, constant 2015)
this created a degree of uncertainty around future to ten) to be made locally by Boeing Australia, it is
funding for defence, following a period under apparent that investment in the local defence sector
the Liberal/National coalition where core defence continues to increase, with local companies moving
spending had risen by 79% since 2013. However, the up the value chain through their development and
new government has been explicit in its support for production of systems and platforms. This move
Asia
maintaining defence spending at levels above 2% aligns with Australia’s Defence Export Strategy,
of GDP. It announced plans for a Defence Strategic released in 2018, which aims to turn the country
Review which will make recommendations to into one of the top ten global exporters of defence
government in early 2023. Meanwhile, the new equipment by 2028.
government backed the enhanced investments in Over the course of 2022, the defence-industrial
the Australian Defence Force outlined in the 2016 relationship between Japan and the UK continued to
White Paper and reaffirmed in the 2020 Strategic strengthen, most notably in relation to cooperation
Update, firmly suggesting that spending will on future combat aircraft development. With both
continue to rise in the coming years in line with countries making progress on their respective projects
those long-term plans. The Labor government’s but acutely aware of the attendant costs, London and
first budget, which was released in October 2022, Tokyo are exploring potential collaboration. After
maintained funding for defence largely in line with announcements on cooperation around engines and
the Strategic Update, while future decisions will sensor technology, both countries launched, with Italy
likely be shaped by the upcoming Defence Strategic in December, the ‘Global Combat Air Programme’.
Review. The budget also announced AUD900 Speaking during a visit to the UK in May, Prime
million (USD638m) and AUD470m (USD333m) in Minister Kishida stated that the work could become
overseas assistance for Pacific Island nations and the cornerstone of a much closer UK–Japan bilateral
Southeast Asia respectively. defence relationship; Japanese and UK companies are
already cooperating in a number of key areas.
Defence industry In August, Vietnam unveiled reforms aimed at
The new Labor government will also continue with developing the local defence sector and increasing
plans for the new trilateral strategic agreement equipment self-sufficiency. The new policies will
between Australia, the United Kingdom and the focus on restructuring the existing defence industrial
United States – referred to as AUKUS – which intends base, encouraging greater cooperation with civil
to provide Australia with a new fleet of conventionally industry and international partners. The most
armed, nuclear-powered submarines and other significant changes are likely to relate to reform and
advanced military capabilities such as hypersonic restructuring within the General Department of
missiles. Coupled with the announcement in May Defence Industry (GDDI), a state-owned network
that Australia would acquire another seven MQ-28A of around 60 manufacturing facilities and research
Ghost Bat uninhabited aerial vehicles (bringing the institutes in Vietnam, in an attempt to expand its
Royal Australian Air Force’s planned total order existing capabilities.
220 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
India continued its import substitution drive, the use of technologies to develop an elite force
against the backdrop of potential shortages of spare that is capable of fighting and winning wars’. In
parts for Russian military equipment in light of the March, Xi stressed the importance of operating the
war in Ukraine. New Delhi announced a new list armed forces in accordance with the law, calling
of 780 ‘strategically important’ components that it for advances in military legislation, stepping up
intends to produce domestically. The list included enforcement of laws and regulations, strengthening
parts for Russian-designed T-90 main battle tanks and troop management and enhancing oversight.
Su-30MKI combat aircraft at a time when concern has
been growing over the ability to source components The 20th Party Congress
from Russia. Reports from India, citing defence In late October, the 20th National Congress of the
officials, suggest that the conflict has added impetus Communist Party of China took stock of the PLA’s
to plans to upgrade the air force’s Su-30MKI fleet achievements since 2017 and set the agenda for the
with an indigenous radar, cockpit avionics and flight- next five years. The PLA is still aiming towards its
control computer in order to reduce dependence upon 2027 and 2035 targets. The 20th Party Congress work
Russia and offset potential challenges in sustaining report included a mention of the 2027 goal, which
the inventory. was officially announced by Xi in 2020; it is important
South Korea arguably had the region’s most as 2027 marks the centenary of the foundation of the
significant industrial success in 2022 with the PLA’s antecedent. It was the first time that a party
framework agreements for the sale to Poland of 1,000 congress work report contained an explicit reference
K2 main battle tanks, 672 K9 self-propelled howitzers to this goal. The report also stated that following
and 48 FA-50 light combat aircraft. The initial contracts reforms the PLA had by 2022 become a ‘much more
for 180 K2 tanks and 212 K9 artillery pieces, finalised modern and capable fighting force’.
in August, were valued at USD6.06bn, while Korea For the next five years, it continued, the PLA
Aerospace Industries (KAI) announced the signed should focus on measures including maintaining
FA-50 deal would be worth a further USD3.31bn. Even political loyalty to the Party, intensifying training
if additional orders do not materialise as expected, the and enhancing combat preparedness, establishing
agreements between Poland and Korea represent by ‘a strong system of strategic deterrence’, speeding
some distance the largest defence export deal secured the development of uninhabited and ‘intelligent’
by an Asian country. Earlier in July, South Korea combat capabilities and promoting the coordinated
had celebrated the first flight of the indigenously development and application of network
developed KF-21 combat aircraft, further advancing information systems. The latter suggests that the
the country’s growing industrial capabilities and goal of ‘informatisation’ has not yet been achieved
expanding its equipment portfolio to multi-role and that ‘intelligentisation’ remains an ambition.
combat aircraft. These deals highlighted the maturity Informatisation is generally held to refer to efforts
of South Korea’s defence industry and the price point to improve technical sophistication (likened by
and perceived quality of its products, but they also the Pentagon to ‘net-centric’ capability) while
raised potential prioritisation challenges (particularly intelligentisation may refer to the idea that military
for the land sector) for a domestic defence sector that systems will be improved by the integration of
must also meet local modernisation requirements. automation, big data and artificial intelligence.
Additionally, the report said that the command
CHINA system for joint operations required improvement,
and that the PLA’s systems and capacity for
In 2022, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) reconnaissance and early warning, joint strikes,
continued its plan to build a modernised army battlefield support and integrated logistics support
by 2027 and to ‘basically achieve’ defence and also needed to be enhanced. Moreover, further
armed forces modernisation by 2035. Xi Jinping efforts were required in areas such as joint and
started 2022, after his new year’s speech, by force-on-force training, military–civil fusion, and
signing a mobilisation order for military training, hastening the development of modern logistics.
instructing the armed forces to ‘redouble their The text mentioned accelerating progress towards
efforts to better combine training with combat certain objectives, but language like this is common
operations, and strengthen systematic training and in Party documents and therefore does not signal an
Asia 221
ambition to speed up the drive to achieve military Later in the year, China’s military training went
modernisation by 2035. Two notable deductions beyond national exercises in what some analysts
from the work report’s section on the PLA are that called a ‘fourth Taiwan Strait crisis’. Following a visit
informatisation remains a work in progress and by then Speaker of the US House of Representatives
that the PLA has been directed to focus more on Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan, China’s drills, which began
strategic capabilities and deterrence, including in on 3 August, were widely viewed as a measure
the use of emerging and disruptive technologies and of Beijing’s strong disapproval of Pelosi’s visit.
‘new-domain forces’. Components of these drills included anti-submarine
Xi’s speech at the Party Congress signalled warfare, joint-service logistic support, in-flight
little new in terms of China’s approach to Taiwan. refuelling, aircraft-carrier and submarine operations
However, the Party’s constitution was amended to and the firing of a range of ballistic missiles, including
include a line to ‘resolutely oppose and deter Taiwan DF-15B (CH-SS-6 Mod 3) missiles launched to
independence’. This represents a shift from the Taiwan’s north, east and south. The PLAN held
previous revision in 2017 where there was a pledge exercises off the coast of Taiwan’s main ports in
to ‘facilitate national unification’. However, the work six locations, though it did not enter into Taiwan’s
report also shifted tone slightly to be conciliatory territorial seas. The PLA’s army- and navy-aviation
to China’s Taiwan compatriots, and instead made forces conducted numerous large-scale incursions
clear that the option of taking all measures necessary into Taiwan’s air defence identification zone (ADIZ),
to ensure reunification was ‘directed solely at crossing over the politically sensitive Taiwan Strait
interference by outside forces and the few separatists median line. Since August, the latter has become a
Asia
seeking Taiwan independence’. more routine occurrence. Amphibious exercises
The Party Congress also unveiled a new Central were absent from the exercises that followed Pelosi’s
Military Commission (CMC) line-up. Personnel visit, as the PLA likely calibrated its response to
changes mirrored wider changes in the Politburo limit misunderstanding.
standing and central committees that broke with
long-held norms around retirement age and PLA Army
promotional ladders. The new CMC is less diverse, Having completed its organisational transition to
lacking PLA Navy (PLAN) and PLA Air Force a combined-arms battalion- and brigade-based
(PLAAF) representation, and puts the army back at structure, the PLAA now appears to be focused
the centre of PLA decision-making. While Admiral on training and developing the skills necessary to
Miao Hua remains as a member of the CMC, his use these new formations effectively, both as an
background is in the PLA Army (PLAA) prior to individual service and in conjunction with other
transferring to the PLAN as political commissar. Only elements of the PLA.
three members of the former CMC remain. Zhang The army has almost certainly paid close attention
Youxia was promoted to first vice chairman, while to the performance of Russian and Ukrainian ground
He Weidong was promoted to the second-ranking forces during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, in
vice chairman, having previously served on the Joint relation to equipment, organisations and operational
Operations Command Center, as commander of the concepts. This may ultimately lead to some further
Eastern Theatre Command and deputy commander changes in force design, but the perceived lessons
of the Western Theatre Command and commander of the campaign will likely take some time to digest
of the Western Theatre Command Army. While before practical changes occur.
Zhang brings his experience from the Sino-Vietnam As in 2021, PLAA brigades continued to
war in 1979, he has been in command positions participate in established annual exercise series, such
for recent Taiwan- and Doklam-related activities. as Stride. However, these exercises again received less
Li Shangfu will likely become the new minister of coverage in China’s media than they had before 2020.
national defence, despite being sanctioned by the Official reporting contrasts the progress achieved in
US government in 2018 while he was head of the these exercises over the last decade with persistent
Equipment Development Department. The new shortfalls in some areas. It also suggests that at least
chief of the Joint Staff Department, Liu Zhenli, some brigades are participating in the same exercise
fought in the Sino-Vietnam war but has not served series over multiple consecutive years, implying an
in any joint position. iterative, long-term approach to skills transfer.
222 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
The PLAN also undertook a number of joint design heritage. It is being replaced by the Shenyang
exercises with Russian navy units. However, while WS-20, a more modern and more powerful engine.
these involved significant numbers of vessels, Indeed, the Y-20 transport aircraft, and the YY-20A
attracted considerable attention and were no doubt tanker variant, are now starting to be built fitted
meant to send a diplomatic message, they remained with the WS-20 rather than the Russian powerplant.
relatively limited in scope and operational ambition. The YY-20A will be used to replace the H-6U tanker
Another notable deployment was that of the space- variant of the H-6 Badger and likely also the Ilyushin
and missile-tracking ship Yuan Wang 5 (part of the Il-78 Midas tanker. In August 2022 the PLAAF released
Strategic Support Force) into the Indian Ocean, footage of a YY-20A being used to refuel J-16s.
including a port visit to Hambantota in Sri Lanka. With the emergence in early December of the
International attention has also remained focused Northrop Grumman B-21 Raider bomber in the
on the continuing assertive use by Beijing of its other United States, it remained to be seen whether this
maritime-security agencies, the China Coast Guard might prompt Beijing to show the Xian H-20 bomber
and the maritime militia. Among improvements in now assessed to be in development. Still possibly
the coastguard’s capabilities has been the transfer under wraps is a fighter-bomber design alluded to by
of all Type-056 corvettes from the PLAN, modified the US Defense Intelligence Agency.
by the removal of air-defence and anti-ship missile At Airshow China 2022, a variant of the turbojet-
systems, significantly enhancing the coastguard’s powered Wing Loong-10 uninhabited aerial vehicle
inventory of ocean-deployable units. (UAV) was displayed with the designation WZ-10
and in PLAAF markings. This supports earlier
Asia
PLA Air Force commercial satellite imagery suggesting that
The PLAAF played a notable role in what appeared to the type has now entered PLA service, but in an
be Beijing’s display of displeasure over Pelosi’s visit to intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR)/
Taiwan at the beginning of August 2022. The increase electronic-warfare role rather than the combat ISR
in PLAAF activity near Taiwan also likely provided role advertised for the Wing Loong-10 export variants.
the air force with a valuable opportunity, and an There was also a display featuring the FH-97 ‘loyal
excuse, to package comparatively large formations in wingman’ UAV, depicted operating with J-20 on
an operationally relevant environment. display screens. This suggests that the PLAAF may
While the scope of the air force’s ongoing combat be considering operating these assets in similar roles
aircraft recapitalisation is readily apparent, with to those being considered by advanced Western air
older types being replaced by modern platforms, less forces for such assets.
easily observed is the extent of the progress being
made in the training and skills required for joint and PLA Rocket Force
integrated air operations. This remains a focus of The modernisation and expansion of China’s
PLAAF attention, as does improving and shortening conventional and nuclear missile forces continues at a
the training syllabus for combat aircraft aircrew. steady pace. In 2021, the discovery by non-government
Deliveries of the Chengdu J-20 and J-10C Firebird, analysts of three intercontinental ballistic missile
and Shenyang J-16 combat aircraft, continued during (ICBM) silo fields in northern China was seen to
2022. As of the fourth quarter of 2022, development potentially signify a significant change in China’s
of a two-seat variant of the J-20 is also ongoing with nuclear-force structure and posture. According to
one or two aircraft in flight test. The PLAAF has, the United States’ annual military report on China,
since at least 2021, been taking delivery of J-20s fitted the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF)
with a domestic afterburning turbofan, the Shenyang is projected to increase the number of warheads
WS-10C, replacing the Russian Saturn AL-31F variant it possesses from around 400 to 1,500 by 2035 and
used originally. The PLAAF also appears to be increase its number of deployed strategic-range
looking at further upgrades for its Shenyang J-11B launchers by at least 300. If China were to significantly
Flanker L aircraft. expand the size of its ICBM forces but continue its
Engine upgrades are also being introduced in historic policy of nuclear ambiguity, this could have
the PLAAF’s Xian Y-20 heavy transport. The Y-20 significant implications for strategic stability with
was introduced into service using a version of the the United States and possible knock-on effects for
Russian Soloviev D-30KP, which has a late-1960s bilateral Russian–US arms control. Meanwhile,
224 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
the PLARF continues to add additional brigades medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles
of conventional missiles to its force structure and (MRBM and IRBM respectively). Although the
modernise its equipment, underlining the importance DF-21C/-D (CH-SS-5 Mod 4/5) MRBM had been the
the PLARF continues to place on these systems for primary instrument for the PLARF’s conventional
regional deterrence and war-fighting purposes. mission, it appears to have been superseded in this
Construction at the Hami, Ordos and Yumen silo role by the DF-26 (CH-SS-18) IRBM since the missile
fields progressed significantly between 2021 and 2022, reached initial operational capability in 2016. It is
and most temporary shelters that have been used to assessed that at least six brigades have been equipped
conceal excavation and construction work have been with the DF-26 (CH-SS-18), with a significant increase
removed, revealing reinforced silo hatches. Although in launchers noted in US government reports between
US government reports have estimated that China’s 2019 and 2020. Although the DF-26 is a dual-capable
ICBM force has increased from 100 to 300 launchers system, meaning it can be equipped with either a
and from 150 to 300 missiles, satellite imagery analysis nuclear or a conventional warhead, most of these
of the silo fields does not appear to display evidence systems are believed to have a conventional mission.
that these silos have been filled. Moreover, additional China has also begun to deploy its new DF-17
construction work will be required to support the (CH-SS-22) medium-range hypersonic boost-
necessary infrastructure for these to become fully glide vehicle and at least two brigades have been
operational. Once ready, however, China is likely identified as being equipped with the DF-17 since
to fill these silos with either the solid-fuel DF-41 the system was unveiled in 2019. It is possible that
(CH-SS-20) or the DF-31A (CH-SS-10 Mod 2), both of the PLARF will continue increasing the number of
which can reach targets on the United States’ eastern brigades operating this system, especially among
seaboard. Although the DF-5A/B variants (CH-SS-4 units that are based in eastern China, considering
Mod 2/3 respectively) are also capable of striking current deployments. At the same time, the number
targets at similar ranges, both systems are liquid- of short-range ballistic-missile launchers possessed
fuelled, and their lengthy fuelling process means that by the PLARF, such as the DF-11A (CH-SS-7
they can be vulnerable to pre-emptive attack. Mod 2), has gradually decreased according to US
Whether the PLARF will fill all of these silos is a government assessments.
matter of debate among analysts. Some specialists Finally, while China’s ballistic missiles are a
have suggested that the gradual evolvement of the focus of attention from analysts and policymakers,
PLARF’s force structure reflects statements from the PLARF also operates several types of ground-
China’s leadership, such as Xi’s directive at the launched cruise missiles (GLCM), including the
Communist Party of China’s 20th Party Conference CJ-100 (CH-SSC-13). However, there is very little
to ‘establish a strong system of strategic deterrence’. open-source information available on the service
The increasingly tense Sino-US security relationship status of the PLARF’s GLCMs and their deployment.
is likely an important reason for China’s apparent
slow drift from its historic restraint in deploying a DEFENCE ECONOMICS
small nuclear force. Although Chinese policymakers
have not provided an official explanation for the Despite the economic challenges posed by ongoing
developments to its nuclear force structure and lockdowns and the country’s zero-tolerance
posture, some Chinese officials have noted that approach to COVID-19, China’s defence-budget
China’s nuclear forces will be influenced by changes growth remained in line with recent trends in 2022.
in the international security environment. Finally, In February, Beijing announced that it would raise
some specialists have suggested that assessments defence spending by 7% for 2022 in nominal terms,
of changes to the PLARF’s force structure should taking military spending to CNY1.45 trillion (USD238
be considered alongside broader changes in billion) from CNY1.36tr (USD224bn). Taking into
other branches of the PLA, given qualitative and account the funding of local militias, the budget
quantitative developments in the PLAAF and PLAN. increased to CNY1.47tr (USD242bn) in 2022. The
In addition to improving its nuclear forces, the new budget represented a marginal acceleration
PLARF continues to expand, improve and modernise in growth from the 6.9% increase approved in 2021
its conventional missile capabilities, evidenced by but remains largely in line with the average 7.3%
the expansion in the number of brigades operating nominal growth seen over the previous five years.
Asia 225
As a result of this sustained and robust growth in made in parallel domains such as aeroengines and
Chinese military spending, the 7% increase for 2022 advanced electronics.
represents a CNY95bn (USD16bn) boost in funding A further transparency problem exists with
for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the largest- regard to how even the official defence budget is
ever annual increase in absolute terms. Growth in real spent. Priorities for the 2022 budget were not laid
terms, however, has stalled in the last five years. out, but a communique on China’s 14th Five-Year
As a proportion of overall government spending, Plan issued in October 2020 outlined plans to ‘make
Chinese military expenditure had declined in the early major strides in the modernization of national
2000s, dropping from 9.0% in 2000 down to 5.2% by the defense and the armed forces’ and in ‘building a
time Xi Jinping became president in 2013. Since that time, modernised military by 2027’. Data contained within
this decline has been arrested, suggesting an increased the country’s 2019 defence White Paper also showed
focus on ensuring the PLA receives the resources it spending on military equipment – which includes
requires. Officially, the 2022 budget represents around procurement and support – had increased from
5.4% of overall government spending, slightly below 33.2% of total spending in 2010 to 41.1% by 2017,
the 5.5% spent in 2021. The official 2022 defence budget as the government sought to direct more funding
comes to 1.2% of GDP, a level at which it has hovered towards technological modernisation.
throughout President Xi’s ten years in power, yet still This prioritisation of modernisation has been a
well below the global average of around 2%. hallmark of Xi’s leadership, with the PLA reduced in
There remains, however, significant debate over size by 300,000 personnel between 2015 and 2017 in
the extent to which the official budget represents the order to channel more funding into equipment. News
Asia
entirety of the country’s spending on defence, with that emerged in 2021 of a pay increase of up to 40% for
additional funding thought to be provided from other some military personnel is likely to have precluded
sources. A key example is through the government’s any further growth in the share of spending directed
long-standing commitment to the policy of military– towards equipment given the resultant increase in
civil fusion, which aims to leverage technological personnel expenses. Nevertheless, with the president
advances between the civil and military functions. having outlined plans to largely complete the
Ostensibly, this creates the potential for substantial modernisation of the PLA by 2035 as part of the 19th
levels of research and development spending, not National Congress of the Communist Party of China
specifically counted as part of the defence budget, to in 2017, the focus on technological advancement will
feed into military programmes through investments remain over the coming years.
▼ Figure 13 China: defence budget compared with the rest of Asia (total), 2008–22, USDbn, constant 2015
300 20
250 15
USDbn (constant, 2015)
200
10
150
5
100
0
50
0 -5
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
Asia
Super Tucano aircraft*** (USD98.56m) Oct 2020 Force
(A-29B)
c. 2018 Hermes 450 Medium 4 PHP8.47bn Elbit Systems 2019–20 Horizon 2 Air
intelligence, (USD160.84m) Force
Hermes 900 surveillance and 9
reconnaissance
uninhabited
air vehicle
Dec 2018 C295M Light transport 1 EUR28.81m M Airbus Sep 2019 Horizon 2 Air
aircraft (USD34.04m) Force
c. 2019 C295M Light transport 3 PHP5.29bn M Airbus Mar 2022– Horizon 2 Air
aircraft (USD102.10m) ongoing Force
c. 2019 Spyder-MR Medium-range 9 PHP6.85bn Rafael Sep 2022– Horizon 2 Air
self-propelled (USD132.19m) Advanced ongoing Force
surface-to-air Defense
missile system Systems
Apr 2019 S-70i Medium 16 USD241.46m PZL Mielec Nov 2020– Horizon 2 Air
Black Hawk transport Dec 2021 Force
helicopter
Jul 2020 T129B Attack 6 PHP13.73bn Turkish Mar 2020– Horizon 2 Air
helicopter (USD276.62m) Aerospace ongoing Force
Industries (TAI)
Feb 2022 S-70i Medium 32 USD624m PZL Mielec 2023–26** Horizon 2 Air
Black Hawk transport Force
helicopter
*Horizon 1 (2013–17); Horizon 2 (2018–22); Horizon 3 (2023–28) – excluding equipment that was second-hand, donated or given in an
assistance or aid programme
**Planned
***Combat capable
M = multinational
228 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
In 2000, the Pakistan Navy (PN) largely comprised platforms This provided a template for subsequent purchases from
of French and UK origin with a handful of Chinese-designed China, with the first vessels built at a Chinese shipyard
patrol craft. Today, many of the navy’s key vessels have and subsequent platforms at KSEW. This pattern has been
been, or are being, replaced by Chinese-designed ships. reflected in procurements from China by the other armed
Indeed, a 2005 deal for Sword-class frigates – based on the services, coming at a time when Pakistan’s economic and
Chinese navy’s Type-053H3 (Jiangwei II) design – heralded strategic relationship with China has deepened significantly.
the construction of the first new-build principal surface But while China may now be the predominant naval supplier,
combatants for the PN since its establishment in 1947. Pakistan’s shipbuilding sector is benefiting from other ties:
The fourth vessel was built in Pakistan by the state-owned the most recent deal was for Turkish-designed corvettes,
Karachi Shipyards & Engineering Works (KSEW) shipyard. two of which will also be built at KSEW.
*planned
Asia 229
Asia
HELICOPTERS
Population 38,346,720
ATK 4 Mi-35 Hind
MRH 14: 8 MD-530F; 6 Mi-17 Hip H
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus TPT • Medium 4 UH-60A Black Hawk
Male 20.3% 5.2% 5.3% 4.6% 14.0% 1.3%
Female 19.7% 5.0% 5.1% 4.4% 13.6% 1.5%
Australia AUS
Capabilities Australian Dollar AUD 2021 2022 2023
Over one year after the collapse of the former Afghan National GDP AUD 2.18tr 2.43tr
Security and Defence Forces (ANSDF), it remains difficult to USD 1.64tr 1.72tr
assess the strength and capability of the Afghan Taliban’s armed per capita USD 63,464 66,408
forces and the extent to which they have been able to use the Growth % 4.9 3.8
foreign-supplied equipment seized from former government Inflation % 2.8 6.5
forces. US authorities indicate that the Taliban administration
Def bdgt [a] AUD 45.5bn 47.8bn 51.7bn
is reorganising its MOD structure, and they have also retained
some formation structures used by the ANSDF, particularly in USD 34.2bn 33.8bn
regions outside Kabul. They have been able to employ some USD1=AUD 1.33 1.41
armoured vehicles and a small number of Soviet-era helicop- [a] Includes pensions
ters for troop movements as well as – according to the Taliban Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015)
– low numbers of Western-supplied helicopters and an An-32 30.8
and Cessna 208. It is likely that, over time, the Taliban’s ability to
maintain in service its Western-derived equipment will reduce, 20.1
because of sanctions and limited supplies of spares. While it 2008 2015 2022
appears that the Taliban have tried to recruit former ANSDF per-
sonnel, including pilots and maintainers, the success of these Population 26,141,369
initiatives is unclear, not least because of continued attacks
against former members of the ANDSF. And the Taliban policy Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
on female education is another disincentive to those who might Male 9.6% 3.1% 3.5% 3.8% 22.1% 7.6%
otherwise return to the country. The government’s priority for
Female 9.0% 2.9% 3.2% 3.6% 22.8% 8.8%
its forces is internal and border security. It has prioritised opera-
tions against the National Resistance Front in the mountain-
ous east of the country, as well as intelligence-led operations
Capabilities
against Islamic State terrorist cells. The lack of international rec- The Australian Defence Force (ADF) is capable, well trained and
ognition and continued financial challenges will likely inhibit well equipped. It also has considerable recent operational experi-
efforts to modernise the security forces. ence. In 2016, the government published Australia’s third defence
White Paper in seven years. This identified China’s growing regional
ACTIVE 100,000 (Taliban 100,000) role, regional military modernisation and inter-state rivalry as
230 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
among the influences shaping defence policy. A ‘Strategic Update’ COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
to the White Paper, published in July 2020, outlined plans to adjust 1 (17th) CSS bde (3 log bn, 3 med bn, 1 MP bn)
Australia’s defence posture in order to develop a more power-
ful and self-reliant military deterrent. The document pointed to Special Operations Command
an increased prospect of war in Australia’s region, claimed that a FORCES BY ROLE
ten-year ‘strategic warning time’ could no longer be assumed, and SPECIAL FORCES
highlighted potential threats from ‘grey-zone activities’. In August
1 (SAS) SF regt
2022, the new Labor government announced a Defence Strategic
Review to examine military posture, structures and investments. 1 (SF Engr) SF regt
This is due to report in early 2023. The country’s primary ally is the 2 cdo regt
US, but it is also forging closer defence ties with India, Japan, South COMBAT SUPPORT
Korea and the UK, while remaining committed to the Five Power 3 sigs sqn (incl 1 reserve sqn)
Defence Arrangements and to its close defence relations with New COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
Zealand. A defence agreement was signed with Fiji in 2022, and 1 CSS sqn
there are plans for closer defence cooperation with Papua New
Guinea. The AUKUS partnership, signed in September 2021, will Reserve Organisations 20,100 reservists
see the UK and US assist Australia in developing a conventionally- FORCES BY ROLE
armed, nuclear-powered submarine capability and other defence COMMAND
and security technologies. The plan is to build the nuclear-pow- 1 (2nd) div HQ
ered submarines in Adelaide, though some doubt has been cast
MANOEUVRE
on the timeline for delivering the first Australian-built boat, raising
questions over what interim capability may be required. Austra-
Reconnaissance
lia is also building frigates and patrol ships, based on European 3 (regional force) surv unit (integrated)
designs. Strategic air- and sea-lift platforms give the capability to Light
move and sustain deployments. Combat-air, maritime-patrol and 1 (4th) inf bde (1 recce regt, 2 inf bn, 1 engr regt, 1 spt bn)
armoured-vehicle capabilities are also being boosted, and more 1 (5th) inf bde (1 recce bn, 4 inf bn, 1 engr regt, 2 spt bn)
closely integrating Australia’s armed forces – and their modern 1 (9th) inf bde (1 recce sqn, 2 inf bn, 1 spt bn)
platforms – is a priority. Australia imports most of its significant 1 (11th) inf bde (1 recce regt, 3 inf bn, 1 engr regt,
defence equipment but possesses an increasingly capable defence 1 spt bn)
industry. Its largest naval shipbuilders are ASC and Austal, whose 1 (13th) inf bde (1 recce sqn, 2 inf bn, 1 spt bn)
US subsidiary, Austal USA, builds vessels for the US Navy.
COMBAT SUPPORT
ACTIVE 59,800 (Army 29,400 Navy 15,500 Air 14,900) 1 arty regt
1 sigs regt
RESERVE 29,750 (Army 20,100 Navy 3,950 Air 5,700) COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
Integrated units are formed from a mix of reserve and regular per- 1 trg bde
sonnel. All ADF operations are now controlled by Headquarters
Joint Operations Command (HQJOC) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
MBT 59 M1A1 Abrams
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE RECCE 25 Boxer CRV (incl variants)
IFV 221 ASLAV-25 (incl 100 variants)
Space APC • APC (T) 416 M113AS4
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AUV 1,950: ε950 Bushmaster IMV; 1,000 Hawkei
SATELLITES • COMMUNICATIONS 1 Optus C1 (dual ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
use for civil/mil comms) ARV 45: 15 ASLAV-F; 17 ASLAV-R; 13 M88A2
VLB 5 Biber
Army 29,400 MW 20: 12 Husky; 8 MV-10
FORCES BY ROLE ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
COMMAND MSL • MANPATS FGM-148 Javelin
1 (1st) div HQ (1 sigs regt) RCL • 84mm Carl Gustaf
MANOEUVRE ARTILLERY 264
Mechanised TOWED 155mm 48 M777A2
3 mech inf bde (1 armd cav regt, 1 mech inf bn, 1 lt MOR 81mm 216: 40 L16; 176 M252A1
mech inf bn, 1 arty regt, 1 cbt engr regt, 1 sigs regt, AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence RBS-70
1 CSS bn) AMPHIBIOUS 15 LCM 8 (capacity either 1 MBT or 200 troops)
Amphibious HELICOPTERS
1 (2nd RAR) amph bn ATK 22 Tiger
Aviation MRH 2 AW139 (leased)
1 (16th) avn bde (1 regt (2 ISR hel sqn), 1 regt (3 tpt hel TPT 89: Heavy 14 CH-47F Chinook; Medium 75: 41
sqn), 1 regt (2 spec ops hel sqn, 1 avn sqn)) NH90 TTH (MRH90); 34 S-70A Black Hawk
COMBAT SUPPORT UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES
1 (6th) cbt spt bde (1 STA regt (1 STA bty, 2 UAV bty, 1 ISR • Medium 15 RQ-7B Shadow 200
CSS bty), 1 AD/FAC regt (integrated), 1 engr regt (2 AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
construction sqn, 1 EOD sqn), 1 EW regt, 1 int bn) ASM AGM-114M Hellfire
Asia 231
Asia
AMPHIBIOUS 1 sqn with C-17A Globemaster III
PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 3 1 sqn with C-27J Spartan
LHD 2 Canberra (capacity 18 hel; 4 LCM-1E; 110 veh; 1 sqn with C-130J-30 Hercules
12 M1 Abrams MBT; 1,000 troops) TRAINING
LSD 1 Choules (ex-UK Bay) (capacity 1 med hel; 1 OCU sqn with F-35A Lightning II
24 MBT; 350 troops) 1 sqn with Beech 350 King Air
LANDING CRAFT • LCM 12 LCM-1E 2 sqn with PC-21
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 11 2 (LIFT) sqn with Hawk MK127*
AGHS 2 Leeuwin with 1 hel landing platform EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AGS 2 Paluma AIRCRAFT 136 combat capable
AORH 2 Supply (ESP Cantabria) (capacity 1 MH-60R Seahawk) FGA 80: 24 F/A-18F Super Hornet; 56 F-35A Lightning II
AX 1 Sycamore (capacity 1 med hel) (operated by ASW 12 P-8A Poseidon
private company, Teekay Shipping; multi-role aviation EW 13: 2 AP-3C Orion mod; 11 EA-18G Growler*
training vessel) AEW&C 6 E-7A Wedgetail
AXS 1 Young Endeavour TKR/TPT 7 A330 MRTT (KC-30A)
The following vessels are operated by a private company, TPT 47: Heavy 8 C-17A Globemaster III; Medium 22: 10
DMS Maritime: C-27J Spartan; 12 C-130J-30 Hercules; Light 12 Beech 350
ASR 2: 1 Besant; 1 Stoker King Air; PAX 5: 2 B-737BBJ (VIP); 3 Falcon 7X (VIP)
AXL 1 Seahorse Mercator TRG 82: 33 Hawk Mk127*; 49 PC-21
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
Naval Aviation 1,450 AAM • IIR AIM-9X Sidewinder II; ASRAAM; ARH
FORCES BY ROLE AIM-120B/C-5/C-7 AMRAAM
ANTI SUBMARINE WARFARE ARM AGM-88B HARM; AGM-88E AARGM
1 sqn with NH90 TTH (MRH90) AShM AGM-84A Harpoon
1 sqn with MH-60R Seahawk ALCM • Conventional AGM-158A JASSM
TRAINING BOMBS
1 OCU sqn with MH-60R Seahawk Laser-guided Paveway II
1 sqn with H135 Laser & INS/GPS-guided GBU-54 Laser JDAM;
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Paveway IV
HELICOPTERS INS/GPS-guided AGM-154C JSOW; JDAM; JDAM-ER
ASW 24 MH-60R Seahawk
TPT 21: Medium 6 NH90 TTH (MRH90) (operated on DEPLOYMENT
rotational basis); Light 15 H135 EGYPT: MFO (Operation Mazurka) 27
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
ASM AGM-114M Hellfire IRAQ: Operation Inherent Resolve (Okra) 110; 1 SF gp;
NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 2
Clearance Diving Branch MALI: UN • MINUSMA 1
232 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
MALAYSIA: 120; 1 inf coy (on 3-month rotational tours); ACTIVE 163,050 (Army 132,150 Navy 16,900
1 P-8A Poseidon (on rotation) Air 14,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 63,900
MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO (Operation Paladin) 11
PHILIPPINES: Operation Augury 100 (trg team) ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS (Operation Aslan) 15
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: Operation Accordion 400: 1 tpt
Army 132,150
det with 2 C-130J-30 Hercules FORCES BY ROLE
COMMAND
10 inf div HQ
FOREIGN FORCES
SPECIAL FORCES
Singapore 230: 1 trg sqn at Pearce with PC-21 trg ac; 1 trg 1 cdo bde (2 cdo bn)
sqn at Oakey with 12 AS332 Super Puma; AS532 Cougar MANOEUVRE
United States US Pacific Command: 1,700; 1 SEWS at Pine Armoured
Gap; 1 comms facility at NW Cape; 1 SIGINT stn at Pine 1 armd bde
Gap • US Strategic Command: 1 detection and tracking 3 indep armd regt
radar at Naval Communication Station Harold E. Holt Light
25 inf bde
Bangladesh BGD 2 (composite) bde
COMBAT SUPPORT
Bangladeshi Taka BDT 2021 2022 2023 10 arty bde
GDP BDT 35.3tr 39.8tr 1 engr bde
1 sigs bde
USD 416bn 461bn
AVIATION
per capita USD 2,498 2,734 1 avn regt (1 avn sqn; 1 hel sqn)
Growth % 6.9 7.2 AIR DEFENCE
Inflation % 5.6 6.2 1 AD bde
Def bdgt BDT 344bn 373bn 400bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
USD 4.06bn 4.32bn ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
MBT 276: 174 Type-59/-59G(BD); 58 Type-69/-69G;
USD1=BDT 84.81 86.30
44 Type-90-II (MBT-2000)
Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015)
LT TK 8+: 8 Type-62; some VT-5
3.44
RECCE 8+ BOV M11
APC 545
1.23
APC (T) 134 MT-LB
2008 2015 2022
APC (W) 330 BTR-80
Population 165,650,475 PPV 81+ Maxxpro
AUV 138: 36 Cobra; 102 Cobra II
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
Male 13.1% 4.4% 4.5% 4.2% 19.4% 3.4% AEV MT-LB
ARV 3+: T-54/T-55; Type-84; 3 Type-654
Female 12.6% 4.3% 4.5% 4.4% 21.2% 3.9%
VLB MTU
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
Capabilities MSL • MANPATS 9K115-2 Metis M1 (RS-AT-13)
Bangladesh has limited military capability, which is optimised for RCL 106mm 238 M40A1
border and domestic security, including domestic disaster relief. ARTILLERY 907+
A defence-modernisation plan is under way, called Forces 2030, SP 155mm 18 NORA B-52
although acquisitions have been limited. Bangladesh has relied
TOWED 363+: 105mm 170 Model 56 pack howitzer;
on Chinese and Russian aid and credit to overcome its limited pro-
curement funding. It has increased defence collaboration with 122mm 131: 57 Type-54/54-1 (M-30); 20 Type-83;
India. Increased tensions on its border with Myanmar may result 54 Type-96 (D-30), 130mm 62 Type-59-1 (M-46)
in enhancements to border security. The country has a long record MRL 54: 122mm 36+ WS-22; 302mm 18 T-300
of UN peacekeeping deployments. A naval-recapitalisation and MOR 472: 81mm 11 M29A1; 82mm 366 Type-53/type-
-expansion programme, including local manufacture of patrol boats, 87/M-31 (M-1937); 120mm 95 AM-50/UBM 52
is underway to better protect the country’s large EEZ. There are plans AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 3: 1 LCT; 2 LCVP
to recapitalise the combat air fleet, and there has also been recent AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 7: 1 C295; 5 Cessna 152; 1 PA-
investment in the fixed-wing training inventory. Airlift capability
31T Cheyenne
has improved with the addition of C295Ws and ex-UK C-130Js. Sub-
stantial efforts have also been made to strengthen the shipbuilding HELICOPTERS
industry and work has begun on a new submarine-support facility. MRH 2 AS365N3 Dauphin
The armed forces reportedly retain extensive commercial interests, TPT 7: Medium 3 Mi-171Sh Light 4: 2 Bell 206L-4 Long
including in real estate, banks and other businesses. Ranger IV; 2 Bell 407GXi
Asia 233
Asia
2 Abu Bakr (ex-PRC Type-053H2 (Jianghu III)) with 2
twin lnchr with C-802A AShM, 2 RBU 1200 Uragan 1 sqn with MiG-29/MiG-29UB Fulcrum
A/S mor, 2 twin 100mm gun FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
1 Osman (ex-PRC Type-053H1 (Jianghu I)) with 2 quad 1 sqn with F-7MB/FT-7B Airguard
lnchr with C-802 (CH-SS-N-6) AShM, 2 RBU 1200 1 sqn with F-7BG/FT-7BG Airguard
Uragan A/S mor, 2 twin 100mm gun 1 sqn with F-7BGI/FT-7BGI Airguard
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 46 GROUND ATTACK
CORVETTES 6 1 sqn with Yak-130 Mitten*
FSGM 4 Shadhinota (PRC C13B) with 2 twin lnchr with TRANSPORT
C-802 (CH-SS-N-6) AShM, 1 octuple lnchr with FL- 1 sqn with An-32 Cline
3000N (HHQ-10) (CH-SA-N-17) SAM, 1 76mm gun, 1 sqn with C-130B/J Hercules
1 hel landing platform 1 sqn with L-410UVP
FSG 2 Bijoy (ex-UK Castle) (of which 1 damaged in TRAINING
2020 Beirut port explosion) with 2 twin lnchr with 1 sqn with K-8W Karakorum*; L-39ZA Albatros*
C-704 AShM, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform 1 sqn with PT-6
PSOH 2 Somudra Joy (ex-US Hero) with 1 76mm gun, hel TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
landing platform 1 sqn with AW139; Mi-17 Hip H; Mi-17-1V Hip H; Mi-171Sh
PCFG 4 Durdarsha (ex-PRC Huangfeng) with 4 single 1 sqn with Mi-17 Hip H; Mi-17-1V Hip H; Mi-171Sh
lnchr with HY-2 (CH-SS-N-2 Safflower) AShM 1 sqn with Bell 212
PCG 2 Durjoy with 2 twin lnchr with C-704 AShM, 1 trg sqn with Bell 206L Long Ranger; AW119 Koala
1 76MM gun EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PCO 8: 1 Madhumati (Sea Dragon) with 1 57mm gun; AIRCRAFT 88 combat capable
5 Kapatakhaya (ex-UK Island); 2 Durjoy with 2 triple FTR 53: 9 F-7MB Airguard; 11 F-7BG Airguard; 12 F-7BGI
324mm ASTT, 1 76mm gun Airguard; 5 FT-7B Airguard; 4 FT-7BG Airguard; 4 FT-7BGI
PCC 8: 2 Meghna with 1 57mm gun (fishery protection); Airguard; 6 MiG-29 Fulcrum; 2 MiG-29UB Fulcrum B
1 Nirbhoy (ex-PRC Hainan) with 4 RBU 1200 Uragan A/S TPT 16: Medium 8: 4 C-130B Hercules; 4 C-130J Hercules;
mor; 2 twin 57mm gun; 5 Padma Light 8: 3 An-32 Cline†; 2 C295W; 3 L-410UVP
PBFG 5 Durbar (PRC Hegu) with 2 single lnchr with SY-1 TRG 81: 4 DA40NG; 12 G 120TP; 15 K-8W Karakorum*; 7
(CH-SS-N-1 Scrubbrush) AShM L-39ZA Albatros*; 30+ PT-6; 13 Yak-130 Mitten*
PBF 4 Titas (ROK Sea Dolphin) HELICOPTERS
PB 7: 1 Barkat (ex-PRC Shanghai III); 2 Karnaphuli; 1 Salam MRH 16: 2 AW139 (SAR); 12 Mi-17 Hip H; 2 Mi-17-1V
(ex-PRC Huangfen); 3 Shaheed Daulat (PRC Shanghai II) Hip H (VIP)
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 5 TPT 19: Medium 11 Mi-171Sh; Light 8: 2 Bell 206L Long
MSO 5: 1 Sagar; 4 Shapla (ex-UK River) Ranger; 4 Bell 212; 2 AW119 Koala
AMPHIBIOUS AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
LANDING SHIPS • LSL 1 AAM • IR R-73 (RS-AA-11A Archer); PL-5; PL-7; SARH
LANDING CRAFT 14 R-27R (RS-AA-10A Alamo)
234 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
Army 4,400
FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
Light
3 inf bn
Asia 235
Asia
MM40 Exocet Block 2 AShM, 1 57mm gun, 1 hel landing
Inflation % 2.9 5.2
platform
PCC 4 Ijtihad Def bdgt [a] KHR 4.25tr 4.21tr
PBF 1 Mustaed USD 1.02bn 1.00bn
AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • LCM 4: 2 Teraban; USD1=KHR 4154.25 4199.86
2 Cheverton Loadmaster [a] Defence and security budget
Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)
Air Force 1,100 944
FORCES BY ROLE
MARITIME PATROL 260
1 sqn with CN235M 2008 2015 2022
TRAINING
Population 16,713,015
1 sqn with Bell 206B Jet Ranger II
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
1 sqn with Bell 214 (SAR)
1 sqn with S-70i Black Hawk Male 15.2% 4.3% 3.8% 4.1% 19.3% 1.8%
AIR DEFENCE Female 14.8% 4.4% 4.0% 4.4% 20.8% 3.2%
1 sqn with Mistral
1 sqn with Rapier Capabilities
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Despite their name, which reflects Cambodia’s formal status as
AIRCRAFT a constitutional monarchy, the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces
TPT • Light 1 CN235M (RCAF) are essentially the modern manifestation of the armed
TRG 4 PC-7 forces of the former People’s Republic of Kampuchea, and were
HELICOPTERS established in 1979 following Vietnam’s invasion. Cambodia faces
no direct external military threats, besides border clashes with Thai-
TPT 15: Medium 13: 1 Bell 214 (SAR); 12 S-70i Black
land which last occurred in 2011. Relations have developed since
Hawk; Light 2 Bell 206B Jet Ranger II
then and a seventh meeting on border issues took place in Septem-
AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence Mistral; Rapier ber 2022, the same month as reports that both sides had resumed
talks on overlapping maritime border claims. There were reports
Special Forces Regiment ε500 in November 2022 of an agreement on demining activities on the
FORCES BY ROLE border. Internally, security concerns include civil unrest and transna-
SPECIAL FORCES tional threats that can generate instability, such as drug trafficking.
Skirmishes on the border with Thailand provided little indication of
1 SF regt
capacity for high-intensity combat. However, Cambodia has contrib-
uted personnel to UN peacekeeping missions, including UNMISS
Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 400–500 in South Sudan. Cambodia’s most important international defence
links are with China’s and Vietnam’s armed forces. While tradition-
Gurkha Reserve Unit 400–500 ally reliant on Russia for defence equipment, China has emerged
236 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
as a key supplier in recent years. Training ties have also developed (BM-13); 140mm 20 BM-14-16 (BM-14); 300mm 6 PHL-03
with China and exercises have grown in scale. Cambodia lacks sig- MOR 82mm M-37; 120mm M-43; 160mm M-160
nificant resources for personnel training, which is partly financed by AIR DEFENCE
Chinese military assistance. In response to deepening Chinese mili- SAM • Point-defence FN-6 (CH-SA-10); FN-16 (CH-
tary influence in Cambodia, the US imposed an arms embargo on
SA-14) (reported)
Cambodia in December 2021. Funds for equipment purchases are
GUNS • TOWED 14.5mm ZPU-1/ZPU-2/ZPU-4; 37mm
limited, although the 2022 National Defence White Paper stated that
modernisation of the RCAF is the top priority. There is no domestic M-1939; 57mm S-60
defence industry, with Cambodia possessing no ability to design
and manufacture modern equipment for its armed forces. Navy ε2,800 (incl 1,500 Naval Infantry)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ACTIVE 124,300 (Army 75,000 Navy 2,800 PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 13
Air 1,500 Provincial Forces 45,000) Gendarmerie PBF 4 Project 205P (Stenka)
& Paramilitary 67,000 PB 7: 3 (PRC 20m); 4 (PRC 46m)
Conscript liability 18 months service authorised but not imple- PBR 2 Kaoh Chhlam
mented since 1993 AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 1
LCU 1 Type-067 (Yunnan)
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AFDL 1
Asia
1 ICBM bde with DF-4
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus 3 ICBM bde with DF-5A/B
Male 8.9% 2.9% 3.0% 3.6% 26.3% 6.3% 1 ICBM bde with DF-31
Female 7.8% 2.4% 2.6% 3.3% 25.6% 7.3% 1 ICBM bde with DF-31A
5 ICBM bde with DF-31A(G)
Capabilities 2 ICBM bde with DF-41
China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is the world’s largest armed
6 IRBM bde with DF-26
force, with an increasingly advanced equipment inventory. Its 3 MRBM bde with DF-17 with HGV
operational effectiveness, however, remains hampered by training 2 MRBM bde with DF-21A/E
and doctrine issues. China’s 2019 defence White Paper did not sig- 1 MRBM bde with DF-21C/D
nificantly alter the strategic direction laid out in the 2015 edition 2 SRBM bde with DF-11A/DF-15B
and was focused more on updating the progress of PLA moderni- 2 SRBM bde with DF-16
sation efforts. In 2021, amendments to the National Defense Law 3 GLCM bde with CJ-10/CJ-10A/CJ-100
were enacted, which handed responsibility for defence mobilisa- 8 SSM bde (forming)
tion fully to the Central Military Commission and removed the
role of the State Council. A major restructuring process is now EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
mostly complete and the Strategic Support Force continues to SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS
develop China’s cyber, space and information-dominance capa- ICBM • Nuclear 140: ε10 DF-4 (CH-SS-3); ε20
bilities. China does not maintain any formal alliances, but it does DF-5A/B (CH-SS-4 Mod 2/3); ε8 DF-31 (CH-SS-10 Mod
have a number of key defence relationships with regional states 1); ε24 DF-31A (CH-SS-10 Mod 2); ε54 DF-31A(G)
and through its membership of the SCO and has also worked to (CH-SS-10 Mod 3); ε24 DF-41 (CH-SS-20)
develop defence ties with several African and Middle Eastern
IRBM • Dual-capable 110+ DF-26 (CH-SS-18)
states. In February 2022, China and Russia announced a friend-
MRBM 94: Nuclear ε40 DF-21A/E (CH-SS-5 Mod 2/6);
ship with ‘no limits’, though China has been reluctant to assist
Russia militarily in its war on Ukraine. Improving readiness for Conventional 54: ε24 DF-17 with HGV (CH-SS-22);
combat operations is a key objective of the current reforms; the ε30 DF-21D (CH-SS-5 Mod 5 – ASBM)
PLA currently lacks any significant recent combat experience and SRBM • Conventional 225: ε108 DF-11A (CH-SS-7
its training has traditionally suffered from over-scripted and unre- Mod 2); ε81 DF-15B (CH-SS-6 Mod 3); ε36 DF-16
alistic exercises. Though these weaknesses are acknowledged, it is (CH-SS-11 Mod 1/2)
unclear how effective the newly established structures will be at GLCM • Conventional 108: ε54 CJ-10/CJ-10A
generating and controlling high-intensity combined-arms capa- (CH-SSC-9 mod 1/2); ε54 CJ-100 (CH-SSC-13 Splinter)
bilities. In 2021, the PLA’s conscription pattern changed from once
to twice a year, with the aim of improving force readiness. Recruit- Navy
ment maintains a particular focus on college graduates and those
skilled in science and engineering. The requirement for out-of-area
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
operations is relatively new for the PLA; the navy is the only service SUBMARINES • STRATEGIC 6
to have experience in extended deployments, assisted by its SSBN 6 Type-094 (Jin) with up to 12 JL-2 (CH-SS-N-14)/
support base in Djibouti. Major platform inventories in all the ser- JL-3 (CH-SS-N-20) strategic SLBMs, 6 single 533mm TT
vices comprise a mix of modern, older and obsolescent designs as with Yu-6 HWT
238 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Asia
three fleets, one each in the Eastern, Southern and Northern
store: 122mm 3,000 PL-54-1 (M-1938)/PL-83/PL-60 (D- theatre commands
74)/PL-96 (D-30); 152mm 1,700 PL-54 (D-1)/PL-66 (D-20))
GUN/MOR 120mm 1,250: 450 PLL-05; 800 PPZ-10 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
MRL 1,320+ 107mm PH-63; 122mm 1,095: 200 PHL-81/ SUBMARINES 59
PHL-90; 350 PHL-11; 375 PHZ-89; 120 PHZ-11; 30 PHL- STRATEGIC • SSBN 6 Type-094 (Jin) with up to 12
20; 10+ PHL-21; 10 PHL-161; 300mm 175 PHL-03; 370mm JL-2 (CH-SS-N-14)/JL-3 (CH-SS-N-20) strategic SLBMs,
50+ PHL-19; (1,000 in store: 122mm 1,000 PHL-81) 6 single 533mm TT with Yu-6 HWT
MOR 2,800: 82mm PP-53 (M-37)/PP-67/PP-82/PP-87; SP TACTICAL 53
82mm PCP-001; 100mm PP-89 SSN 6:
COASTAL DEFENCE 2 Type-093 (Shang I) with 6 single 533mm TT with
AShM HY-1 (CH-SSC-2 Silkworm); HY-2 (CH-SSC-3 YJ-82 (CH-SS-N-7) AShM or YJ-18 (CH-SS-N-13)
Seersucker); HY-4 (CH-SSC-7 Sadsack); YJ-62 AShM/Yu-3 HWT/Yu-6 HWT
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 25 4 Type-093A (Shang II) with 6 single 533mm TT with
PB 25: 9 Huzong; 16 Shenyang YJ-82 (CH-SS-N-7) AShM or YJ-18 (CH-SS-N-13)
AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • LCM 255: 3+ Yugong; AShM/Yu-3 HWT/Yu-6 HWT
50+ Yunnan II; 100+ Yupen; 2+ Yutu; approx. 100 Yuwei (3 Type-091 (Han) in reserve with 6 single 533mm TT
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 22 with YJ-82 (CH-SS-N-7) AShM/Yu-3 HWT)
AK 6+ Leizhuang SSK 46:
AKR 1 Yunsong (capacity 1 MBT; 1 med hel) 2 Project 636 (Improved Kilo) with 6 single 533mm
ARC 1 TT with TEST-71ME HWT/53-65KE HWT
AOT 11: 1 Fuzhong; 8 Fubing; 2 Fulei 8 Project 636M (Improved Kilo) with 6 single 533mm
ATF 2 Huntao TT with TEST-71ME HWT/53-65KE HWT/3M54E
AX 1 Haixun III Klub-S (RS-SS-N-27B Sizzler) AShM
AIRCRAFT • TPT 6: Medium 4: 2 Y-8; 2 Y-9; Light 2 Y-7 4 Type-035B (Ming) with 8 single 533mm TT with
HELICOPTERS Yu-3 HWT/Yu-4 HWT
ATK 320+: 200 WZ-10; 120+ WZ-19 12 Type-039(G) (Song) with 6 single 533mm TT with
MRH 208: 22 Mi-17 Hip H; 3 Mi-17-1V Hip H; 38 YJ-82 (CH-SS-N-7) AShM or YJ-18 (CH-SS-N-13)
Mi-17V-5 Hip H; 25 Mi-17V-7 Hip H; ε120 Z-9WZ AShM/Yu-3 HWT/Yu-6 HWT
TPT 452: Heavy 125: 9 Z-8A; 96 Z-8B; ε20 Z-8L; Medium 4 Type-039A (Yuan) (fitted with AIP) with 6 533mm
259: 140 Mi-171; 19 S-70C2 (S-70C) Black Hawk; ε100 Z-20; TT with YJ-82 (CH-SS-N-7) AShM or YJ-18
Light 68: 15 H120 Colibri; 53 Z-11 (CH-SS-N-13) AShM/Yu-3 HWT/Yu-6 HWT
UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES 16+ Type-039B (Yuan) (fitted with AIP) with 6
CISR • Heavy 5+ CH-4B 533mm TT with YJ-82 (CH-SS-N-7) AShM or YJ-18
ISR • Heavy BZK-005; BZK-009 (reported); Medium (CH-SS-N-13) AShM/Yu-3 HWT/Yu-6 HWT
BZK-006 (incl variants); BZK-007; BZK-008 (10 Type-035(G) (Ming) in reserve with 8 single
LOITERING & DIRECT ATTACK MUNITIONS 533mm TT with Yu-3 HWT/Yu-4 HWT)
Harpy SSB 1 Type-032 (Qing) (SLBM trials)
240 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Asia
LCAC 19: 15+ Type-726 (Yuyi); 4 Zubr
1 regt with Y-7H; Y-8C; CRJ-200/700
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 153
TRAINING
ABU 1 Type-744A
1 regt with CJ-6A
AFS 2: 1 Type-904 (Dayun); 1 Type-904A (Danyao I)
1 regt with HY-7
AFSH 2 Type-904B (Danyao II)
2 regt with JL-8
AG 7: 6 Kanhai; 1 Kanwu
1 regt with JL-9G
AGB 2 Type-272 (Yanrao) with 1 hel landing platform 1 regt with JL-9
AGE 7: 2 Type-909 (Dahua) with 1 hel landing platform 1 regt with JL-10
(weapons test platform); 1 Kantan; 3 Type-636 (Shupang); 1 regt with Z-9C
1 Yuting I (naval rail gun test ship) HELICOPTER
AGI 19: 1 Dadie; 1 Type-815 (Dongdiao) with 1 hel landing 1 regt with Ka-27PS; Ka-28; Ka-31
platform; 9 Type-815A (Dongdiao) with 1 hel landing 1 regt with AS365N; Z-9C/D; Z-8J/JH
platform; 8 FT-14 1 regt with Y-7G; Z-8; Z-8J; Z-8S; Z-9C/D
AGOR 2 Dahua AIR DEFENCE
AGOS 4 Dongjian 2 SAM bde with HQ-9; HQ-9B: HQ-6A
AGS 8 Type-636A (Shupang) with 1 hel landing platform
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AH 8: 5 Ankang; 1 Type-920 (Anwei); 2 Anshen AIRCRAFT 456 combat capable
AOEH 2 Type-901 (Fuyu) with 2 H/PJ-13 CIWS BBR 45: 27 H-6G/G mod; 18 H-6J
AORH 10: 2 Type-903 (Fuchi); 7 Type-903A (Fuchi II); FTR 24 J-8F Finback
1 Fusu FGA 179: 16 J-10A Firebird; 7 J-10S Firebird; 72 J-11B/
AOT 22: 4 Fubai; 16 Type-632 (Fujian); 2 Fuxiao BS Flanker L; ε60 J-15 Flanker; 24 Su-30MK2 Flanker G
AP 4: 2 Daguan; 2 Darong ATK 120: 48 JH-7; 72 JH-7A Flounder
ARC 2 Youlan ASW 20+ KQ-200
ARS 18: 1 Dadao; 1 Dadong; 1 Type-922III (Dalang II); ELINT 13: 4 Y-8JB High New 2; 3 Y-8X; 6 Y-9JZ
3 Type-922IIIA (Dalang III); 3 Dasan; 4 Datuo; 2 Dazhou; AEW&C 24: 6 KJ-200 Moth; 14+ KJ-500; 4 Y-8J Mask
3 Hai Jiu 101 with 1 hel landing platform TKR 5 H-6DU
ASR 6: 3 Type-926 (Dalao); 3 Type-925 (Dajiang) (capacity TPT 38: Medium 6 Y-8C; Light 28: 20 Y-5; 2 Y-7G;
2 Z-8) 6 Y-7H; PAX 4: 2 CRJ-200; 2 CRJ-700
ATF 14: ε11 Hujiu; 3 Tuqiang TRG 118: 38 CJ-6; 12 HY-7; 16 JL-8*; 28 JL-9*; 12 JL-9G*;
AWT 8: 4 Fujian; 3 Fushi; 1 Jinyou 12 JL-10*
AX 4: HELICOPTERS
1 Type-0891A (Dashi) with 2 hel landing platforms ASW 33: 14 Ka-28 Helix A; 14 Z-9C; 5 Z-18F
1 Daxin with 2 FQF 1200 A/S mor, 1 57mm gun, 1 hel AEW 12: 9 Ka-31; 3 Z-18 AEW
landing platform MRH 18: 7 AS365N; 11 Z-9D
1 Type-927 (Qi Ji Guang) with 1 76mm gun, 1 hel SAR 11: 3 Ka-27PS; 4 Z-8JH; 2 Z-8S; 2 Z-9S
landing platform TPT 42: Heavy 34: 8 SA321 Super Frelon; 9 Z-8; 13 Z-8J;
1 Yudao 4 Z-18; Medium 8 Mi-8 Hip
242 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Asia
S-300PMU2 (RS-SA-20 Gargoyle); 32 S-400 (RS-SA- Strategic Support Force ε175,000
21B Growler) The Strategic Support Force reports to the Central Military
Medium-range 150 HQ-12 (CH-SA-12) Commission and is responsible for the PLA’s space and
Short-range 74+: 50+ HQ-6A (CH-SA-6); 24 HQ-6D cyber capabilities
(CH-SA-6) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
GUNS • TOWED • 57mm PG-59 (S-60) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AGM 4 Type-718 (Yuan
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES Wang) (space and missile tracking)
AAM • IR PL-5B/C; PL-8; R-73 (RS-AA-11A Archer); IIR
PL-10 (CH-AA-9); IR/SARH R-27 (RS-AA-10 Alamo); Theatre Commands
SARH PL-11; ARH PL-12 (CH-AA-7A Adze); PL-12A
(CH-AA-7B Adze); PL-15 (CH-AA-10); R-77 (RS-AA-12A
Eastern Theatre Command
Adder); R-77-1 (RVV-SD) (RS-AA-12B Adder) Eastern Theatre Ground Forces
ASM AKD-9; AKD-10; KD-88; Kh-29 (RS-AS-14 Kedge); 71st Group Army
Kh-31A (RS-AS-17B Krypton); Kh-59M (RS-AS-18 Kazoo) (1 spec ops bde, 4 armd bde, 1 mech inf bde, 1 inf bde,
AShM YJ-12 1 arty bde, 1 engr/NBC bde bde, 1 spt bde, 1 hel bde,
ARM Kh-31P (RS-AS-17A Krypton); YJ-91 (Domestically 1 AD bde)
produced Kh-31P variant) 72nd Group Army
ALCM • Conventional CJ-20; YJ(KD)-63 (1 spec ops bde, 1 armd bde, 1 mech inf bde, 2 inf bde,
2 amph bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr bde, 1 NBC bde, 1 spt
BOMBS
bde, 1 hel bde, 1 AD bde)
Laser-guided: LS-500J; LT-2
73rd Group Army
TV-guided: KAB-500KR; KAB-1500KR (1 spec ops bde, 1 armd bde, 1 mech inf bde, 2 inf bde,
2 amph bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr/NBC bde, 1 spt bde,
Airborne Corps 1 hel bde, 1 AD bde)
FORCES BY ROLE
SPECIAL FORCES Eastern Theatre Navy
1 spec ops bde Coastal defence from south of Lianyungang to
MANOEUVRE Dongshan (approx. 35°10´N to 23°30´N), and to
Air Manoeuvre seaward; HQ at Ningbo; support bases at Fujian,
5 AB bde Zhoushan, Ningbo
16 SSK; 16 DDGHM; 18 FFGHM; 19 FSGM; ε30
1 air aslt bde
PCFG/PCG; ε22 MCMV; 3 LPD; ε22 LST/M
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
1 spt bde Eastern Theatre Navy Aviation
TRANSPORT 1st Naval Aviation Division
1 bde with Y-5; Y-7; Y-8; Y-12 (1 AEW&C regt with KJ-500: 1 ASW regt with KQ-200)
244 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
1 arty bde, 1 engr bde, 1 NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 hel Central Theatre Air Force
bde, 1 AD bde) 13th Transport Division
80th Group Army (1 tpt regt with Y-20A; 1 tpt regt with Il-76MD/TD;
(1 spec ops bde, 1 armd bde; 2 mech inf bde, 3 inf bde, 1 tpt regt with Il-76MD; Il-78)
1 arty bde, 1 engr/NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 hel bde, 1 AD bde) 34th VIP Transport Division
(1 tpt regt with A319; B-737; CRJ200/700; 1 tpt regt
Northern Theatre Navy with Tu-154M; Tu-154M/D; 1 tpt regt with Y-7; 1 hel
Coastal defence from the DPRK border (Yalu River) to regt with AS332; H225)
south of Lianyungang (approx 35°10´N), and to seaward; 36th Bomber Division
HQ at Qingdao; support bases at Lushun, Qingdao. (1 bbr regt with H-6K; 1 bbr regt with H-6H)
4 SSN; 15 SSK; 1 CV; 4 CGHM; 10 DDGHM; Datong Base
2 DDGM; 11 FFGHM; 10 FSGM; ε18 PCFG/PCG; ε18 (3 ftr bde with J-7E/G; 1 ftr bde with J-11A/B; 2 FGA
MCMV; ε7 LST/M bde with J-10A; 1 FGA bde with J-10C; 1 SAM div;
4 SAM bde)
Northern Theatre Navy Aviation Wuhan Base
2nd Naval Air Division (2 ftr bde with J-7E/G; 1 ftr bde with J-11A; 1 FGA bde
(1 EW/ISR/ASW regt with KQ-200; Y-8JB/X; Y-9JZ; with J-20A; 1 trg bde with J-7/JJ-7A; 3 SAM bde)
1 AEW&C regt with Y-8J; KJ-200; KJ-500) Shijiazhuang Flying Academy
Other Forces (3 trg bde with JL-8; 1 trg bde with JL-8; JL-10)
(1 FGA regt with J-15; 1 FGA bde with JH-7A; J-8F; Airborne Corps
1 hel regt with AS365N; Z-8J/JH; Z-9C/D1 tpt regt with (5 AB bde; 1 air aslt bde; 1 tpt bde; 1 hel regt)
Y-7H/Y-8C/CRJ-200/CRJ-700; 1 trg regt with CJ-6A; Other Forces
2 trg regt with JL-8; 1 trg regt with HY-7; 1 trg regt with (1 bbr bde with H-6N; 1 SAR bde)
JL-9G; 1 trg regt with JL-9; 1 trg regt with JL-10)
Asia
Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 500,000+ active
Northern Theatre Air Force
16th Special Mission Division People’s Armed Police ε500,000
(1 EW regt with Y-8CB/G; 1 ISR regt with JZ-8F; 1 UAV In 2018 the People’s Armed Police (PAP) divested its
regt with WZ-7) border-defence, firefighting, gold, forest, hydropower
Dalian Base and security-guard units. In addition to the forces listed
(1 ftr bde with J-7; 2 ftr bde with J-7E; 1 ftr bde with below, PAP also has 32 regional commands, each with
J-11B; 1 FGA bde with J-10C; 1 FGA bde with J-10B; one or more mobile units
1 FGA bde with J-16; 1 FGA bde with J-20A; 1 atk bde FORCES BY ROLE
with JH-7A; 3 SAM bde) MANOEUVRE
Jinan Base Other
(1 ftr bde with J-7G; 1 FGA bde with J-10C; 1 atk bde
1 (1st Mobile) paramilitary corps (3 SF regt; 9 (mobile)
with JH-7A; 2 SAM bde)
paramilitary units; 1 engr/CBRN unit; 1 hel unit)
Harbin Flying Academy
1 (2nd Mobile) paramilitary corps (2 SF unit; 9 (mobile)
(1 trg bde with CJ-6; Y-5; 1 trg bde with H-6; HY-7; 2 trg
paramilitary units; 1 engr/CBRN unit; 1 hel unit)
bde with JL-8; 1 trg bde with JL-9)
Other Forces China Coast Guard (CCG)
(1 SAR bde)
In 2018 the CCG was moved from the authority of the
Other Forces State Oceanic Administration to that of the People’s
Marines Armed Police. The CCG is currently reorganising
(2 mne bde; 1 hel bde) its pennant-number system, making it problematic
to assess the number of vessels that entered service
Central Theatre Command since 2019.
Central Theatre Ground Forces EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
81st Group Army PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 546
(1 spec ops bde, 2 armd bde, 1 (OPFOR) armd bde, PSOH 42:
2 mech inf bde, 1 inf bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr/NBC bde, 2 Zhaotou with 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 med hel)
1 spt bde, 1 avn bde, 1 AD bde) 3 Type-053H2G (Jiangwei I) (capacity 1 med hel)
82nd Group Army (ex-PLAN)
(1 spec ops bde, 4 armd bde, 1 mech bde, 2 inf bde, 7 Type-054 mod (Zhaoduan) with 1 76mm gun
1 arty bde, 1 engr bde, 1 NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 hel (capacity 1 med hel)
bde, 1 AD bde) 4 Shuoshi II (capacity 1 med hel)
83rd Group Army 2 Shucha I (capacity 1 med hel)
(1 spec ops bde, 2 armd bde, 4 mech inf bde, 1 air aslt 10 Shucha II (capacity 1 med hel)
bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr/NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 AD bde) 12 Zhaoyu (capacity 1 med hel)
Other Forces 1 Zhaochang (capacity 1 med hel)
(2 (Beijing) gd div) 1 Zhongyang (capacity 1 med hel)
246 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
PSO 49: SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 1,054; 1 inf bn; 1 engr coy;
9 Type-718B (Zhaojun) with 1 76mm gun, 1 hel 1 fd hospital
landing platform
SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 87; 1 hel flt with 2 Mi-171
1 Type-922 (Dalang I) (ex-PLAN)
1 Type-625C (Hai Yang) (ex-PLAN) TAJIKISTAN: ε300 (trg)
1 Type-053H (Jianghu I) (ex-PLAN) WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 11
1 Type-636A (Kanjie) with 1 hel landing platform
(ex-PLAN)
6 Shusheng with 1 hel landing platform Fiji FJI
3 Shuwu
3 Tuzhong (ex-PLAN) Fijian Dollar FJD 2021 2022 2023
4 Type-056 mod (Zhaogao) with 1 hel landing GDP FJD 8.90bn 10.5bn
platform USD 4.30bn 4.86bn
1 Type-918 (Wolei) (ex-PLAN) per capita USD 4,749 5,341
1 Xiang Yang Hong 9 (ex-PLAN)
Growth % -5.1 12.5
4 Zhaolai with 1 hel landing platform
14 Zhaotim Inflation % 0.2 4.7
PCOH 22 Type-056 (Jiangdao) (ex-PLAN) with 1 Def bdgt FJD 95m 94m 109m
76mm gun USD 45.8m 43.6m
PCO 29: 1 Shuke I; 4 Shuke II; 14 Shuke III; 3 Shuyou; USD1=FJD 2.07 2.16
4 Zhaodai; 3 Zhaoming Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)
PCC 104: 25+ Type-618B-II; 45 Hailin I/II; 1 Shuzao 74
II; 14 Shuzao III; 10 Zhongeng; 2 Zhongmel; 7 Zhongsui
PB/PBF 300+ 42
AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING SHIPS 2 2008 2015 2022
LST 2 Type-072-II (Yuting I) (ex-PLAN; used as
hospital vessels and island supply) Population 943,737
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 27
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
AG 6: 5+ Kaobo; 1 Shutu
AGB 1 Type-210 (Yanbing) (ex-PLAN) Male 13.1% 4.1% 3.7% 3.9% 22.1% 3.8%
AGOR 9: 4 Haijian; 3 Shuguang 04 (ex-PLAN); Female 12.6% 4.0% 3.5% 3.8% 21.0% 4.4%
w2 Xiang Yang Hong 9
ATF 11 Capabilities
AIRCRAFT
The Republic of Fiji Military Forces (RFMF) are an infantry-
MP 1+ MA60H
dominated defence force with a small naval element. The RFMF
TPT • Light Y-12 (MP role)
has intervened heavily in Fiji’s domestic politics and after a third
HELICOPTERS
coup in 2006, democracy was effectively suspended until 2014.
TPT • Light Z-9
Guidelines issued in 2018 emphasised the need to confront
Maritime Militia non-traditional threats such as climate change, terrorism and
Composed of full- and part-time personnel. Reports to transnational crime. The RFMF is developing a deployable-force
PLA command and trains to assist PLAN and CCG in a headquarters, funded by Australia, which will also administer and
variety of military roles. These include ISR, maritime law train personnel for peacekeeping and HA/DR roles. Engagement in
enforcement, island supply, troop transport and sup- international peacekeeping operations is an important source of
porting sovereignty claims. The Maritime Militia oper- revenue for the government. Fiji’s principal defence relationships
ates a variety of civilian vessels including fishing boats are with Australia and New Zealand, with which the RFMF
and oil tankers. regularly conducts training and maritime patrols. A status of forces
agreement was signed with Australia in October 2022. Defence
relations with China, South Korea and the US are growing, with
DEPLOYMENT all three countries providing training or donating equipment. The
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • RFMF is attempting to improve the quality of senior NCOs and to
MONUSCO 233; 1 engr coy; 1 fd hospital raise standards across the rest of the force. Fiji has no significant
defence industry and is only able to carry out basic equipment
DJIBOUTI: 240; 1 mne coy(-); 1 med unit; 2 ZTL-11; 8 ZBL-
maintenance domestically. Significant upgrade and maintenance
08; 1 LPD; 1 ESD
work is usually conducted in Australia.
GULF OF ADEN: 1 DDGHM; 1 FFGHM; 1 AORH
LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 419; 2 engr coy; 1 med coy ACTIVE 4,040 (Army 3,700 Navy 340)
MALI: UN • MINUSMA 430; 1 engr coy; 1 fd hospital RESERVE ε6,000
MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 5 (to age 45)
Asia 247
Asia
ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm 12 Male 13.2% 4.6% 4.7% 4.6% 21.3% 3.2%
Female 11.9% 4.2% 4.2% 4.1% 20.5% 3.7%
Navy 340
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Capabilities
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 4:
India continues to modernise its armed forces, though progress in
PCO 1 Guardian (AUS Bay mod)
some areas remains slow. The armed forces are orientated against
PB 3: 1 Kula (AUS Pacific); 2 Levuka
both Pakistan and China. India is looking to improve military infra-
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 2 structure on its northern border. Mutual reaffirmation of the 2003
AGHS 2: 1 Kacau; 1 Volasiga ceasefire agreement between India and Pakistan reduced conflict
across the Line of Control in the disputed region of Kashmir. There
DEPLOYMENT is growing focus on Indian Ocean security. Indian forces participate
in numerous bilateral and multilateral exercises, and the country
EGYPT: MFO 170; elm 1 inf bn is one of the main troop contributors to UN peacekeeping opera-
IRAQ: UN • UNAMI 174; 2 sy unit tions. In April 2022, it was announced after the annual US-India
2+2 talks that India would join the Combined Maritime Forces
LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 1
multinational maritime partnership as an associate member. Large
MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 2 numbers of paramilitary forces remain employed in the internal-
SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 3 security role. A Joint Armed Forces Doctrine was issued in 2017.
It set out doctrine for Indian nuclear command and control, and
SYRIA/ISRAEL: UN • UNDOF 150; 1 inf coy envisaged an ‘emerging triad’ of space, cyber and special-opera-
tions capabilities complementing conventional land, sea and air
capabilities. India continues to develop its nuclear capabilities.
Army doctrine issued in late 2018 identified requirements includ-
ing for ‘integrated battle groups’ and improved cyber, information-
warfare and electronic-warfare capabilities. In 2020 the first Chief
of Defence Staff was appointed. India operates significant quanti-
ties of equipment of Soviet as well as Russian origin and there is
cooperation with Russia on missile developments. In 2022 con-
cerns were raised over dependence on Russia for some weapons
and spare parts, after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Recent
imports of foreign equipment have primarily been from the US
and France. However, the overall capability of India’s large conven-
tional forces is limited by inadequate logistics, maintenance and
shortages of ammunition, spare parts and maintenance personnel.
Though modernisation continues, many equipment projects have
seen delays and cost overruns, particularly indigenous systems.
The government’s ‘Make in India’ policy aims to strengthen the
defence-industrial base.
248 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
VLB AM-50; BLG-60; BLG T-72; Kartik; MTU-20; AShM variant unclear) AShM/53-65KE HWT/
MT-55; Sarvatra TEST-71ME HWT/SET-65E HWT
MW 24 910 MCV-2 4 Kalvari (FRA Scorpène) with 6 533mm TT with
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE SM39 Exocet Block 2 AShM
MSL PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 28
SP 110 9P148 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel) AIRCRAFT CARRIERS • CV 2
MANPATS 9K113 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel); Milan 2 1 Vikramaditya (ex-FSU Kiev mod) with 3 8-cell VLS
RCL 3,000+: 84mm Carl Gustaf; 106mm 3,000+ M40A1 (10 with Barak-1 SAM, 4 AK630M CIWS (capacity 12
per inf bn) MiG-29K/KUB Fulcrum FGA ac; 6 Ka-28 Helix A
ARTILLERY 9,743+ ASW hel/Ka-31 Helix B AEW hel)
SP 155mm 100 K9 Vajra-T 1 Vikrant with 3 AK630M CIWS (to be fitted with Barak
TOWED 3,095+: 105mm 1,350+: 600+ IFG Mk1/Mk2/ 8 SAM) (capacity 30 aircraft including MiG-29K/KUB
Mk3; up to 700 LFG; 50 M-56; 122mm 520 D-30; 130mm Fulcrum, Ka-31 Helix B, MH-60R Seahawk, Dhruv)
ε600 M-46 (500 in store) 155mm 625: ε300 FH-77B; ε200 DESTROYERS 10
M-46 (mod); 125 M777A2 DDGHM 7:
MRL 228: 122mm ε150 BM-21/LRAR 214mm 36 Pinaka; 2 Delhi (Project 15) with 4 quad lnchr with 3M24E
300mm 42 9A52 Smerch Uran-E (RS-SS-N-25 Switchblade) AShM, 2 single
MOR 6,320+: 81mm 5,000+ E1; 120mm ε1,500 AM-50/E1; 3S90E lnchr with 9M38E M-22E Shtil (RS-SA-N-7
SP 120mm E1 Gadfly) SAM, 4 8-cell VLS with Barak-1 SAM,
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS 5 single 533mm ASTT with SET-65E HWT/
IRBM • Nuclear some Agni-III (entering service) Varunastra HWT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor;
MRBM • Nuclear ε12 Agni-II 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 100mm gun (capacity either 2
SRBM • Nuclear 42: ε12 Agni-I; ε30 250 Prithvi II Dhruv hel/Sea King Mk42A ASW hel)
GLCM • Conventional 15 PJ-10 Brahmos 1 Delhi (Project 15) with 4 quad lnchr with 3M24E
Asia
HELICOPTERS Uran-E (RS-SS-N-25 Switchblade) AShM, 2 single
ATK 5 LCH Prachand 3S90E lnchr with 9M38E M-22E Shtil (RS-SA-N-7
MRH 342: 79 Dhruv; 12 Lancer; 74 Rudra; 117 SA315B Gadfly) SAM, 5 single 533mm ASTT with SET-65E
Lama (Cheetah); 60 SA316B Alouette III (Chetak) HWT/Varunastra HWT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S
UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES mor; 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 100mm gun (capacity either
ISR • Medium 25: 13 Nishant; 12 Searcher Mk I/II 2 Dhruv hel/Sea King Mk42A ASW hel)
AIR DEFENCE 3 Kolkata (Project 15A) with 2 8-cell UVLM VLS with
SAM 748+ Brahmos AShM, 4 8-cell VLS with Barak-8 SAM;
Medium-range ε48 Akash 2 twin 533mm TT with SET-65E HWT/Varunastra
Short-range 180 2K12 Kub (RS-SA-6 Gainful) HWT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 4 AK630M
Point-defence 500+: 50+ 9K33AKM Osa-AKM CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 Dhruv/Sea King
(RS-SA-8 Gecko); 200 9K31 Strela-1 (RS-SA-9 Gaskin); Mk42B hel)
250 9K35 Strela-10 (RS-SA-13 Gopher); 9K310 Igla-1 1 Visakhapatnam (Project 15B) with 2 8-cell UVLM
(RS-SA-16 Gimlet); 9K38 Igla (RS-SA-18 Grouse) VLS with Brahmos AShM, 4 8-cell VLS with Barak-8
SPAAGM 30mm up to 80 2K22 Tunguska (RS-SA-19 Grison) SAM; 2 twin 533mm TT with Varunastra HWT,
2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 4 AK630M CIWS,
GUNS 2,315+
1 76mm gun (capacity 2 Dhruv/Sea King Mk42B hel)
SP 23mm 75 ZSU-23-4; ZU-23-2 (truck-mounted);
DDGM 3:
TOWED 2,240+: 20mm Oerlikon (reported); 23mm 320
1 Rajput (FSU Kashin) with 2 twin lnchr with P-27
ZU-23-2; 40mm 1,920 L40/70
Termit-R (RS-SS-N-2D Styx) AShM, 2 twin ZIF-101
lnchr with 4K91 M-1 Volnya (RS-SA-N-1 Goa) SAM,
Navy 73,850 (incl 7,000 Naval Avn and 1,200 5 single 533mm PTA-51-61ME ASTT with SET-65E
Marines) HWT/Varunastra HWT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S
Fleet HQ New Delhi. Commands located at Mumbai, mor, 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity Ka-
Vishakhapatnam, Kochi and Port Blair 28 Helix A hel)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 2 Rajput (FSU Kashin) with 1 8-cell UVLM VLS with
SUBMARINES 16 Brahmos AShM, 2 twin lnchr with P-27 Termit-R
STRATEGIC • SSBN 1 Arihant with 4 1-cell VLS with (RS-SS-N-2D Styx) AShM, 2 8-cell VLS with
K-15 Sagarika SLBM, 6 533mm TT Barak-1 SAM, 1 twin ZIF-101 lnchr with 4K91 M-1
TACTICAL 15 Volnya (RS-SA-N-1 Goa) SAM, 5 single 533mm
SSK 15: ASTT with SET-65E HWT/Varunastra HWT, 2 RBU
3 Shishumar (GER T-209/1500) with 8 single 533mm 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 4 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm
TT with SUT mod 1 HWT gun (capacity 1 Ka-28 Helix A hel)
1 Shishumar (GER T-209/1500) with 8 single 533mm TT FRIGATES 16
with UGM-84L Harpoon II AShM/SUT mod 1 HWT FFGHM 12:
7 Sindhughosh (FSU Kilo) with 6 single 533mm TT 3 Brahmaputra (Project 16A) with 4 quad lnchr with
with 3M54E1/E Klub-S (RS-SS-N-27A/B) (Klub-S 3M24E Uran-E (RS-SS-N-25 Switchblade) AShM,
250 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
3 8-cell VLS with Barak-1 SAM, 2 triple ILAS-3 14 Immediate Support Vessel (Craftway); 15 Plascoa 1300
(B-515) 324mm ASTT with A244 LWT, 4 AK630M (SPB); 5 Super Dvora; 77 Solas Marine Interceptor
CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 SA316B Alouette III AMPHIBIOUS
(Chetak)/Sea King Mk42 ASW hel) PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS VESSELS • LPD 1 Jalashwa
3 Shivalik (Project 17) with 1 8-cell 3S14E VLS with (ex-US Austin) with 1 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS (capacity up
3M54TE Klub-N (RS-SS-N-27B Sizzler) AShM/ to 6 med spt hel; either 9 LCM or 4 LCM and 2 LCAC;
Brahmos AShM, 4 8-cell VLS with Barak-1 SAM, 4 LCVP; 930 troops)
1 single 3S90E lnchr with 9M317E Shtil-1 (RS-SA- LANDING SHIPS 8
N-7B) SAM, 2 triple 324mm ILAS-3 (B-515) ASTT, LSM 3 Kumbhir (FSU Polnochny C) (capacity 5 MBT or
2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 2 AK630M CIWS, 5 APC; 160 troops)
1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Sea King Mk42B ASW hel) LST 5: 2 Magar (capacity 15 MBT or 8 APC or 10
3 Talwar I with 1 8-cell 3S14E VLS with 3M54TE trucks; 500 troops); 3 Magar mod (capacity 11 MBT or
Klub-N (RS-SS-N-27B Sizzler) AShM, 1 single 3S90E 8 APC or 10 trucks; 500 troops)
lnchr with 9M317E Shtil-1 (RS-SA-N-7B) SAM, LANDING CRAFT 12
2 twin 533mm DTA-53-11356 ASTT with SET-65E LCT 8 LCU Mk-IV (capacity 1 Arjun MBT/2 T-90
HWT/Varunastra HWT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S MBT/4 IFV/160 troops)
mor, 2 Kashtan (RS-CADS-N-1) CIWS, 1 100mm LCM 4 LCM 8 (for use in Jalashwa)
gun (capacity 1 Dhruv/Ka-28 Helix A ASW hel) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 41
3 Talwar II with 1 8-cell UVLM VLS with Brahmos AFD 2: 1 FDN-1; 1 FDN-2
AShM, 1 single 3S90E lnchr with 9M317E Shtil-1 AGOR 1 Sagardhwani with 1 hel landing platform
(RS-SA-N-7B) SAM, 2 twin 533mm DTA-53-11356 AGHS 7: 1 Makar; 6 Sandhayak
ASTT with SET-65E HWT/Varunastra HWT, 2 RBU AGM 1 Dhruv
6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 100mm AO 4 GSL 1,000T Fuel Barge
gun (capacity 1 Dhruv/Ka-28 Helix A ASW hel) AOL 10: 1 Ambika; 2 Poshak; 7 Purak
FFH 4 Kamorta (Project 28) with 2 twin 533mm ITTL
AOR 1 Jyoti with 1 hel landing platform
ASTT with Varunastra HWT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S
AORH 3: 1 Aditya (based on Deepak (1967) Bremer
mor, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Dhruv/
Vulkan design); 2 Deepak with 4 AK630 CIWS
Ka-28 Helix A ASW hel)
AP 3 Nicobar with 1 hel landing platform
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 164
ASR 1
CORVETTES • FSGM 7:
ATF 1
3 Khukri (Project 25) with 2 twin lnchr with P-27
AWT 3 Ambuda
Termit-R (RS-SS-N-2D Styx) AShM, 2 twin
AX 1 Tir
lnchr (manual aiming) with 9K32M Strela-2M
AXS 4: 2 Mhadei; 2 Tarangini
(RS-SA-N-5 Grail) SAM, 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm
gun, 1 hel landing platform (for Dhruv/SA316 Naval Aviation 7,000
Alouette III (Chetak))
FORCES BY ROLE
4 Kora (Project 25A) with 4 quad lnchr with 3M24E
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
Uran-E (RS-SS-N-25 Switchblade) AShM, 1 quad
lnchr (manual aiming) with 9K32M Strela-2M 2 sqn with MiG-29K/KUB Fulcrum
(RS-SA-N-5 Grail) SAM, 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE
gun, 1 hel landing platform (for Dhruv/SA316 1 sqn with Ka-28 Helix A
Alouette III (Chetak)) 1 sqn with Sea King Mk42B
PSOH 10: 4 Saryu with 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun MARITIME PATROL
(capacity 1 Dhruv); 6 Sukanya with 4 RBU 2500 A/S mor 4 sqn with BN-2 Islander; Do-228-101
(capacity 1 SA316 Alouette III (Chetak)) 1 sqn with Do-228
PCFGM 7: 1 sqn with Il-38SD May
5 Veer (FSU Tarantul) with 4 single lnchr with P-27 2 sqn with P-8I Neptune
Termit-R (RS-SS-N-2D Styx) AShM, 2 quad lnchr AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL
(manual aiming) with 9K32M Strela-2M (RS-SA-N-5 1 sqn with Ka-31 Helix B
Grail), 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun SEARCH & RESCUE
2 Prabal (mod Veer) each with 4 quad lnchr with 3M24E 1 sqn with SA316B Alouette III (Chetak); Sea King
Uran-E (RS-SS-N-25 Switchblade) AShM, 1 quad lnchr Mk42C
(manual aiming) with 9K32M Strela-2M (RS-SA-N-5 4 sqn with Dhruv MkI/MkIII
Grail) SAM, 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun TRANSPORT
PCMT 1 Abhay (FSU Pauk II) with 1 quad lnchr (manual 1 sqn with Do-228-101; HS-748M (HAL-748M)
aiming) with 9K32M Strela-2M (RS-SA-N-5 Grail) SAM, TRAINING
2 twin 533mm DTA-53 ASTT with SET-65E, 2 RBU 1200 1 sqn with Do-228
Uragan A/S mor, 1 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun 1 sqn with HJT-16 Kiran MkI/II, Hawk Mk132*
PCC 15: 4 Bangaram; 10 Car Nicobar; 1 Trinkat (SDB Mk5) 1 hel sqn with Sea King Mk42B
PCF 4 Tarmugli (Car Nicobar mod) TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
PBF 120: 9 Immediate Support Vessel (Rodman 78); 1 sqn with UH-3H Sea King
Asia 251
Asia
AAM • IR R-550 Magic/Magic 2; R-73 (RS-AA-11A
Archer); IR/SARH R-27 (RS-AA-10 Alamo); ARH: R-77 2 sqn with SA316B Alouette III (Chetak)
(RS-AA-12A Adder) 1 flt with Mi-26 Halo
AShM AGM-84 Harpoon (on P-8I ac); Kh-35 (RS-AS-20 2 flt with SA315B Lama (Cheetah)
Kayak) 2 flt with SA316B Alouette III (Chetak)
BOMBS • TV-guided KAB-500KR/OD ISR UAV
5 sqn with Heron; Searcher MkII
Marines ε1,200 (Additional 1,000 for SPB SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE
duties) 2 GLCM sqn with PJ-10 Brahmos
After the Mumbai attacks, the Sagar Prahari Bal (SPB), AIR DEFENCE
with 80 PBF, was established to protect critical maritime 6 sqn with 9K33M3 Osa-AKM (RS-SA-8B Gecko)
infrastructure 8 sqn with Akash
FORCES BY ROLE 2 sqn with Barak-8 MR-SAM
SPECIAL FORCES 25 sqn with S-125M Pechora-M (RS-SA-3B Goa)
1 (marine) cdo force 2 sqn with S-400 (RS-SA-21 Growler)
MANOEUVRE 10 flt with 9K38 Igla-1 (RS-SA-18 Grouse)
Amphibious EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 amph bde AIRCRAFT 800 combat capable
FTR 61: 54 MiG-29 Fulcrum (incl 12+ MiG-29UPG);
Air Force 139,850 7 MiG-29UB Fulcrum B
5 regional air comds: Western (New Delhi), Southwestern FGA 523: 109 MiG-21 Bison; 37 MiG-21U/UM Mongol;
(Gandhinagar), Eastern (Shillong), Central (Allahabad), 38 Mirage 2000E/I (2000H); 10 Mirage 2000ED/IT (2000TH);
Southern (Trivandrum). 2 support comds: Maintenance 8 Rafale DH; 28 Rafale EH; 263 Su-30MKI Flanker H; 30 Tejas
(Nagpur) and Training (Bangalore) ATK 115: 28 Jaguar IB; 79 Jaguar IS; 8 Jaguar IM
FORCES BY ROLE ISR 3 Gulfstream IV SRA-4
FIGHTER AEW&C 5: 2 EMB-145AEW Netra (1 more in test);
3 sqn with MiG-29 Fulcrum; MiG-29UB Fulcrum 3 Il-76TD Phalcon
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK TKR 6 Il-78 Midas
4 sqn with Jaguar IB/IS TPT 243: Heavy 28: 11 C-17A Globemaster III; 17 Il-76MD
6 sqn with MiG-21 Bison Candid; Medium 10 C-130J-30 Hercules; Light 141: 47 An-
3 sqn with Mirage 2000E/ED/I/IT (2000H/TH – 32; 55 An-32RE Cline; 35 Do-228; 4 EMB-135BJ; PAX 64:
secondary ECM role) 1 B-707; 4 B-737; 3 B-737BBJ; 56 HS-748
2 sqn with Rafale DH/EH TRG 308: 101 Hawk Mk132*; 90 HJT-16 Kiran MkI/IA;
11 sqn with Su-30MKI Flanker 42 HJT-16 Kiran MkII; 75 PC-7 Turbo Trainer MkII
2 sqn with Tejas HELICOPTERS
ANTI SURFACE WARFARE ATK 43: 22 AH-64E Apache Guardian; 4 LCH Prachand;
1 sqn with Jaguar IM 17 Mi-25/Mi-35 Hind
252 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Asia
Growth % 3.7 5.3
infantry weapons and equipment
Inflation % 1.6 4.6
FORCES BY ROLE Def bdgt IDR 120tr 133tr 132tr
MANOEUVRE
USD 8.41bn 9.06bn
Other
FMA (US) USD 14m 14m 14m
144 (India Reserve Police) paramilitary bn
USD1=IDR 14293.37 14725.86
Reserve Organisations Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015)
8.23
Civil Defence 500,000 reservists
Operate in 225 categorised towns in 32 states. Some units 3.30
for NBC defence 2008 2015 2022
The armed forces have contributed to UN and other international Special Forces Command (KOPASSUS)
peacekeeping operations and exercise regularly with Australian
FORCES BY ROLE
and US armed forces as well as those of other Southeast Asian
states. The TNI’s inventory comprises equipment from diverse SPECIAL FORCES
international sources, and the country uses technology-transfer 3 SF gp (total: 2 cdo/para unit, 1 CT unit, 1 int unit)
agreements to develop its national defence industry which has sig-
nificant capabilities in specific areas, including naval construction Strategic Reserve Command (KOSTRAD)
and the manufacture of transport aircraft and helicopters. Indone- FORCES BY ROLE
sia consolidated its five leading defence firms into the state-owned COMMAND
Defend ID in 2022 as part of plans to achieve more than 40% locali- 3 div HQ
sation in defence production. MANOEUVRE
Armoured
ACTIVE 395,500 (Army 300,400 Navy 65,000 Air
2 tk bn
30,100) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 280,000
Mechanised
Conscription liability 24 months selective conscription authorised
1 mech inf bde (3 mech inf bn)
(not required by law)
Light
RESERVE 400,000 2 inf bde (3 cdo bn)
Army cadre units; numerical str n.k., obligation to age 45 for officers 1 inf bde (2 inf bn)
Air Manoeuvre
3 AB bde (3 AB bn)
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE COMBAT SUPPORT
2 arty regt (1 SP arty bn; 1 MRL bn; 1 fd arty bn)
Army ε300,400 1 fd arty bn
2 cbt engr bn
Mil Area Commands (KODAM) AIR DEFENCE
15 comd (I, II, III, IV, V, VI, IX, XII, XIII, XIV, XVI, XVII, 3 AD bn
XVIII, Jaya & Iskandar Muda)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
FORCES BY ROLE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
MANOEUVRE MBT 103: 42 Leopard 2A4; 61 Leopard 2RI
Mechanised LT TK 350: 275 AMX-13 (partially upgraded); 15 PT-76;
3 armd cav bn 60 FV101 Scorpion-90
8 cav bn ASLT 7 Babak
1 mech inf bde (1 cav bn, 3 mech inf bn) RECCE 142: 55 Ferret (13 upgraded); 69 Saladin (16
1 mech inf bde (3 mech inf bn) upgraded); 18 VBL
3 indep mech inf bn IFV 64: 22 Black Fox; 42 Marder 1A3
Light APC 860+
1 inf bde (3 cdo bn) APC (T) 267: 75 AMX-VCI; 34 BTR-50PK; 15 FV4333
1 inf bde (2 cdo bn, 1 inf bn) Stormer; 143 M113A1-B
1 inf bde (1 cdo bn, 2 inf bn) APC (W) 593+: 376 Anoa; some Barracuda; 40 BTR-40;
2 inf bde (3 inf bn) 45 FV603 Saracen (14 upgraded); 100 LAV-150
3 inf bde (1 cdo bn, 1 inf bn) Commando; 32 VAB-VTT
3 inf bde (2 inf bn) PPV some Casspir
24 indep inf bn AUV 39: 14 APR-1; 3 Bushmaster; 22 Commando Ranger;
20 indep cdo bn Komodo 4×4
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
COMBAT SUPPORT
AEV 4: 3 PiPz-2RI Dachs; 1 M113A1-B-GN
1 SP arty bn
ARV 15+: 2 AMX-13; 6 AMX-VCI; 3 BREM-2; 4 BPz-3
11 fd arty bn
Buffel; Stormer; T-54/T-55
11 cbt engr bn
VLB 19: 10 AMX-13; 3 BPR Biber-1; 4 M3; 2 Stormer
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
4 construction bn MSL • MANPATS FGM-148 Javelin; SS.11; Milan; 9K11
AVIATION Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger)
1 composite avn sqn RCL 90mm M67; 106mm M40A1
HELICOPTER RL 89mm LRAC
1 hel sqn with Bo-105; Bell 205A; Bell 412; Bell 412EPI ARTILLERY 1,243+
Twin Huey; AH-64E Apache Guardian SP 92: 105mm 20 AMX Mk61; 155mm 72: 54 CAESAR;
1 hel sqn Mi-35P Hind; Mi-17V-5 Hip H 18 M109A4
AIR DEFENCE TOWED 133+: 105mm 110+: some KH-178; 60 M101;
1 AD regt (2 ADA bn, 1 SAM unit) 50 M-56; 155mm 23: 5 FH-88; 18 KH-179
9 ADA bn MRL 127mm 63 ASTROS II Mk6
3 SAM unit MOR 955: 81mm 800; 120mm 155: 75 Brandt; 80 UBM 52
Asia 255
Asia
1 57mm gun
Three fleets: East (Sorong), Central (Surabaya) and West PCT 2 Andau with 2 single 533mm TT with SUT,
(Jakarta). Two Forward Operating Bases at Kupang (West 1 57mm gun
Timor) and Tahuna (North Sulawesi) PCC 14: 4 Kakap with 1 hel landing platform; 2 Pandrong;
4 Pari; 2 Sampari (KCR-60M) with 1 NG-18 CIWS; 2 Todak
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
SUBMARINES • SSK 4: with 1 57mm gun
1 Cakra (Type-209/1300) with 8 single 533mm TT with PBG 8: 2 Clurit with 2 single lnchr with C-705 AShM,
SUT HWT 1 AK630 CIWS; 6 Clurit with 2 single lnchr with C-705
3 Nagapasa (Type-209/1400) with 8 single 533mm TT with AShM
Black Shark HWT PBF 4 Combat Boat AL D-18
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 7 PB 79: 2 Badau (ex-BRN Waspada); 9 Boa; 1 Cucut (ex-SGP
FRIGATES 7: Jupiter); 1 Klewang; 4 Kobra; 1 Krait; 8 Sibarau; up to 32
FFGHM 5: Sinabang (KAL 28); 4 Tarihu; 13 Tatihu (PC-40); 4 Viper
1 Ahmad Yani (ex-NLD Van Speijk) with 2 twin-cell VLS MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 8
with 3M55E Yakhont (RS-SS-N-26 Strobile) AShM; MCO 2 Pulau Rengat
2 twin Simbad lnchr (manual) with Mistral SAM, MSC 6 Pulau Rote (ex-GDR Wolgast)
2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, AMPHIBIOUS
1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Bo-105 (NBo-105) hel) PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS VESSELS • LPD 6:
2 Ahmad Yani (ex-NLD Van Speijk) with 2 twin lnchr 1 Dr Soeharso (ex-Tanjung Dalpele) (capacity 2 LCU/
with C-802 (CH-SS-N-6) AShM, 2 twin Simbad LCVP; 13 tanks; 500 troops; 2 AS332L Super Puma)
lnchr (manual) with Mistral SAM, 2 triple 324mm (used in AH role)
SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 76mm 4 Makassar (capacity 2 LCU or 4 LCVP; 13 tanks;
gun (capacity 1 Bo-105 (NBo-105) hel) 500 troops; 2 AS332L Super Puma)
2 R.E. Martadinata (SIGMA 10514) with 2 quad lnchr 1 Semarang (IDN Makassar mod) (capacity 2 LCM;
with MM40 Exocet Block 3 AShM, 2 6-cell CLA 3 hels; 28 vehs; 650 troops) (used in AH role)
VLS with VL MICA SAM, 2 triple 324mm ILAS- LANDING SHIPS • LST 25
3 (B-515) ASTT with A244/S LWT, 1 Millennium 1 Teluk Amboina (capacity 16 tanks; 800 troops)
CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 med hel) 4 Teluk Bintuni (capacity 10 MBT)
FFHM 2 Ahmad Yani (ex-NLD Van Speijk) with 2 twin 2 Teluk Cirebon (ex-GDR Frosch II)
Simbad lnchr (manual) with Mistral SAM, 2 triple 9 Teluk Gilimanuk (ex-GDR Frosch)
324mm ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 5 Teluk Lada with 1 hel landing platform (capacity 4
1 Bo-105 (NBo-105) hel) LCVP; 470 troops; 15 APC; 10 MBT)
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 138 4 Teluk Semangka (capacity 17 tanks; 200 troops)
CORVETTES 24 LANDING CRAFT 54
FSGM 7: LCM 20
3 Bung Tomo with 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet LCU 4
Block 2 AShM, 1 18-cell VLS with Sea Wolf SAM, LCVP 30
256 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Asia
Def bdgt JPY 5.73tr 6.17tr
Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 280,000+ USD 52.2bn 48.1bn
Police ε280,000 (including 14,000 police USD1=JPY 109.75 128.42
‘mobile bde’ (BRIMOB) org in 56 coy, incl CT Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015)
unit (Gegana)) 50.4
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES 38.5
APC (W) 34 Tactica 2008 2015 2022
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 6: 2 Beech 18; 2 C-212 Aviocar Population 124,214,766
(NC-212); 1 C295; 1 Turbo Commander 680
HELICOPTERS Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
MRH 1 Bell 412EP
Male 6.4% 2.3% 2.5% 2.6% 21.9% 12.8%
TPT • Light 22: 3 Bell 206 Jet Ranger; 19 Bo-105 (NBo-105)
Female 6.0% 2.2% 2.3% 2.4% 22.3% 16.3%
KPLP (Coast and Seaward Defence
Command) Capabilities
Responsible to Military Sea Communications Agency Japan’s concerns over its regional security environment have
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE heightened, as evidenced in its 2022 Defence White Paper. These
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 37 principally relate to security challenges posed by a more assertive
PCO 7: 1 Arda Dedali; 3 Chundamani; 1 Kalimasada; China and continued concern over North Korea. As a result, there
2 Trisula have been defence-budget increases and defence-policy and leg-
islative reforms designed to enable Japan to play a more active
PB 30: 4 Golok (SAR); 5 Kujang; 6 Rantos; 15 (various)
international security role and strengthen the Japan Self-Defense
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • ABU 1 Jadayat Forces (JSDF). Due to their defensive mandate, JSDF deployments
are mostly for peacekeeping purposes. While the JSDF’s offensive
Bakamla (Maritime Security Agency) capacity remains weak, the navy has strengths in anti-submarine
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE warfare and air defence. An Amphibious Rapid Deployment
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 10 Brigade has also been established, tasked mainly with the defence
PSO 4: 3 Pulau Nipah with 1 hel landing platform; of remote islands. The Izumo helicopter carrier has completed the
1 Tanjung Datu with 1 hel landing platform first stage of modifications to embark and operate fixed-wing air-
PB 6 Bintang Laut (KCR-40 mod) craft. Final conversion work will take place at the end of FY 2024. JS
Kaga began the first stage of its conversion in March 2022, with the
second stage due in FY 2026. Japan is developing capabilities in
Reserve Organisations space, cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum to develop
a ‘multi-domain defence force’, based on the 2018 National
Kamra People’s Security ε40,000 Defense Program Guidelines and the 2019–23 Mid-Term Defense
Report for 3 weeks’ basic training each year; part-time Program. In 2020, a Space Operations Squadron was set up, with
police auxiliary the aim of enhancing space situational-awareness capabilities.
258 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
The Cyber Defense Group is to expand. Enhancing ballistic missile 1 (6th) inf div (1 recce sqn, 1 mech inf regt; 3 inf regt,
defence remains a key priority. In December 2020, the cabinet 1 hel sqn, 1 SAM bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 NBC
announced that two vessels equipped with Aegis ballistic missile bn, 1 log regt)
defence systems would be developed as alternatives to the can- 1 (9th) inf div (1 armd recce sqn, 1 tk bn, 3 inf regt, 1
celled land-based Aegis Ashore. The Ministry of Defense requested
hel sqn, 1 SAM bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 NBC bn,
a budget for the development of the vessels for FY2023. Japan’s
1 log regt)
alliance with the US remains the cornerstone of its defence policy,
reflected by continued US basing, the widespread use of US equip-
1 (5th) inf bde (1 armd recce sqn, 1 tk bn, 3 inf regt, 1 hel
ment across all three services and regular training with US forces. sqn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 SAM coy, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 sigs coy,
Meanwhile, meetings with Germany, India, Indonesia and the UK 1 NBC coy, 1 log bn)
have indicated efforts to expand security relations. In November 1 (11th) inf bde (1 armd recce sqn, 1 tk sqn, 3 inf regt,
2020, Australia and Japan agreed in principle on a Reciprocal 1 hel sqn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 SAM coy, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 sigs
Access Agreement, while India and Japan inked an Acquisition coy, 1 NBC coy, 1 log bn)
and Cross-Servicing Agreement in September 2020. Negotiations Light
for a Reciprocal Access Agreement with the UK continued in 2022, 1 (1st) inf div (1 armd recce bn, 3 inf regt, 1 hel sqn, 1 fd
as did discussions on closer cooperation on future combat aircraft arty bn, 1 SAM bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 NBC bn,
development. Japan has an advanced defence-industrial base.
1 log regt)
Defence exports have mainly consisted of components, though
1 (3rd) inf div (1 recce sqn, 1 tk bn, 3 inf regt, 1 hel sqn,
there are ambitions to secure more significant export deals.
Japan’s ongoing military-procurement drive is focused on power 1 fd arty bn, 1 SAM bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 NBC
projection, mobility and ISR. Budget documents also note research bn, 1 log regt)
on a hypersonic glide body, new anti-ship missiles and research on 1 (10th) inf div (1 recce sqn, 1 tk bn, 3 inf regt, 1 hel sqn,
advanced radar technology. 1 fd arty regt, 1 SAM bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 NBC
bn, 1 log regt)
ACTIVE 247,150 (Ground Self-Defense Force 1 (8th) inf div (1 recce sqn, 3 inf regt, 1 hel sqn, 1 SAM bn,
150,700 Maritime Self-Defense Force 45,300 Air 1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 NBC bn, 1 log regt)
Self-Defense Force 46,950 Central Staff 4,200) 1 (13th) inf bde (1 recce sqn, 1 tk coy, 3 inf regt, 1 hel sqn,
Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 14,550 1 fd arty bn, 1 SAM coy, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 NBC coy,
1 sigs coy, 1 log bn)
RESERVE 55,900 (General Reserve Army (GSDF) 1 (14th) inf bde (1 recce sqn, 2 inf regt, 1 hel sqn, 1 SAM
46,000 Ready Reserve Army (GSDF) 8,000 Navy 1,100 coy, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 NBC coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn)
Air 800) 1 (15th) inf bde (1 recce sqn, 1 inf regt, 1 avn sqn, 1 AD
regt, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 NBC coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn)
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Air Manoeuvre
1 (1st) AB bde (3 AB bn, 1 fd arty bn, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 sigs
Space coy, 1 log bn)
1 (12th) air mob inf bde (1 recce sqn, 3 inf regt, 1 avn sqn,
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 fd arty bn, 1 SAM coy, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 NBC coy,
SATELLITES 11
1 sigs coy, 1 log bn)
COMMUNICATIONS 2: 1 Kirameki-1; 1 Kirameki-2
Amphibious
ISR 9 IGS
1 amph bde (1 recce coy, 2 amph regt, 1 amph aslt bn,
1 log bn)
Ground Self-Defense Force 150,700 COMBAT SUPPORT
FORCES BY ROLE 1 (1st) arty bde (1 SP arty regt (2 SP arty bn, 1 MRL bn);
COMMAND 1 SP arty regt (1 SP arty bn, 1 MRL bn); 3 AShM regt)
5 army HQ (regional comd) 1 (Northwestern Army) arty bde (1 fd arty regt (4 fd arty
SPECIAL FORCES bn); 1 AShM regt)
1 spec ops unit (bn) 1 (Western Army) arty bde (1 fd arty regt (4 fd arty bn);
MANOEUVRE 1 MRL bn; 1 AShM regt)
Armoured 1 (Central Army) fd arty bn
1 (7th) armd div (1 armd recce sqn, 3 tk regt, 1 armd inf 4 engr bde
regt, 1 hel sqn, 1 SP arty regt, 1 AD regt, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 engr unit
1 sigs bn, 1 NBC bn, 1 log regt) 1 EW bn
1 indep tk bn 5 int bn
Mechanised 1 MP bde
1 (2nd) inf div (1 armd recce sqn, 1 tk regt, 1 mech inf 1 sigs bde
regt, 2 inf regt, 1 hel sqn, 1 SP arty regt, 1 AT coy, 1 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
ADA bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 NBC bn, 1 log regt) 5 log unit (bde)
1 (4th) inf div (1 armd recce bn, 3 inf regt, 1 inf coy, 1 hel 5 trg bde
sqn, 1 AT coy, 1 SAM bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 NBC HELICOPTER
bn, 1 log regt) 2 sqn with MV-22B Osprey (forming)
Asia 259
Asia
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE CRUISERS • CGHM 4:
MSL 2 Atago with Aegis Baseline 9 C2, 2 quad lnchr with
SP 37 Type-96 MPMS SSM-1B (Type-90) AShM, 12 8-cell Mk 41 VLS (8
MANPATS Type-79 Jyu-MAT; Type-87 Chu-MAT; fore, 4 aft) with SM-2 Block IIIA/B SAM/SM-3 Block
Type-01 LMAT IA/IB SAM/ASROC A/S msl, 2 triple 324mm HOS-
RCL • 84mm Carl Gustaf 302 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 2 Mk 15 Phalanx Block
ARTILLERY 1,593 1B CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 SH-60 Seahawk
SP 167: 155mm 136 Type-99; 203mm 31 M110A2 ASW hel)
TOWED 155mm 229 FH-70 2 Maya (Atago mod) with Aegis Baseline 9 C2, w quad
MRL 227mm 54 M270 MLRS lnchr with SSM-1B (Type-90) AShM/SSM-2 (Type-
MOR 1,143: 81mm 656 L16 120mm 463 RT-61; SP 120mm 17) AShM, 12 8-cell Mk 41 VLS (8 fore, 4 aft) with
24 Type-96 SM-2 Block IIIA/B SAM/SM-3 Block IA/IB SAM/
Type-07 A/S msl, 2 triple 324mm HOS-303 ASTT
COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM 92: 30 Type-12; 62 Type-88
with Mk 46 LWT, 2 Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS,
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 8 Beech 350 King Air (LR-2)
1 127mm gun (capacity 1 SH-60 Seahawk ASW hel)
TILTROTOR • TPT 7+ MV-22B Osprey
DESTROYERS 34
HELICOPTERS DDGHM 28:
ATK 99: 50 AH-1S Cobra; 12 AH-64D Apache; 37 OH-1 8 Asagiri with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon
TPT 249: Heavy 53: 18 CH-47D Chinook (CH-47J); 35 Block 1B AShM, 1 octuple Mk 29 lnchr with RIM-
CH-47JA Chinook; Medium 43: 3 H225 Super Puma MkII+ 7M Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 triple 324mm HOS-302
(VIP); 40 UH-60L Black Hawk (UH-60JA); Light 153: 123 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 octuple Mk 112 lnchr
Bell 205 (UH-1J); 30 Enstrom 480B (TH-480B) with ASROC, 2 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS, 1 76mm gun
AIR DEFENCE (capacity 1 SH-60 Seahawk ASW hel)
SAM 311+ 4 Akizuki with 2 quad lnchr with SSM-1B (Type-90)
Medium-range 130: 48 Type-03 Chu-SAM; 4 Type-03 AShM, 4 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with ASROC/RIM-162B
Chu-SAM Kai; 78 MIM-23B I-Hawk ESSM SAM, 2 triple 324mm HOS-303 ASTT with
Short-range ε44 Type-11 Tan-SAM Type-97 LWT, 2 Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS,
1 127mm gun (capacity 1 SH-60 Seahawk ASW hel)
Point-defence 137+: 46 Type-81 Tan-SAM; 91 Type-93
2 Asahi (Akizuki mod) with 2 quad lnchr with SSM-
Kin-SAM; Type-91 Kei-SAM
1B (Type-90) AShM, 4 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with
GUNS • SP 35mm 52 Type-87
RIM-162B ESSM SAM/Type-07 A/S msl, 2 triple
324mm HOS-303 ASTT with Type-12 LWT, 2 Mk
Maritime Self-Defense Force 45,300 15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity
Surface units organised into 4 Escort Flotillas with a mix 1 SH-60 Seahawk ASW hel)
of 8 warships each. Bases at Yokosuka, Kure, Sasebo, 9 Murasame with 2 quad lnchr with SSM-1B (Type-
Maizuru, Ominato. SSK organised into two flotillas with 90) AShM, 1 16-cell Mk 48 mod 0 VLS with RIM-
bases at Kure and Yokosuka 162C ESSM SAM, 2 triple 324mm HOS-302 ASTT
260 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Asia
FGA 122: 64 F-2A; 27 F-2B; 31 F-35A Lightning II
EW 3: 1 Kawasaki EC-1; 2 YS-11EA LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 18
SIGINT 4: 1 RC-2; 3 YS-11EB ABU 1 Teshio
AEW&C 20: 10 E-2C Hawkeye; 6 E-2D Hawkeye; 4 E-767 AGS 14: 6 Hamashio; 1 Jinbei; 2 Meiyo; 2 Peiyo; 1 Shoyo;
SAR 26 U-125A Peace Krypton 1 Takuyo; 1 Tenyo
TKR/TPT 8: 2 KC-46A Pegasus; 2 KC-130H Hercules; AX 3
4 KC-767J AIRCRAFT
TPT 54: Medium 34: 13 C-130H Hercules; 7 C-1; 14 C-2; PAX MP 5 Falcon 2000MSA
20: 2 B-777-300ER (VIP); 13 Beech T-400; 5 Gulfstream IV (U-4) SAR 4 Saab 340B
TRG 246: 197 T-4*; 49 T-7 TPT 27: Light 25: 5 Cessna 172; 10 Beech 350 King Air
HELICOPTERS (LR-2); 10 DHC Dash-7 (Bombardier 300) (MP); PAX 2
SAR 37 UH-60J Black Hawk Gulfstream V (MP)
TPT • Heavy 15 CH-47JA Chinook HELICOPTERS
UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES 1 MRH 4 Bell 412 Twin Huey
ISR • Heavy 1 RQ-4B Global Hawk SAR 12 S-76D
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES TPT 39: Medium 13: 2 AS332 Super Puma; 11 H225
AAM • IR AAM-3 (Type-90); IIR AAM-5 (Type-04); Super Puma; Light 26: 19 AW139; 4 Bell 505 Jet Ranger
SARH AIM-7 Sparrow; ARH AAM-4 (Type-99); AIM- X; 3 S-76C
120C5/C7 AMRAAM (limited numbers) UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES 1
AShM ASM-1 (Type-80); ASM-2 (Type-93) CISR • Heavy 1 MQ-9B SeaGuardian (unarmed)
BOMBS
Laser & INS/SAT-guided GBU-54 Laser JDAM DEPLOYMENT
INS/SAT-guided GBU-38 JDAM
ARABIAN SEA & GULF OF ADEN: Combined Maritime
Air Defence Forces • CTF-151: 160; 1 DDGHM
Ac control and warning. 4 wg; 28 radar sites DJIBOUTI: 180; 2 P-3C Orion
FORCES BY ROLE SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 4
AIR DEFENCE
6 SAM gp (total: 24 SAM bty with M902 Patriot PAC-3)
1 AD gp with Type-81 Tan-SAM; M167 Vulcan FOREIGN FORCES
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE United States
AIR DEFENCE US Pacific Command: 55,600
SAM 146+ Army 2,600; 1 corps HQ (fwd); 1 SF gp; 1 avn bn; 1 SAM
Long-range 120 M902 Patriot PAC-3 bn with M903 Patriot PAC MSE
Short-range ε26 Air Base Defense SAM Navy 20,000; 1 CVN; 3 CGHM; 4 DDGHM; 4 DDGM; 1
Point-defence Type-81 Tan-SAM LCC; 4 MCO; 1 LHA; 2 LPD; 2 LSD; 3 FGA sqn with 10
GUNS • TOWED 20mm M167 Vulcan F/A-18E Super Hornet; 1 FGA sqn with 10 F/A-18F Super
262 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Hornet; 2 ASW sqn with 5 P-8A Poseidon; 1 ELINT flt was a reported incursion by a North Korean merchant vessel across
with 2 EP-3E Aries II; 2 EW sqn with 5 EA-18G Growler; 1 the Northern Limit Line, and in November a North Korean missile
AEW&C sqn with 5 E-2D Hawkeye; 2 ASW hel sqn with crossed the NLL. North Korea remains diplomatically isolated.
12 MH-60R Seahawk; 1 tpt hel sqn with MH-60S Knight While foreign defence cooperation is restricted by international
Hawk; 1 base at Sasebo; 1 base at Yokosuka pressure and sanctions, Pyongyang has nonetheless often found
ways to develop military ties. Official conscription for both men
USAF: 13,000; 1 HQ (5th Air Force) at Okinawa–Kadena
and women is often extended, sometimes indefinitely. Training
AB; 1 ftr wg at Misawa AB (2 ftr sqn with 22 F-16C/D is focused on fighting a short, intensive war on the peninsula,
Fighting Falcon); 1 ftr wg at Okinawa–Kadena AB (2 ftr but the armed forces’ overall effectiveness in a modern conflict
sqn with 27 F-15C/D Eagle; 1 tkr sqn with 15 KC-135R against technologically superior opposition is unclear. Internal
Stratotanker; 1 AEW sqn with 2 E-3B Sentry; 1 CSAR sqn exercises are conducted regularly, but those publicised are staged
with 10 HH-60G Pave Hawk); 1 tpt wg at Yokota AB with and are not necessarily representative of wider operational capa-
10 C-130J-30 Hercules; 3 Beech 1900C (C-12J); 1 spec ops bility. In May 2022 North Korea announced it had mobilised the
gp at Okinawa–Kadena AB with (1 sqn with 5 MC-130J armed forces to supply medicines, in response to the country’s first
Commando II; 1 sqn with 5 CV-22B Osprey); 1 ISR sqn with acknowledged outbreak of COVID-19. North Korea’s conventional
RC-135 Rivet Joint; 1 ISR UAV flt with 5 RQ-4A Global Hawk forces remain reliant on increasingly obsolete equipment, with
USMC 20,000; 1 mne div; 1 mne regt HQ; 1 arty regt HQ; 1 older Soviet-era and Chinese-origin equipment supplemented by
a growing number of indigenous designs and upgrades, though
recce bn; 1 mne bn; 1 amph aslt bn; 1 arty bn; 1 FGA sqn at
the precise capability of these remains unclear. The overall effec-
Iwakuni with 12 F/A-18A++/C+ Hornet; 2 FGA sqn at Iwakuni
tiveness and serviceability of some equipment remains in doubt
with 12 F-35B Lightning II; 1 tkr sqn at Iwakuni with 15 KC- but there is local maintenance, repair and overhaul capacity. Local
130J Hercules; 2 tpt sqn at Futenma with 12 MV-22B Osprey defence-industrial capacity includes the manufacture of light
US Strategic Command: 1 AN/TPY-2 X-band radar at arms, armoured vehicles, artillery and missile systems. North Korea
Shariki; 1 AN/TPY-2 X-band radar at Kyogamisaki has exported weaponry in the past. In September 2022 Pyongyang
denied any plans to supply Russia with ammunition, following US
reporting that this had been requested. It is unclear whether the
country would have had the capability to indigenously develop
Korea, Democratic People’s some of the technical advances it has demonstrated, including in
Republic of DPRK rocket propulsion.
Asia
SPECIAL FORCES
8 (Reconnaissance General Bureau) SF bn GUNS 11,000+
MANOEUVRE SP 14.5mm M-1984; 23mm M-1992; 37mm M-1992;
Reconnaissance 57mm M-1985
17 recce bn TOWED 11,000: 14.5mm ZPU-1/ZPU-2/ZPU-4; 23mm
Light ZU-23; 37mm M-1939; 57mm S-60; 85mm M-1939 KS-
9 lt inf bde 12; 100mm KS-19
6 sniper bde
Air Manoeuvre Navy ε60,000
3 AB bde EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 AB bn SUBMARINES 71
2 sniper bde SSB 1 8.24 Yongung (Gorae (Sinpo-B)) (SLBM trials) with 1
Amphibious Pukguksong-1 SLBM (status unclear)/KN-23 Mod 2 SLBM
2 sniper bde (in test)
SSK ε20 Type-033 (Romeo) with 8 single 533mm TT with
Reserves 600,000 SAET-60 HWT
FORCES BY ROLE SSC ε40 (some Sang-O some with 2 single 533mm TT
MANOEUVRE with 53–65E HWT; some Sang-O II with 4 single 533mm
Light TT with 53–65E HWT)
40 inf div SSW ε10† (some Yugo some with 2 single 406mm TT;
18 inf bde some Yeono some with 2 single 533mm TT)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE (ε) PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 2
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES FRIGATES • FFG 2:
The Korean People’s Army displayed a number of new 1 Najin with 2 single lnchr with P-20 (RS-SS-N-2A Styx)
armoured-vehicle designs at a parade in 2020, but it is AShM, 2 RBU 1200 Uragan A/S mor, 2 100mm gun,
unclear if any of them have entered operational service 2 twin 57mm gun
MBT 3,500+ T-34/T-54/T-55/T-62/Type-59/Chonma/ 1 Najin with 2 twin lnchr with Kumsong-3
Pokpoong/Songun (KN-SS-N-2 Stormpetrel) AShM, 2 RBU 1200
LT TK 560+: 560 PT-76; M-1985 Uragan A/S mor, 2 100mm gun, 2 twin 57mm gun
IFV 32 BTR-80A (operational status unclear)
APC 2,500+ PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 372+
APC (T) BTR-50; Type-531 (Type-63); VTT-323 CORVETTES • FS 5: 4 Sariwon with 2 twin 57mm gun;
APC (W) 2,500 BTR-40/BTR-60/M-1992/1/BTR-152/ 1 Tral with 1 85mm gun (Two Tuman- and two Amnok-
M-2010 (6×6)/M-2010 (8×8) class corvettes constructed since early 2010s; operational
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE status unknown)
MSL PCG 10 Soju (FSU Project 205 mod (Osa)) with 4 single
SP 9K11 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger); M-2010 ATGM lnchr with P-20 (RS-SS-N-2A Styx) AShM
264 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Worker/Peasant Red Guard ε5,700,000 though industry will have to carefully balance new export con-
reservists tracts against existing local orders, particularly in land systems.
Org on a province/town/village basis; comd structure is ACTIVE 555,000 (Army 420,000 Navy 70,000 Air
bde–bn–coy–pl; small arms with some mor and AD guns
65,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 13,500
(but many units unarmed)
Conscript liability Army and Marines 18 months, Navy 20 months,
Air Force 21 months
Korea, Republic of ROK RESERVE 3,100,000
Reserve obligation of three days per year. First Combat Forces
South Korean Won KRW 2021 2022 2023
(Mobilisation Reserve Forces) or Regional Combat Forces (Home-
GDP KRW 2072tr 2203tr land Defence Forces) to age 33
USD 1.81tr 1.73tr
Reserve Paramilitary 3,000,000
per capita USD 35,004 33,592
Being reorganised
Growth % 4.1 2.6
Inflation % 2.5 5.5
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
Def bdgt KRW 52.9tr 54.6tr 57.1tr
USD 46.3bn 43.0bn
Space
USD1=KRW 1143.95 1270.29
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015)
43.3
SATELLITES • COMMUNICATIONS 2 Anasis
27.0
Army 420,000
Asia
2008 2015 2022 FORCES BY ROLE
COMMAND
Population 51,844,834
8 corps HQ
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus 1 (Capital Defence) comd HQ
SPECIAL FORCES
Male 6.0% 2.3% 3.1% 3.8% 27.3% 7.7%
1 (Special Warfare) SF comd (1 SF gp; 6 spec ops bde)
Female 5.7% 2.1% 2.8% 3.3% 26.1% 9.9%
6 cdo regt
2 indep cdo bn
Capabilities MANOEUVRE
South Korea’s forces are some of the best equipped and trained Armoured
in the region. Defence policy remains focused on North Korea,
7 armd bde
and Seoul continues to prioritise developing new capabilities to
respond to the nuclear and conventional threat from the DPRK. 1 (Capital) armd inf div (1 armd cav bn, 2 armd bde,
The new administration is replacing the 2018 Defense Reform 1 armd inf bde, 1 SP arty bde, 1 engr bn)
2.0 project with the Defense Innovation 4.0 programme. As well 1 (8th) armd inf div (1 armd cav bn, 1 armd bde, 2 armd
as redesigning overall defence policy to focus on advanced tech- inf bde, 1 SP arty bde, 1 engr bn)
nology and cyber security, South Korea has again adopted the
1 (11th) armd inf div (1 armd cav bn, 3 armd inf bde,
three-axis defence strategy comprising ‘Kill Chain’, ‘Korea Air and
Missile Defense’ and ‘Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation’ 1 SP arty bde, 1 engr bn)
components which were abandoned in 2019. The 2020 defence 2 tk bn
White Paper, released in February 2021, detailed plans to tackle Light
North Korea’s missile threats through a ‘four-Ds strategy’ of detect, 15 inf div (1 recce bn, 1 tk bn, 3 inf bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr bn)
disrupt, destroy and defend. The next edition of the White Paper
2 indep inf bde
is expected to be released in early 2023. The long-established
alliance with the US is a central element of defence strategy. The Air Manoeuvre
planned transfer of wartime operational control of forces to Seoul 1 air mob div (2 cdo bde)
is now ‘conditions based’ with no firm date set. A large number of 1 air aslt bde
US military personnel and equipment remain stationed in South Other
Korea, along with THAAD missile-defence systems. In 2022, South 5 sy regt
Korea and the US resumed large-scale joint military exercises
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE
that had been scaled back in recent years. A space operations
centre was inaugurated in 2021. South Korea has demonstrated 3 SSM bn
the capacity to support small international deployments, includ- COMBAT SUPPORT
ing contributions to UN missions and counter-piracy operations 6 arty bde
in the Arabian Sea. The equipment inventory increasingly com- 1 MRL bde (3 MRL bn; 1 SSM bn)
prises modern systems. South Korea has developed a substantial
6 engr bde
domestic defence industry which supply a large proportion of
equipment requirements, although some equipment – notably 5 engr gp
the F-35 combat aircraft – is still procured from the US. Local 1 CBRN defence bde
defence companies are finding growing export success globally, 8 sigs bde
266 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
6 Incheon with 2 quad lnchr with TSLM LACM/Hae with K745 Blue Shark LWT, 1 76mm gun (fitted for but not
Sung I AShM, 1 21-cell Mk 49 lnchr with RIM-116 with K-VLS) (capacity 2 med hels; 300 students); 2 MTB
RAM SAM, 2 triple 324mm KMk. 32 ASTT with
K745 Blue Shark LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B Naval Aviation
CIWS, 1 127 mm gun (capacity 1 Lynx Mk99/ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AW159 Wildcat hel) AIRCRAFT 16 combat capable
FFG 4 Ulsan with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84 Harpoon ASW 16: 8 P-3C Orion; 8 P-3CK Orion
AShM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 TPT • Light 5 Cessna F406 Caravan II
LWT, 2 76mm gun HELICOPTERS
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS ε64 ASW 31: 11 Lynx Mk99; 12 Lynx Mk99A; 8 AW159 Wildcat
CORVETTES • FSG 7: TPT 15: Medium 8 UH-60P Black Hawk Light 7 Bell 205
1 Po Hang (Flight IV) with 2 twin lnchr with RGM-84 (UH-1H Iroquois)
Harpoon AShM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk 46
LWT, 2 76mm gun Marines 29,000
6 Po Hang (Flight V/VI) with 2 twin lnchr with Hae
FORCES BY ROLE
Sung I AShM, 2 triple 324mm KMk. 32 ASTT with
SPECIAL FORCES
K745 Blue Shark LWT, 2 76mm gun
1 SF regt
PCFG 22: 18 Gumdoksuri with 2 twin lnchr with Hae Sung
MANOEUVRE
I AShM, 1 76mm gun; 4 Chamsuri II with 1 12-cell 130mm
Amphibious
MRL, 1 76mm gun
2 mne div (1 recce bn, 1 tk bn, 3 mne bde, 1 amph bn,
PBF ε35 Sea Dolphin
MINE WARFARE 12 1 arty bde, 1 engr bn)
MINE COUNTERMEASURES 10 1 mne bde (1 recce coy, 4 mne bn, 1 SP arty bn)
MHO 6 Kan Kyeong 1 mne bde (3 mne bn, 1 fd arty bn)
Asia
MSO 4 Yang Yang 1 mne BG (1 mne bn, 1 SP arty bn)
MINELAYERS • ML 2: EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 Nampo (MLS-II) with 1 4-cell K-VLS VLS with ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
Haegung (K-SAAM) SAM, 2 triple KMk. 32 triple MBT 100: 50 K1E1/A2; 50 M48A3
324mm ASTT with K745 Blue Shark LWT, 1 76mm AAV 166 AAV-7A1
gun (capacity 1 med hel) APC • APC(W) K808
1 Won San with 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTUCTURE • MSL
Mk 46 LWT/K745 Blue Shark LWT, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel SP Spike NLOS
landing platform MANPATS Hyeongung
AMPHIBIOUS ARTILLERY 238
PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 6 SP • 155mm 80: ε40 K9 Thunder; ε20 K9A1 Thunder;
LHD 2: ε20 M109A2 (K55/K55A1)
1 Dokdo with 1 Mk 49 GMLS with RIM-116 RAM TOWED 140: 105mm ε20 M101; 155mm ε120 KH-179
SAM, 2 Goalkeeper CIWS (capacity 2 LCAC; 10 MRL • 239mm 18 K239 Cheonmu
tanks; 700 troops; 10 UH-60 hel) MOR 81mm KM29 (M29)
1 Marado (Dokdo mod) with 1 4-cell K-VLS with COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM RGM-84A Harpoon
K-SAAM SAM, 2 Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS (truck mounted)
(capacity 2 LCAC; 6 MBT, 7 AAV-7A1, 720 troops; HELICOPTERS • TPT • Medium 15+ MUH-1 Surion
7-12 hels)
AIR DEFENCE
LPD 4 Cheonwangbong (LST-II) (capacity 3 LCM; 2
GUNS • Towed • 20mm M167 Vulcan (direct fire role)
MBT; 8 AFV; 300 troops; 2 med hel)
LANDING SHIPS • LST 4 Go Jun Bong with 1 hel Naval Special Warfare Flotilla
landing platform (capacity 20 tanks; 300 troops)
LANDING CRAFT 25 Air Force 65,000
LCU 7+ Mulgae I
4 Comd (Ops, Southern Combat, Logs, Trg)
LCT 3 Mulgae II
LCM 10 LCM-8 FORCES BY ROLE
LCAC 5: 3 Tsaplya (capacity 1 MBT; 130 troops); 2 LSF- FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
II (capacity 150 troops or 1 MBT & 24 troops) 1 sqn with F-4E Phantom II
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 11 5 sqn with F-5E/F Tiger II
AG 1 Sunjin (trials spt) 3 sqn with F-15K Eagle
AOEH 1 Soyangham (AOE-II) with 1 Mk 15 Phalanx Block 8 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon (KF-16C/D)
1B CIWS (capacity 1 med hel) 2 sqn with F-35A Lightning II
AORH 3 Chun Jee 3 sqn with FA-50 Fighting Eagle
ARS 1 Cheong Hae Jin ISR
ATS 2 Tongyeong 1 wg with KO-1
AX 3: 1 Hansando with 2 triple 324mm KMk. 32 ASTT 1 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon (KF-16C/D)
268 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Asia
Growth % 2.1 2.2
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
Inflation % 3.8 15.0 MBT 25: 15 T-54/T-55; 10 T-72B1
Def bdgt LAK n.k. n.k. LT TK 10 PT-76
USD n.k. n.k. RECCE BRDM-2M
USD1=LAK 9753.18 13082.84 IFV 10+ BMP-1
APC • APC (W) 50: 30 BTR-40/BTR-60; 20 BTR-152
Population 7,749,595 AUV Dongfeng Mengshi 4×4; ZYZ-8002 (CS/VN3)
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus ARV T-54/T-55
Male 15.8% 4.9% 5.0% 4.5% 17.7% 2.1% VLB MTU
Female 15.3% 4.8% 5.0% 4.5% 18.0% 2.4% ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • RCL 57mm
M18/A1; 75mm M20; 106mm M40; 107mm B-11
ARTILLERY 62+
Capabilities TOWED 62: 105mm 20 M101; 122mm 20 D-30/M-30
The Lao People’s Armed Forces (LPAF) are closely linked to the M-1938; 130mm 10 M-46; 155mm 12 M114
ruling Communist Party and their primary role is internal security. MOR 81mm; 82mm; 107mm M-1938/M2A1; 120mm M-43
Their main operational experience dates from the Second Indo- AIR DEFENCE
China War and the 1988 border war with Thailand. Defence spend- SAM
ing and military procurement have been constrained for the last Short-range 6+: 6 S-125M Pechora-M† (RS-SA-3 Goa);
two decades. There are military-to-military contacts including with some Yitian (CH-SA-13)
the Cambodian, Chinese and Vietnamese armed forces, and there Point-defence 9K32M Strela-2M (RS-SA-7 Grail)‡;
is defence cooperation with Russia. Training support has been 9K35 Strela-10 (RS-SA-13 Gopher); 9K310 Igla-1 (RS-
provided by Russia and Vietnam. The LPAF have participated in SA-16 Gimlet)
exercises, including those organised by the ADMM-Plus, with other GUNS
regional countries and international partners. However, they have SP 23mm ZSU-23-4
made no international deployments and have little capacity for TOWED 14.5mm ZPU-1/ZPU-4; 23mm ZU-23; 37mm
sustained operations. Laos still operates Soviet-era military equip- M-1939; 57mm S-60
ment and relies on Russian supplies, as illustrated by ongoing
deliveries of training aircraft, armoured reconnaissance vehicles Army Marine Section ε600
and main battle tanks. The country lacks a traditional defence- EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
industrial base and maintenance capacity is limited, reflected in a PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PBR some
support contract with a Russian firm for helicopter maintenance in AMPHIBIOUS • LCM some
2016.
Air Force 3,500
ACTIVE 29,100 (Army 25,600 Air 3,500) FORCES BY ROLE
Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 100,000 TRANSPORT
Conscript liability 18 months minimum 1 regt with MA60; MA600; Mi-17 Hip H
270 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ageing and there are important capability gaps, particularly in air
AIRCRAFT 4 combat capable defence and maritime surveillance. There are plans to acquire new
TPT • Light 5: 1 An-74TK Coaler; 2 MA60; 2 MA600 light combat aircraft, maritime patrol aircraft and MALE UAVs. An
TRG 4 Yak-130 Mitten* air force squadron was established in 2021 to operate UAVs. Funds
HELICOPTERS have been earmarked for an F/A-18D sustainment and upgrade
programme. Malaysia hosts Australian forces and the headquarters
MRH 15: 6 Mi-17 Hip H; 5 Mi-17V-5 Hip; 4 Z-9A
of the FPDA Integrated Area Defence System at RMAF Butterworth;
TPT 4: Medium 1 Ka-32T Helix C; Light 3 SA360 Dauphin
Butterworth is set to be modernised in 2023-25. Malaysia’s defence
industry focuses mainly on providing maintenance, repair and
Gendarmerie & Paramilitary overhaul services, and on naval shipbuilding and land vehicle pro-
duction via offset agreements with European companies.
Militia Self-Defence Forces 100,000+
Village ‘home guard’ or local defence ACTIVE 113,000 (Army 80,000 Navy 18,000
Air 15,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 22,500
Malaysia MYS RESERVE 51,600 (Army 50,000, Navy 1,000
Malaysian Ringgit MYR 2021 2022 2023 Air Force 600) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 244,700
GDP MYR 1.55tr 1.69tr
USD 373bn 434bn
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
per capita USD 11,408 13,108
Army 80,000
Growth % 3.1 5.4
2 mil region
Inflation % 2.5 3.2
FORCES BY ROLE
Def bdgt MYR 15.9bn 16.1bn
COMMAND
USD 3.83bn 4.15bn 5 div HQ
USD1=MYR 4.14 3.89 SPECIAL FORCES
Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 1 SF bde (3 SF bn)
4.55 MANOEUVRE
Armoured
3.08 1 tk regt
2008 2015 2022 Mechanised
4 armd regt
Population 33,871,431
1 mech inf bde (4 mech bn, 1 cbt engr sqn)
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus Light
1 inf bde (6 inf bn, 1 arty regt)
Male 11.7% 4.0% 4.5% 4.7% 22.6% 3.8%
4 inf bde (3 inf bn, 1 arty regt)
Female 11.0% 3.8% 4.2% 4.4% 21.3% 4.0%
2 inf bde (3 inf bn)
1 inf bde (2 inf bn, 1 arty regt)
Capabilities 1 inf bde (2 inf bn)
Modernisation programmes over the past 30 years have provided 1 inf bde (forming)
the Malaysian armed forces with a limited capacity for external Air Manoeuvre
defence. However, the army has continued to be the dominant
1 (Rapid Deployment Force) AB bde (1 lt tk sqn, 4 AB bn,
service, reflecting a longstanding but now outdated focus on
counter-insurgency. In December 2019, the then-government 1 lt arty regt, 1 engr sqn)
tabled the country’s first defence White Paper; this was reaffirmed Other
by the new government that took office in August 2021. The White 2 (border) sy bde (5 bn)
Paper identified the ‘three pillars’ of Malaysia’s defence strategy as COMBAT SUPPORT
‘concentric deterrence’ (the armed forces’ protection of national 9 arty regt
interests in ‘core’, ‘extended’ and ‘forward’ zones); ‘comprehensive 1 STA regt
defence’ (involving whole-of-government and whole-of-society
1 MRL regt
support for the national-defence effort); and ‘credible partner-
ships’ (involving engagement in regional and wider international
1 cbt engr sqn
defence cooperation). While the paper identified new defence 3 fd engr regt (total: 7 cbt engr sqn, 3 engr spt sqn)
challenges, including tensions in the South China Sea and cyber 1 construction regt
threats, it provided no detailed insights into future resource alloca- 1 int unit
tion or capability development. However, it is likely that budget- 4 MP regt
ary constraints will continue to limit defence resources. Malaysian 1 sigs regt
forces regularly participate in ADMM–Plus, Five Power Defence
HELICOPTER
Arrangements and other exercises with regional and international
partners, including the US. Malaysia has invested in synthetic
1 hel sqn
military-training aids. In 2017, Malaysia began trilateral joint mari- 1 tpt sqn with S-61A-4 Nuri (forming)
time patrols and joint Sulu-Sulawesi Seas air patrols with Indone- AIR DEFENCE
sia and the Philippines. Much of Malaysia’s military equipment is 3 ADA regt
Asia 271
Asia
RCL 84mm Carl Gustaf landing platform (fitted for but not with MM40 Exocet
ARTILLERY 438 AShM & RAM SAM)
TOWED 140: 105mm 118: 18 LG1 MkIII; 100 Model 56 PCFM 4 Laksamana with 1 Albatros quad lnchr with
pack howitzer; 155mm 22 G-5 Aspide SAM, 1 76mm gun
MRL 36 ASTROS II (equipped with 127mm SS-30) PCF 4 Perdana (FRA Combattante II) with 1 57mm gun
MOR 262: 81mm 232; SP 81mm 14: 4 K281A1; 10 PCC 4 Keris (Littoral Mission Ship)
ACV300-S; SP 120mm 16: 8 ACV-S; 8 AV8 Gempita PBF 23: 6 Gading Marine FIC; 17 Tempur (SWE CB90)
AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT PB 12: 4 Handalan (SWE Spica-M) with 1 57mm gun; 6
LCA 165 Damen Assault Craft 540 (capacity 10 troops) Jerong (Lurssen 45) with 1 57mm gun; 2 Sri Perlis
HELICOPTERS MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 4
MRH 6 MD-530G MCO 4 Mahamiru (ITA Lerici)
TPT 12: Medium 2 S-61A-4 Nuri; Light 10 AW109 LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 14
AIR DEFENCE AFS 2: 1 Mahawangsa with 2 57mm guns, 1 hel landing
SAM • Point-defence 15+: 15 Jernas (Rapier 2000); Anza-II; platform; 1 Sri Indera Sakti with 1 57mm gun, 1 hel
HY-6 (FN-6) (CH-SA-10); 9K38 Igla (RS-SA-18 Grouse); Starstreak landing platform
GUNS 52+ AG 3: 2 Bunga Mas Lima with 1 hel landing platform; 1
SP 20mm K263 Tun Azizan
TOWED 52: 35mm 16 GDF-005; 40mm 36 L40/70 AGS 2: 1 Dayang Sari; 1 Perantau
AP 2 Sri Gaya
Reserves ASR 1 Mega Bakti
Territorial Army ATF 1
Some paramilitary forces to be incorporated into a re- AX 2 Gagah Samudera with 1 hel landing platform
organised territorial organisation AXS 1 Tunas Samudera
FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
Naval Aviation 160
Mechanised FORCES BY ROLE
4 armd sqn ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE
Light 1 sqn with Super Lynx 300
16 inf regt (3 inf bn) TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
Other 1 sqn with AS555 Fennec
5 (highway) sy bn 1 sqn with AW139
COMBAT SUPPORT EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
5 arty bty HELICOPTERS
2 fd engr regt ASW 6 Super Lynx 300
1 int unit MRH 8: 6 AS555 Fennec; 2 AW139
3 sigs sqn AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AShM Sea Skua
272 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Border Scouts 1,200 reservists ACTIVE 4,000 (Maldives National Defence Force 4,000)
in Sabah, Sarawak
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
People’s Volunteer Corps 240,000 reservists
(some 17,500 armed) Maldives National Defence Force 4,000
RELA
Special Forces
FORCES BY ROLE
DEPLOYMENT SPECIAL FORCES
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • 1 SF sqn
MONUSCO 6
Marine Corps
LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 830; 1 mech inf bn(-); 1 sigs coy; FORCES BY ROLE
1 log coy; 1 maint coy; 1 tpt coy SPECIAL FORCES
SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 1 1 spec ops unit
WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 9 MANOEUVRE
Mechanised
1 mech sqn
FOREIGN FORCES Amphibious
Australia 130; 1 inf coy (on 3-month rotational tours); 7 mne coy
1 P-8A Poseidon (rotational) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
Maldives MDV IFV 2 BMP-2
AUV 2 Cobra
Asia
Maldivian Rufiyaa MVR 2021 2022 2023
GDP MVR 80.2bn 90.9bn
Coast Guard
FORCES BY ROLE
USD 5.20bn 5.90bn
SPECIAL FORCES
per capita USD 13,539 15,097
1 spec ops unit
Growth % 37.0 8.7
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Inflation % 0.2 4.3 PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 12
Def bdgt MVR 1.42bn 1.55bn 1.49bn PCC 3: 1 Ghazee; 1 Shaheed Ali; 1 Trinkat (Bangaram
USD 92.4m 100m SDB Mk5)
PBF 7: 5 SM50 Interceptor; 2 Super Dvora Mk III
USD1=MVR 15.41 15.41
PB 2: 1 Dhaharaat; 1 Kaamiyab
Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)
AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 4:
91
LCU 1 L301
LCP 3
53
AIRCRAFT
2008 2015 2022
MP 1 Do-228
Population 390,164 HELICOPTERS
MRH 2 Dhruv
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Male 11.3% 3.8% 4.8% 5.8% 23.9% 2.4%
Female 10.8% 3.3% 3.8% 4.7% 22.3% 3.0%
Capabilities
The Maldives National Defence Force (MNDF) is tasked with defence,
security and civil emergency response over the wide-ranging and
mostly oceanic territory of the archipelagic nation. It is therefore a
maritime-centric organisation, with a littoral Coast Guard, includ-
ing a small aviation wing, and a Marine Corps. There is focus on
ISR, maritime security and counter-terrorist training and capability
development needs. India is the MNDF’s key defence partner, having
supplied most of the force’s major military platforms, and regularly
donates surplus military equipment and offers training to MNDF
personnel. In 2020 Malé signed a defence agreement with the
United States and in 2021 the MNDF started capacity building work
with the US Army. Training facilities are being developed, including
a basic training school in 2020 and work is proceeding on the devel-
opment of the Composite Training Centre on Maafilaafushi Island.
274 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
COMBAT SUPPORT
Mongolia MNG 1 arty regt
Asia
10 inf div HQ
n.k. 34+ bde HQ (tactical op comd)
1.90
MANOEUVRE
2008 2015 2022
Armoured
Population 57,526,449 10 armd bn
Light
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus 100 inf bn (coy)
Male 12.9% 4.2% 4.2% 4.1% 21.0% 2.9% 337 inf bn (coy) (regional comd)
COMBAT SUPPORT
Female 12.3% 4.1% 4.1% 4.2% 22.2% 3.7%
7 arty bn
37 indep arty coy
Capabilities 6 cbt engr bn
Since the country’s independence struggle in the 1940s, Myanmar’s 54 fd engr bn
large, army-dominated Tatmadaw (armed forces) has been inti- 40 int coy
mately involved in domestic politics as well as internal security. Even 45 sigs bn
though the National League for Democracy (NLD) won the Novem-
AIR DEFENCE
ber 2015 election, the armed forces remained politically powerful. A
defence White Paper published in 2016 gave a ‘statebuilding’ role to
7 AD bn
the Tatmadaw, further legitimising intervention in politics. Despite EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
the NLD winning an increased majority in the November 2020 elec- ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
tion, the Tatmadaw declared the result illegitimate and seized power MBT 195+: 10 T-55; 50 T-72S; 25+ Type-59D; 100 Type-69-
on 1 February 2021, declaring a year-long state of emergency which II; 10+ Type-90-II (MBT-2000)
was extended to 31 July 2022 and then again to February 2023. LT TK 105 Type-63 (ε60 serviceable)
The 2016 White Paper prioritised ending conflicts with domestic
ASLT 24 PTL-02 mod
armed groups. However, widespread civil unrest and an escalation
in clashes with ethnic-minority armed groups and People’s Defence
RECCE 95+: ε50 AML-90; 33 BRDM-2MS (incl CP);
Force (PDF) groups since the coup has sharpened the Tatmadaw’s 12+ EE-9 Cascavel; MAV-1
focus on internal security and counter-insurgency. In response, IFV 36+: 10+ BTR-3U; 26+ MT-LBMSh
the Tatmadaw launched a multipronged counter-insurgency cam- APC 345+
paign across 2021 and 2022. The Tatmadaw’s actions have also APC (T) 305: 250 ZSD-85; 55 ZSD-90
focused attention on force health, including morale and general APC (W) 30+ ZSL-92
cohesion. The Tatmadaw has been accused of widespread human- PPV 10+: BAAC-87; Gaia Thunder; 10 MPV
rights abuses against non-combatants during counter-insurgency AUV MAV-2; MAV-3
operations. These concerns intensified after the widely condemned
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
actions aimed at the Rohingya ethnic minority in 2017. China and
ARV Type-72
Russia are key partners in defence cooperation. In September 2022,
Japan said it would stop from 2023 a training programme that has VLB MT-55A
since 2015 seen small numbers of Myanmar military personnel ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
attend defence educational institutions in Japan. Since the 1990s, RCL 84mm Carl Gustaf; 106mm M40A1
the armed forces have attempted to develop limited conventional GUNS • TOWED 60: 57mm 6-pdr; 76mm 17-pdr
276 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
MRH 23: 3 AS365; 11 Mi-17 Hip H; 9 SA316 Alouette III ACTIVE 96,600 (Army 96,600) Gendarmerie &
TPT 49: Medium 10 PZL W-3 Sokol; Light 39: 12 Bell 205; Paramilitary 15,000
6 Bell 206 Jet Ranger; 4 H120 Colibri; 17 PZL Mi-2 Hoplite
UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES
CISR • Heavy 4 CH-3
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
AAM • IR PL-5; R-73 (RS-AA-11A Archer); PL-5E- Army 96,600
II; IR/SARH R-27 (RS-AA-10 Alamo); ARH PL-12 FORCES BY ROLE
(CH-AA-7A Adze) COMMAND
AShM C-802A 2 inf div HQ
1 (valley) comd
Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 107,000 SPECIAL FORCES
1 bde (1 SF bn, 1 AB bn, 1 cdo bn, 1 ranger bn, 1 mech
People’s Police Force 72,000 inf bn)
MANOEUVRE
People’s Militia 35,000 Light
18 inf bde (total: 62 inf bn; 32 indep inf coy)
COMBAT SUPPORT
Nepal NPL 1 arty bde
4 arty regt
Nepalese Rupee NPR 2021 2022 2023
5 engr bn
GDP NPR 4.28tr 4.74tr 1 sigs bde
USD 35.8bn 39.0bn AIR DEFENCE
2 AD regt
Asia
per capita USD 1,209 1,293
Growth % 4.2 4.2 4 indep AD coy
Inflation % 3.6 6.3 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
Def bdgt NPR 49.2bn 51.0bn 55.0bn
RECCE 40 Ferret
USD 413m 421m APC 253
USD1=NPR 119.32 121.38 APC (W) 13: 8 OT-64C; 5 WZ-551
Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) PPV 240: 90 Casspir; 150 MPV
387 AUV Dongfeng Mengshi; CS/VN3C mod 2
ARTILLERY 92+
205 TOWED 105mm 22: 8 L118 Light Gun; 14 pack howitzer
2008 2015 2022 (6 non-operational)
MOR 70+: 81mm; 120mm 70 M-43 (est 12 op)
Population 30,666,598
AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 32+: 14.5mm 30 Type-
56 (ZPU-4); 37mm (PRC); 40mm 2 L/60
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Male 13.8% 5.0% 5.1% 5.0% 17.1% 2.9% Air Wing 320
Female 13.1% 4.7% 5.1% 5.1% 20.1% 3.0% EQUIPMENT BY TYPE†
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 7: 1 BN-2T Islander;
Capabilities 1 CN235M-220; 3 M-28 Skytruck; 2 PA-28 Cherokee (trg)
HELICOPTERS
The principal role of Nepal’s armed forces is maintaining territo-
MRH 14: 1 A139; 1 Bell 407GXP (VIP); 2 Dhruv;
rial integrity, but they have also traditionally focused on internal
security and humanitarian relief. Nepal has a history of deploying 2 Lancer; 3 Mi-17-1V Hip H; 2 Mi-17V-5 Hip; 1 SA315B
contingents to UN peacekeeping operations. Training support Lama (Cheetah); 2 SA316B Alouette III
is provided by several countries, including China, India and the TPT 3: Medium 1 SA330J Puma; Light 2 AS350B2 Ecureuil
US. Following a 2006 peace accord with the Maoist People’s
Liberation Army, Maoist personnel underwent a process of demo- Paramilitary 15,000
bilisation or integration into the armed forces. Gurkhas continue to
be recruited by the British and Indian armed forces and the Singa- Armed Police Force 15,000
porean police. The small air wing provides a limited transport and Ministry of Home Affairs
support capacity but mobility remains a challenge, in part because
of topography. Nepal’s logistic capability appears to be sufficient
for internal-security operations; however, its contingents on UN DEPLOYMENT
peacekeeping operations appear to largely depend on contracted CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 835; 1 inf
logistic support. Modernisation plans include a very limited
bn; 1 MP pl
increase in the size of its air force. Barring maintenance capacities
there is no defence-industrial base, and Nepal is dependent on DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN •
foreign suppliers for modern equipment. MONUSCO 1,154; 1 inf bn; 1 engr coy
278 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
IRAQ: UN • UNAMI 77; 1 sy unit Defence Capability Plan outlined plans to acquire a sealift vessel
and C-130J Hercules transport aircraft before 2030, as well as to
LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 872; 1 mech inf bn expand the army to 6,000 personnel by 2035. The year before,
LIBYA: UN • UNISMIL 234; 2 sy coy the decision was taken to purchase four P-8 Poseidon maritime
patrol aircraft. Replacement of the ANZAC frigates, both of which
MALI: UN • MINUSMA 177; 1 EOD coy are being upgraded, has now been postponed until the 2030s.
MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 3 New Zealand has a small defence industry consisting of numerous
private companies and subsidiaries of larger North American and
SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 1,749; 2 inf bn European companies. These companies are able to provide some
SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 89; 1 log coy maintenance, repair and overhaul capability but significant work is
contracted overseas.
SYRIA/ISRAEL: UN • UNDOF 412; 1 mech inf coy; 1 inf
coy; 1 log coy(-) ACTIVE 9,200 (Army 4,500 Navy 2,200 Air 2,500)
WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 5 RESERVE 3,010 (Army 2,050 Navy 610 Air Force 350)
Asia
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT 3 combat capable Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
ASW 3 P-3K2 Orion Male 18.0% 5.2% 4.7% 4.2% 16.7% 2.2%
TPT 11: Medium 5 C-130H Hercules (upgraded); Light 4 Female 17.2% 5.0% 4.4% 4.0% 16.0% 2.5%
Beech 350 King Air (leased); PAX 2 B-757-200 (upgraded)
TRG 11 T-6C Texan II Capabilities
HELICOPTERS
The armed forces have considerable domestic political influ-
ASW 8 SH-2G(I) Super Seasprite
ence and are the dominant voice on defence and security policy.
TPT 13: Medium 8 NH90; Light 5 AW109LUH
Pakistan’s nuclear and conventional forces have traditionally been
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AShM AGM-119 Penguin oriented and structured against a prospective threat from India.
Mk2 mod7 Since 2008, counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism have been
the forces’ main effort. Although an army-led counter-terrorism
DEPLOYMENT operation has improved domestic security, terrorist attacks
continue. Some analysts believe that the Pakistan government con-
EGYPT: MFO 26; 1 trg unit; 1 tpt unit sidered the Taliban victory in Afghanistan a policy success. Mutual
reaffirmation of the 2003 ceasefire agreement between India and
IRAQ: Operation Inherent Resolve 9
Pakistan has reduced conflict across the Line of Control in the
MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 8 disputed region of Jammu and Kashmir. The armed forces have a
SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 3 major role in disaster relief. China is Pakistan’s main defence partner,
with all three services employing a large amount of Chinese equip-
ment. Military cooperation with the US is limited by sanctions
aiming to improve cooperation on counter-terrorism. Recruitment
is good, retention is high and the forces have experienced training
establishments. The army and air force have considerable opera-
tional experience from a decade of counter-insurgency operations
in Pakistan’s tribal areas. Funds have been directed towards improv-
ing security on the border with Afghanistan. Major investment in
military nuclear programmes continues, including the testing of
a nuclear-capable sea-launched cruise missile. The navy plans to
increase surface combatants, patrol vessels, submarines (in collabo-
ration with China), maritime-patrol aircraft and UAVs. This is to both
improve combat capability and the protection of sea-based nuclear
weapons. The air force is modernising its inventory while improv-
ing its precision-strike and ISR capabilities. The indigenous defence
industry has well-developed maintenance facilities for combat
aircraft and exports platforms, weapons and ammunition; there is
considerable defence-industrial collaboration with China.
AIR DEFENCE
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE 1 AD comd (3 AD gp (total: 8 AD bn))
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Strategic Forces ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
Operational control rests with the National Command MBT 2,537: 300 Al-Khalid (MBT 2000); ε110 Al-Khalid I;
Authority. The Strategic Plans Directorate (SPD) manages 315 T-80UD; ε500 Al-Zarrar; 400 Type-69; 268 Type-85-
and commands all of Pakistan’s military nuclear capability. IIAP; 44 VT-4; ε600 ZTZ-59
The SPD also commands a reportedly 25,000-strong APC 3,545
military security force responsible for guarding the APC (T) 3,200: 2,300 M113A1/A2/P; ε200 Talha;
country’s nuclear infrastructure 600 VCC-1/VCC-2; ε100 ZSD-63
APC (W) 120 BTR-70/BTR-80
Army Strategic Forces Command 12,000–
PPV 225 Maxxpro
15,000
AUV 10 Dingo 2
Commands all land-based strategic nuclear forces
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARV 262+: 175 Type-70/Type-84 (W653/W653A);
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS 60+ Al-Hadeed; 52 M88A1; 35 Maxxpro ARV; T-54/T-55
MRBM • Nuclear 30+: ε30 Ghauri/Ghauri II (Hatf-V)/ VLB M47M; M48/60
Shaheen-II (Hatf-VI); Shaheen-III (in test) MW Aardvark Mk II
SRBM • Nuclear 30+: ε30 Ghaznavi (Hatf-III – PRC ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
M-11)/Shaheen-I (Hatf-IV); some Abdali (Hatf-II); some MSL
Nasr (Hatf-IX)
SP M901 TOW; ε30 Maaz (HJ-8 on Talha chassis)
GLCM • Nuclear Babur-I/IA (Hatf-VII); Ra’ad (Hatf-
MANPATS HJ-8; TOW
VIII – in test)
RCL 75mm Type-52; 106mm M40A1 RL 89mm M20
Air Force GUNS 85mm 200 Type-56 (D-44)
ARTILLERY 4,619+
1–2 sqn of F-16A/B or Mirage 5 may be assigned a
SP 552: 155mm 492: 200 M109A2; ε115 M109A5;
nuclear-strike role
123 M109L; ε54 SH-15; 203mm 60 M110/M110A2
Army 560,000 TOWED 1,629: 105mm 329: 216 M101; 113 M-56;
FORCES BY ROLE 122mm 570: 80 D-30 (PRC); 490 Type-54 (M-1938);
COMMAND 130mm 410 Type-59-I; 155mm 292: 144 M114; 148
9 corps HQ M198; 203mm 28 M115
1 (Northern) comd MRL 88+: 107mm Type-81; 122mm 52+: 52 Azar (Type-
SPECIAL FORCES 83); some KRL-122; 300mm 36 A100
2 SF gp (total: 4 SF bn) MOR 2,350+: 81mm; 120mm AM-50
MANOEUVRE SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS
Armoured MRBM • Nuclear 30+: ε30 Ghauri/Ghauri II (Hatf-V)/
2 armd div Shaheen-II (Hatf-VI); some Shaheen-III (in test)
7 indep armd bde SRBM 135+: Nuclear 30+: ε30 Ghaznavi (Hatf-III – PRC
Mechanised M-11)/Shaheen-I (Hatf-IV); some Abdali (Hatf-II); some
2 mech inf div Nasr (Hatf-IX); Conventional 105 Hatf-I
1 indep mech bde GLCM • Nuclear some Babur-I/IA (Hatf-VII)
Light AIRCRAFT
18 inf div TPT • Light 13: 1 Beech 350 King Air; 3 Cessna 208B;
5 indep inf bde 1 Cessna 421; 1 Cessna 550 Citation; 1 Cessna 560 Citation;
4 (Northern Command) inf bde 2 Turbo Commander 690; 4 Y-12(II)
Other TRG 87 MFI-17B Mushshak
2 sy div HELICOPTERS
COMBAT SUPPORT ATK 42: 38 AH-1F/S Cobra with TOW; 4 Mi-35M Hind;
1 arty div (1 Mi-24 Hind in store)
14 arty bde MRH 115+: 10 H125M Fennec; 7 AW139; 26 Bell 412EP
7 engr bde Twin Huey; 38+ Mi-17 Hip H; 2 Mi-171E Hip; 12 SA315B
AVIATION Lama; 20 SA319 Alouette III
1 VIP avn sqn TPT 76: Medium 36: 31 SA330 Puma; 4 Mi-171; 1 Mi-
4 avn sqn 172; Light 40: 17 H125 Ecureuil (SAR); 5 Bell 205 (UH-
HELICOPTER 1H Iroquois); 5 Bell 205A-1 (AB-205A-1); 13 Bell 206B
3 atk hel sqn Jet Ranger II
2 ISR hel sqn TRG 10 Hughes 300C
2 SAR hel sqn UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES
2 tpt hel sqn CISR • Heavy 5 CH-4
1 spec ops hel sqn ISR • Light Bravo; Jasoos; Vector
Asia 281
Asia
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 8
TPT 3: Light 2 ATR-72-500; PAX 1 Hawker 850XP
FFGHM 6:
HELICOPTERS
4 Sword (F-22P) with 2 quad lnchr with C-802A AShM,
ASW 11: 4 Sea King Mk45; 7 Z-9C Haitun
1 octuple lnchr with FM-90N (CH-SA-N-4) SAM,
MRH 6 SA319B Alouette III
2 triple 324mm ASTT with ET-52C (A244/S) LWT,
SAR 1 Sea King (ex-HAR3A)
2 RDC-32 A/S mor, 1 Type 730B (H/PJ-12) CIWS,
TPT • Medium 5: 1 Commando Mk2A; 3 Commando
1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Z-9C Haitun hel)
Mk3; 1 Sea King (ex-HC4)
2 Tughril (Type-054AP (Jiangkai II)) with 2 twin lnchr
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AShM AM39 Exocet
with CM-302 (YJ-12A) AShM, 4 8-cell H/AJK-16
VLS with LY-80N (HHQ-16 (CH-SA-N-16)) SAM, 2 Coastal Defence
triple 324mm ASTT with Yu-7 LWT, 2 H/PJ-11 CIWS,
FORCES BY ROLE
1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Z-9C Haitun ASW hel)
COASTAL Defence
FFGH 1 Alamgir (ex-US Oliver Hazard Perry) with 2 quad
1 AShM regt with Zarb (YJ-62)
lnchr with RGM-84 Harpoon AShM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT
with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS, 1 76mm gun EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
FFHM 1 Tariq (ex-UK Amazon) with 1 sextuple lnchr COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM Zarb (YJ-62)
with LY-60N SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk 46
LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 1 114mm gun Air Force 70,000
(capacity 1 hel) 3 regional comds: Northern (Peshawar), Central (Sargodha),
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 20 Southern (Masroor). The Composite Air Tpt Wg, Combat
CORVETTES • FSH 2 Yarmook (Damen OPV 1900) Cadres School and PAF Academy are Direct Reporting Units
(fitted for but not with 2 quad lnchr for AShM) with 1 FORCES BY ROLE
Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS (capacity 1 hel) FIGHTER
PCG 4: 2 Azmat (FAC(M)) with 2 quad lnchr with C-802A 3 sqn with F-7PG/FT-7PG Airguard
AShM, 1 AK630 CIWS; 2 Azmat (FAC(M)) with 2 triple 1 sqn with F-16A/B MLU Fighting Falcon
lnchr with C-602 AShM, 1 AK630 CIWS 1 sqn with F-16A/B ADF Fighting Falcon
PBG 4: 2 Jalalat with 2 twin lnchr with C-802 (CH- 1 sqn with Mirage IIID/E (IIIOD/EP)
SS-N-6) AShM; 2 Jurrat with 2 twin lnchr with C-802 FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
(CH-SS-N-6) AShM 1 sqn with JF-17 Thunder (FC-1 Block 1)
PBF 4: 2 Kaan 15; 2 Zarrar (33) 3 sqn with JF-17 Thunder (FC-1 Block 2)
PB 6: 1 Larkana; 1 Rajshahi†; 4 M16 Fast Assault Boat 1 sqn with JF-17B Thunder (FC-1 Block 2)
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 3 1 sqn with F-16C/D Block 52 Fighting Falcon
MCC 3 Munsif (FRA Eridan) 3 sqn with Mirage 5 (5PA)
AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 8 ANTI-SURFACE WARFARE
LCM 2 1 sqn with Mirage 5PA2/5PA3 with AM-39 Exocet AShM
LCAC 2 Griffon 8100TD ELECTRONIC WARFARE/ELINT
UCAC 4 Griffon 2000TD 1 sqn with Falcon 20F
282 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 1,310; government made efforts in the next decade to revive defence
1 inf bn; 2 engr coy; 1 hel sqn capability. A 2013 defence White Paper identified core roles includ-
ing defending the state and civil-emergency assistance, but noted
CYPRUS: UN • UNFICYP 3
that ‘defence capabilities have deteriorated to the extent that
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • we have alarming gaps in our land, air and maritime borders’.
MONUSCO 1,974; 2 inf bn; 1 hel sqn with SA330 Puma The White Paper called for strengthening defence capability on
an ambitious scale, with long-term plans calling for a ‘division-
MALI: UN • MINUSMA 221; 1 hel flt with 3 Mi-17; 1 fd
sized force’ of 10,000 personnel by 2030. The PNGDF continues
hospital to receive substantial external military assistance from Australia
SOMALIA: UN • UNSOS 1 and also from China, which has donated equipment. In late 2018,
plans to build a joint US–Australia–Papua New Guinea naval base
SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 286; 1 engr coy
at Lombrum were announced. In 2022 there were discussions on
SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 583; 1 inf bn closer defence cooperation with Australia. The PNGDF is not able
WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 13 to deploy outside the country without outside assistance and there
have only been small PNGDF deployments to UN peacekeeping
missions. The PNGDF will receive four of the Guardian-class patrol
FOREIGN FORCES boats that Australia is donating to small Pacific island nations.
Figures represent total numbers for UNMOGIP mission in These will replace the four Pacific-class boats Australia donated in
India and Pakistan the 1980s. Papua New Guinea has no significant defence industry,
though there is some local maintenance capacity.
Argentina 3
Croatia 8 ACTIVE 4,000 (Army 3,700 Maritime Element 200
Italy 2 Air 100)
Korea, Republic of 7
Mexico 1 ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
Asia
Philippines 5
Romania 2 Army ε3,700
Sweden 4 FORCES BY ROLE
Switzerland 3 SPECIAL FORCES
Thailand 6 1 spec ops unit
Uruguay 3 MANOEUVRE
Light
Papua New Guinea PNG 2 inf bn
COMBAT SUPPORT
Papua New Guinea Kina
2021 2022 2023
1 engr bn
PGK 1 EOD unit
GDP PGK 94.6bn 109bn 1 sigs sqn
USD 27.3bn 31.4bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
per capita USD 3,050 3,427 ARTILLERY • MOR 3+: 81mm Some; 120mm 3
Growth % 1.2 3.8
Inflation % 4.5 6.6 Maritime Element ε200
Def bdgt PGK 305m 344m 333m HQ located at Port Moresby
USD 88.2m 99.4m EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PCO 3
USD1=PGK 3.46 3.46
Guardian (AUS Bay mod)
Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 2
94
LCT 1 Salamaua (ex-AUS Balikpapan)
LCM 1 Cape Gloucester
42
2008 2015 2022
Air Force ε100
Population 9,593,498 FORCES BY ROLE
TRANSPORT
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus 1 sqn with CN235M-100; IAI-201 Arava
Male 19.2% 5.0% 4.5% 4.1% 16.1% 1.9% TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
Female 18.4% 4.8% 4.4% 3.9% 15.9% 1.9% 1 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois)†
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Capabilities AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 3: 1 CN235M-100 (1 more in
Since independence in 1975, the Papua New Guinea Defence Force store); 2 IAI-201 Arava
(PNGDF) has suffered from underfunding and lack of capacity to HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 3: 2 Bell 412 (leased); 1 Bell
perform its core roles. After personnel reductions in the 2000s, the 212 (leased) (2 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois) non-operational)
284 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Shark LWT, 1 76mm gun (fitted for but not with 1 8-cell AAV 67: 8 AAV-7A1; 4 LVTH-6†; 55 LVTP-7
VLS) (capacity 1 AW159 Wildcat) ARTILLERY 37+
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 53 TOWED 37: 105mm 31: 23 M101; 8 M-26; 155mm 6
CORVETTES • FS 1 Conrado Yap (ex-ROK Po Hang (Flight Soltam M-71
III)) with 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT, 2 76mm gun MOR 107mm M30
PSOH 3 Del Pilar (ex-US Hamilton) with 1 76mm gun
(capacity 1 Bo 105) Naval Special Operations Group
PCF 1 General Mariano Alvares (ex-US Cyclone) FORCES BY ROLE
PCO 4: 3 Emilio Jacinto (ex-UK Peacock) with 1 76mm gun; SPECIAL FORCES
1 Miguel Malvar (ex-US) with 1 76mm gun 1 SEAL unit
PBFG 6 MPAC Mk3 with 1 Typhoon MLS-ER quad lnchr 1 diving unit
with Spike-ER SSM 10 naval spec ops unit
PBF 6 MPAC Mk1/2 1 special boat unit
PB 26: 22 Jose Andrada; 2 Kagitingan; 2 Point (ex-US) COMBAT SUPPORT
PBR 6 Silver Ships 1 EOD unit
AMPHIBIOUS
PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS • LPD 2: Air Force 17,600
2 Tarlac (IDN Makassar) (capacity 2 LCVP; 3 hels; FORCES BY ROLE
13 tanks; 500 troops) FIGHTER
LANDING SHIPS • LST 4: 1 sqn with FA-50PH Fighting Eagle*
2 Bacolod City (US Besson) with 1 hel landing platform GROUND ATTACK
(capacity 32 tanks; 150 troops) 1 sqn with EMB-314 Super Tucano*
2 LST-1/542 (ex-US) (capacity 16 tanks; 200 troops) 1 sqn with OV-10A/C Bronco*; SF-260F/TP*
(1 other permanently grounded as marine outpost)
Asia
ISR
LANDING CRAFT 15 1 sqn with Cessna 208B Grand Caravan; Turbo Commander
LCM 2: 1 Manobo; 1 Tagbanua (capacity 100 tons; 690A
200 troops) SEARCH & RESCUE
LCT 5 Ivatan (ex-AUS Balikpapan) 4 (SAR/Comms) sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1M Iroquois);
LCU 4: 3 LCU Mk 6 (ex-US); 1 Mamanwa (ex-RoK Mulgae I) AUH-76; W-3A Sokol
LCVP 4 TRANSPORT
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 4 1 sqn with C-130B/H/T Hercules
AGOR 1 Gregorio Velasquez (ex-US Melville) 1 sqn with C295/W; F-27-200 MPA; F-27-500 Friendship
AOL 1 1 sqn with N-22B Nomad; N-22SL Searchmaster; C-212
AP 1 Ang Pangulo Aviocar (NC-212i)
AWT 1 Lake Buluan 1 VIP sqn with C295M; F-28 Fellowship; Gulfstream G280
TRAINING
Naval Aviation 1 sqn with SF-260FH
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 1 sqn with T-41B/D/K Mescalero
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 14: 5 Beech 90 King Air (TC- 1 sqn with S-211*
90); 3 BN-2A Defender; 4 Cessna 172; 2 Cessna 177 Cardinal 1 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois)
HELICOPTERS ATTACK HELICOPTER
ASW 2 AW159 Wildcat 1 sqn with AH-1S Cobra; MD-520MG
TPT 13: Medium 4 Mi-171Sh; Light 9: 3 AW109; 1 sqn with AW109E
2 AW109E; 4 Bo-105 TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
2 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois)
Marines 8,300 1 sqn with S-70i Black Hawk
FORCES BY ROLE 1 (VIP) sqn with Bell 412EP Twin Huey; S-70A Black Hawk
SPECIAL FORCES (S-70A-5)
1 (force recon) spec ops bn ISR UAV
MANOEUVRE 1 sqn with Hermes 450/900
Amphibious AIR DEFENCE
4 mne bde (total: 12 mne bn) 2 bty with Spyder-MR
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 CSS bde (6 CSS bn) AIRCRAFT 49 combat capable
COASTAL DEFENCE FGA 12 FA-50PH Fighting Eagle
1 coastal def bde (1 AShM bn (forming); 1 SAM bn MP 3: 1 C-130T MP mod; 1 F-27-200 MPA; 1 N-22SL
(forming)) Searchmaster
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ISR 11: 2 Cessna 208B Grand Caravan; 9 OV-10A/C Bronco*
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES TPT 17: Medium 4: 1 C-130B Hercules; 2 C-130H Hercules;
APC • APC (W) 42: 19 LAV-150 Commando; 23 LAV-300 1 C-130T Hercules Light 11: 3 C295; 1 C295M; 2 C295W;
286 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Asia
6 mech inf bn
Light MRL 227mm 18 M142 HIMARS
2 (gds) inf bn MOR 638+
Other SP 90+: 81mm; 120mm 90: 40 on Bronco; 50 on M113
2 sy bn TOWED 548: 81mm 500 120mm 36 M-65; 160mm 12
COMBAT SUPPORT M-58 Tampella
2 arty bn
1 STA bn Navy 4,000 (incl 1,000 conscripts)
2 engr bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 EOD bn SUBMARINES • SSK 4:
1 ptn br bn 2 Archer (ex-SWE Västergötland) (fitted with AIP) with 3
1 int bn single 400mm TT with Torped 431, 6 single 533mm TT
2 ISR bn
with Black Shark HWT
1 CBRN bn
2 Challenger (ex-SWE Sjoormen) with 2 single 400mm TT
3 sigs bn
with Torped 431, 4 single 533mm TT with Torped 613
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 6
3 med bn
FFGHM 6 Formidable with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84
2 tpt bn
Harpoon AShM, 4 8-cell Sylver A43 VLS with Aster 15
3 spt bn
SAM, 2 triple 324mm ILAS-3 (B-515) ASTT with A244/S
Reserves LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 S-70B Sea Hawk hel)
Activated units form part of divisions and brigades listed PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 26
above; 1 op reserve div with additional armd & inf bde; CORVETTES • FSM 8 Independence (Littoral Mission
People’s Defence Force Comd (homeland defence) with Vessel) with 1 12-cell CLA VLS with VL MICA,
12 inf bn 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform
FORCES BY ROLE PCGM 6 Victory with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84C
SPECIAL FORCES Harpoon Block 1B AShM, 2 8-cell VLS with Barak-1
1 cdo bn SAM, 1 76mm gun
MANOEUVRE PCO 4 Sentinel (Fearless mod) with 1 76mm gun
Reconnaissance PBF 8: 2 SMC Type 1; 6 SMC Type 2
6 lt armd/recce bn MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 4
Mechanised MCC 4 Bedok
6 mech inf bn AMPHIBIOUS
Light PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS • LPD 4 Endurance
ε56 inf bn with 2 twin Simbad lnchr with Mistral SAM, 1 76mm gun
COMBAT SUPPORT (capacity 2 hel; 4 LCVP; 18 MBT; 350 troops)
ε12 arty bn LANDING CRAFT • LCVP 23: ε17 FCEP; 6 FCU
ε8 engr bn LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 5
288 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
21 (flying trg) located at Pearce. Army: prepositioned AFVs ACTIVE 255,000 (Army 177,000 Navy 50,000
and heavy equipment at Shoalwater Bay training area Air 28,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 62,200
BRUNEI: 1 trg camp with inf units on rotation; 1 hel det
with AS332M1 Super Puma
RESERVE 5,500 (Army 1,100 Navy 2,400
Air Force 2,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 30,400
FRANCE: 200: 1 trg sqn with 12 M-346 Master
TAIWAN: 3 trg camp (incl inf and arty)
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
THAILAND: 1 trg camp (arty, cbt engr)
UNITED STATES: Trg units with F-16C/D; 12 F-15SG; AH- Army 113,000; 64,00 active reservists (recalled)
64D Apache; 6+ CH-47D Chinook (total 177,000)
Regt are bn sized
FOREIGN FORCES FORCES BY ROLE
United States US Indo-Pacific Command: 200; 1 naval spt COMMAND
facility at Changi naval base; 1 USAF log spt sqn at Paya 7 region HQ
Lebar air base 21 div HQ
SPECIAL FORCES
Sri Lanka LKA 1 indep SF bde
MANOEUVRE
Sri Lankan Rupee LKR 2021 2022 2023 Reconnaissance
GDP LKR 17.7tr 23.8tr 3 armd recce regt
Armoured
USD 89.0bn 73.7bn
1 armd bde(-)
Asia
per capita USD 4,016 3,293
Mechanised
Growth % 3.3 -8.7 1 mech inf bde
Inflation % 6.0 48.2 Light
Def bdgt LKR 308bn 373bn 60 inf bde
USD 1.55bn 1.15bn 1 cdo bde
USD1=LKR 198.76 323.34 Air Manoeuvre
1 air mob bde
Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015)
2.04 COMBAT SUPPORT
7 arty regt
1.38 1 MRL regt
2008 2015 2022 8 engr regt
6 sigs regt
Population 23,187,516
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
MBT 62 T-55A/T-55AM2
Male 11.4% 4.0% 3.6% 3.5% 21.6% 4.8%
RECCE 15 Saladin
Female 11.0% 3.8% 3.4% 3.4% 23.0% 6.6% IFV 62+: 13 BMP-1; 49 BMP-2; WZ-551 20mm
APC 211+
Capabilities APC (T) 30+: some Type-63; 30 Type-85; some Type-89
Since the defeat of the Tamil Tigers, the armed forces have reori- APC (W) 181: 25 BTR-80/BTR-80A; 31 Buffel; 20 WZ-
ented to a peacetime internal-security role. Support has been 551; 105 Unicorn
provided by China, in an indication of a growing military-to-military ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
relationship. The US has eased its long-standing military trade ARV 16 VT-55
restrictions and Japan has stated an intention to increase mari-
VLB 2 MT-55
time cooperation. Sri Lanka has little capacity for force projection
beyond its national territory but has sent small numbers of troops ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
on UN missions. The navy’s littoral capability, based on fast-attack MANPATS HJ-8
and patrol boats, has been strengthened with the acquisition of RCL 40: 105mm ε10 M-65; 106mm ε30 M40
offshore-patrol vessels, while the US has gifted a former US coast- GUNS 85mm 8 Type-56 (D-44)
guard cutter and China has gifted a frigate. The army is reducing in ARTILLERY 908
size and there appears to have been little spending on new equip- TOWED 96: 122mm 20; 130mm 30 Type-59-I; 152mm 46
ment since the end of the civil war. Sri Lanka is looking to begin
Type-66 (D-20)
a series of procurements to fill key capability gaps but ambitions
MRL 122mm 28: 6 KRL-122; 22 RM-70
are limited by budget constraints. The effect of the 2022 political
and economic crisis on Sri Lanka’s defence policy and procurement MOR 784: 81mm 520; 82mm 209; 120mm 55 M-43
is unclear. Beyond maintenance facilities and limited fabrication, UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES
such as at Sri Lanka’s shipyards, there is no defence-industrial base. ISR • Medium 1 Seeker
290 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Special Boat Service ε100 Police Force 30,200; 1,000 (women) (total
31,200) 30,400 reservists
Reserve Organisations Ministry of Defence Special Task Force 3,000
Sri Lanka Volunteer Naval Force (SLVNF) 13,000 Anti-guerrilla unit
active reservists
Coast Guard n/k
Air Force 28,000 (incl SLAF Regt) Ministry of Defence
FORCES BY ROLE EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
FIGHTER PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 28
1 sqn with F-7BS/G; FT-7 PCO 1 Suraksha (ex-IND Vikram) with 1 hel landing
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK platform
1 sqn with Kfir C-2 PBF 22: 2 Dvora; 4 Super Dvora Mk I; 3 Killer (ROK);
1 sqn with K-8 Karakorum* 10 (Inshore Patrol Craft); 3 (Fast Patrol Craft)
TRANSPORT PB 4: 2 Simonneau Type-508; 2 Samudra Raksha
1 sqn with An-32B Cline; C-130K Hercules; Cessna 421C PBR 1
Golden Eagle
1 sqn with Beech B200 King Air; Y-12 (II) DEPLOYMENT
TRAINING
1 wg with PT-6, Cessna 150L CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 112;
ATTACK HELICOPTER 1 hel sqn
1 sqn with Mi-24V Hind E; Mi-35P Hind LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 126; 1 inf coy
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER MALI: UN • MINUSMA 243; 1 sy coy
1 sqn with Mi-17 Hip H; Mi-171Sh
1 sqn with Bell 206A/B (incl basic trg), Bell 212 SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 66; 1 fd hospital
1 (VIP) sqn with Bell 212; Bell 412 Twin Huey WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 2
Asia 291
Asia
Female 6.0% 2.2% 2.9% 3.4% 26.7% 9.5% 3 sigs gp
COASTAL DEFENCE
Capabilities 1 AShM bn
TOWED 81mm 160 M29; T-75; 107mm M30; 120mm FFGH 1 Chin Yang (ex-US Knox) with 1 octuple Mk 112
K5; XT-86 lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon Block 1B AShM, 2 twin
COASTAL DEFENCE 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Mk 15
ARTY 54: 127mm ε50 US Mk32 (reported); 240mm 4 M1 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 MD-
AShM Ching Feng 500 hel)
HELICOPTERS PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 44
ATK 96: 67 AH-1W Cobra; 29 AH-64E Apache CORVETTES • FSGM 1 Ta Jiang (Tuo Jiang mod) with 4
MRH 38 OH-58D Kiowa Warrior twin lnchr with Hsiung Feng II AShM, 2 twin lnchr with
TPT 38: Heavy 8 CH-47SD Super D Chinook; Medium 30 Hsiung Feng III AShM, 2 octuple lnchr with Tien Chien 2N
UH-60M Black Hawk (Sea Sword II) SAM, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS, 1 76mm gun,
TRG 29 TH-67 Creek
1 hel landing platform
UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES
PCFG 1 Tuo Jiang (Hsun Hai) with 4 twin lnchr with
ISR • Light Mastiff III
Hsiung Feng II AShM, 4 twin lnchr with Hisung Feng
AIR DEFENCE
III AShM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT, 1 Mk 15
SAM • Point-defence 76+: 74 M1097 Avenger; 2 M48
Phalanx Block 1B CIWS; 1 76mm gun
Chaparral; FIM-92 Stinger
PCG 10:
GUNS
SP 40mm M42 4 Jin Chiang with 2 twin lnchr with Hsiung Feng II
TOWED 40mm L/70 AShM, 1 76mm gun
6 Jin Chiang with 1 twin lnchr with Hsiung Feng III
Navy 40,000 AShM, 1 76mm gun
PCC 1 Jin Chiang (test platform)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PBG 31 Kwang Hua with 2 twin lnchr with Hsiung Feng
SUBMARINES • SSK 4:
2 Hai Lung with 6 single 533mm TT with UGM-84L II AShM
Harpoon Block II AShM/SUT HWT MINE WARFARE 9
2 Hai Shih† (ex-US Guppy II (used in trg role)) with 10 MINE COUNTERMEASURES 7
single 533mm TT (6 fwd, 4 aft) with SUT HWT MHC 6: 4 Yung Feng; 2 Yung Jin (ex-US Osprey)
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 26 MSO 1 Yung Yang (ex-US Aggressive)
DESTROYERS • DDGHM 4 Keelung (ex-US Kidd) with MINELAYERS • ML 2 FMLB
2 quad lnchr with RGM-84L Harpoon Block II AShM, 2 COMMAND SHIPS • LCC 1 Kao Hsiung
twin Mk 26 GMLS with SM-2 Block IIIA SAM, 2 triple AMPHIBIOUS
324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 2 Mk 15 PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 2
Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 2 127mm gun (capacity 1 S-70 LPD 1 Yu Shan with 4 octuple lnchr with Tien Chien 2N
ASW hel) (Sea Sword II) SAM, 2 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS, 1 76mm
FRIGATES 22 gun (capacity 2 med hel; 4 LCM; 9 AAV-7A1; approx
FFGHM 21: 500 troops)
8 Cheng Kung (US Oliver Hazard Perry mod) with 2 LSD 1 Shiu Hai (ex-US Anchorage) with 2 Mk 15 Phalanx
quad lnchr with Hsiung Feng II/III AShM, 1 Mk CIWS, 1 hel landing platform (capacity either 2 LCU
13 GMLS with SM-1MR Block VI SAM, 2 triple or 18 LCM; 360 troops)
324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Mk LANDING SHIPS
15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity LST 6:
2 S-70C ASW hel) 4 Chung Hai (ex-US LST-524) (capacity 16 tanks; 200
2 Meng Chuan (ex-US Oliver Hazard Perry) with 1
troops)
Mk13 GMLS with RGM-84 Harpoon AShM/SM-
2 Chung Ho (ex-US Newport) with 1 Mk 15 Phalanx
1MR Block VI SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32
CIWS, 1 hel landing platform (capacity 3 LCVP, 23
ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B
AFVs, 400 troops)
CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 S-70C ASW hel)
LANDING CRAFT 44
5 Chin Yang (ex-US Knox) with 1 octuple Mk 16 lnchr
LCM ε32 (various)
with RGM-84C Harpoon Block 1B AShM/ASROC
A/S msl, 2 triple lnchr with SM-1MR Block VI LCU 12 LCU 1610 (capacity 2 M60A3 or 400 troops)
SAM, 2 twin lnchr with SM-1MR Block VI SAM, (minelaying capability)
2 twin 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 9
LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 1 127mm AGOR 1 Ta Kuan
gun (capacity 1 MD-500 hel) AOEH 1 Panshih with 1 quad lnchr with Sea Chaparral
6 Kang Ding with 2 quad lnchr with Hsiung Feng SAM, 2 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS (capacity 3 med hel)
II AShM, 1 quad lnchr with Sea Chaparral SAM, AOE 1 Wu Yi with 1 quad lnchr with Sea Chaparral SAM,
2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 1 hel landing platform
LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 1 76mm gun ARS 2: 1 Da Hu (ex-US Diver); 1 Da Juen (ex-US Bolster)
(capacity 1 S-70C ASW hel) ATF 4 Ta Tung (ex-US Cherokee)
Asia 293
Asia
BOMBS • Laser-guided GBU-12 Paveway II
1 sqn with MD-500 Defender
ISR UAV Air Defence and Missile Command
1 bn with Chung Shyang II FORCES BY ROLE
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE
HELICOPTERS 1 GLCM bde (2 GLCM bn with Hsiung Feng IIE)
ASW 19 S-70C Seahawk (S-70C Defender) AIR DEFENCE
MRH 10 MD-500 Defender 1 (792) SAM bde (1 SAM bn with Tien Kung III; 2 ADA bn)
UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES • ISR • Medium 2 (793 & 794) SAM bde (1 SAM bn with Tien Kung II;
ε28 Chung Shyang II 1 SAM bn with M902 Patriot PAC-3; 1 SAM bn with
MIM-23 Hawk)
Air Force 35,000 1 (795) SAM bde (1 SAM bn with M902 Patriot PAC-3;
FORCES BY ROLE 2 ADA bn)
FIGHTER EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
3 sqn with Mirage 2000-5E/D (2000-5EI/DI) SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK GLCM • Conventional ε12 Hsiung Feng IIE
3 sqn with F-5E/F Tiger II AIR DEFENCE
3 sqn with F-16A/B Fighting Falcon SAM 202+
3 sqn with F-16V(A/B) Fighting Falcon Long-range 122+: 72+ M902 Patriot PAC-3; ε50 Tien
5 sqn with F-CK-1A/B/C/D Ching Kuo Kung II
ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE Medium-range 50 MIM-23 Hawk
1 sqn with P-3C Orion Short-range 30 RIM-7M Sparrow with Skyguard
ELECTRONIC WARFARE Point-defence Antelope
1 sqn with C-130HE Tien Gian GUNS • 20mm some T-82; 35mm 20+ GDF-006
ISR with Skyguard
1 sqn with RF-5E Tigereye MISSILE DEFENCE Tien Kung III
AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 11,800
1 sqn with E-2T Hawkeye
SEARCH & RESCUE Coast Guard 11,800
1 sqn with H225; UH-60M Black Hawk EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
TRANSPORT PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 168
2 sqn with C-130H Hercules PSOH 5: 1 Chiayi; 2 Tainan; 2 Yilan
1 (VIP) sqn with B-727-100; B-737-800; Beech 1900; F-50; PSO 6: 4 Miaoli with 1 hel landing platform; 2 Ho Hsing
S-70C Black Hawk PCF 3 Anping (Tuo Jiang mod)
TRAINING PCO 14: 2 Kinmen; 2 Mou Hsing; 1 Shun Hu 1; 3 Shun Hu
1 sqn with AT-3A/B Tzu-Chung* 7; 4 Taichung; 2 Taipei
1 sqn with Beech 1900 PBF ε58 (various)
1 (basic) sqn with T-34C Turbo Mentor PB 82: 1 Shun Hu 6; ε81 (various)
294 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Asia
2 Chao Phraya (trg role) with 4 twin lnchr with
MSL
C-802A AShM, 2 RBU 1200 Uragan A/S mor, 2 twin
SP 30+: 18+ M901A5 (TOW); 12 BTR-3RK
100mm gun
MANPATS M47 Dragon
2 Chao Phraya with 4 twin lnchr with C-802A AShM,
RCL 180: 75mm 30 M20; 106mm 150 M40
2 RBU 1200 Uragan A/S mor, 1 twin 100mm gun, 1
ARTILLERY 2,579
hel landing platform
SP 155mm 42: 16 ATMOS 2000; 6 CAESAR; 20 M109A5
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 70
TOWED 525: 105mm 296: 24 LG1 MkII; 12 M-56; 200
CORVETTES 7:
M101A1; 60 L119 Light Gun; (12 M102; 32 M618A2 in
FSGM 2 Rattanakosin with 2 twin lnchr with RGM-84
store); 155mm 229: 90 GHN-45 A1; 118 M198; 21 M-71
Harpoon AShM, 1 octuple Albatros lnchr with Aspide
(48 M114 in store)
SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Stingray
MRL 68: 122mm 4 SR-4; 130mm 60 PHZ-85; 302mm 4: 1
LWT, 1 76mm gun
DTI-1 (WS-1B); 3 DTI-1G (WS-32)
FSG 1 Krabi (UK River mod) with 2 twin lnchr with
MOR 1,944+: 81mm/107mm/120mm 1,867; SP 81mm 39:
RGM-84L Harpoon Block II AShM, 1 76mm gun
18 BTR-3M1; 21 M125A3; SP 107mm M106A3; SP 120mm
FS 4:
38: 8 BTR-3M2; 6+ Elbit Spear; 12 M1064A3; 12 SM-4A
AIRCRAFT 1 Makut Rajakumarn with 2 triple 324mm ASTT,
TPT • Light 22: 2 Beech 200 King Air; 2 Beech 1900C; 1 2 114mm gun
C-212 Aviocar; 1 C295W; 3 Cessna 182T Skylane; 9 Cessna 1 Pin Klao (ex-US Cannon) (trg role) with 2 triple
A185E (U-17B); 2 ERJ-135LR; 2 Jetstream 41 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT, 3 76mm gun
TRG 33: 11 MX-7-235 Star Rocket; 22 T-41B Mescalero 2 Tapi with 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with
HELICOPTERS Mk 46 LWT, 1 76mm gun
ATK 7 AH-1F Cobra PSO 1 Krabi (UK River mod) with 1 76mm gun
MRH 20: 8 AS550 Fennec; 2 AW139; 10 Mi-17V-5 Hip H PCT 3 Khamronsin with 2 triple 324mm ASTT with
TPT 122: Heavy 5 CH-47D Chinook; Medium 11: 8 UH- Stingray LWT, 1 76mm gun
60L Black Hawk; 3 UH-60M Black Hawk; Light 106: 27 Bell PCOH 2 Pattani (1 in trg role) with 1 76mm gun
206 Jet Ranger; 52 Bell 212 (AB-212); 16 Enstrom 480B; 6 PCO 4: 3 Hua Hin with 1 76mm gun; 1 M58 Patrol Gun
H145M (VIP tpt); 5 UH-72A Lakota Boat with 1 76mm gun
TRG 53 Hughes 300C PCC 9: 3 Chon Buri with 2 76mm gun; 6 Sattahip with 1
UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES 76mm gun
ISR • Medium 4+: 4 Hermes 450; Searcher; Searcher II PBF 4 M18 Fast Assault Craft (capacity 18 troops)
AIR DEFENCE PB 40: 3 T-81; 5 M36 Patrol Boat; 1 T-227; 2 T-997; 23 M21
SAM 8+ Patrol Boat; 3 T-991; 3 T-994
Short-range Aspide MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 17
Point-defence 8+: 8 Starstreak; 9K338 Igla-S MCCS 1 Thalang
(RS-SA-24 Grinch) MCO 2 Lat Ya
GUNS 192 MCC 2 Bang Rachan
SP 54: 20mm 24 M163 Vulcan; 40mm 30 M1/M42 SP MSR 12: 7 T1; 5 T6
296 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Asia
Population 1,445,006
Border Patrol Police 20,000
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Marine Police 2,200 Male 20.2% 5.3% 4.9% 3.8% 13.6% 2.0%
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Female 19.1% 5.1% 4.8% 4.0% 14.9% 2.2%
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 101
PCO 1 Srinakrin Capabilities
PCC 2 Hameln
The small Timor-Leste Defence Force (F-FDTL) has been afflicted by
PB 52: 1 Chasanyabadee; 3 Cutlass; 2 M25;
funding, personnel and morale challenges since it was established
2 Ratayapibanbancha (Reef Ranger); 1 Sriyanont; in 2001. The F-FDTL was reconstituted in the wake of fighting
2 Wasuthep; 41 (various) between regional factions in the security forces in 2006, but is still
PBR 46 a long way from meeting the ambitious force-structure goals set
out in the Force 2020 plan published in 2007. In 2016, the govern-
National Security Volunteer Corps 45,000 ment published a Strategic Defence and Security Concept (SDSC).
– Reserves This outlined the roles of the F-FDTL as including the protection
of the country from external threats and combating violent crime.
Police Aviation 500 However, this parallel internal-security role has sometimes brought
it into conflict with the national police force. The SDSC also stated
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
that the F-FDTL needs to improve its naval capabilities, owing to
AIRCRAFT 6 combat capable the size of Timor-Leste’s exclusive economic zone. The origins of
ATK 6 AU-23A Peacemaker the F-FDTL in the Falintil national resistance force, and continuing
TPT 16: Light 15: 2 CN235; 8 PC-6 Turbo-Porter; 3 SC-7 training and doctrinal emphasis on low-intensity infantry tactics,
3M Skyvan; 2 Short 330UTT; PAX 1 F-50 mean that the force provides a deterrent to invasion. The F-FDTL
HELICOPTERS has received training from Australian and US personnel. Austra-
lia is also donating two Guardian-class patrol vessels as part of
MRH 12: 6 Bell 412 Twin Huey; 6 Bell 429
its Pacific Patrol Boat Replacement programme; these are due to
TPT • Light 61: 27 Bell 205A; 14 Bell 206 Jet Ranger; 20 arrive in 2023. Maintenance capacity is limited and the country has
Bell 212 (AB-212) no defence industry.
Provincial Police 50,000 (incl ε500 Special ACTIVE 2,280 (Army 2,200 Naval Element 80)
Action Force)
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
Thahan Phran (Hunter Soldiers) 21,000
Volunteer irregular force Army 2,200
FORCES BY ROLE Training began in January 2001 with the aim of deploying
MANOEUVRE 1,500 full-time personnel and 1,500 reservists. Authorities
Other are engaged in developing security structures with
22 paramilitary regt (total: 275 paramilitary coy) international assistance
298 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
Light Royal Guard & Land Force 140
2 inf bn
FORCES BY ROLE
COMBAT SUPPORT
MANOEUVRE
1 MP pl Light
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 inf coy(-)
1 log spt coy Other
1 sy coy(-)
Naval Element 80
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Navy 130
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 5 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PB 5: 2 Dili (ex-ROK); 2 Shanghai II; 1 Kamenassa (ex- PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS
ROK Chamsuri) PCO 2 Guardian (AUS Bay mod)
AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • LCM 1
Air Component LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AOL 1
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 1 Cessna 172 Vietnam VNM
Vietnamese Dong VND 2021 2022 2023
Tonga TON GDP VND 8399tr 9325tr
Tongan Pa’anga TOP 2021 2022 2023 USD 366bn 414bn
GDP TOP 1.07bn 1.14bn per capita USD 3,718 4,163
USD 470m 501m Growth % 2.6 7.0
per capita USD 4,701 5,008 Inflation % 1.8 3.8
Growth % -2.7 -2.0 Def bdgt VND ε145tr ε136tr
Inflation % 1.4 8.5 USD ε6.31bn ε6.03bn
Def bdgt TOP 11.6m 18.5m 20.4m FMA (US) USD 10.9m 12.0m 12.0m
USD 5.09m 8.15m USD1=VND 22934.42 22534.02
USD1=TOP 2.27 2.27 Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015)
5.66
Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)
10
2.84
2008 2015 2022
5
2008 2015 2022 Population 103,808,319
Population 105,517 Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus Male 12.5% 3.8% 3.7% 4.1% 23.1% 3.0%
Female 11.2% 3.6% 3.5% 3.9% 23.3% 4.5%
Male 15.5% 5.2% 4.7% 4.0% 17.4% 3.2%
Female 15.0% 5.0% 4.5% 4.0% 17.4% 3.9%
Capabilities
Capabilities Vietnam has a stronger military tradition, and its armed forces
have more operational experience, than its neighbours. Its defence
His Majesty’s Armed Forces (HMAF) are a battalion-sized military efforts and armed forces also benefit from broad popular support,
based around the light infantry of the Tonga Royal Guards and the particularly in the context of tensions with China over conflict-
Royal Tongan Marines, and a small naval patrol squadron. Maritime ing claims in the South China Sea. Vietnam adopted a new Law
security is a primary concern of defence operations, although, on National Defence in 2018 and issued a defence White Paper in
between 2002 and 2014, HMAF also contributed platoon-sized 2019. The latter referred several times to Vietnam’s differences with
forces to multinational peacekeeping efforts in the Solomon China and the need for both sides to ‘put more effort into main-
taining stability’. It is evident, from Hanoi’s perspective, that stabil-
Islands, and then international coalition operations in Iraq and
ity will depend in good measure on Vietnam bolstering its deter-
Afghanistan. Australia and the United States are Tonga’s key exter-
rent capabilities in the South China Sea. This explains the emphasis
nal defence partners, but the armed forces also undertake defence on strengthening naval and air capabilities, including develop-
cooperation activities with China, India, New Zealand and the ment of an advanced submarine capability and procurement of
United Kingdom. new ISR, air-defence and naval anti-surface systems to boost the
capacity for anti-access/area-denial operations in Vietnam’s mari-
ACTIVE 600 (Royal Guards & Land Force 140 Navy time littoral. A joint vision statement on defence cooperation and
130 Other 330) a memorandum of understanding on mutual logistics support
Asia 299
were signed with India in June 2022. While Russia has been the 1 trg regt
dominant defence supplier, Washington lifted its arms embargo on AIR DEFENCE
Vietnam in 2016, and New Delhi and Seoul are understood to be 11 AD bde
seeking inroads into Vietnam’s defence market. Japan also signed
a defence trade deal with Vietnam in September 2021 to support Reserve
defence exports to the country as well as future collaboration on
research and development. Long-expected orders for new combat FORCES BY ROLE
aircraft and maritime-patrol aircraft have failed to materialise, MANOEUVRE
though Vietnam ordered a Japanese-produced satellite-based sur- Light
veillance system in April 2020 and jet and turboprop trainers from 9 inf div
the Czech Republic and United States, while the US has also trans-
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ferred ex-Hamilton class vessels to Vietnam’s coastguard under the
US Excess Defense Articles programme. Vietnam is developing ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
its limited defence-industrial capacities and launched a defence- MBT 1,383: 45 T-34; 850 T-54/T-55; 4+ T-54B mod;
focused subsidiary to state-owned Viettel Military Industry and 70 T-62; 64 T-90S; 350 Type-59;
Telecoms Group, called Viettel High Technology Industries Corpo- LT TK 620: 300 PT-76; 320 Type-62/Type-63
ration, which focuses on defence electronics and communications. RECCE 100 BRDM-1/BRDM-2
The 2019 White Paper promoted investment in Vietnam’s defence IFV 300 BMP-1/BMP-2
industry with the aim to become internationally competitive and
APC 1,380+
join the ‘global value chain’ by 2030.
APC (T) 280+: Some BTR-50; 200 M113 (to be
ACTIVE 482,000 (Army 412,000 Navy 40,000 Air upgraded); 80 Type-63
30,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 40,000 APC (W) 1,100 BTR-40/BTR-60/BTR-152
Conscript liability 2 years army and air defence, 3 years air force and ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
navy, specialists 3 years, some ethnic minorities 2 years AEV IMR-2
ARV BREM-1M
RESERVES Gendarmerie & Paramilitary
Asia
VLB TMM-3
5,000,000 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
MSL • MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger);
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE 9M14 mod
RCL 75mm Type-56; 82mm Type-65 (B-10); 87mm Type-51
Space GUNS
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SP 100mm SU-100; 122mm SU-122
SATELLITES • ISR 1 VNREDSat TOWED 100mm T-12 (arty); M-1944
ARTILLERY 3,040+
Army ε412,000 SP 30+: 122mm 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 30 2S3 Akatsiya;
8 Mil Regions (incl capital) 175mm M107
FORCES BY ROLE TOWED 2,300: 105mm M101/M102; 122mm D-30/Type-
COMMAND 54 (M-1938)/Type-60 (D-74); 130mm M-46; 152mm D-20;
4 corps HQ 155mm M114
SPECIAL FORCES MRL 710+: 107mm 360 Type-63; 122mm 350 BM-21 Grad;
1 SF bde (1 AB bde, 1 demolition engr regt) 140mm BM-14
MANOEUVRE MOR 82mm; 120mm M-1943; 160mm M-1943
Armoured SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS
10 tk bde SRBM • Coventional 9K72/9K77 (RS-SS-1C/D Scud B/C)
Mechanised AIR DEFENCE
2 mech inf div SAM • Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-7 Grail)‡;
Light 9K310 Igla-1 (RS-SA-16 Gimlet); 9K38 Igla (RS-SA-18 Grouse)
23 inf div GUNS 12,000
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE SP 23mm ZSU-23-4
1 SRBM bde TOWED 14.5mm/30mm/37mm/57mm/85mm/100mm
COMBAT SUPPORT
13 arty bde Navy ε40,000 (incl ε27,000 Naval Infantry)
1 arty regt
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
11 engr bde
1 engr regt SUBMARINES 8
1 EW unit SSK 6 Hanoi (RUS Project 636.1 (Improved Kilo))
3 sigs bde with 6 533mm TT with 3M14E Klub-S (RS-SS-N-30B)
2 sigs regt LACM/3M54E1/E Klub-S (RS-SS-N-27A/B) AShM (Klub-S
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT AShM variant unclear)/53-65KE HWT/TEST-71ME HWT
9 economic construction div SSW 2 Yugo (DPRK)
1 log regt PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 61
1 med unit CORVETTES 12:
300 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Asia
Igla-1 (RS-SA-16 Gimlet) cbt units, log spt and village protection pl; some arty,
GUNS 37mm; 57mm; 85mm; 100mm; 130mm mor and AD guns; acts as reserve
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
AAM • IR R-60 (RS-AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (RS-AA-11A
Archer); IR/SARH R-27 (RS-AA-10 Alamo); ARH R-77
DEPLOYMENT
(RS-AA-12A Adder) CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 9
ASM Kh-29L/T (RS-AS-14 Kedge); Kh-59M (RS-AS-18 Kazoo)
SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 69; 1 fd hospital
AShM Kh-31A (RS-AS-17B Krypton)
ARM Kh-28 (RS-AS-9 Kyle); Kh-31P (RS-AS-17A Krypton) SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 190; 1 engr coy
302 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Chapter Seven
60 15 Egypt 438,500
Morocco 195,800
Year-on-year % change
USDbn, constant 2015
40 5
Iraq 193,000
30 0
Israel 169,500
20 -5
Syria 169,000
10 -10
Algeria 139,000
Middle East and North Africa: selected tactical combat aircraft, 2022*
Algeria
Advanced
Egypt Modern
Iran Ageing
Obsolescent
Iraq
Israel
Morocco
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
Syria
UAE
Algeria
Egypt
Iran
Israel
Jordan
Kuwait
Lebanon
Morocco
Modern
Saudi Arabia Ageing
UAE Obsolescent
6 Submarines Frigates
5 Corvettes Principal Amphibious Ships
4
3
2
1
China France Germany Italy South Korea Spain United States
Conflict and competition in the Middle East and access and a boost to the local economy, though
North Africa reached their lowest levels of intensity the reopening of roads across zones of control was
in a decade, as 2022 saw regional governments limited. The Houthis had agreed to the ceasefire after
embrace de-escalation and engage in diplomacy in months of ground attacks aimed at seizing Marib.
ways not seen in previous years. These developments Several thousand Houthi fighters were reportedly
were motivated by the post-pandemic recovery and killed in this campaign, mainly after operations by
the need for a greater focus on economic affairs. Saudi Arabia’s air force. The Houthis were believed
While power projection by most of the major states to have only agreed to the truce because they believed
engaged in regional competition appeared to decline, it would allow them to regroup and reconstitute their
Iran stepped up its activities, exerting influence in forces before attempting new attacks.
the war in Ukraine by supplying weapons to Russia. Several reports, including by UN experts,
Indeed, broader concerns about Iran’s activities and indicated that Iranian provision of weaponry to the
the regional repercussions of Russia’s invasion of Houthis continued during the truce. Anti-Houthi
Ukraine, together with the lack of formal settlements forces also used the lull to regroup and prepare for
of various crises, suggested caution over the durability new rounds of fighting but faced conflicted patrons
of this regional de-escalation in the medium term. whose interests and risk profile were more limited
than during the early years of the intervention.
Regional conflicts Analysts believe that Saudi Arabia agreed to the
Since 2011, three major civil wars have engulfed the ceasefire not only to placate the United States and
region. Although these conflicts saw their lowest levels the rest of the international community but also to
of violence yet in 2022, they continue to destabilise reduce its exposure to the conflict, notably in the
the region’s economies and societies, risking military form of Houthi aerial attacks against the Kingdom’s
confrontation between states and continuing to cause infrastructure. To support the political process,
much human suffering for civilian populations. Riyadh also compelled president Hadi to resign in
favour of a newly formed presidential council. Saudi-
Yemen and Emirati-supported factions largely abided by the
In Yemen, a United Nations-brokered ceasefire was ceasefire, mostly out of exhaustion but also out of
agreed in April. This froze the front lines and, though deference to their patrons. The Houthi decision not to
it was extended in July, ended in October. In the extend the ceasefire in October came as the regional
months leading up to April, Houthi forces had made security situation worsened. The failure of Saudi–
further advances towards the south and the east. Iranian talks in Iraq over Yemen and large-scale
Meanwhile, United Arab Emirates-supported militias popular unrest in Iran increased concerns over the
made progress pushing back Houthi advances in potential for renewed attacks by the Houthis as well
Shabwa and along the western coast. The forces of as Iran on Saudi Arabia. It was also largely interpreted
the UAE-backed secessionist Southern Transitional as heralding new campaigns in Marib and Ta’izz.
Council (STC) pushed into Abyan province. In recent Meanwhile, the UAE maintained its support for the
years, the STC had clashed with forces loyal to the STC and other militias, as did Saudi Arabia with its
central government of president Abd Rabbo Mansour own partners.
Hadi and expelled them from several regions in the
south. In contrast, government forces retained the Libya
greater authority in Marib, the last major government- In Libya, violence resumed in mid-year because
held city in central Yemen, thanks largely to Saudi of a political stalemate. Long-awaited presidential
military support. Non-governmental organisations elections had been scheduled for late 2021, after the
reported a 60% decrease in civilian casualties during formation of a unity government headed by Abdul
the ceasefire, along with greater humanitarian Hamid Dbeibah. However, the postponement of the
Middle East and North Africa 305
elections fuelled political divisions and led to political Irini, a maritime mission designed to intercept illicit
and militia realignments. In early 2022, two rival shipments bound for Libya, boarded a number of
governments claimed authority and legitimacy: the vessels in 2022 and seized weapons and military
Tripoli-based Government of National Unity led by vehicles bound for the country. The UN process,
Dbeibah and the Government of National Stability which in 2019 and 2021 seemed close to delivering a
based in eastern Libya and headed by former interior settlement, was once again under threat in late 2022.
minister Fathi Bashagha. Both entities relied on the
support of militias: Dbeibah depended on Tripoli- and Syria
Misrata-based factions, while Bashagha could muster The main battlelines in Syria did not change
some support in Tripoli as well as from militias loyal to significantly in 2022 despite violence reaching its
the Tobruk parliament. Khalifa Haftar, the country’s lowest levels since 2011. The regime of President
most powerful warlord, was nominally supportive of Bashar al-Assad remained firmly in place in
Bashagha but did not commit his Libyan Arab Armed Damascus but remained too weak to consolidate
Forces (LAAF), which had failed to seize the capital power in the areas in the northwest and northeast
in 2019–20. These factions competed over territory, that are outside its control. However, Assad’s
particularly oil-export facilities, and institutions, various opponents remained in disarray and heavily
including the National Oil Corporation and Libyan dependent on foreign support. Throughout the year,
Central Bank. there were assessments that Turkey might conduct a
In August, Bashagha attempted to seize power campaign to seize further territory from the Kurdish-
in Tripoli, mobilising several militias and obtaining dominated administration in northern and eastern
political backing in the Gulf as well as Egypt. Having Syria, but US lobbying and Russian opposition
secured the support of Tripoli and Misrata militias, seemed to forestall any Turkish plans. Instead, the
Dbeibah successfully resisted the attack. Both men, greatest change occurred inside the rebel holdout of
however, emerged weaker from this confrontation, Idlib, where the jihadi group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham
Middle East
Importantly, Egypt, Turkey and the UAE have Ankara. The humanitarian situation remained dire,
appeared less willing to deploy forces or provide with international aid agencies securing less than
equipment in this current round but appear ready half of the funding required to provide support to the
to back more reliable and effective local partners. population. In July, the UN Security Council agreed
Dbeibah was keen to cultivate the support of Turkey, to keep the sole remaining cross-border humanitarian
which maintained a small presence in the country, route from Turkey into Idlib open for only six months,
while Egypt backed the speaker of parliament and down from 12 months in previous years. This was
Bashagha ally Aguileh Saleh. due to Russian opposition.
The Wagner Group, a Russian private military Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine has had some
company, had been less active since the 2020 Tripoli military effect in Syria. Moscow maintains a naval
debacle when it attempted to assault the city. But presence in the port of Tartus and an air base in
it maintained a significant presence, estimated to Hmeimim, as well as an operations room and military
number between 1,500 and 2,000 troops, alongside intelligence group in Damascus that coordinates
Haftar’s troops and in key locations, including oil Russian activity countrywide. In the first months of
facilities. There was no discernible reduction in this Russia’s invasion, there was no noticeable reduction
presence after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, in the size of the Russian military presence in Syria,
as Libya remained a convenient pressure point for estimated to be around 4,000 troops. But reports
Russia against Turkey and European countries. emerged in the autumn of increased turnover,
Some of the combat aircraft previously associated suggesting a limited but noteworthy Russian
with Wagner seemed to have been transferred to readjustment including the relocation of one of
LAAF control. This situation led to relative quiet Russia’s S-300 air-defence units back to Russia.
in the country but presaged violent competition as Indeed, as Russian forces began to struggle
new contenders, courting foreign support, geared in Ukraine, this had a direct impact on the Syrian
up to replace existing groups. Moreover, there were battlefield. Turkey was a prime beneficiary of
continued attempts to rearm. Crew from vessels Russia’s isolation and its reliance on Turkish
participating in the European Union’s Operation goodwill. The prospects of Russia supporting an
306 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Assad campaign to retake Idlib were considerably Turkey continued to fight Kurdish separatists of the
reduced. Likewise, Iran benefitted insofar as it could Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) through ground and
maintain its influence in Syria, with reduced chances aerial operations, which caused civilian casualties as
of Russian pushback. Israel’s reluctance to condemn well as protests from Baghdad over the violation of
the Russian invasion was partly determined by the Iraqi sovereignty. Kurdish separatists of the Free Life
imperative of maintaining military coordination Party of Kurdistan (PJAK) in Iraq were also the target
with Russia in Syria to secure air access and of intense Iranian attacks.
avoid accidents. Israel was keen to preserve its air There were also more attacks by Iranian-aligned
dominance and worried that direct Israeli military groups against US military targets in Iraq and Syria. In
support to Ukraine would lead to Russian pushback parallel with diplomatic paralysis over Iran’s nuclear
in Syria. Nonetheless, the IDF was troubled by programme and in the context of regional tensions,
the increase in defence cooperation between Iran Iranian-backed groups launched missile and UAV
and Russia. It was feared that Iranian provision of attacks against small US bases in northern Iraq and
uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs) to Russia would Syria, including Al-Tanf in August. This precipitated
allow Tehran to test its capabilities on a contested US retaliation against militia leaders.
battlefield, while the increased ties between the two
also raised concerns that Russia could reciprocate Regional effects of Russia’s 2022 invasion
and provide Iran with defence technologies of Ukraine
previously denied to it and align itself with Tehran Many states in the region have preferred to remain
on critical security issues. neutral in the war in Ukraine or have only mildly
Within this environment, there was no real condemned the Russian invasion without taking
progress in reforming and modernising the Syrian measures against Moscow or reducing their
Arab Army and the wider security apparatus. engagement. Over the past decade, Russia had
The worsening economic climate in Syria and the emerged as a security interlocutor as well as a
continued existence of pro-regime militias keen to possible alternative to the US in the eyes of several
preserve their autonomy precluded any prospect of countries who were unnerved by fluctuations in US
consolidation. This led to sustained violence in many policy and appreciative of Vladimir Putin’s ostensibly
regions across the country: the Islamic State (ISIS) effective statecraft. Several countries – notably Algeria
insurgency remained active in the Badiya desert and Syria, but also Egypt, Iraq and other smaller
region and in Deir ez-Zor and increasingly in the states – have been traditional customers of Russian
south. The regime was also unable to stabilise the weaponry as well as defence partners, at times also
region bordering Jordan. Moscow had guaranteed the conducting joint exercises with Russian armed forces.
regional deal that led in 2018 to the dismantlement Even US regional allies had evoked the possibility
and abandonment by their foreign sponsors of rebel of acquiring Russian weapons systems, such as the
groups operating there. Moscow, however, did not S-400 air-defence system. Russian military trainers
deploy military police units, provide stabilisation and private military companies, including the
funds or encourage reconciliation. This failure caused Wagner Group, have operated in several countries in
security to deteriorate. the region, including Libya, Syria and Sudan.
However, Russian prestige and credibility
Iraq diminished in 2022, in comparison with a high point
In contrast to Libya, Syria and Yemen, violence in in 2015–16, when Moscow successfully intervened
Iraq increased in 2022. Civil unrest, which peaked in the Syrian civil war. Russia’s operational and
in 2019, took a back seat as political competition military setbacks in Ukraine and the relatively
increased between parties backed by militias. This poor performance of its weapons systems have
was notably the case between Moqtada al-Sadr, a damaged its reputation across the region. It is widely
prominent and popular Shia cleric with nationalistic considered that Russia will struggle to innovate in
appeal, and an array of Iranian-backed militias. the technological domain and to maintain its export
This escalated into several armed confrontations in capability given its internal demands and shortages.
Baghdad and elsewhere, though the violence was Concerns about incurring Western sanctions were
ultimately contained. Intensified violence in northern also thought to be a deterrent for most countries.
Iraq was perhaps of greater significance. There, Importantly, the rapid growth of Russian–Iranian
Middle East and North Africa 307
defence relations has caused significant unease, cooperation, including maritime and air exercises,
particularly among Gulf governments. In recent years, between Cyprus, Egypt and Greece as well as between
Iran had hoped that Russia would help it recapitalise Greece and the UAE.
its armed forces. But Moscow, then seen as the senior A maritime agreement between Israel and
partner, was reluctant and unwilling to upset Israel Lebanon, brokered by the US, also served to reduce
and Gulf countries and risk Western disapproval. The tensions. The two countries have not delineated
Ukraine conflict has made Russia more dependent their land borders and there have been regular
on Iranian goodwill: Moscow has acquired Iranian confrontations. However, the prospect of exploiting
UAVs and deployed them in Ukraine. Tehran has offshore energy resources seemed to underpin the
supplied the Shahed-131 and Shahed-136 direct- agreement in October by both countries to delineate
attack munitions and the Mohajer-6 UAV to Russia their maritime border. In the months prior to the
as Moscow has attempted to fill gaps in its inventory agreement, Hizbullah had threatened Israeli ships
resulting from the invasion. As of November 2022, and exploration vessels operating in the hitherto
the initial batch of the Shahed systems appeared to contested area, deploying surveillance UAVs and
have almost been exhausted in Russia’s attacks. They alluding to the possession of armed UAVs. However,
have been used to supplement Moscow’s inventory domestic pressure in Lebanon, where the prospect of
of land-attack cruise missiles, which has depleted energy wealth seemed to improve an otherwise dire
considerably since it launched its 2022 invasion on 24 economic outlook, trumped Hizbullah’s scepticism.
February. Russia has also sought Iranian assistance to There was hope that the agreement would reduce
circumvent Western sanctions. tensions between Lebanon and Israel, but Hizbullah
as well as other Iran- and Syria-aligned groups
Regional competition rejected this prospect. The breakthrough happened
There was a trend towards regional de-escalation as Lebanon continued to face economic and political
in 2022. In the Gulf region, Iran was engaged in turmoil. This put significant pressure on the armed
Middle East
rivals, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. A key motivation from Western and Arab governments.
for the governments of Saudi Arabia and the UAE The rivalry between Algeria and Morocco
was the need to avoid becoming entangled in US– worsened substantially in 2022. Morocco obtained
Iran or Israel–Iran escalation, especially as talks over increased access to defence technology thanks to
Iran’s nuclear programme seemed inconclusive. improving ties with the US, and especially Israel –
Additionally, they both sought to reduce aerial with whom it signed a normalisation agreement in
attacks from Yemen. The UAE was the target of 2020. It now boasts the most diverse UAV fleet in
several waves of UAV and missile strikes in January the region, comprising Chinese, Israeli, Turkish and
and February and the Saudi city of Jeddah was hit US equipment. Rabat deployed UAVs against the
in March during the Saudi Arabian Grand Prix. The Polisario Front in the contested Western Sahara region.
bilateral discussions had limited positive impact, with Morocco reportedly sought to buy the Israeli-made
Iran unwilling to make firm security commitments Barak MX air- and missile-defence system in 2022.
until an agreement with the US had been reached. For Algeria, the prospect of a better-armed Morocco,
More notable detentes occurred between Saudi benefitting from Western alliances, has raised alarms
Arabia and the UAE and between Saudi Arabia given its dependence on Russian weaponry.
and Turkey. Turkey’s economic problems were the To foster conditions for greater regional
proximate cause of this rapprochement, which helped collective cooperation against Iran, the US has
alleviate its regional isolation. Ankara obtained orchestrated initiatives that capitalised on warming
Gulf investment pledges and the Gulf boycotts of relations between Israel and several regional states.
Turkish goods were lifted. This also opened the way In February, US Central Command launched a task
to renewed discussions over defence procurement, force in the Gulf to conduct surveillance by using
notably those concerning Turkish UAVs. Likewise, uninhabited systems. In March, the Negev Summit
Turkish–Israeli relations improved markedly. Facing in Israel brought together the US, Israeli, Egyptian,
isolation in the Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey was Moroccan, Bahraini and Emirati foreign ministers.
keen to restore political ties with Israel. This took In April, the US announced the creation of CTF-153,
place within a context of strengthening defence a maritime task force in the Red Sea designed to
308 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
monitor the activities of Iran and its proxies in IMF put it. Brent crude prices jumped to levels in
the region. Over the spring and summer, the US excess of USD120 a barrel in March, but they then
organised regional discussions about air-defence stabilised to pre-invasion levels by the end of the
cooperation. However, political and operational year mainly because of a strong dollar, an increase
obstacles hindered an agreement. Perhaps the most in interest rates and fears of recession impacting oil
significant hurdles were the absence of a peace demand. Throughout 2022, oil prices have stayed at
agreement between Saudi Arabia and Israel and levels beyond the amount needed by some Gulf states
political disagreements related to Red Sea issues. to balance their budgets. In 2022, this fiscal breakeven
Inventories comprising different weapons systems price ranged between USD60 and USD80 a barrel for
and states having diverse weapons procurement Oman, Saudi Arabia and the UAE and was between
priorities were equally significant factors. USD48–55 a barrel for Kuwait and Qatar, with
Bahrain being the exception at USD128 a barrel. In
DEFENCE ECONOMICS late September 2022, days after prices dipped close to
USD80 a barrel for the first time since the beginning
Macroeconomics of the year, OPEC+ (OPEC members plus ten leading
The region’s economies have generally been shielded non-OPEC oil exporters) announced an agreement
from the slowdown in global economic activity in for the biggest oil production cut since the start of the
2022. The year before, a tentative economic recovery coronavirus pandemic in a move likely designed to
across the world saw real GDP grow by 6% following keep oil prices at elevated levels.
the near 3% contraction in 2020 linked to the
coronavirus pandemic. In contrast, real GDP growth Defence spending and procurement
in 2022 is projected to reach just 3.2%, inhibited by Defence spending in the Middle East and North Africa
the economic fallout of Russia’s full-scale invasion of reached USD187 billion in 2022, up from USD173bn
Ukraine – which contributed to high rates of inflation in 2021 (excluding Foreign Military Financing
and a cost-of-living crisis in several regions. The allocations from the US) largely due to a surge in
lingering coronavirus pandemic and the negative spending in Iran. However, Iran’s 40% inflation rate
impact on Chinese economic activity is also weighing meant that regional spending in real terms continued
heavily on the economic outlook. to contract in line with the trend seen in the region
Amid this challenging context, regional real GDP since 2018. The strengthening of the oil price in 2021
growth is projected to increase from an average was not reflected in the spending decisions for 2022
4.1% in 2021 to an average 5.0% in 2022, excluding made by several of the region’s oil exporters that
Lebanon, Libya and Syria. The Middle East and continued to pursue a fiscally conservative stance.
North Africa is highly exposed to global food prices, This subdued regional trend covers significant
particularly the price of wheat, but inflation rates in disparities. The notable real reductions in defence
several regional states are lower than those being spending between 2021 and 2022 in Saudi Arabia
experienced in Europe, Russia and Latin America. (-12.4%), Israel (-5.6%), Algeria (-3.7%) and Oman
The most notable exceptions to this are inflation rates (-3.0%) were partially offset by growth in Iran (+30.0%),
in Iran and Yemen, which reached 40.0% and 43.8% Qatar (+28.8%), Iraq (10.3%) and Egypt (+2.9%). It
in 2022 respectively. Conversely, inflation in Gulf has been suggested that Saudi Arabia’s reduced
Cooperation Council (GCC) states is expected to be share could be linked to the Kingdom’s ambition to
just 3.6% in 2022. Regional trends therefore mask diversify its economy through the development of
sharp disparities driven by the surge in the oil price local industry and plans to increase domestic weapons
over 2022: real GDP growth among oil importers is procurement and reduce dependence on expensive
expected to reach 4.4% in 2022 compared with 5.2% imports. Other factors should not be overlooked,
for the region’s oil exporters and 6.5% for the GCC. such as the completion of existing equipment
Indeed, higher oil prices are offering these delivery contracts, a possible reduction in the level
countries a chance to transcend the two policy of spending on military operations in Yemen and a
trade-offs that the war in Ukraine has sharpened for strained diplomatic relationship between Riyadh and
most of the world: ‘between tackling inflation and Washington, traditionally the Kingdom’s main arms
safeguarding the recovery; and between supporting supplier. Economic recovery in Saudi Arabia and
the vulnerable and rebuilding fiscal buffers’, as the other oil exporters may, along with the rise in oil prices
Middle East and North Africa 309
Increase
Qatar
Iraq** εUSD8.42bn
εUSD8.94bn
Iran**
εUSD44.01bn
Tunisia
USD1.37bn
Egypt
USD6.51bn
UAE
Mauritania εUSD20.36bn
USD0.23bn
Morocco
USD6.42bn
Bahrain
USD1.40bn
Jordan
Middle East
Algeria
USD8.94bn
Saudi Arabia**
Israel USD45.60bn
USD22.65bn
Oman
εUSD6.43bn
Kuwait*
USD9.17bn
Decrease
*IISS estimate of Ministry of Defence and National Guards budget using overall
Lebanon Libya Palestine Syria Yemen government expenditure which dropped significantly in 2022, official spending
n.k n.k n.k n.k n.k breakdown not available. **Security expenditure removed from defence budget figure.
[1] Map illustrating 2022 planned defence-spending levels (in USDbn at market
Real % Change (2021–22) exchange rates), as well as the annual real percentage change in planned
More than 20% increase Between 0% and 3% decrease defence spending between 2021 and 2022 (at constant 2015 prices and exchange
Between 10% and 20% increase Between 3% and 10% decrease rates). Percentage changes in defence spending can vary considerably from
year to year, as states revise the level of funding allocated to defence. Changes
Between 3% and 10% increase Between 10% and 20% decrease indicated here highlight the short-term trend in planned defence spending
Between 0% and 3% increase More than 20% decrease between 2021 and 2022. Actual spending changes prior to 2021, and projected
spending levels post-2022, are not reflected.
ε Estimate Spending 2% of GDP or above Insufficient data
©IISS
▲ Map 7 Middle East and North Africa: regional defence spending (USDbn, %ch yoy)1
in 2022, enable increased investment over the next few as well as to major modernisation cycles in certain
years. In October 2022, Saudi Arabia announced plans countries. Real-terms increases in Qatari defence
to boost public spending by 18% in 2023. spending averaged 12% annually between 2011
Over the last decade, the upward trend in defence and 2022. They were driven at various points by
spending in certain regional states can be linked to heightened security concerns amid the diplomatic
renewed tensions and associated threat perceptions crisis with its neighbours over the period, and a
310 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Egypt, 3.3% Other North Africa, 0.8% focused on US and European suppliers. For instance,
Morocco, 3.4%
Kuwait is growing its fleet with US helicopters and
Algeria, 4.6%
Jordan, 1.2% F/A-18E/F Super Hornets and Eurofighter Typhoons
Saudi Arabia
23.7% and also its air defence such as with the notification
Israel by the US Defense Security Cooperation Agency in
11.8%
October 2022 of a potential US sale of the NASAMS III
Bahrain air defence system. Several countries may be tempted
0.7% to branch out to other partners to move towards
Qatar, 3.3% relative autonomy, which is increasingly supported
Oman, 4.4% by the development of regional defence-industrial
and technological bases.
Kuwait, 4.6% United Arab The outlook for the region will hinge on the
Emirates, 22.8%
Iraq, 4.8% response of oil producers to higher oil prices as they
Iran, 10.6% make their budgetary decisions. The spike in prices
means that fiscal balances in the Gulf have moved
Note: Analysis excludes Lebanon, Libya, Palestinian Authority, Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen. ©IISS
from an average deficit of 5% of GDP during 2015–21
▲ Figure 14 Middle East and North Africa: defence to a projected surplus of around 5% of GDP for 2022
spending by country and sub-region, 2022 and that countries will remain in surplus in 2023 and
2024. However, Gulf states may continue to adopt
procurement drive from 2015 that included 108 fiscally cautious behaviour. The volatility in oil prices
combat aircraft, such as the F-15 from the United and vulnerability to global shocks create significant
States, and the Eurofighter Typhoon and the Rafale budgetary uncertainty in the major defence-spending
from the UK and France respectively. Qatar’s air force states in the Gulf. As a result, countries may prefer
will be one of the most modern and diverse in the to continue improving resilience through economic
region once all three types are in service. However, diversification, reducing fiscal breakeven points, and
the volume and speed of these acquisitions raises shoring up reserves in the short term.
questions over Qatar’s ability to crew and maintain If countries do implement increases for
the aircraft. Modernisation programmes in Kuwait defence in the short term, these will likely benefit
and Egypt have also driven budget growth, while investment spending or enable a resumption of
recent defence budget uplifts in Morocco were made delayed procurement programmes or one-off capital
against the backdrop of rising tensions with Algeria projects that support modernisation and domestic
in 2021. Rabat procured attack helicopters and fighter development efforts. The countries spending the most
jets from the US in 2019–2020 and armed uninhabited – Saudi Arabia and the UAE – have ambitious defence-
aerial vehicles (UAVs) from Turkey in 2021. industrial ambitions, so higher government revenues
In Egypt and other regional states, another
important recent trend has been a diversification 7
6.33
of arms suppliers and defence partners. While 6.00
6 5.41 5.42 5.39
Cairo historically procured from Washington, it has
5 4.66 4.81
increasingly turned to Europe (mainly France but 4.31 4.30 4.28 4.41
also Germany and Italy). While most of their crewed 4 3.79
% of GDP
may enable much-needed investment in defence R&D to their neighbours to buy military equipment or
to bolster domestic production capabilities. However, develop joint projects. The region’s only credible
governments will likely want to avoid higher recurring arms provider would have been Israel until recently.
costs that result in a sustained increase in the defence Prior to 2021, there had already been numerous
budget, for instance changes in force structure. The cases of intra-regional military assistance and arms
Middle East and North Africa remains home to most transfers, and also to African countries, particularly
of the world’s countries with the highest military of armoured personnel carriers. Meanwhile, the
burden, including Oman (where spending accounts UAE has started exporting its weapons, such as Al
for 5.9% of GDP), Kuwait (5.0%) and Saudi Arabia Tariq guided bombs (re-branded Denel-designed
(4.5%). The region’s average is 3.8% of GDP to defence, Umbani guided bombs) sold to Egypt in 2020.
which is well above the global average of 1.7% in 2022, However, the growth in intra-regional defence-
meaning that the cost of defence is already higher here industrial cooperation became particularly evident
compared with other regions. in 2021 with the memorandum of understanding
between Saudi Arabia’s General Authority for
Defence industry Military Industries and the UAE’s Tawazun
Continued initiatives to produce military equipment Economic Council signed at that year’s IDEX
domestically and increasingly localise arms show. This is designed to boost defence-industrial
procurement are notable trends. This is apparent capability, explore the prospects for joint projects
chiefly in Gulf states, led by the UAE and followed and identify areas of cooperation in defence R&D.
by Saudi Arabia, although more recently Egypt, It is particularly important to improve in this
Jordan, Morocco and Qatar have followed suit. Rabat, area, as one of the identified roadblocks to the
for example, is developing its aircraft maintenance development of domestic capabilities has been
capability. The development of a defence-industrial the low regional investment in defence R&D. At
and technological base is most advanced in the the same time, regional states are becoming more
Middle East
is supported by demanding offset policies and defence sales as a way of boosting local industrial
diversification of partners. This has included turning capacity. IDEX has been established since the
to countries willing to consider technology transfer, early 1990s in the UAE; the Egypt Defence Expo is
such as South Africa, or looking to acquire know-how hosted in Cairo; Jordan hosts SOFEX; Morocco the
by acquiring or closely working with foreign firms. Marrakesh Airshow; and Saudi Arabia joined in
The nascent localisation of regional defence early 2022 with its first World Defense Show, held
procurements is also noteworthy as countries turn outside Riyadh.
312 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Middle East
Dec 2017 F-15QA FGA ac 48 Boeing Oct 2021–
ongoing
Mar 2018 Bayraktar TB2 Medium combat 6 Baykar est. 2019
intelligence, surveillance
and reconnaissance
uninhabited aerial vehicle
Mar 2018 Kirpi Protected patrol vehicle 50 BMC est. 2020–21
Amazon 35
Mar 2018 NH90 TTH Medium transport 16 Leonardo Dec 2021–
helicopter (formerly Finmeccanica) 2025*
NH90 NFH Anti-submarine warfare 12 Mar 2022–
helicopter 2025*
H125 (AS350) Ecureuil** Light transport helicopter 16 est. 2018–21
Jul 2019 MIM-104 Patriot Long-range SAM system n.k. Raytheon Technologies n.k.
NASAMS II Short-range SAM system
c. 2020 Fuwairit (TUR Anadolu Landing craft tank 1 Anadolu Shipyard Feb 2022
Shipyard LCT)
Broog (Anadolu Landing craft medium 2
Shipyard LCM)
16m (Anadolu Landing craft vehicles and 1
Shipyard LCVP) personnel
Dec 2020 Gepard 35mm self-propelled 15 Rheinmetall Air 2021–ongoing
air defence artillery Defence (formerly
Oerlikon Contraves)
c. 2021 M-346 Training aircraft 6 Leonardo (formerly n.k.
Finmeccanica)
*Planned
**In training configuration
M = multinational
314 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
During the Cold War, Egypt’s defence industries licence-built withdrew, leaving AOI as a solely Egyptian entity owned by the
foreign equipment but the country did not possess significant Ministry of Defense. AOI factories subsequently licence-built
indigenous design capacity. Over two decades later Egypt’s French Alpha Jet training aircraft and Gazelle helicopters and
defence industry has made little progress in this regard de- Brazilian Tucano turboprop training aircraft, as well as various
spite spending significant sums on acquisition, particularly in missiles. The production of 120 Chinese K-8 training aircraft was
the last decade. completed in 2010 in Helwan, with a high level of indigenisation
Egypt’s defence industry is mostly grouped under three reported, and the site now serves as a maintenance, repair and
entities that broadly correspond to the air, land and maritime overhaul (MRO) facility for the aircraft.
domains. The Ministry of Military Production is a stand-alone Established in 2003, the Marine Industry & Services Organ-
government ministry established in 1954 that today oversees isation is the smallest of the three groups and is focused on
the production of armoured vehicles, artillery, small arms and shipbuilding and maritime services. Alexandria Shipyard is
ammunition. The Fahd APC, based on a German chassis and licence-building three of four French Gowind frigates and in
powerpack, has been exported in small numbers to states in 2020 announced that it was going to build a MEKO A200 frig-
the Middle East and North Africa and in Sub-Saharan Africa. ate. The navy plans to acquire at least three from Germany.
A 2022 deal with South Korea for the licensed production of Today many of the factories that had production lines in
an estimated 200 K9 howitzers will be carried out by the Abu previous decades have now either switched to MRO or have
Zaabal Tank Repair Factory (Factory 200) that assembled M1 diversified their business to produce civil products. Military
Abrams tanks from 1992 to 2018. factories have been active in the civil sector since the 1980s;
Established in 1975, the Arab Organization for Industrializa- continued focus and activity in this sector may continue to
tion (AOI) was originally a joint effort by Egypt, Kuwait, Qatar complicate Cairo’s ambitions to further develop indigenous
and Saudi Arabia to develop a pan-Arab defence industry. Fol- defence production, including the development of complex
lowing Egypt’s peace treaty with Israel in 1979, the other nations equipment, without foreign assistance.
©IISS
Benha Company
for Electronic
Ismailia Canal
Industries
Damietta
branch (River Nile)
Abu Zaabal Company for Specialized
Abu Zaabal Tank Industries (Factory 300)
Repair Factory
Qaha Chemical (Factory 200) Abu Zaabal Engineering
Plant (Factory 270) Industries Company (Factory 100)
Middle East
rial integrity, internal security and regional stability. The army 4 engr bn
retains a key political position since its instrumental role in 2019 AIR DEFENCE
in ending President Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s two decades in power. 7 AD bn
Algeria is part of the African Union’s North African Regional Capa- EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
bility Standby Force, hosting the force’s logistics base in Algiers. ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
There are discussions with neighbours about regional security MBT 1,485: 270 T-55AMV; 290 T-62; 325 T-72M1/M1M;
challenges such as counter-terrorism and there is close security
600+ T-90SA
cooperation with Tunisia. A November 2020 referendum approved
TSV 26+: 13+ BMPT; 13+ BMPT-62
a change to the constitution enabling Algeria to send forces on UN
peacekeeping missions. Tensions with Morocco, which increased
RECCE 70: 44 AML-60; 26 BRDM-2
once more in 2021, have persisted into 2022. The conscript-based IFV 980: ε220 BMP-2; 760 BMP-2M with 9M133 Kornet
force exercises regularly, although standards are difficult to judge (RS-AT-14 Spriggan)
from open sources. There is an ongoing attempt to professionalise APC 1,307+
the armed forces, which was reflected in the reduction of conscript APC (T) VP-6
liability from 18 to 12 months in 2014. Military logistics capability APC (W) 1,305: 250 BTR-60; 150 BTR-80; 150 OT-64; 55
appears sufficient to support internal deployments. Army and air M3 Panhard; ε600 Fuchs 2; 100 Fahd
force inventories consist of a core of modern, primarily Russian- PPV 2+: 2 Marauder; some Maxxpro
sourced equipment, though China has also supplied equipment, AUV Nimr Ajban; Nimr Ajban LRSOV
including self-propelled artillery. The extent to which Russia’s inva- ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
sion of Ukraine has affected the supply of spare parts to Algeria AEV IMR-2
is unclear, though these are likely to become evident the longer ARV BREM-1
that conflict continues. Algiers has recapitalised around half of its
VLB MTU-20
fixed-wing combat-aircraft inventory and the navy has invested
MW M58 MICLIC
in its submarine and frigate fleet. Local industry and the services
are capable of equipment maintenance. Algeria is largely depen- ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
dent on foreign suppliers for new equipment, but it has in recent SP 92: 64 9P133 with 9M113 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel);
years made investments towards developing a domestic defence 28 9P163-3 Kornet-EM (RS-AT-14 Spriggan)
industry. This has led to joint ventures with foreign partners, such MSL • MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger);
as Italy’s Leonardo and Germany’s Rheinmetall. 9K111 Fagot (RS-AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1 Konkurs (RS-AT-5
Spandrel); 9K115-2 Metis-M1 (RS-AT-13); 9K135 Kornet-E
ACTIVE 139,000 (Army 110,000 Navy 15,000 Air (RS-AT-14 Spriggan); Luch Skif; Milan
14,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 187,200 RCL 180: 82mm 120 B-10; 107mm 60 B-11
Conscript liability 12 months GUNS 100mm 10 T-12
316 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Middle East
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
1 sqn with AS355 Ecureuil Gendarmerie & Paramilitary ε187,200
5 sqn with Mi-8 Hip; Mi-17 Hip H
1 sqn with Ka-27PS Helix D; Ka-32T Helix
Gendarmerie 20,000
ISR UAV
1 sqn with Seeker II Ministry of Defence control; 6 regions
AIR DEFENCE EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
3 ADA bde
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
3 SAM regt with S-125M/M1 Pechora-M/M1 (RS-SA-3
Goa); 2K12 Kub (RS-SA-6 Gainful); S-300PMU2 RECCE AML-60
(RS-SA-20 Gargoyle) APC • APC (W) 210: 100 TH-390 Fahd; 110 Panhard M3
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 12+: 12 AW109; Some
AIRCRAFT 184 combat capable PZL Mi-2 Hoplite
FTR 23 MiG-29S/UB Fulcrum
FGA 73: 14 MiG-29M/M2 Fulcrum; 59 Su-30MKA National Security Forces 16,000
Flanker H
ATK 33 Su-24M/MK Fencer D Directorate of National Security. Equipped with small arms
ISR 3 Su-24MR Fencer E*
TKR 6 Il-78 Midas Republican Guard 1,200
TPT 67: Heavy 11: 3 Il-76MD Candid B; 8 Il-76TD EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Candid; Medium 18: 8 C-130H Hercules; 6 C-130H-30
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
Hercules; 2 C-130J Hercules; 2 L-100-30; Light 32: 3
Beech C90B King Air; 5 Beech 200T King Air; 6 Beech RECCE AML-60
300 King Air; 12 Beech 1900D (electronic surv); 5
C295M; 1 F-27 Friendship; PAX 6: 1 A340; 4 Gulfstream Legitimate Defence Groups ε150,000
IV-SP; 1 Gulfstream V Self-defence militia, communal guards (60,000)
TRG 99: 36 L-39ZA Albatros*; 7 L-39C Albatros; 16 Yak-
130 Mitten*; 40 Z-142
HELICOPTERS DEPLOYMENT
ATK 72: 30 Mi-24 Hind; 42+ Mi-28NE/UB Havoc
SAR 3 Ka-27PS Helix D DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN •
MRH 85: 8 AW139 (SAR); 3 Bell 412EP; 74 Mi-8 Hip MONUSCO 2
318 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
MANOEUVRE
Bahrain BHR Armoured
1 armd bde(-) (1 recce bn, 2 armd bn)
Bahraini Dinar BHD 2021 2022 2023 Mechanised
GDP BHD 14.6bn 16.4bn 1 inf bde (2 mech bn, 1 mot bn)
USD 38.9bn 43.5bn Light
per capita USD 26,136 28,692 1 (Amiri) gd bn
COMBAT SUPPORT
Growth % 2.2 3.4
1 arty bde (1 hvy arty bty, 2 med arty bty, 1 lt arty bty,
Inflation % -0.6 3.5 1 MRL bty)
Def bdgt [a] BHD 526m 526m 1 engr coy
USD 1.40bn 1.40bn COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
1 log coy
FMA (US) USD 3.0m 4.0m 4.0m
1 tpt coy
USD1=BHD 0.38 0.38 1 med coy
[a] Excludes funds allocated to the Ministry of the Interior and AIR DEFENCE
the National Security Agency 1 AD bn (1 ADA bty, 2 SAM bty)
Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1.53
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
MBT 100 M60A3; (80 more in store)
0.81 RECCE 22 AML-90
2008 2015 2022
IFV 67: 25 YPR-765 PRI; 42 AIFV-B-C25
Population 1,540,558 APC 303+
APC (T) 303: 300 M113A2; 3 AIFV-B
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus APC (W) Arma 6×6
Male 9.2% 3.5% 4.8% 6.3% 34.5% 1.9% AUV M-ATV
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
Female 9.0% 3.0% 3.4% 3.9% 18.6% 1.8%
ARV 53 Fahd 240
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
Capabilities MSL
Bahrain is a member of the GCC and occupies a key strategic SP 5 AIFV-B-Milan; HMMWV with BGM-71A TOW;
position between regional rivals Iran and Saudi Arabia. The 9P163-3 Kornet-EM (RS-AT-14 Spriggan)
principal roles of the armed forces are territorial defence
MANPATS BGM-71A TOW; Kornet-EM (RS-AT-14
and internal-security support. Bahrain’s most critical security
relationship is with Saudi Arabia, but it also has a strong defence
Spriggan)
relationship with the US and has been a US major non-NATO RCL 31: 106mm 25 M40A1; 120mm 6 MOBAT
ally since 2002. The US 5th Fleet is headquartered in Bahrain, as ARTILLERY 175
is the US-led Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) and the UK-led SP 82: 155mm 20 M109A5; 203mm 62 M110A2
International Maritime Security Construct. Bahrain has periodically TOWED 36: 105mm 8 L118 Light Gun; 155mm 28 M198
commanded CMF task forces. The armed forces carried out a MRL 13: 220mm 4 SR5; 227mm 9 M270 MLRS
limited expeditionary deployment in support of the Saudi-led MOR 44: 81mm 12 L16; SP 81mm 20 VAMTAC with
intervention in Yemen, notably by the special forces. Bahrain also
EIMOS; SP 120mm 12 M113A2
signed a security cooperation agreement with Israel in February
2022. As part of a major air-force modernisation, Bahrain is in the
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS
process of acquiring new F-16V fighters and upgrading its existing SRBM • Conventional MGM-140A ATACMS (launched
F-16s to that configuration, as well as acquiring the Patriot air- and from M270 MLRS)
missile-defence system. In recent years there have been modest AIR DEFENCE
additions to Bahrain’s naval forces in the form of an ex-UK patrol SAM 13+
ship and former-US patrol vessels, as well as upgrades to other Medium-range 6 MIM-23B I-Hawk
craft. The armed forces have organic maintenance support, but Short-range 7 Crotale
there is little in the way of a defence-industrial base beyond the
Point-defence 9K338 Igla-S (RS-SA-24 Grinch)
limited maintenance support provided by the Arab Shipbuilding
and Repair Yard. (reported); FIM-92 Stinger; RBS-70
GUNS 24: 35mm 12 GDF-003/-005; 40mm 12 L/70
ACTIVE 8,200 (Army 6,000 Navy 700 Air 1,500)
Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 11,260 Navy 700
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 1
FFGHM 1 Sabha (ex-US Oliver Hazard Perry) with 1 Mk
Army 6,000 13 GMLS with RGM-84C Harpoon Block 1B AShM/SM-
FORCES BY ROLE 1MR Block VI SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT
SPECIAL FORCES with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 1
1 SF bn 76mm gun (capacity 1 Bo-105 hel)
Middle East and North Africa 319
APC (W) 1,560: 250 BMR-600P; 250 BTR-60; 410 Fahd- Mk 46 LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS, 1 76mm gun
30/TH 390 Fahd; 650 Walid (capacity 2 SH-2G Super Seasprite ASW hel)
PPV 984+: 535 Caiman; some REVA III; some REVA V 2 El Fateh (Gowind 2500) with 2 quad lnchrs with
LWB; 360 RG-33L; 89 RG-33 HAGA (amb); ST-500 MM40 Exocet Block 3 AShM, 1 16-cell CLA VLS
AUV 173+: Panthera T6; 173 Sherpa Light Scout; ST-100 with VL MICA SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES MU90 LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 med hel)
ARV 367+: Fahd 240; BMR 3560.55; 12 Maxxpro ARV; 220 1 Tahya Misr (FRA Aquitaine (FREMM)) with 2 quad lnchr
M88A1; 90 M88A2; M113 ARV; 45 M578; T-54/55 ARV with MM40 Exocet Block 3 AShM, 2 8-cell Sylver A43
VLB KMM; MTU; MTU-20 VLS with Aster 15 SAM, 2 twin 324mm B-515 ASTT
MW Aardvark JFSU Mk4 with MU90 LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 med hel)
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL FFGH 2 Damyat (ex-US Knox) with 1 octuple Mk 16
SP 352+: 52 M901, 300 YPR-765 PRAT; HMMWV with GMLS with RGM-84C Harpoon Block 1B AShM/ASROC,
TOW-2 2 twin 324mm SVTT Mk 32 TT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Mk
MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger) (incl 15 Phalanx CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 SH-2G Super
BRDM-2); HJ-73; Luch Corsar (reported); Milan; Seasprite ASW hel)
Stugna-P (reported); TOW-2 FFHM 2 Al-Galala (ITA Bergamini (FREMM)) with 2
ARTILLERY 4,468 8-cell Sylver A50 VLS with Aster 15/30 SAM, 2 twin
324mm B-515 ASTT with MU90 LWT, 1 127mm gun, 1
SP 492+: 122mm 124+: 124 SP 122; D-30 mod; 130mm
76mm gun (fitted for but not with Otomat (Teseo) Mk2A
M-46 mod; 155mm 368: 164 M109A2; 204 M109A5
AShM) (capacity 2 med hel)
TOWED 962: 122mm 526: 190 D-30M; 36 M-1931/37; 300
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 73
M-30; 130mm 420 M-46; 155mm 16 GH-52
CORVETTES 5
MRL 450: 122mm 356: 96 BM-11; 60 BM-21; 50 Sakr-
FSGM 2 Abu Qir (ESP Descubierta) (of which 1†) with
10; 50 Sakr-18; 100 Sakr-36; 130mm 36 K136 Kooryong;
2 quad lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon Block 1B AShM,
140mm 32 BM-14; 227mm 26 M270 MLRS; 240mm (48
1 octuple Albatros lnchr with Aspide SAM, 2 triple
BM-24 in store)
324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Sting Ray LWT, 1 twin
MOR 2,564: 81mm 50 M125A2; 82mm 500; SP 107mm 375mm Bofors ASW Rocket Launcher System A/S
100: 65 M106A1; 35 M106A2; 120mm 1,848: 1,800 M-1943; mor, 1 76mm gun
48 Brandt; SP 120mm 36 M1064A3; 160mm 30 M-160
Middle East
with 2 twin lnchr with HY-2 (CH-SS-N-2 Safflower)
SRBM • Conventional 42+: 9 FROG-7; 24 Sakr-80; 9 AShM, 4 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 2 twin 57mm guns
9K72 Elbrus (RS-SS-1C Scud-B) FS 1 Shabab Misr (ex-RoK Po Hang) with 2 76mm guns
UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES PCFGM 4 Ezzat (US Ambassador Fast Missile Craft) with
ISR • Medium R4E-50 Skyeye; ASN-209 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84L Harpoon Block II AShM, 1
AIR DEFENCE 21-cell Mk49 lnchr with RIM-116B RAM Block 1A SAM,
SAM 45+ 1 Mk15 mod 21 Block 1B Phalanx CIWS 1 76mm gun
Point-defence 45 Sinai-23 with Ayn al-Saqr; Ayn al- PCFG 8:
Saqr; FIM-92 Stinger; 9K38 Igla (RS-SA-18 Grouse); 1 Project 12418 (RUS Tarantul IV) with 2 twin lnchr
9K338 Igla-S (RS-SA-24 Grinch) (reported) with 3M80E Moskit (RS-SS-N-22A Sunburn), 2
GUNS 860 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun
SP 160: 23mm 120 ZSU-23-4; 57mm 40 ZSU-57-2 6 Ramadan with 4 single lnchr with Otomat Mk2
TOWED 700: 14.5mm 300 ZPU-4; 23mm 200 ZU-23-2; AShM, 1 76mm gun
57mm 200 S-60 1 Tiger with 2 twin lnchr with RGM-84 Harpoon
AShM, 1 76mm gun
Navy ε8,500 (incl 2,000 Coast Guard); 10,000 PCF 4 Tiger with 1 76mm gun
conscript (total 18,500) PCC 15: 5 Al-Nour (ex-PRC Hainan) (3 more in reserve†)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE with 2 triple 324mm TT, 4 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 2 twin
57mm guns; 1 Lurssen 41m; 9 Omar Ibn El Khattab (GER
SUBMARINES • SSK 8
OPB 40)
4 Type-033 (PRC Romeo) with 8 single 533mm TT with
PBFGM 8 Project 205 (ex-YUG Osa I) (of which 3†) with
UGM-84C Harpoon Block 1B AShM/Mk 37 HWT
4 single lnchr with P-20 (RS-SS-N-2A Styx) AShM, 1
4 Type-209/1400 with 8 single 533mm TT with UGM-84L
9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-N-5 Grail) SAM (manual aiming)
Harpoon Block II AShM/SeaHake mod 4 (DM2A4) HWT PBFG 9:
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 12 4 Type-024 (PRC Hegu) (2 additional vessels in
FFGHM 8: reserve) with 2 single lnchr with SY-1 (CH-SS-N-1
1 Al-Aziz (GER MEKO A200) with 4 quad lnchr with Scrubbrush) AShM
MM40 Exocet Block 3 AShM, 4 8-cell CLA with VL 5 October (FSU Komar) (of which 1†) with 2 single
MICA NG SAM, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 med hel) lnchr with Otomat Mk2 AShM (1 additional vessel
4 Alexandria (ex-US Oliver Hazard Perry) with 1 Mk in reserve)
13 GMLS with RGM-84C Harpoon Block 1B AShM/ PBFM 4 Shershen (FSU) with 1 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-N-5
SM-1MR Block VI SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Grail) SAM (manual aiming), 1 12-tube BM-24 MRL
322 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Middle East
5 AD div HQ (geographically based)
3 SAM bty with S-300V4 (RS-SA-23) DEPLOYMENT
4 SAM bty with 9K37M1-2/9K317 Buk-M1-2/M2E (RS-
SA-11 Gadfly/RS-SA-17 Grizzly) CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 1,025;
11 SAM bty with MIM-23B I-Hawk 1 inf bn; 1 tpt coy
38 SAM bty with S-75M Volkhov (RS-SA-2 Guideline) DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN •
10 SAM bty with S-125-2M Pechora-2M (RS-SA-26) MONUSCO 11
Some SAM bty with 2K12 Kub (RS-SA-6 Gainful) MALI: UN • MINUSMA 1,052; 1 spec ops coy; 1 sy bn;
2 SAM bty with 9K331/9K331ME Tor-M1/M2E (RS- 1 MP coy
SA-15 Gauntlet)
SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 5
14 SAM bty with Crotale
12 SAM bty with M48 Chaparral SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 3
30 SAM bty with S-125M Pechora-M (RS-SA-3 Goa) WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 22
18 AD bn with RIM-7M Sea Sparrow with Skyguard/GDF-
003 with Skyguard
12 ADA bde (total: 100 ADA bn)
FOREIGN FORCES
Australia MFO (Operation Mazurka) 27
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Canada MFO 55
AIR DEFENCE
SAM 777 Colombia MFO 275; 1 inf bn
Long-range ε18 S-300V4 (RS-SA-23) Czech Republic MFO 18; 1 C295M
Medium-range 323+: 40+ 9K37M1-2/9K317 Buk-M1-2/ Fiji MFO 170; elm 1 inf bn
M2E (RS-SA-11 Gadfly/RS-SA-17 Grizzly); ε33 MIM- France MFO 1
23B I-Hawk; ε210 S-75M Volkhov (RS-SA-2 Guideline); Italy MFO 75; 3 PB
ε40 S-125-2M Pechora-2M (RS-SA-26) New Zealand MFO 26; 1 trg unit; 1 tpt unit
Short-range 300+: 56+ 2K12 Kub (RS-SA-6 Gainful); Norway MFO 3
10 9K331 Tor-M1 (RS-SA-15 Gauntlet); 10+ 9K331ME United Arab Emirates ε300: 12 F-16E/F Fighting Falcon;
Tor-M2E (RS-SA-15 Gauntlet); 24+ Crotale; 80 RIM-7M Wing Loong I UAV; Wing Loong II UAV (status uncertain)
Sea Sparrow with Skyguard; ε120 S-125M Pechora-M United Kingdom MFO 2
(RS-SA-3 Goa) United States MFO 426; elm 1 ARNG inf bn; 1 ARNG spt
Point-defence 136+: 50 M1097 Avenger; 50+ M48 bn (1 EOD coy, 1 medical coy, 1 hel coy)
Chaparral; 36+ Sinai-23 with Ayn al-Saqr Uruguay MFO 41 1 engr/tpt unit
324 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Middle East
Bell 206 Jet Ranger (AB-206) AShM, 2 3-cell VLS & 4 single cell VLS (likely fitted
UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES with SAM), 1 hel landing platform
CISR • Medium Mohajer 6; Kaman 12 PBFG 56:
ISR • Medium Ababil 2; Ababil 3; Mohajer 3; Mohajer 4; 5 C14 with 2 twin lnchr with C-701 (Kosar)/C-704
Light Mohajer 2 (Nasr) AShM
AIR DEFENCE 10 Mk13 with 2 single lnchr with C-704 (Nasr)
SAM AShM, 2 single 324mm TT
Short-range FM-80 (CH-SA-4) 10 Thondor (PRC Houdong) with 2 twin lnchr with
Point-defence 9K36 Strela-3 (RS-SA-14 Gremlin); 9K32 C-802A (Ghader) AShM, 2 AK230 CIWS
Strela-2 (RS-SA-7 Grail)‡; Misaq 1 (QW-1); Misaq 2 25 Peykaap II (IPS-16 mod) with 2 single lnchr
(QW-18); 9K338 Igla-S (RS-SA-24 Grinch) (reported); with C-701 (Kosar) AShM/C-704 (Nasr), 2 single
HN-5A (CH-SA-3) 324mm TT
GUNS 1,122 6 Zolfaghar (Peykaap III/IPS-16 mod) with 2 single
SP 180: 23mm 100 ZSU-23-4; 57mm 80 ZSU-57-2 lnchr with C-701 (Kosar)/C-704 (Nasr) AShM
TOWED 942+: 14.5mm ZPU-2; ZPU-4; 23mm 300 PBG 1 Shahid Rouhi with 2 twin lnchr with C-704
ZU-23-2; 35mm 92 GDF-002; 37mm M-1939; 40mm 50 (Nasr) AShM
L/70; 57mm 200 S-60; 85mm 300 M-1939 PBFT 15 Peykaap I (IPS -16) with 2 single 324mm TT
BOMBS PBF 35: 15 Kashdom II; 10 Tir (IPS-18); ε10 Pashe
Laser-guided Qaem (MIG-G-1900)
Electro-optical guided Qaem PB 21: ε20 Ghaem; 1 Shahid Nazeri
AMPHIBIOUS
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 190,000 LANDING SHIPS • LST 3 Hormuz 24 (Hejaz design
for commercial use)
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Ground LANDING CRAFT • LCT 2 Hormuz 21
Forces 150,000 (minelaying capacity)
Controls Basij paramilitary forces. Lightly staffed in LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AP 3 Naser
peacetime. Primary role: internal security; secondary role: COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM C-701 (Kosar); C-704
external defence, in conjunction with regular armed forces (Nasr); C-802 (Noor); HY-2 (CH-SSC-3 Seersucker)
FORCES BY ROLE HELICOPTERS
COMMAND MRH 5 Mi-171 Hip
31 provincial corps HQ (2 in Tehran) TPT • Light some Bell 206 (AB-206) Jet Ranger
326 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES SSW 15: 14 Ghadir (Yono) with 2 single 533mm TT with
CISR • Medium Mohajer 6 Jask-2 (C-704 (Nasr)) AShM/Valfajr HWT (additional
BOMBS vessels in build); 1 Nahang
Laser-guided Qaem PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 68
Electro-optical guided Qaem CORVETTES 7
FSGM 3 Jamaran (UK Vosper Mk 5 derivative – 1
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps more undergoing sea trials) with 2 twin lnchr with
Marines 5,000+ C-802 (Noor) (CH-SS-N-6) AShM, 2 single lnchr with
FORCES BY ROLE SM-1 SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT, 1
MANOEUVRE 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform
Amphibious FSG 4:
1 mne bde 2 Alvand (UK Vosper Mk 5) with 2 twin lnchr with
C-802 (CH-SS-N-6) AShM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
Mk 32 ASTT, 1 114mm gun
Aerospace Force 15,000
1 Alvand (UK Vosper Mk 5) with 2 twin lnchr with
Controls Iran’s strategic-missile force
C-802 (CH-SS-N-6) AShM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT
FORCES BY ROLE
Mk 32 ASTT, 1 AK630M CIWS, 1 114mm gun
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
1 Bayandor (US PF-103) with 2 twin lnchr with C-802
1 sqn with Su-22M4 Fitter K; Su-22UM-3K Fitter G
(CH-SS-N-6) AShM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32
TRAINING
ASTT, 1 76mm gun
1 sqn with EMB-312 Tucano*
PCFG 15: up to 10 Kaman (FRA Combattante II) with 1
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE twin lnchr with C-802 (Noor) (CH-SS-N-6) AShM,
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS 1 76mm gun; 5+ Sina with 1 twin lnchr with C-802
MRBM • Conventional up to 50: Emad-1 (Shahab-3 (Noor) (CH-SS-N-6) AShM, 1 76mm gun
mod); Ghadr-1/-2 (Shahab-3 mod); Sajjil-2; Shahab-3
PBG 9:
(IR-SS-7) (mobile & silo); Khorramshahr (in devt)
3 Hendijan with 2 twin lnchr with C-802 (Noor)
SRBM • Conventional up to 100: Fateh-110; Fateh-313;
(CH-SS-N-6) AShM
Khalij Fars (Fateh-110 mod ASBM); Qiam-1/-1 mod;
3 Kayvan with 2 single lnchr with C-704 (Nasr)
Shahab-1/-2 (Scud variants; service status uncertain);
AShM
Zelzal; Zolfaghar (IR-SS-1)
3 Parvin with 2 single lnchr with C-704 (Nasr) AShM
GLCM • Conventional some Ya’ali (Quds-1)
PBFT 3 Kajami (semi-submersible) with 2 324mm TT
AIRCRAFT 23 combat capable
PBF 1 MIL55
FGA 8: up to 7 Su-22M4 Fitter K; 1+ Su-22UM-3K Fitter G
PB 33: 9 C14; 8 Hendijan; 6 MkII; 10 MkIII
TRG 15 EMB-312 Tucano*
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES •
UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES
MCC 1 Shahin
CISR • Heavy Shahed 129; Medium Shahed 181;
Shahed 191 AMPHIBIOUS
ISR • Medium Ababil 3; Mohajer 4; Shahed 123 LANDING SHIPS 12
AIR DEFENCE LST 3 Hengam with 1 hel landing platform (capacity 9
SAM tanks; 225 troops)
Medium-range Ra‘ad/3rd Khordad; Talash/15th Khordad LSM 3 Farsi (ROK) (capacity 9 tanks; 140 troops)
Point-defence Misaq 1 (QW-1); Misaq 2 (QW-18) LSL 6 Fouque
BOMBS LANDING CRAFT 11
Laser-guided Sadid LCT 2
Electro-optical guided Sadid LCU 1 Liyan 110
UCAC 8: 2 Wellington Mk 4; 4 Wellington Mk 5; 2
Islamic Revolutionary Quds Force 5,000 Tondar (UK Winchester)
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 18
Navy 18,000 AE 2 Delvar
HQ at Bandar Abbas AFD 2 Dolphin
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AG 1 Hamzah with 2 single lnchr with C-802 (Noor)
In addition to the vessels listed, the Iranian Navy operates (CH-SS-N-6) AShM
a substantial number of patrol boats with a full-load dis- AK 3 Delvar
placement below 10 tonnes AKR 1 Makran
SUBMARINES • TACTICAL 17 AORH 2 Bandar Abbas
SSK 1 Taregh (RUS Paltus (Project 877EKM (Kilo))) (2 AWT 5: 4 Kangan; 1 Delvar
more non-operational) with 6 single 533mm TT AX 2 Kialas
SSC 1 Fateh with 4 single 533mm TT with C-704 (Nasr-1) COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM C-701 (Kosar); C-704
AShM/Valfajr HWT (Nasr); C-802 (Noor); C-802A (Ghader); Ra’ad (reported)
Middle East and North Africa 327
Marines 2,600 Some units with Bell 206A Jet Ranger (AB-206A);
FORCES BY ROLE Shabaviz 2-75; Shabaviz 2061
MANOEUVRE EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Amphibious AIRCRAFT 312 combat capable
2 mne bde FTR 180+: 20 F-5B Freedom Fighter; 54+ F-5E/F Tiger II;
24 F-7M Airguard; up to 41 F-14 Tomcat; 35 MiG-29A/UB
Naval Aviation 2,600 Fulcrum; up to 6 Azarakhsh (reported)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE FGA 80: 62 F-4D/E Phantom II; 2 Mirage F-1BQ; 10
AIRCRAFT Mirage F-1EQ; up to 6 Saegheh (reported)
TPT 16: Light 13: 5 Do-228; 4 F-27 Friendship; 4 Turbo ATK 29 Su-24MK Fencer D
Commander 680; PAX 3 Falcon 20 (ELINT) ASW 3 P-3F Orion
HELICOPTERS ISR: 6+ RF-4E Phantom II*
ASW ε10 SH-3D Sea King TKR/TPT 3: ε1 B-707; ε2 B-747
MCM 3 RH-53D Sea Stallion TPT 116: Heavy 12 Il-76 Candid; Medium ε19 C-130E/H
TPT • Light 17: 5 Bell 205A (AB-205A); 2 Bell 206 Jet Hercules; Light 75: 11 An-74TK-200; 5 An-140 (Iran-140
Ranger (AB-206); 10 Bell 212 (AB-212) Faraz); 10 F-27 Friendship; 1 L-1329 Jetstar; 10 PC-6B
UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES Turbo Porter; 8 TB-21 Trinidad; 4 TB-200 Tobago; 3 Turbo
CISR • Heavy Shahed 129 Commander 680; 14 Y-7; 9 Y-12; PAX 10: ε1 B-707; 1
BOMBS B-747; 4 B-747F; 1 Falcon 20; 3 Falcon 50
Laser-guided Sadid TRG 126: 25 Beech F33A/C Bonanza; 14 JJ-7*; 25 MFI-17
Electro-optical guided Sadid Mushshak; 12 Parastu; 15 PC-6; 35 PC-7 Turbo Trainer
HELICOPTERS
Air Force 37,000 MRH 2 Bell 412
FORCES BY ROLE TPT 34+: Heavy 2+ CH-47 Chinook; Medium 30 Bell
Serviceability probably about 60% for US ac types and about 214C (AB-214C); Light 2+: 2 Bell 206A Jet Ranger (AB-
80% for PRC/Russian ac. Includes IRGC AF equipment 206A); some Shabaviz 2-75 (indigenous versions in
FIGHTER production); some Shabaviz 2061
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
Middle East
2 sqn with F-14 Tomcat
2 sqn with MiG-29A/UB Fulcrum (RS-AA-11A Archer); AIM-9J Sidewinder; IR/SARH R-27
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK (RS-AA-10 Alamo); SARH AIM-7E-2 Sparrow; ARH
1 sqn with Mirage F-1B/E AIM-54 Phoenix†
1 sqn with F-5E/F Tiger II ASM AGM-65A Maverick; Kh-25 (RS-AS-10 Karen); Kh-
5 sqn with F-4D/E Phantom II 25ML (RS-AS-10 Karen); Kh-29L/T (RS-AS-14A/B Kedge)
3 sqn with F-5E/F Tiger II AShM C-801K
GROUND ATTACK ARM Kh-58 (RS-AS-11 Kilter)
1 sqn with Su-24MK Fencer D BOMBS
MARITIME PATROL Electro-optical guided GBU-87/B Qassed
1 sqn with P-3F Orion
ISR Air Defence Force 15,000
1 (det) sqn with RF-4E Phantom II* FORCES BY ROLE
SEARCH & RESCUE AIR DEFENCE
Some flt with Bell 214C (AB-214C) 16 bn with MIM-23B I-Hawk/Shahin
TANKER/TRANSPORT 4 bn with S-300PMU2 (RS-SA-20 Gargoyle)
1 sqn with B-707; B-747; B-747F 5 sqn with FM-80 (CH-SA-4); Rapier; HQ-2 (CH-SA-1);
TRANSPORT S-200 Angara (RS-SA-5 Gammon); 9K331 Tor-M1
1 sqn with B-707; Falcon 50; L-1329 Jetstar; Bell 412 (RS-SA-15 Gauntlet)
2 sqn with C-130E/H Hercules EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 sqn with F-27 Friendship; Falcon 20 AIR DEFENCE
1 sqn with Il-76 Candid; An-140 (Iran-140 Faraz) SAM 410
TRAINING Long-range 42+: 10 S-200 Angara (RS-SA-5 Gammon);
1 sqn with Beech F33A/C Bonanza 32 S-300PMU2 (RS-SA-20 Gargoyle); Bavar-373
1 sqn with F-5B Freedom Fighter Medium-range 59+: ε50 MIM-23B I-Hawk/Shahin; 9
1 sqn with PC-6 HQ-2 (CH-SA-1); Talash/15th Khordad
1 sqn with PC-7 Turbo Trainer Short-range 279: 250 FM-80 (CH-SA-4); 29 9K331
Some units with MFI-17 Mushshak; TB-21 Trinidad; TB- Tor-M1 (RS-SA-15 Gauntlet)
200 Tobago Point-defence 30+: 30 Rapier; Misaq 1 (QW-1); Misaq 2
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER (QW-18)
1 sqn with CH-47 Chinook GUNS • TOWED 23mm ZU-23-2; 35mm GDF-002
328 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 40,000–60,000 the relationship between the official government forces, Kurdish
Peshmerga forces and the Popular Mobilisation Units militias
Law-Enforcement Forces 40,000–60,000 remains uncertain. The government’s most critical security rela-
(border and security troops); 450,000 on tionship has been with the US, on whom Iraqi forces remain largely
mobilisation (incl conscripts) dependent for training and ISR support, as well as contractor
maintenance. Political pressure from nationalist and Iran-aligned
Part of armed forces in wartime
political parties, and continuing attacks on US forces by Iranian-
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE supported militia units have strained this relationship in recent
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB ε90 years. The US-led combat mission designed to help Iraqi forces
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 2+: 2 An-140; some Cessna tackle ISIS ended in December 2021 with troops under Combined
185/Cessna 310 Joint Task Force – Inherent Resolve moving to an ‘advise, assist
HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light ε24 AB-205 (Bell 205)/ and enable’ role. The NATO Mission Iraq is focused on training and
AB-206 (Bell 206) Jet Ranger capacity building. The armed forces’ inventory comprises a heter-
ogenous mix of Soviet-era and Russian equipment combined with
Basij Resistance Force ε600,000 on mobilisation newer European- and US-sourced platforms, but significant short-
comings remain in logistics support. Barring military maintenance
Paramilitary militia with claimed membership of 12.6
facilities, Iraq’s defence industry has only limited capacity, focusing
million; ε600,000 combat capable on the manufacture of light weapons and ammunition.
Middle East
ISR 10: 2 Cessna AC-208B Combat Caravan*; 2 SB7L-360
ATK 35: 11 Mi-28NE Havoc; 4 Mi-28UB Havoc; 20+ Mi- Seeker; 6 Beech 350ER King Air
35M Hind TPT 29: Medium 15: 3 C-130E Hercules; 6 C-130J-30
MRH 63+: 4+ SA342 Gazelle; 17 Bell IA407; 23 H135M; Hercules; 6 An-32B Cline (of which 2 combat capable);
ε19 Mi-17 Hip H/Mi-171Sh
Light 14: 1 Beech 350 King Air; 5 Cessna 208B Grand
ISR 10 OH-58C Kiowa
Caravan; 8 Cessna 172
TPT • Light 44: 16 Bell 205 (UH-1H Huey II); 10 Bell
TRG 57+: 8 CH-2000 Sama; 10+ Lasta-95; 15 T-6A; 24
206B3 Jet Ranger; ε18 Bell T407
T-50IQ Golden Eagle*
UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES
CISR • Heavy 12 CH-4 AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • ASM 9K114 Shturm (RS- AAM • IR AIM-9L/M Sidewinder; SARH AIM-7M Sparrow
AT-6 Spiral); AGR-20A APKWS; AR-1; Ingwe ASM AGM-114 Hellfire
BOMBS BOMBS
INS/GPS-guided FT-9 Laser-guided GBU-10 Paveway II; GBU-12 Paveway II
Gendarmerie & Paramilitary ε266,000 Norway Operation Inherent Resolve 60; 1 trg unit • NATO
Mission Iraq 2
Iraqi Federal Police ε36,000 Poland Operation Inherent Resolve 150 • NATO Mission
Iraq 30
Territorial Interdiction Force ε50,000 Portugal Operation Inherent Resolve 30
FORCES BY ROLE
Romania Operation Inherent Resolve 30 • NATO Mission
MANOEUVRE
Iraq 170
Other
Slovakia NATO Mission Iraq 5
4 sy bde
11 sy bde (forming) Slovenia Operation Inherent Resolve 3
Spain Operation Inherent Resolve 150; 1 trg units; 1 hel unit
Popular Mobilisation Forces ε180,000 • NATO Mission Iraq 130
Includes Badr Organisation; Kataib Hizbullah; Kataib Sweden Operation Inherent Resolve 2 • NATO Mission Iraq 1
Imam Ali; Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada Turkey Army 1,000; 1 cdo unit • NATO Mission Iraq 86
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE United Kingdom Operation Inherent Resolve (Shader) 100 •
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES NATO Mission Iraq 12
MBT T-55; T-72B; T-72 Rakhsh United States Operation Inherent Resolve 2,000; 1 mech bde(-);
IFV BMP-1 mod (23mm gun); BMP-2 1 atk hel bn with AH-64E Apache; MQ-1C Gray Eagle; 1 spec
APC • PPV Toophan
ops hel bn with MH-47G Chinook; MH-60M Black Hawk; 1
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
CISR UAV sqn with MQ-9A Reaper • NATO Mission Iraq 12
MANPATS Dehlavieh (Kornet); Toophan
ARTILLERY
TOWED • 130mm M-46; 152mm D-20
MRL • 122mm HM-20
Israel ISR
AIR DEFENCE New Israeli Shekel ILS 2021 2022 2023
SAM • Short-range Saqr-1 (358) (reported)
GDP ILS 1.58tr 1.74tr
GUNS • SP 23mm BMP-1 mod (ZU-23-2 on
BMP-1 chassis) USD 489bn 527bn
per capita USD 52,152 55,359
FOREIGN FORCES Growth % 8.6 6.1
Inflation % 1.5 4.5
Australia Operation Inherent Resolve (Okra) 110 • NATO
Mission Iraq 2 Def bdgt ILS 65.9bn 63.9bn
Belgium Operation Inherent Resolve (Valiant Phoenix) 6 • USD 20.4bn 19.4bn
NATO Mission Iraq 7 FMA (US) USD 3.30bn 3.30bn 3.30bn
Canada NATO Mission Iraq 16 USD1=ILS 3.23 3.30
Croatia Operation Inherent Resolve 3 • NATO Mission Iraq 8 Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015)
Czech Republic Operation Inherent Resolve 60 19.3
Denmark Operation Inherent Resolve 39 • NATO Mission
Iraq 125 16.9
Estonia Operation Inherent Resolve 10 • NATO Mission Iraq 40 2008 2015 2022
Fiji UNAMI 174; 2 sy unit Population 8,914,885
Finland Operation Inherent Resolve 75; 1 trg unit • NATO
Mission Iraq 5 Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
France Operation Inherent Resolve 6 • NATO Mission Iraq 3 Male 13.4% 4.2% 3.9% 3.6% 19.7% 5.5%
Germany Operation Inherent Resolve 70 • NATO Mission Female 12.8% 4.0% 3.7% 3.4% 19.1% 6.7%
Iraq 15
Greece NATO Mission Iraq 2 Capabilities
Hungary Operation Inherent Resolve 133 • NATO Mission
Iraq 3 The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) are organised for territorial defence,
short-term interventions in neighbouring states and limited
Italy Operation Inherent Resolve (Prima Parthica) 650; 1 inf regt; regional power projection. In recent years this has included air-to-
1 trg unit; 1 hel sqn with 4 NH90 • NATO Mission Iraq 610 ground missions in Syria, while the navy is tasked with interdicting
Latvia Operation Inherent Resolve 6 • NATO Mission Iraq 1 illicit shipments and delivering maritime security as Israel’s littoral
Lithuania Operation Inherent Resolve 6 • NATO Mission becomes more economically important to the country. Israel is
Iraq 34 widely believed to possess a nuclear-weapons capability. Follow-
Luxembourg NATO Mission Iraq 1 ing the 2015 Plan Gideon, the IDF adopted a new five-year Tnufa
(Momentum) programme in 2020. It seeks to improve areas of
Nepal UNAMI 77; 1 sy unit
relative superiority, such as technology and intelligence, to ensure
Netherlands Operation Inherent Resolve 150; 2 trg units • swifter and more decisive operations against future threats. The
NATO Mission Iraq 2 new government approved a defence budget in mid-2021, follow-
New Zealand Operation Inherent Resolve 9 ing two years without a new budget, which has enabled the plan
Middle East and North Africa 331
to progress. The US remains Israel’s key defence partner, as well as Army 26,000; 100,000 conscript (total 126,000)
a significant source of funding, and is instrumental in several of the
Organisation and structure of formations may vary
IDF’s equipment programmes, particularly in missile defence and
combat aviation. Israel also maintains discreet ties with a number according to op situations. Equipment includes that
of Arab states, has recently normalised relations with several Gulf required for reserve forces on mobilisation
states and has even started selling defence and security equip- FORCES BY ROLE
ment to the region. Personnel quality and training are generally at
COMMAND
a high standard, despite the IDF’s continuing reliance on national
service. A task force tasked with examining the number of combat 3 (regional comd) corps HQ
roles open to women reported to service chiefs in 2022; additional 2 armd div HQ
roles will be opened to women, including some additional special 1 (Multidimensional) div HQ
forces positions. Ground-forces training is being overhauled, with 5 (territorial) inf div HQ
new training centres under construction. Edge of Tomorrow, a 1 (home defence) comd HQ
new MOD and industry technology-driven project, is designed to SPECIAL FORCES
improve situational awareness and networking. Given its mission-
1 spec ops bde (3 spec ops unit)
set, the IDF’s logistics capabilities are likely limited to sustaining
operations within Israel itself or in immediately neighbouring ter- MANOEUVRE
ritories. The largely asymmetric nature of the threats the IDF has Reconnaissance
faced in recent years has focused modernisation efforts on force- 1 indep recce bn
protection, missile-defence and precision-strike capabilities. Armoured
Israel maintains a broad defence-industrial base, with world-class 3 armd bde (1 recce coy, 3 a rmd bn, 1 AT coy, 1 cbt
capabilities in armoured vehicles, uninhabited systems, guided-
engr bn)
weapons, radars and sensors, and cyber security.
1 (Multidimensional) armd inf/ISR bn
ACTIVE 169,500 (Army 126,000 Navy 9,500 Mechanised
Air 34,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 8,000 3 mech inf bde (3 mech inf bn, 1 cbt spt bn, 1 sigs coy)
Conscript liability Officers 48 months, other ranks 32 months, 1 mech inf bde (1 recce bn, 4 mech inf bn, 1 cbt spt bn)
women 24 months (Jews and Druze only; Christians, Circassians 1 indep mech inf bn
and Muslims may volunteer) Light
RESERVE 465,000 (Army 400,000 Navy 10,000 2 indep inf bn
Middle East
Annual trg as cbt reservists to age 40 (some specialists to age 54) 1 para bde (3 para bn, 1 cbt spt bn, 1 sigs coy)
for male other ranks, 38 (or marriage/pregnancy) for women Other
1 armd trg bde (3 armd bn)
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE 1 (Border Protection) sy bde (5 ISR bn; 4 sy bn)
COMBAT SUPPORT
Strategic Forces 3 arty bde
Israel is widely believed to have a nuclear capability – 1 engr bde (3 engr bn, 3 EOD coy)
delivery means include F-15I and F-16I ac, Jericho 2 IRBM 1 CBRN bn
and, reportedly, Dolphin/Tanin-class SSKs with LACM 1 int bde (3 int bn)
FORCES BY ROLE 1 int unit
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE 1 SIGINT unit
3 IRBM sqn with Jericho 2 2 MP bn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Reserves 400,000+ on mobilisation
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS
FORCES BY ROLE
IRBM • Nuclear: ε24 Jericho 2
COMMAND
Strategic Defences 3 armd div HQ
1 AB div HQ
FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
AIR DEFENCE
3 bty with Arrow 2 ATBM with Green Pine/Super Green Armoured
Pine radar and Citrus Tree command post 9 armd bde
10 bty with Iron Dome (incl reserve bty) Mechanised
4 bty with M901 Patriot PAC-2 8 mech inf bde
2 bty with David’s Sling Light
16 (territorial/regional) inf bde
Space Air Manoeuvre
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 4 para bde
SATELLITES 10 Mountain
COMMUNICATIONS 3 Amos 1 mtn inf bde
ISR 7: 1 EROS; 5 Ofeq (5, 7, 9, 10 & 16); 1 TecSAR-1 (Polaris) 1 mtn inf bn
332 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Middle East
TPT 65: Medium 18: 5 C-130E Hercules; 6 C-130H
Chile 3
Hercules; 7 C-130J-30 Hercules; Light 47: 3 AT-802 Air
China 5
Tractor; 9 Beech 200 King Air; 8 Beech 200T King Air; 5
Beech 200CT King Air; 22 Beech A36 Bonanza (Hofit) Czech Republic UNDOF 4
TRG 66: 16 Grob G-120; 30 M-346 Master (Lavi)*; 20 T-6A Denmark 10
HELICOPTERS Estonia 3
ATK 43: 26 AH-64A Apache (Peten); 17 AH-64D Fiji 2 • UNDOF 150; 1 inf coy
Apache (Sarat)
Finland 14
ASW 7 AS565SA Panther (missions flown by IAF but
with non-rated aircrew) Ghana UNDOF 6
ISR 12 OH-58B Kiowa India 2 • UNDOF 198; 1 inf pl; 1 MP pl; 1 log coy(-)
TPT 80: Heavy 25 CH-53D Sea Stallion; Medium 49: 39 Ireland 12 • UNDOF 130; 1 inf coy
S-70A Black Hawk; 10 UH-60A Black Hawk; Light 6 Bell Latvia 1
206 Jet Ranger
Nepal 3 • UNDOF 412; 1 mech inf coy; 1 inf coy; 1 log coy(-)
UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES
ISR 3+: Heavy 3+: Heron (Shoval); 3 Heron TP (Eitan); Netherlands 12 • UNDOF 1
RQ-5A Hunter; Medium Hermes 450; Hermes 900 (22+ New Zealand 8
Searcher MkII in store); Light Orbiter 4 (Nitzotz); (an Norway 13
unknown number of ISR UAVs are combat capable) Poland 4
LOITERING & DIRECT ATTACK MUNITIONS
Russia 4
Harop; Harpy
Serbia 1
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS
IRBM • Nuclear ε24 Jericho 2 Slovakia 2
AIR DEFENCE Slovenia 3
SAM 40+: Sweden 7
Long-range M901 Patriot PAC-2 Switzerland 11
Medium-range some David’s Sling
United States 2 • US Strategic Command; 100; 1 AN/TPY-
Short-range up to 40 Iron Dome
Point-defence Machbet 2 X-band radar at Mount Keren
GUNS • TOWED 20mm M167 Vulcan Uruguay UNDOF 212; 1 mech inf coy
MISSILE DEFENCE • SAM 24 Arrow 2/Arrow 3; Zambia 1
334 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Middle East
1 sqn with Grob 120TP FORCES BY ROLE
1 hel sqn with R-44 Raven II SPECIAL FORCES
ATTACK HELICOPTER 2 SF unit
2 sqn with AH-1F Cobra (with TOW) MANOEUVRE
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER Other
1 sqn with AS332M Super Puma; UH-60A Black Hawk 10 sy bn
1 sqn with UH-60A Black Hawk EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 sqn with UH-60M Black Hawk ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
1 sqn with Mi-26T2 Halo APC • APC (W) 25+: AT105 Saxon (reported); 25+
EE-11 Urutu
1 (Royal) flt with VH-60M Black Hawk; AW139
AUV AB2 Al-Jawad
ISR UAV
1 sqn with S-100 Camcopter
AIR DEFENCE DEPLOYMENT
2 bde with MIM-23B Phase III I-Hawk CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 10
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN •
AIRCRAFT 57 combat capable MONUSCO 11
FGA 47: 33 F-16AM Fighting Falcon; 14 F-16BM
MALI: UN • MINUSMA 322; 1 mech inf coy(+)
Fighting Falcon
SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 5
ATK (2 AC235 in store, offered for sale)
ISR 10 AT-802U Air Tractor*
TPT 11: Medium 3 C-130E Hercules (1 C-130B Hercules; FOREIGN FORCES
4 C-130H Hercules in store); Light 7: 5 Cessna 208B; 2 France Operation Inherent Resolve (Chammal) 300; 4 Rafale F3
M-28 Skytruck (2 C295M in store, offered for sale); PAX 1 Germany Operation Inherent Resolve 150; 1 A400M
CL-604 Challenger United States Central Command: Operation Inherent
TRG 26: 14 Grob 120TP; 12 PC-21; (12 Hawk Mk63* in Resolve 3,000; 1 FGA sqn with 18 F-15E Strike Eagle; 1 CISR
store, offered for sale) sqn with 12 MQ-9A Reaper
336 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Middle East
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PPV 40 Otokar ISV
AIRCRAFT 53 combat capable AUV 120 Sherpa Light Scout
FGA 39: 6 Eurofighter Typhoon; 26 F/A-18C Hornet; 7
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
F/A-18D Hornet
ARV Pandur
TKR/TPT 3 KC-130J Hercules
HELICOPTERS
TPT 5: Heavy 2 C-17A Globemaster III; Medium 3 L-100-30
TPT • Heavy 3 H225M
TRG 14: 6 EMB-312 Tucano*; 8 Hawk Mk64* (10 EMB-312
Tucano* in store) Coast Guard 500
HELICOPTERS
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ATK 16 AH-64D Apache
MRH 13 SA342 Gazelle with HOT PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 32
TPT 19: Heavy 6+ H225M; Medium 13: 3 AS532 Cougar; PBF 12 Manta
7 SA330 Puma; 3 S-92A (SAR/VIP) PB 20: 3 Al Shaheed; 4 Inttisar (Austal 31.5m); 3 Kassir
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES (Austal 22m); 10 Subahi
AAM • IR AIM-9L Sidewinder; R-550 Magic; SARH AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT
AIM-7F Sparrow; ARH AIM-120C7 AMRAAM LCU 4: 2 Al Tahaddy; 1 Saffar; 1 other
ASM AGM-65G Maverick; AGM-114K Hellfire; HOT LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AG 1 Sawahil
AShM AGM-84D Harpoon Block IC
FOREIGN FORCES
Air Defence Command
Canada Operation Inherent Resolve (Impact) 200
FORCES BY ROLE
Italy Operation Inherent Resolve (Prima Parthica) 300; 4
AIR DEFENCE
1 SAM bde (7 SAM bty with M902 Patriot PAC-3) Typhoon; 1 MQ-9A Reaper; 1 C-27J Spartan; 1 KC-767A;
1 SAM bde (6 SAM bty with Skyguard/Aspide) 1 SAM bty with SAMP/T
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE United Kingdom Operation Inherent Resolve (Shader) 50;
AIR DEFENCE 1 CISR UAV sqn with 8 MQ-9A Reaper
SAM 47 United States Central Command: 10,000; 1 ARNG armd
Long-range 35 M902 Patriot PAC-3 bn; 1 ARNG (cbt avn) hel bde; 1 spt bde; 1 CISR UAV sqn
Short-range 12 Aspide with Skyguard with MQ-9A Reaper; 1 (APS) armd bde eqpt set; 1 (APS)
GUNS • TOWED 35mm 12+ Oerlikon GDF inf bde eqpt set
338 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Middle East
MRH 14: 1 AW139; 5 MD530F+; 8 SA342L Gazelle (5
Greece UNIFIL 109: 1 FFGHM
SA342L Gazelle; 5 SA316 Alouette III; 1 SA318 Alouette II
all non-operational) Guatemala UNIFIL 2
TPT 41: Medium 13: 3 S-61N (fire-fighting); 10 SA330/ Hungary UNIFIL 16
IAR330 Puma; Light 28: 18 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); 6 India 2 • UNIFIL 895: 1 inf bn; 1 med coy
Bell 205 (UH-1H Huey II); 4 R-44 Raven II (basic trg) (11 Indonesia UNIFIL 1,106: 1 mech inf bn; 1 MP coy; 1 FSGM
Bell 205; 7 Bell 212 all non-operational) Ireland 12 • UNIFIL 338: 1 mech inf bn(-)
AIR LAUNCHED MISSILES Italy MIBIL 160 • UNIFIL 868: 1 mech bde HQ; 1 mech inf
ASM AGM-114 Hellfire; AGR-20A APKWS bn; 1 MP coy; 1 sigs coy; 1 hel bn
Kazakhstan UNIFIL 9
Gendarmerie & Paramilitary ε20,000 active Kenya UNIFIL 3
Korea, Republic of UNIFIL 254: 1 mech inf BG HQ; 1
Internal Security Force ε20,000
mech inf coy; 1 inf coy; 1 log coy
Ministry of Interior
Latvia 1
FORCES BY ROLE
Macedonia, North UNIFIL 3
Other Combat Forces
Malaysia UNIFIL 830: 1 mech inf bn(-); 1 sigs coy; 1 log
1 (police) judicial unit
coy; 1 maint coy; 1 med coy
1 regional sy coy
1 (Beirut Gendarmerie) sy coy Malta UNIFIL 9
Moldova UNIFIL 4
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES Nepal 3 • UNIFIL 872: 1 mech inf bn
APC • APC (W) 60 V-200 Chaimite Netherlands 12 • UNIFIL 1
New Zealand 8
Customs Nigeria UNIFIL 2
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Norway 13
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 7 Peru UNIFIL 1
PB 7: 5 Aztec; 2 Tracker Poland 4 • UNIFIL 193; 1 mech inf coy
Qatar UNIFIL 1
FOREIGN FORCES Russia 4
Unless specified, figures refer to UNTSO and represent Serbia 1 • UNIFIL 177; 1 mech inf coy
total numbers for the mission Sierra Leone UNIFIL 3
340 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Middle East
Firtina; 1 AD unit with MIM-23B Hawk; Korkut; GDF-003; 1 Stan 1605) with 1 73mm gun; 2 Ikrimah (FRA RPB20); 1
CISR UAV unit with Bayraktar TB2
Hamelin; 1+ PV30
United Kingdom UNSMIL 1
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AFD 1
United States UNSMIL 1
MANOEUVRE
Mauritania MRT Reconnaissance
Mauritanian Ouguiya 1 armd recce bn
2021 2022 2023 Armoured
MRU
GDP MRU 360bn 366bn 1 armd bn
USD 9.89bn 10.1bn Light
7 mot inf bn
per capita USD 2,333 2,328
8 (garrison) inf bn
Growth % 2.4 4.0
Air Manoeuvre
Inflation % 3.8 7.1 1 cdo/para bn
Def bdgt MRU 7.77bn 8.33bn Other
USD 213m 229m 2 (camel corps) bn
USD1=MRU 36.44 36.30 1 gd bn
Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) COMBAT SUPPORT
208 3 arty bn
n.k. 4 ADA bty
111 1 engr coy
2008 2015 2022 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
Population 4,161,925
MBT 35 T-54/T-55
RECCE 70: 20 AML-60; 40 AML-90; 10 Saladin
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus APC • APC (W) 32: 5 FV603 Saracen; 7 Bastion APC; ε20
Male 18.3% 5.1% 4.5% 3.9% 14.5% 1.8% Panhard M3
Female 18.2% 5.2% 4.7% 4.3% 17.0% 2.4% AUV 12 Cobra
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
Capabilities ARV T-54/55 ARV reported
The country’s small and modestly equipped armed forces are ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
tasked with maintaining territorial integrity and internal secu- MSL • MANPATS Milan
rity. In light of the regional threat from extremist Islamist groups, RCL • 106mm ε90 M40A1
border security is also a key role for the armed forces, which are ARTILLERY 180
accustomed to counter-insurgency operations in the desert. In TOWED 80: 105mm 36 HM-2/M101A1; 122mm 44: 20
early 2021, the cabinet approved a draft decree establishing a D-30; 24 D-74
defence area along the northern border to counter incursions by
MRL 10: 107mm 4 Type-63; 122mm 6 Type-81
the Polisario Front. This followed the group’s closure of a border
crossing for several weeks in late 2020. The country is a member MOR 90: 81mm 60; 120mm 30 Brandt
of the G5 Sahel group and in late 2021 the armed forces of Mauri- AIR DEFENCE
tania and Senegal signed an agreement to jointly patrol offshore SAM • Point-defence ε4 9K31 Strela-1 (RS-SA-9 Gaskin)
gas fields. Both countries have also conducted joint riverine patrols (reported); 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-7 Grail)‡
along their border. Mauritania’s armed forces take part in the Flint- GUNS • TOWED 82: 14.5mm 28: 16 ZPU-2; 12 ZPU-4;
lock US-led special-operations exercise and also train with France’s
23mm 20 ZU-23-2; 37mm 10 M-1939; 57mm 12 S-60;
armed forces. Deployment capabilities are limited, but the armed
forces have demonstrated mobility and sustainment in desert 100mm 12 KS-19
regions. A new naval base has been constructed by a Chinese firm
in the south, possibly designed to enable improved protection of Navy ε600
offshore gas fields. Mauritania has a limited and ageing equipment EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
inventory, but the navy has recently received some new patrol
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 17
vessels from China. Despite recent acquisitions, including small ISR
aircraft, aviation resources are insufficient considering the coun-
PCO 1 Voum-Legleita
try’s size. Naval equipment is geared toward coastal-surveillance PCC 7: 1 Abourbekr Ben Amer (FRA OPV 54); 1 Arguin;
missions and China’s donation of a landing ship has helped estab- 2 Conejera; 1 Limam El Hidrami (PRC); 2 Timbédra (PRC
lish a basic sealift capability. There is no domestic defence industry. Huangpu mod)
PB 9: 1 El Nasr† (FRA Patra); 4 Mandovi; 2 Saeta-12; 2
ACTIVE 15,850 (Army 15,000 Navy 600 Air 250)
Megsem Bakkar (FRA RPB20 – for SAR duties)
Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 5,000
AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING SHIPS 1
Conscript liability 24 months
LSM 1 Nimlane (PRC)
National Guard 2,000 Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Ministry of Interior Male 13.4% 4.3% 3.9% 3.8% 20.8% 3.8%
Female 12.9% 4.2% 3.9% 3.8% 21.3% 4.0%
Middle East
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Capabilities
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 2:
Regional security challenges are a key concern for Morocco’s
1 Dah Ould Bah (FRA Amgram 14); 1 Yaboub Ould Rajel
armed forces. A 30-year ceasefire between Morocco and the
(FRA RPB18) Polisario Front ended in late 2020 and the UN has reported that
hostilities have resumed, albeit at a low-level. Morocco maintains
DEPLOYMENT defence ties with France and the US, receiving military training and
equipment from both. However, although the US Trump adminis-
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 464; 1 inf tration recognised Moroccan claims to Western Sahara, the Biden
bn(-) administration has come under pressure in Congress to reverse
the policy and to find an alternative location for the African Lion
MALI: UN • MINUSMA 7
exercises, which in 2022 saw exercise activity in Ghana, Morocco,
SOMALIA: UN • UNSOS 1 Senegal, and Tunisia. There is also close cooperation with NATO,
and in 2016 Morocco was granted access to the Alliance’s Interop-
erability Platform in order to strengthen the defence and security
sectors and bring the armed forces up to NATO standards. Defence
ties have developed with Israel, and Morocco is reportedly pro-
curing an Israeli-developed air defence system. In 2017, Morocco
rejoined the African Union. The armed forces have gained experi-
ence from UN peacekeeping deployments and from multinational
exercises. Conscription was reintroduced in early 2019. The armed
forces have some capacity to deploy independently within the
region and on UN peacekeeping missions in sub-Saharan Africa,
although they lack heavy sealift and airlift capabilities. Morocco
has also deployed overseas in a combat role, contributing F-16
aircraft to the Saudi-led coalition intervention in Yemen from 2015
to early 2019. The inventory primarily comprises ageing French
and US equipment, though there are plans to re-equip all the ser-
vices and to invest significantly in the navy. Morocco operates two
Earth-observation satellites, meeting some surveillance require-
ments. Morocco relies on imports and donations for major defence
equipment. However, its relative stability has attracted Western
defence companies, such as Airbus, Safran and Thales, to establish
aerospace manufacturing and servicing facilities in the country.
344 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
FSGHM 2 Sultan Moulay Ismail (NLD SIGMA 9813) 1 VIP sqn with B-737BBJ; Beech 200/300 King Air; Falcon
with 2 twin lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 2/3 AShM, 50; Gulfstream II/III/V-SP/G550
1 12-cell CLA VLS with VL MICA SAM, 2 triple TRAINING
324mm ILAS-3 (B-515) ASTT with MU90 LWT, 1 1 sqn with Alpha Jet*
76mm gun (capacity 1 AS565SA Panther) 1 sqn T-6C
FSM 1 Lt Col Errhamani (ESP Descubierto) with 1 ATTACK HELICOPTER
octuple Albatros lnchr with Aspide SAM, 2 triple 1 sqn with SA342L Gazelle (some with HOT)
324mm ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 1 76mm gun TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
PSO 1 Bin an Zaran (OPV 70) with 1 76mm gun 1 sqn with Bell 205A (AB-205A); Bell 206 Jet Ranger (AB-
PCG 4 Cdt El Khattabi (ESP Lazaga 58m) with 4 single 206); Bell 212 (AB-212)
lnchr with MM38 Exocet AShM, 1 76mm gun 1 sqn with CH-47D Chinook
PCO 5 Rais Bargach (under control of fisheries dept) 1 sqn with SA330 Puma
PCC 12:
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
4 El Hahiq (DNK Osprey 55, incl 2 with customs)
AIRCRAFT 90 combat capable
6 LV Rabhi (ESP 58m B-200D)
FTR 22: 19 F-5E Tiger II; 3 F-5F Tiger II
2 Okba (FRA PR-72) each with 1 76mm gun
FGA 49: 15 F-16C Fighting Falcon; 8 F-16D Fighting
PB 27: 6 El Wacil (FRA P-32); 10 VCSM (RPB 20); 10
Falcon; 15 Mirage F-1C (F-1CH); 11 Mirage F-1E (F-1EH)
Rodman 101; 1 other (UK Bird)
ELINT 1 EC-130H Hercules
AMPHIBIOUS
TKR/TPT 2 KC-130H Hercules
LANDING SHIPS • LST 3 Ben Aicha (FRA Champlain
TPT 47: Medium 17: 4 C-27J Spartan; 13 C-130H
BATRAL) with 1 hel landing platform (capacity 7 tanks;
Hercules; Light 19: 4 Beech 100 King Air; 2 Beech 200
140 troops)
King Air; 1 Beech 200C King Air; 2 Beech 300 King
LANDING CRAFT 2:
LCT 1 Sidi Ifni Air; 3 Beech 350 King Air; 5 CN235; 2 Do-28; PAX 11:
LCM 1 CTM (FRA CTM-5) 1 B-737BBJ; 2 Falcon 20; 2 Falcon 20 (ELINT); 1 Falcon
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 9 50 (VIP); 1 Gulfstream II (VIP); 1 Gulfstream III; 1
AG 1 Damen 3011 Gulfstream V-SP; 2 Gulfstream G550
AGHS 1 Dar Al Beida (FRA BHO2M) TRG 80: 12 AS-202 Bravo; 19 Alpha Jet*; 2 CAP-10; 24
AGOR 1 Abou Barakat Albarbari† (ex-US Robert D. T-6C Texan; 9 T-34C Turbo Mentor; 14 T-37B Tweet
Middle East
AGS 1 Damen Stan Tender 1504 MRH 19 SA342L Gazelle (7 with HOT, 12 with cannon)
AK 2 TPT 76: Heavy 10 CH-47D Chinook; Medium 24 SA330
AX 1 Essaouira Puma; Light 42: 24 Bell 205A (AB-205A); 11 Bell 206 Jet
AXS 2 Ranger (AB-206); 3 Bell 212 (AB-212); 4 Bell 429
UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES
Marines 1,500 CISR
FORCES BY ROLE Heavy Wing Loong (reported)
MANOEUVRE Medium Bayraktar TB2 (reported)
Amphibious ISR • Heavy Heron
2 naval inf bn AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
AAM • IR AIM-9J Sidewinder; R-550 Magic; Mica IR;
Naval Aviation IIR AIM-9X Sidewinder II; ARH AIM-120C7 AMRAAM;
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Mica RF
AIRCRAFT • MP 2 Beech 350ER King Air ASM AASM; AGM-65 Maverick; HOT
HELICOPTERS • ASW/ASUW 3 AS565SA Panther ARM AGM-88B HARM
BOMBS
Air Force 13,000 Laser-guided Paveway II
FORCES BY ROLE Laser & INS/GPS-guided GBU-54 Laser JDAM
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK INS/GPS-guided GBU-31 JDAM
2 sqn with F-5E/F-5F Tiger II
3 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 50,000 active
1 sqn with Mirage F-1C (F-1CH)
1 sqn with Mirage F-1E (F-1EH) Gendarmerie Royale 20,000
ELECTRONIC WARFARE FORCES BY ROLE
1 sqn with EC-130H Hercules; Falcon 20 (ELINT) MANOEUVRE
MARITIME PATROL Air Manoeuvre
1 flt with Do-28 1 para sqn
TANKER/TRANSPORT Other
1 sqn with C-130/KC-130H Hercules 1 paramilitary bde
TRANSPORT 4 (mobile) paramilitary gp
1 sqn with CN235 1 coast guard unit
346 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER has a close and long-standing defence and security relationship.
1 sqn Oman does not host a significant permanent presence of US or
other foreign forces, in contrast to other GCC states, but UK forces
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
are frequently deployed to the country for training and Oman
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 15
has been developing its naval exercises with these and other
Arcor 53 partner countries. In addition, both the US and the UK make use
AIRCRAFT • TRG 2 R-235 Guerrier of Omani air- and naval-logistics facilities, most notably the port
HELICOPTERS at Duqm, where the UK has a Joint Logistics Support Base. Oman
MRH 14: 3 SA315B Lama; 2 SA316 Alouette III; 3 SA318 has also been seeking to strengthen ties with Asian states; there
Alouette II; 6 SA342K Gazelle was another joint exercise with India and also a meeting with
TPT 8: Medium 6 SA330 Puma; Light 2 SA360 Dauphin senior Chinese defence officials. Whilst Oman is a member of the
GCC, it has not participated in the Saudi-led coalition’s operations
Force Auxiliaire 30,000 (incl 5,000 Mobile in Yemen and has largely followed a semi-independent regional
Intervention Corps) policy. Although Muscat has recently maintained the highest
level of defence spending as a percentage of GDP in the GCC,
Customs/Coast Guard the defence budget was reduced in 2021. Nonetheless, Oman
has recently recapitalised its core air- and naval-systems inven-
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE tory, including combat aircraft and patrol and high-speed support
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS vessels, and is now looking to do the same in the land domain.
PB 36: 4 Erraid; 18 Arcor 46; 14 (other SAR craft) Oman has very limited indigenous defence-industrial capacity, but
it has begun local production of various types of ammunition and
is looking to boost organic support capability, particularly in the
DEPLOYMENT air and land sectors.
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 777; 1
inf bn ACTIVE 42,600 (Army 25,000 Navy 4,200
Air 5,000 Foreign Forces 2,000 Royal Household
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN •
6,400) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 4,400
MONUSCO 926; 1 inf bn; 1 fd hospital
SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 2
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 3
Army 25,000
Oman OMN FORCES BY ROLE
Omani Rial OMR 2021 2022 2023
(Regt are bn size)
MANOEUVRE
GDP OMR 33.0bn 41.9bn Armoured
USD 85.9bn 109bn 1 armd bde (2 armd regt, 1 recce regt)
per capita USD 18,966 23,542 Light
Growth % 3.0 4.4 1 inf bde (5 inf regt, 1 arty regt, 1 fd engr regt, 1 engr
regt, 1 sigs regt)
Inflation % 1.5 3.1
1 inf bde (3 inf regt, 2 arty regt)
Def bdgt [a] OMR 2.47bn 2.47bn
1 indep inf coy (Musandam Security Force)
USD 6.43bn 6.43bn Air Manoeuvre
USD1=OMR 0.38 0.38 1 AB regt
[a] Excludes security funding COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 1 tpt regt
8.45 AIR DEFENCE
1 ADA regt (2 ADA bty)
3.70 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
2008 2015 2022 ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
MBT 117: 38 Challenger 2; 6 M60A1 Patton; 73 M60A3 Patton
Population 3,764,348 LT TK 37 FV101 Scorpion
RECCE 12 Pars III 6×6 (Recce)
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus IFV 72 Pars III 8×8 IFV
Male 15.3% 4.0% 4.7% 5.6% 22.4% 1.8% APC 262
Female 14.6% 3.8% 4.1% 4.4% 17.2% 2.1% APC (T) 10 FV4333 Stormer
APC (W) 252: 15 AT-105 Saxon; 15 Pars III 6×6 (incl
Capabilities 10 CP; 1 trg); 47 Pars III 8×8 (38 CP; 8 amb; 1 trg); 175
Piranha (incl variants);
The principal task for Oman’s armed forces is ensuring territorial
integrity, with a particular focus on maritime security, given the AUV 143: 6 FV103 Spartan; 13 FV105 Sultan (CP); 124
country’s long coastline. Oman maintains important but carefully VBL
calibrated relations with the US while it continues to develop its ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
defence agreements with the UK, a country with which Muscat AEV 6 Pars III AEV
Middle East and North Africa 347
Middle East
AShM, 1 octuple lnchr with Crotale SAM, 1 76mm AAM • IR AIM-9/M/P Sidewinder; IIR AIM-9X
gun, 1 hel landing platform Sidewinder II; ARH AIM-120C7 AMRAAM
PCFG 1 Dhofar with 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet ASM AGM-65D/G Maverick
AShM, 1 76mm gun AShM AGM-84D Harpoon
PCO 4 Al Ofouq with 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform BOMBS
PCC 3 Al Bushra (FRA P-400) with 1 76mm gun Laser-guided EGBU-10 Paveway II; EGBU-12 Paveway II
PBF 1 1400 FIC INS/GPS-guided GBU-31 JDAM
AMPHIBIOUS
LANDING SHIPS • LST 1 Nasr el Bahr† with 1 hel Royal Household 6,400
landing platform (capacity 7 tanks; 240 troops) (in refit (incl HQ staff)
since 2017) FORCES BY ROLE
LANDING CRAFT 5: 1 LCU; 1 LCT; 3 LCM SPECIAL FORCES
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 8 2 SF regt
AGS 1 Al Makhirah
AK 1 Al Sultana Royal Guard Brigade 5,000
AP 2 Shinas (commercial tpt – auxiliary military role FORCES BY ROLE
only) (capacity 56 veh; 200 tps) MANOEUVRE
AX 1 Al-Mabrukah Other
AXS 1 Shabab Oman II 1 gd bde (1 armd sqn, 2 gd regt, 1 cbt spt bn)
EPF 2 Al Mubshir (High Speed Support Vessel 72) with 1 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
hel landing platform (capacity 260 troops) ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
ASLT 9 Centauro MGS (9 VBC-90 in store)
Air Force 5,000 IFV 14 VAB VCI
FORCES BY ROLE APC • APC (W) ε50 Type-92
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
2 sqn with F-16C/D Block 50 Fighting Falcon MSL • MANPATS Milan
1 sqn with Hawk Mk103; Hawk Mk203; Hawk Mk166 ARTILLERY • MRL 122mm 6 Type-90A
1 sqn with Typhoon AIR DEFENCE
MARITIME PATROL SAM • Point-defence Javelin
1 sqn with C295MPA GUNS • SP 9: 20mm 9 VAB VDAA
348 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Royal Yacht Squadron 150 al-Qassam Brigades personnel have received military training
in Iran and Syria. None of the Palestinian security organisations
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
conduct external military deployments, and they lack a formal
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 3 military-logistics structure. Both Hamas and the Palestinian
AP 1 Fulk Al Salamah (also veh tpt) with up to 2 AS332 Authority lack heavy military equipment, although the former has
Super Puma hel retained a substantial arsenal of improvised rocket and mortar
capabilities, as well as some portable guided weapons. During
Royal Flight 250 renewed conflict in mid-2021, Hamas demonstrated a loitering-
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE munition capability as well as new missiles with a claimed range
AIRCRAFT • TPT • PAX 7: 1 747-400; 1 747-8; 1 of 250 km. No formal defence industry exists, although Hamas can
B-747SP; 1 A319; 1 A320; 2 Gulfstream IV acquire light or improvised weapons, either smuggled into Gaza
HELICOPTERS • TPT • Medium 6 EC225LP Super Puma or of local construction or assembly.
Middle East
and best equipped armed forces in the group. In addition to tra- RECCE 300 AML-60/AML-90
ditional objectives relating to territorial integrity and internal IFV 860: 380 AMX-10P; 380 M2A2 Bradley; 100 VAB Mk3
security, the Kingdom has displayed an increasing willingness to APC 1,340
use the armed forces as part of a more assertive regional foreign
APC (T) 1,190 M113A4 (incl variants)
policy, most notably in Yemen. Whilst operations in Yemen have
allowed the armed forces to gain combat experience, they have APC (W) 150 Panhard M3; (ε40 AF-40-8-1 Al-Fahd
also exposed areas of comparative weakness and capability gaps, in store)
especially in the application of precision airpower, air–ground AUV 1,200+: 100 Didgori (amb); 1,000+ M-ATV; Al-Shibl
coordination and logistics support. Meanwhile, cruise-missile and 2; 100 Sherpa Light Scout; Terradyne Gurkha
UAV attacks on Saudi oil infrastructure have exposed capability ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
weaknesses with the Kingdom’s air- and missile-defence capa- AEV 15 M728
bilities. Saudi Arabia’s most critical defence relationship continues
ARV 275+: 8 ACV ARV; AMX-10EHC; 55 AMX-30D;
to be with the US, although recent frictions including over the
Ukraine war, related particularly to oil production, led to a review Leclerc ARV; 122 M88A1; 90 M578
of that relationship in Washington. Issues including aspects of VLB 10 AMX-30
Saudi Arabia’s military campaign in Yemen have also sharpened MW Aardvark Mk2
focus in the US over defence sales to the country more generally. NBC VEHICLES 10 TPz-1 Fuchs NBC
Riyadh has over the years sought to mitigate any dependence on ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
Washington by also maintaining security relationships with other MSL
states such as France and the UK, while relationships with China –
SP 290+: 90+ AMX-10P (HOT); 200 VCC-1 ITOW;
including equipment sales – as well as India and others have been
strengthened. Equipment recapitalisation continues, with orders M-ATV with Milan
for combat aircraft, corvettes and multi-mission surface combat- MANPATS Hyeongung; Luch Corsar (reported); Luch
ants, despite concerns about austerity. There is currently only a Skif (reported); Stugna-P (reported); TOW-2A
modest domestic defence-industrial base, mainly in the assem- RCL 84mm Carl Gustaf; 90mm M67; 106mm M40A1
bly and overhaul of land systems. However, Riyadh continues ARTILLERY 833
to reaffirm and pursue an intention to spend 50% of its defence SP 155mm 224: 60 AU-F-1; 110 M109A1B/A2; 54 PLZ-45
outlays locally as part of its Vision 2030 initiative and established
TOWED 172: 105mm 62 LG1; (100 M101/M102 in store);
the state-owned Saudi Arabian Military Industries to oversee local
defence production. 155mm 110: 50 M114; 60 M198; 203mm (8 M115 in store)
MRL 70: 127mm 60 ASTROS II Mk3; 220mm 10 TOS-1A
ACTIVE 257,000 (Army 75,000 Navy 13,500 Air MOR 367: SP 81mm 70; 107mm 150 M30; 120mm 147:
20,000 Air Defence 16,000 Strategic Missile Forces 110 Brandt; 37 M12-1535; SP 120mm M113A4 with 2R2M
2,500 National Guard 130,000) Gendarmerie & HELICOPTERS
Paramilitary 24,500 ATK 35: 11 AH-64D Apache; 24 AH-64E Apache
352 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Middle East
17 bty with Shahine/AMX-30SA MRH 35: 23 AH-6i Little Bird; 12 MD530F (trg role)
16 bty with MIM-23B I-Hawk TPT • Medium ε50 UH-60M Black Hawk
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIR DEFENCE
AIR DEFENCE SAM 73
SAM 817+ Short-range 5 VL MICA
Long-range 108 M902 Patriot PAC-3 Point-defence 68 MPCV
Medium-range 128 MIM-23B I-Hawk GUNS • TOWED • 20mm 30 M167 Vulcan
Short-range 181: 40 Crotale; 141 Shahine AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
Point-defence 400+: LMM; 400 M1097 Avenger; Mistral ASM AGM-114R Hellfire II
GUNS 218
SP • 20mm 90 M163 Vulcan Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 24,500+ active
TOWED 128: 35mm 128 GDF Oerlikon; 40mm (150
L/70 in store) Border Guard 15,000
DE • Laser Silent Hunter FORCES BY ROLE
Subordinate to Ministry of Interior. HQ in Riyadh. 9
Strategic Missile Forces 2,500 subordinate regional commands
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE MANOEUVRE
MSL • TACTICAL Other
IRBM 10+ DF-3 (CH-SS-2) (service status unclear) Some mobile def (long-range patrol/spt) units
MRBM Some DF-21 (CH-SS-5 – variant unclear) 2 border def (patrol) units
(reported) 12 infrastructure def units
18 harbour def units
National Guard 130,000 Some coastal def units
FORCES BY ROLE COMBAT SUPPORT
MANOEUVRE Some MP units
Mechanised EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
5 mech bde (1 recce coy, 3 mech inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
cbt engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn) APC • PPV Caprivi Mk1/Mk3
Light PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 106
5 inf bde (3 combined arms bn, 1 arty bn, 1 log bn) PCC 13+ OPB 40
3 indep lt inf bn PBF 85: 4 Al Jouf; 2 Sea Guard; 79 Plascoa FIC 1650
354 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
PB 8: 6 Damen Stan Patrol 2606; 2 Al Jubatel production and distribution of illegal narcotics to other countries
AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • UCAC 8: 5 in the region, the Gulf and Europe. There is no published defence
Griffon 8000; 3 other doctrine or White Paper with the conflict instead dictating ad hoc
requirements. Opposition groups maintain control over parts
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 4: 1 AXL; 3 AO
of the country. Most formal pre-war structures and formations
exist in name only, as resources have been channelled into the
Facilities Security Force 9,000+ irregular network of military organisations that form the regime’s
Subordinate to Ministry of Interior most effective military capabilities. Russia has been the regime’s
principal ally and has provided essential combat support and assis-
General Civil Defence Administration Units tance, as well as replacement equipment. Russia is also involved
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE in efforts to reconstitute the army’s pre-war divisions, although
HELICOPTERS • TPT • Medium 10 Boeing Vertol 107 some Russian equipment has been withdrawn following Russia’s
invasion of Ukraine. Iran and Hizbullah also continue to assist in
Special Security Force 500 the provision and training of militias and other ground forces but
reports allege a lack of coordination, with Russia supporting some
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE formations and Iran/Hizbullah others. Overall levels of training
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES remain poor but combat experience has improved proficiency in
APC • APC (W) UR-416 select regular and irregular military formations. The armed forces
AUV 60+: Gurkha LAPV; 60 Kozak-5 lack the requisite capabilities for external deployment, although
they remain able to redeploy moderate numbers of formations
and capabilities within the country. Logistics support for major
DEPLOYMENT internal operations away from established bases remains a chal-
YEMEN: Operation Restoring Hope 2,500; 2 armd BG; M60A3; lenge. Before the civil war, Syria did not have a major domestic
defence industry, although it possessed facilities to overhaul
M2A2 Bradley; M113A4; M-ATV; 2+ M902 Patriot PAC-3
and maintain its existing systems. It did, however, possess some
capacity in focused areas, such as ballistic missiles and chemical
FOREIGN FORCES weapons. International efforts continue to verify destruction of
chemical-weapons stockpiles and production facilities.
France 50 (radar det)
Greece 100: 1 SAM bty with M901 Patriot PAC-2 ACTIVE 169,000 (Army 130,000 Navy 4,000
United Kingdom 50 (radar det) Air 15,000 Air Defence 20,000) Gendarmerie &
United States US Central Command: 2,000; 1 FGA sqn Paramilitary 100,000
with 12 F-16C Fighting Falcon Conscript liability 30 months (there is widespread avoidance of
military service)
Middle East
152mm D-20; ML-20 (M-1937); 180mm S-23 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM P-35 (RS-SSC-1B Sepal);
GUN/MOR 120mm 2S9 NONA-S
P-15M Termit-R (RS-SSC-3 Styx); C-802; K-300P Bastion
MRL 107mm Type-63; 122mm BM-21 Grad; 140mm BM-
(RS-SSC-5 Stooge)
14; 220mm 9P140 Uragan; 300mm 9A52 Smerch; 330mm
some (also improvised systems of various calibres) Naval Aviation
MOR 82mm some; 120mm M-1943; 160mm M-160; All possibly non-operational after vacating base for Rus-
240mm M-240 sian deployment
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
SRBM • Conventional 8K14 (RS-SS-1C Scud-B); 9K72 HELICOPTERS • ASW 9: 4 Ka-28 Helix A; 5 Mi-14 Haze
Elbrus (RS-SS-1D Scud C) 9K72-1 (RS-SS-1E Scud D);
Scud lookalike; 9K79 Tochka (RS-SS-21 Scarab); Fateh- Air Force ε15,000(-)
110/M-600 FORCES BY ROLE
UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES FIGHTER
2 sqn with Mig-23MF/ML/MLD/UM Flogger
ISR • Medium Mohajer 3/4; Light Ababil
2 sqn with MiG-29A/UB/SM Fulcrum
AIR DEFENCE
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
SAM 4 sqn with MiG-21MF/bis Fishbed; MiG-21U Mongol A
Medium-range 9K37 Buk (RS-SA-11 Gadfly); 9K317 2 sqn with MiG-23BN/UB Flogger
Buk-M2 (RS-SA-17 Grizzly) GROUND ATTACK
Point-defence 9K31 Strela-1 (RS-SA-9 Gaskin); 9K33 4 sqn with Su-22M3/M4 Fitter J/K
Osa (RS-SA-8 Gecko); 9K35 Strela-10 (RS-SA-13 1 sqn with Su-24MK Fencer D
Gopher); 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-7 Grail)‡; 9K38 Igla 1 sqn with L-39ZA/ZO Albatros*
(RS-SA-18 Grouse); 9K36 Strela-3 (RS-SA-14 Gremlin); TRANSPORT
1 sqn with An-24 Coke; An-26 Curl; Il-76 Candid
9K338 Igla-S (RS-SA-24 Grinch)
1 sqn with Falcon 20; Falcon 900
SPAAGM 30mm 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (RS-SA-22 Greyhound)
1 sqn with Tu-134B-3
GUNS 1 sqn with Yak-40 Codling
SP 23mm ZSU-23-4; 57mm ZSU-57-2 ATTACK HELICOPTER
TOWED 23mm ZU-23-2; 37mm M-1939; 57mm S-60; 3 sqn with Mi-24D/P Hind D/F
100mm KS-19 2 sqn with SA342L Gazelle
356 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
6 sqn with Mi-8 Hip/Mi-17 Hip H
FOREIGN FORCES
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Hizbullah 7,000–8,000
Heavy use of both fixed- and rotary-wing assets has like- Iran 1,500
ly reduced readiness and availability to very low levels. Russia 4,000: 1 inf BG; 3 MP bn; 1 engr unit; ε10 T-72B3;
It is estimated that no more than 30–40% of the inventory ε20 BTR-82A; BPM-97; 12 2A65; 4 9A52 Smerch; 10 Su-24M
is operational Fencer; 6 Su-34; 6 Su-35S; 1 A-50U; 1 Il-20M; 12 Mi-24P/
AIRCRAFT 184 combat capable Mi-35M Hind; 4 Mi-8AMTSh Hip; 1 AShM bty with 3K55
FTR 55: ε25 MiG-23MF/ML/MLD/UM Flogger; ε30 MiG- Bastion (RS-SSC-5 Stooge); 1 SAM bty with S-400 (RS-SA-21
29A/SM/UB Fulcrum Growler); 1 SAM bty with Pantsir-S1/S2; air base at Latakia;
FGA 79: ε50 MiG-21MF/bis Fishbed J/L; 9 MiG-21U naval facility at Tartus
Mongol A; ε20 MiG-23BN/UB Flogger
ATK 30: 20 Su-22M3/M4 Fitter J/K; ε10 Su-24MK Fencer D TERRITORY WHERE THE GOVERNMENT
TPT 23: Heavy 3 Il-76 Candid; Light 13: 1 An-24 Coke; 6 DOES NOT EXERCISE EFFECTIVE CONTROL
An-26 Curl; 2 PA-31 Navajo; 4 Yak-40 Codling; PAX 7: 2
Data here represents the de facto situation for selected
Falcon 20; 1 Falcon 900; 4 Tu-134B-3 armed opposition groups and their observed equipment
TRG 20+: ε20 L-39ZA/ZO Albatros*; some MBB-223
Flamingo†
Syrian Democratic Forces ε50,000
HELICOPTERS
A coalition of predominantly Kurdish rebel groups in
ATK 20+: ε20 Mi-24D Hind D; some Mi-24P Hind F
de facto control of much of northeastern Syria. Kurdish
MRH 40: ε20 Mi-17 Hip H; ε20 SA342L Gazelle
forces from the YPG/J (People’s Protection Units/
TPT • Medium ε10 Mi-8 Hip
Women’s Protection Units) provide military leadership
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES and main combat power, supplemented by Arab militias
AAM • IR R-60 (RS-AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (RS-AA-11 and tribal groups.
Archer); IR/SARH; R-23/24 (RS-AA-7 Apex); R-27
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
(RS-AA-10 Alamo); ARH; R-77 (RS-AA-12A Adder)
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
ASM Kh-25 (RS-AS-10 Karen); Kh-29T/L (RS-AS-14
MBT T-55; T-72 (reported)
Kedge); HOT
IFV BMP-1
ARM Kh-31P (RS-AS-17A Krypton)
APC • PPV Guardian
AUV M-ATV
Air Defence Command ε20,000(-) ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
FORCES BY ROLE MSL • MANPATS 9K111-1 Konkurs (RS-SA-5 Spandrel)
AIR DEFENCE RCL 73mm SPG-9; 90mm M-79 Osa
4 AD div with S-125M/M1 Pechora-M/M1 (RS-SA-3 Goa); ARTILLERY
S-125-2M Pechora-2M (RS-SA-26); 2K12 Kub (RS-SA-6 MRL 122mm BM-21 Grad; 9K132 Grad-P
Gainful); S-75 Dvina (RS-SA-2 Guideline) MOR 82mm 82-BM-37; M-1938; 120mm M-1943;
3 AD regt with S-200 Angara (RS-SA-5 Gammon); improvised mortars of varying calibre
S-300PMU2 (RS-SA-20 Gargoyle) AIR DEFENCE • GUNS
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SP 14.5mm ZPU-4 (tch); ZPU-2 (tch); ZPU-1 (tch); 1
AIR DEFENCE • SAM ZPU-2 (tch/on T-55); 23mm ZSU-23-4 Shilka; ZU-23-2
Long-range S-200 Angara (RS-SA-5 Gammon); 20 (tch); 57mm S-60
S-300PMU2 (RS-SA-20 Gargoyle) TOWED 14.5mm ZPU-2; ZPU-1; 23mm ZU-23-2
Medium-range 36+: S-75 Dvina (RS-SA-2 Guideline); ε36
S-125-2M Pechora-2M (RS-SA-26) Syrian National Army & National Front for
Short-range 2K12 Kub (RS-SA-6 Gainful); S-125M/M1 Liberation ε70,000
Pechora-M/M1 (RS-SA-3 Goa) In late 2019 the Syrian National Army (SNA) and the
Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2/2M (RS-SA-7A/B Grail)‡ National Front for Liberation (NLF) began to merge
under the SNA umbrella. The SNA formed in late 2017
Gendarmerie & Paramilitary ε100,000 from Syrian Arab and Turkmen rebel factions operating
under Turkish command in the Aleppo governate and
National Defence Force ε50,000 northwestern Syria, including Afrin province. The NLF
An umbrella of disparate regime militias performing a is a coalition of surviving Islamist and nationalist rebel
variety of roles, including territorial control factions formed in 2018 operating in northwestern Syria,
particularly in and around Idlib.
Other Militias ε50,000 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Numerous military groups fighting for the Assad ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
regime, including Afghan, Iraqi, Pakistani and sectarian MBT T-54; T-55; T-62
organisations. Some receive significant Iranian support IFV BMP-1
Middle East and North Africa 357
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
MSL • MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger); Tunisia TUN
9K111 Fagot (RS-AT-4 Spigot); 9K113 Konkurs (RS-T-5
Tunisian Dinar TND 2021 2022 2023
Spandrel); 9K115 Metis (RS-AT-7); 9K115-2 Metis-M
GDP TND 131bn 144bn
(RS-AT-13 Saxhorn 2); 9K135 Kornet (RS-AT-14 Spriggan);
USD 46.8bn 46.3bn
BGM-71 TOW; Milan
per capita USD 3,897 3,816
RCL 73mm SPG-9; 82mm B-10
Growth % 3.3 2.2
ARTILLERY
Inflation % 5.7 8.1
TOWED 122mm D-30
Def bgt TND 3.44bn 4.00bn
MRL 107mm Type-63; 122mm 9K132 Grad-P; BM-21
USD 1.23bn 1.28bn
Grad; Grad (6-tube tech)
FMA (US) USD 85m 85m 45m
MOR 82mm 2B9 Vasilek; improvised mortars of varying
USD1=TND 2.79 3.11
calibre Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015)
AIR DEFENCE 1.4
SAM • Point-defence MANPADS some
GUNS 0.5
2008 2015 2022
SP 14.5mm ZPU-4 (tch); ZPU-2 (tch); ZPU-1 (tch);
23mm ZU-23-2 (tch); ZSU-23-4 Shilka; 57mm AZP S-60 Population 11,896,972
TOWED 14.5mm ZPU-1; ZPU-2; ZPU-4; 23mm ZU-23-2
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) ε10,000 Male 12.9% 3.4% 3.0% 3.4% 22.4% 4.5%
Female 12.1% 3.2% 3.0% 3.5% 23.5% 5.0%
HTS was formed by Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (formerly known
as Jabhat al-Nusra) in January 2017 by absorbing other
Capabilities
hardline groups. It is designated a terrorist organisation by
Middle East
the US government.
and internal security and, while they have limited capacities, a
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE modernisation process is underway. Instability in Libya and Islam-
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE ist terrorist groups operating from there continue to pose a secu-
MSL • MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger); rity concern. In the light of terrorist attacks, the armed forces are
engaged in counter-terrorism operations and have been tasked
9K113 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel); 9K115-2 Metis-M
with securing sensitive industrial sites. Designated a major non-
(RS-AT-13); 9K135 Kornet (RS-AT-14 Spriggan) NATO ally by the US in 2015, Tunisia benefits from defence and
RCL 73mm SPG-9; 106mm M-40 security cooperation with US AFRICOM and also with France and
ARTILLERY NATO. A ten-year military-cooperation agreement signed with the
MRL 107mm Type-63 US in 2020 will provide more training and after-sales support. In
2019, Tunisia sent a C-130 transport aircraft to support the UN’s
MOR 120mm some; improvised mortars of varying
MINUSMA peacekeeping mission in Mali and maintains a deploy-
calibres ment to the mission. A helicopter unit was deployed to the Central
AIR DEFENCE African Republic in 2021 to join the UN MINUSCA mission there,
SAM followed by a battalion of troops in 2022. Tunisia is a member of
the Saudi-led Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition. The
Point-defence 9K32M Strela-2M (RS-SA-7B Grail)‡
armed forces are involved in multinational exercises, notably those
GUNS led by the US, and was one of the hosts for the 2022 African Lion
SP 14.5mm ZPU-1; ZPU-2; 23mm ZU-23-2; 57mm S-60 exercise. Overall military capability is limited by the ageing equip-
ment inventory, although Tunisia has been the recipient of surplus
Guardians of Religion (Huras al-Din) ε2,500 US systems, including armed utility helicopters. The country has
limited defence-industrial capabilities but has recently manufac-
An al-Qaeda-affiliated group operating in Idlib province. It
tured a small number of patrol boats for the navy.
is designated a terrorist organisation by the US government.
ACTIVE 35,800 (Army 27,000 Navy 4,800 Air 4,000)
Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 12,000
FOREIGN FORCES
Conscript liability 12 months selective
Turkey ε3,000; 3 armd BG; some cdo units; 1
gendarmerie unit ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
United States Operation Inherent Resolve 900; 1 armd inf
coy; 1 mne bn(-) Army 5,000; 22,000 conscript (total 27,000)
358 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Middle East
Light
9.95 1 inf bde
2008 2015 2022 COMBAT SUPPORT
1 arty bde (3 SP arty regt)
Population 9,915,803
1 engr gp
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
Male 8.3% 2.8% 2.8% 4.8% 48.8% 1.4%
MBT 303: 45 AMX-30; 258 Leclerc
Female 7.9% 2.4% 2.3% 3.1% 15.1% 0.4% LT TK 76 FV101 Scorpion
RECCE 49 AML-90
Capabilities IFV 395: 160 BMP-3; 235 Rabdan
The UAE’s armed forces are arguably the best trained and most APC 1,656
capable of all GCC states. Iran remains a key defence concern, for APC (T) 136 AAPC (incl 53 engr plus other variants)
reasons including the continuing dispute with Tehran over owner- APC (W) 185: 45 AMV 8×8 (one with BMP-3 turret);
ship of islands in the Strait of Hormuz, as well as attacks both on 120 EE-11 Urutu; 20 VAB
tankers off the UAE coast and on oil infrastructure. However, the PPV 1,335: ε460 Caiman; ε680 Maxxpro LWB; 150 Nimr
UAE has shown a growing willingness to take part in operations
Hafeet 630A (CP); 45 Nimr Hafeet (Amb)
and project power and influence further abroad, including by
sending an F-16 detachment to Afghanistan in the early-to-mid
AUV 674+: MCAV-20; 650 M-ATV; Nimr Ajban; Nimr
2010s, and involvement in the conflict in Libya. The UAE also con- Jais; 24 VBL
tinues to be involved in the Yemen conflict as part of the Saudi- ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
led coalition. In 2022 it was the target of missile and UAV attacks, AEV 53+: 53 ACV-AESV; Wisent-2
and the UAE continues to seek to enhance its air defences against ARV 158: 8 ACV-AESV Recovery; 4 AMX-30D; 85
such threats. Experience gained in Yemen-related operations has BREM-L; 46 Leclerc ARV; 15 Maxxpro ARV
offered combat lessons, not least in limited amphibious opera- NBC VEHICLES 32: 8 Fuchs 2 BIO-RS; 16 Fuchs 2 NBC-
tions, and has demonstrated the country’s developing approach to RS; 8 Fuchs 2 NBC-CPS (CP)
both the use of force and the acceptance of military risk. The UAE
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
hosts a French base and is diversifying its security relationships,
MSL
including with China, although these are complicating ties with
the US, which remains the country’s key extra-regional defence SP 135: 20 HOT; 115 Nimr Ajban 440A with Kornet-E
partner. A new defence agreement with Washington came into (RS-AT-14 Spriggan)
force in May 2019 and the US Air Force continues to maintain a MANPATS FGM-148 Javelin; Milan; TOW
substantial force at the Al Dhafra airbase. The armed forces have RCL 84mm Carl Gustaf
360 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Air Defence TPT • Light 14: 2 Beech 350 King Air; 7 Cessna 208B
FORCES BY ROLE Grand Caravan*; 1 DHC-6-300 Twin Otter; 4 DHC-6-400
AIR DEFENCE Twin Otter
2 AD bde (3 bn with Barak LRAD: M902 Patriot PAC-3) HELICOPTERS
3 (short range) AD bn with Crotale; Mistral; Rapier; ATK 28 AH-64D Apache
RBS-70; Javelin; 9K38 Igla (RS-SA-18 Grouse); 96K6 ASW 7 AS332F Super Puma (5 in ASuW role)
Pantsir-S1 (RS-SA-22)
MRH 53+: 4 AS365F Dauphin 2 (VIP); 9 H125M Fennec; 7
2 SAM bty with THAAD
AS565 Panther; 3 AW139 (VIP); 20 Bell 407MRH; 4 SA316
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Alouette III; 6+ UH-60M Black Hawk (ABH)
AIR DEFENCE
SAM 81+ TPT 66: Heavy 22 CH-47F Chinook; Medium 44: 11 UH-
Long-range 39+: 2+ Barak LRAD: 37 M902 Patriot 60L Black Hawk; up to 33 UH-60M Black Hawk
PAC-3 AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
Short-range Crotale ASM AGM-114 Hellfire; Cirit; Hydra-70; HOT
Point-defence 9K38 Igla (RS-SA-18 Grouse); RBS-70; AShM AS-15TT; AM39 Exocet
Rapier; Mistral
SPAAGM 30mm 42 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (RS-SA-22) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary
GUNS • Towed 35mm GDF-005
MISSILE DEFENCE 12 THAAD Critical Infrastructure and Coastal
Protection Agency (CICPA)
Presidential Guard Command 12,000 Ministry of Interior
FORCES BY ROLE
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
SPECIAL FORCES
1 SF bn PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 115
1 spec ops bn PSO 1 Al Wtaid
MANOEUVRE PCM 2 Arialah (Damen Sea Axe 6711) with 1 11-cell
Reconaissance Mk 15 SeaRAM GMLS with RIM-116C RAM Block 2
Middle East
Mechanised PCC 1 Shujaa (Damen Stan Patrol 5009)
1 mech bde (1 tk bn, 4 mech inf bn, 1 AT coy, 1 cbt engr
PBF 58: 6 Baglietto GC23; 3 Baglietto 59; 15 DV-15;
coy, 1 CSS bn)
Amphibious 34 MRTP 16
1 mne bn PB 53: 2 Protector; 16 (US Camcraft 65); 5 (US
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Camcraft 77); 6 Watercraft 45; 12 Halmatic Work;
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES 12 Al Saber
MBT 50 Leclerc
IFV 290: 200 BMP-3; 90 BTR-3U Guardian DEPLOYMENT
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
MSL • SP HMMWV with 9M133 Kornet EGYPT: ε300 12 F-16E/F Fighting Falcon; Wing Loong I UAV;
(RS-AT-14 Spriggan) Wing Loong II UAV (status uncertain)
APC
Yemen, Republic of YEM APC (W) BTR-60
PPV Streit Cougar; Streit Spartan
Yemeni Rial YER 2021 2022 2023
AUV M-ATV
GDP YER 20.6tr 30.2tr ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
USD 19.9bn 27.6bn MSL • MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger);
per capita USD 644 874 M47 Dragon; TOW
Growth % -1.0 2.0
GUNS • SP 100mm SU-100†
ARTILLERY • SP 122mm 2S1 Gvozdika
Inflation % 45.7 43.8
AIRCRAFT • ISR 6 AT-802 Air Tractor*
Def bdgt YER n.k n.k AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 14.5mm ZPU-4;
USD n.k n.k 23mm ZU-23-2
USD1=YER 1035.48 1092.84
Chapter Eight
Latin America and the Caribbean defence Active military personnel – top 10
spending, 2022 – top 5, including US Foreign (25,000 per unit)
Military Financing Global
Brazil 366,500 total
20,773,950
Colombia 255,950
United States
Venezuela 123,000
Peru 81,000
Latin America and the Caribbean: selected tactical combat aircraft, 2022
Argentina
Modern
Brazil Ageing
Chile Obsolescent
Colombia
Cuba
El Salvador
Honduras
Peru
Uruguay
Venezuela
0 20 40 60 80 100
*’Combat aircraft’ includes fighter, fighter ground-attack and attack aircraft
Latin America and the Caribbean: selected main battle tank fleets, 2022
Brazil
Chile
the Caribbean
Nicaragua
Peru
Modern Obsolescent
Uruguay Mixed Obsolete
Venezuela Ageing
Latin America and the Caribbean: defence spending as % of GDP (average), 2008-22
1.25
1.15
1.05
0.95
0.85
0.75
2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022
366 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Non-state threats in the region have in recent decades Brazil remains the region’s foremost military
led to significant investment in security capacities. power, with the region’s most sophisticated domestic
Insecurity and violence persist, but this is generally defence industry. Defence-industrial modernisation
the result of organised criminal activity, some is being helped by technology-offset terms associated
political violence and, in some cases, attempts by with key defence programmes, such as the Gripen
groups to supplant state institutions. However, the contract with Saab and the PROSUB submarine-
still-limited risk of state-on-state conflict in Latin modernisation contract with French firm Naval
America and the Caribbean means that armed forces Group. Military modernisation is focused on the
and defence investments remain small relative to the air force and navy, but despite having the region’s
size of the region’s economies and populations. High largest defence budget, fiscal constraints continue
levels of coronavirus-related spending in 2020–21 and to force procurement trade-offs. An example is
the regional economic shock caused by the pandemic, the decision to purchase additional Gripen combat
combined with the global rise in inflation and other aircraft (eventually taking the total to over 60) but at
effects of the war in Ukraine, such as supply-chain the cost of reducing its planned fleet of locally built
disruptions, mean that there will be less fiscal space KC-390 medium transport aircraft to just 19. Four
for states looking to increase defence expenditure. As Gripens will be added to the original contract for 36,
a result, it is likely that priorities, in the short term at and negotiations are under way for an additional
least, will focus on continuing existing modernisation batch of 26. The first aircraft are now in flight test
plans, particularly in countries where there are readily in Brazil. Meanwhile, the navy’s first Scorpène-class
apparent capability gaps. And there will be continued submarine, the Riachuelo (S40), was commissioned
investment by many regional defence establishments in September 2022, with three more to follow along
in internal-security capabilities, particularly in those with a nuclear-powered attack submarine (the
states suffering from high levels of drug-related region’s first) later in the decade. As part of this
organised crime, such as Mexico, or from low-level PROSUB programme, significant investment has
insurgencies, such as Colombia and Peru. been made in manufacturing and operational-related
Perhaps the most significant challenge to internal infrastructure. For its part, the army is engaged
security is seen in Mexico, where authorities continue in a significant series of programmes intended to
attempts to tackle drug cartels in various regions. modernise its armoured vehicles. Nonetheless, the
Although there have been some procurements in country faces few serious internal or external threats,
recent years, notably of naval vessels and helicopters, though there were entreaties by supporters of Jair
it is possible that these continued internal-security Bolsonaro, the defeated candidate in the presidential
requirements could take priority over improving the elections, for the armed forces to intervene following
armed forces’ limited war-fighting capabilities. Indeed, his loss, in a bid to halt the transfer of power.
organisational reform has recently been a focus of The country will continue to remain active in
the administration, including the plan to place the international security tasks, such as humanitarian and
National Guard under military control (which faced peacekeeping missions. But it is reportedly unlikely
legal objections in late 2022) and to extend until 2028 to repeat its deployment to Haiti, where it led the
the mandate for the armed forces to remain engaged MINUSTAH mission in the last decade, amid calls for
in domestic security duties. Analysts understand an international presence to help stabilise Haiti in the
that the National Guard has not reached its full midst of continued instability and violence.
personnel complement or deployment targets but its Modernisation plans in Argentina remain largely
presence across the country will continue expanding, dependent on the country’s economic outlook.
particularly in regions most prone to drug-related Principal capability gaps are the lack of fast-jet combat
violence such as the north and along the Pacific coast. aircraft as well as submarines, with its two ageing boats
Latin America and the Caribbean 367
currently non-operational and reactivation increasingly willingness to proceed, and it has been reported that
unlikely. Argentine defence officials reportedly visited ex-European F-16s could be a potential replacement
China and Pakistan in 2022 seeking information about (these have also been suggested for Argentina) and
the JF-17 combat aircraft. But such a purchase would there have been reports of negotiations with South
very likely prove difficult in budgetary terms without Korea for FA-50 aircraft. Meanwhile, the government
some form of special funding arrangement, given the has also begun a rapprochement with Venezuela,
declining defence budget and increasing inflation. including the re-establishment of military ties, which
In recent years there were reports that Buenos Aires had been suspended since 2019. Colombia continues
was interested in obtaining second-hand aircraft from to face the threat of low-intensity guerrilla warfare,
abroad, and that the United Kingdom had vetoed the although it is not certain that this would escalate
export of UK-sourced components given reported to levels seen before the 2016 peace deal with the
Argentinian interest in the South Korean FA-50 aircraft. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
Also, there was tension with Chile in 2022 amid a guerrilla group.
dispute over the two countries’ Antarctic maritime Peru has faced a similar situation with regards
boundaries. In contrast to its neighbour, Chile has to the Shining Path terrorist group, which continues
undertaken one of the most comprehensive military to have a localised presence in areas such as the
modernisation processes in Latin America over the Valley of the Apurímac, Ene and Mantaro rivers
past two decades. Concerns that there may have been (VRAEM) region despite the armed forces scoring
tension between the administration of Gabriel Boric some notable successes against them in recent
and the armed forces appear to have dissipated, and years. Some limited modernisation efforts are under
the president has ordered deployments into some way, such as a requirement for a fleet of new 8x8
southern regions affected by territorial disputes with armoured personnel carriers, although the upgrade
indigenous groups. The armed forces are adjusting to of Peru’s equipment inventory has been complicated
the law passed in 2019 that sets a new framework for by limited funding in recent years, the diverse
defence financing, which was previously reliant on nature of the current inventory and also by the war
copper revenues; the new framework sets financing in Ukraine. Venezuela’s economic crisis appears
plans for four-year periods. Similar to Chile, the arrival to have plateaued since 2020, though it remains
of a new government in Colombia raised questions subject to sanctions, which will limit the source of
for observers over the future of key procurement any military modernisation aspirations. Venezuela
the Caribbean
Kfir combat aircraft fleet. However, there appears a Russian, Chinese and Iranian weapons.
and fire-direction vehicles. Analysts understand that a acquired for additional trials, followed by production
batch of 6x6 truck-based armoured recovery vehicles is vehicles in tranches. The Materiel Directorate of the
being acquired through the US Foreign Military Sales army’s Logistics Command had earlier issued the request
programme to support the Guarani fleet. for proposals (RFP) on 20 July. An additional 89 vehicles
On 7 July 2022, a consortium comprising Akaer in serial production configuration will be later acquired
Engenharia, Opto Space and Defence and Universal was in different tranches and another 123 vehicles may be
awarded a contract for the modernisation of an initial acquired at a later date, depending on budget availability.
nine EE-9 Cascavel M VII 6x6 armoured reconnaissance The VBC OAP 155mm SR project will lead to the
vehicles. The contract is reportedly valued at acquisition of up to 36 truck-mounted 155mm 52-calibre
BRL74.6 million (USD14.6m) and was awarded by the artillery systems. Guidelines for the project were approved
Manufacturing Directorate. The plan is to gradually in July 2021 and initial requirements were reportedly
modernise 98 vehicles by 2031 with upgrades including unveiled in April 2022. A request for information / request
a new powerpack; new communications; optronics for for quotations consultation process began in mid-August
the driver, commander and gunner; an anti-tank guided 2022 and was scheduled to end in November.
missile (ATGM) launcher; an electric gun- and turret-drive The SPrg Vtr Lagartas project is intended to refurbish
system; as well as refurbishment of the 90mm cannon. An and upgrade 116 of the existing 220 Leopard 1A5BR
additional 103 vehicles could be modernised depending main battle tanks (MBTs) from 2023. Options include
on available funds. refurbishing the chassis and adding new features
In 2021 the army received the first 32 LMV-BR including an electric gun and turret drive system; battle
4x4 armoured vehicles under a reported BRL67.8m management system; fire-control system; and driver and
(USD17.2m) contract signed in November 2019 with commander optronics. An RFP for this modernisation
Iveco to fulfil the army’s VBMT-LSR project for wheeled project may be issued in late 2022 or early 2023. The
light multirole vehicles. The plan is to acquire additional Leopard 1A5BR fleet will be replaced later by a medium
vehicles in several variants, including to carry ATGMs, and MBT with a 120mm cannon under the VBC CC project.
the artillery-observation role. Initial requirements for the future MBT were released in
The 8x8 medium wheeled cavalry armoured combat February 2020.
vehicle project, known as the VBC Cav-MSR 8x8, achieved The army also wants to replace its ageing M113BR
a major milestone on 25 November. It was announced APCs. To meet this requirement, the VBC Fuz project was
that the Centauro II (combining the Iveco VBM 8x8 set up to acquire a tracked platform with a crewed turret
wheeled armoured platform and the Leonardo HITFACT fitted with a medium-calibre automatic cannon and
MkII 120mm modular protected turret) from the CIO 7.62mm and 12.7mm machine guns. The Fifth Regional
consortium (comprising Iveco Defence Vehicles and Maintenance Park modernised 150 M113B APCs to the
Leonardo Electronics) had been selected over proposals M113BR standard between 2011 and 2016. A further 236
from NORINCO and General Dynamics Land Systems- M113Bs were modernised at the facility between 2016
Canada. It was suggested that a contract would be and 2019 via the US FMS programme, with the assistance
placed in early December for an initial two vehicles for of BAE Systems. This plant will soon begin modernising
evaluation in Brazil in 2023, with a further seven to be the third and final batch of 150 M113Bs.
supply-chain disruptions and soaring inflation that The wave of demonstrations across the region since
have stemmed from the war. Regional governments late 2019 stalled in 2020 because of pandemic-related
are also limited in their fiscal and monetary options, restrictions on public activity. These re-emerged as the
having increased deficits and debt to fund the support underlying drivers of unrest have intensified with the
measures intended to counter the economic impact easing of pandemic restrictions. According to the IMF,
of the pandemic. Moreover, any positive economic countries in the region must simultaneously tackle
effect from higher commodity prices is countered by three major challenges: ‘ensuring the sustainability of
rising inflation, higher interest rates and the negative public finances; raising potential growth; and doing
impact on crucial trading partners. it in a manner that promotes social cohesion and
Regional real GDP growth is projected to come to addresses social inequities’.
3.5% in 2022 and slow to 1.7% in 2023. The regional
trend masks variances in economic performance and Defence spending
outlook across the region. The relatively quick and Lacklustre economic performance, an absence of major
effective vaccine rollout in Chile, combined with external security threats and persistently high rates of
extensive policy support, resulted in a rapid recovery inflation have resulted in a constrained budgetary
in 2021 and its outlook is stronger than many of environment for defence, with 2022 funding at the
its neighbours due to strong consumer activity. same level as 2009 in real terms. Widespread social
Colombia is also on a strong economic footing, challenges and pressing internal-security concerns
having recovered to pre-pandemic levels of output create conflicting spending pressures and, as a result,
in early 2022. The outlook there is strengthened regional defence spending has stagnated in recent
by higher prices for oil, coal and metals. Real GDP years. Budgets have also fallen significantly in US
growth in Argentina reached a sizeable 10.4% in 2021, dollar terms, as several currencies – including the
after contracting by 9.9% in 2020, and the projected Argentine peso, the Brazilian real and the Chilean
4.0% growth rate in 2022 was among the strongest in peso – have been severely devalued against the dollar
the region. However, inflation will continue to have a since 2018.
dampening effect on growth. Regional spending is further muted by the stable but
Coming into 2022, Brazil looked to be on a low growth trend in the Brazilian defence budget. This
solid path to regaining pre-pandemic levels of remains the largest in Latin America even though its
output, but the country faced challenges from share of regional spending fell from 57% in 2010 to 45%
the Caribbean
stalling investment growth and from domestic between USD22 billion and USD27bn in real terms for
political uncertainty after the presidential election. the last decade with the country generally spending
Meanwhile, Mexico suffered a severe 8.1% real GDP between 1.3% and 1.5% of GDP. This is somewhat
contraction in 2020 and has struggled to achieve higher than the regional average of 0.9% of GDP but
sizeable growth since. Mexico’s economy is more well below the global average of 1.7% of GDP.
exposed to global shocks as its manufacturing sector After a sizeable cut to the 2020 defence budget
is more globally integrated and therefore more was reversed, Brazilian funding reached BRL114bn
vulnerable to supply-chain disruptions. Finally, (USD22.2bn) that year, which marked a 1.9% real
Caribbean countries with high tourism-dependence increase over 2019 levels. However, growth rates have
saw significant contractions in output in 2022, and been subdued ever since with spending effectively
it may take until 2024 for them to recover as global static, resulting in cuts in real terms of 9.7% and
travel struggles to return to pre-pandemic levels. 6.0% in 2021 and 2022 respectively. The 2023 budget
High rates of inflation are a pervasive issue of BRL121bn (USD24.0bn) does little to counter this
across the region while increased unemployment trend, with inflation expected to come to 5%, though
has also resulted in a rise in regional inequality and former Minister of Defence Paulo Sérgio Nogueria de
poverty. According to the Economic Commission Oliveira was looking to increase the defence budget
for Latin America and the Caribbean, the number to 2% of GDP. Speaking to the House Foreign Affairs
of people in poverty in the region reached 209 Committee of the Brazilian Congress in July 2022,
million in 2020, 22m more than in 2019. High rates he highlighted the need to invest in R&D, military
of inequality have fuelled protests in recent years, training and surveillance in the Amazon as well as the
with some driven by perceptions of social injustice. need to engage more in international security.
370 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Increase
Dominican Republic
USD0.76bn
Guatemala
USD0.40bn
Belize Argentina
USD0.02bn USD3.38bn
Panama
USD0.87bn
Honduras
USD0.37bn Colombia
Guyana USD6.35bn
Barbados USD0.08bn
USD0.04bn
Nicaragua Jamaica
USD0.08bn USD0.20bn
Bolivia
USD0.48bn Brazil
Antigua Uruguay USD22.95bn
and Barbuda USD0.55bn
USD0.01bn Trinidad
and Tobago
Bahamas USD0.84bn
USD0.09bn
El Salvador
USD0.26bn Paraguay Ecuador Chile
USD0.28bn USD1.59bn USD3.76bn Peru Mexico
Costa Rica USD1.75bn USD5.74bn
Decrease
USD0.42bn
Cuba Suriname Venezuela Haiti
n.k n.k n.k USD0.01bn
[1] Map illustrating 2022 planned defence-spending levels (in USDbn at market
Real % Change (2021–22) exchange rates), as well as the annual real percentage change in planned
More than 20% increase Between 0% and 3% decrease defence spending between 2021 and 2022 (at constant 2015 prices and exchange
Between 10% and 20% increase Between 3% and 10% decrease rates). Percentage changes in defence spending can vary considerably from
year to year, as states revise the level of funding allocated to defence. Changes
Between 3% and 10% increase Between 10% and 20% decrease indicated here highlight the short-term trend in planned defence spending
Between 0% and 3% increase More than 20% decrease between 2021 and 2022. Actual spending changes prior to 2021, and projected
spending levels post-2022, are not reflected.
ε Estimate Spending 2% of GDP or above Insufficient data
©IISS
▲ Map 9 Latin America and the Caribbean: regional defence spending (USDbn, %ch yoy)1
Speaking alongside the minister, the commanders acquisition programmes. They include the PROSUB
of the air force and the army asked the committee for submarine-development programme and the
more funds for defence and highlighted the challenges purchase of 36 Saab Gripen combat aircraft (both with
that the constrained budgetary environment had technology-transfer terms); four MEKO frigates; a
created over the previous eight years. According to medium-range air-defence system; main battle tanks;
the air force commander, despite closing four air bases transport aircraft; and offshore patrol vessels.
and three maintenance facilities, personnel spending Inflation in Colombia has not been as severe as
still needed to reduce in order to fund investments. in many of its neighbours, reaching 3.5% in 2021
The army commander asked that any cuts to defence compared with the regional average of 8.2% (excluding
be minimised so the progress of strategic projects was Venezuela). This means the country managed real
not impeded. defence budget growth in 2020 and 2021 whereas
Despite a constrained budgetary environment, other countries saw contractions. Despite inflation
Brazil is pursuing several modernisation and rising to 9.7% in 2022, the country still managed to
Latin America and the Caribbean 371
% of GDP
for ‘defence and police’ to USD11.6bn, although the
Ministry of Finance was considering a small reduction 0.5
to the defence budget that would reportedly impact
investment in new systems and equipment.
It had been suggested that the outlook for
0.0
Colombia’s defence budget would be subdued with 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
the election in June 2022 of a new president, Gustavo
Petro, focused on pursuing ‘total peace’ for Colombia ▲ Figure 17 Latin America and the Caribbean: regional
with a strong accent on social development. Petro defence spending as % of GDP (average)
reportedly stated during the election campaign that
he would not prioritise the purchase of combat aircraft
or military hardware. However, the programme to first real-term increase for four years and investment
replace Colombia’s ageing Kfir fighter ground-attack has increased from an average of 2.1% of the budget
aircraft was reactivated in September 2022. Reports over 2010–20 to 5.3% in 2021 and 5.9% in 2022. The
suggest that the disparity with Venezuela’s inventory government is also planning to spend USD684m on
was a driver behind the decision, although relations new combat aircraft and related infrastructure, a
between the two countries have improved recently programme that has been stymied by UK embargo
after eight years of political conflict. restrictions in the past.
Argentina’s defence budget plummeted in both Defence budget movements in Mexico have been
real and US dollar terms between 2017 and 2021. volatile in recent years, with an 8% real cut in 2019
Inflation has averaged 50% since 2018, which has followed by sharp increases in 2020 and 2021 of 13%
created further pressure for devaluation of a currency and 10% respectively to reach USD6.7bn in 2021.
that has already fallen from 17 pesos to the dollar in The 2022 budget fell back slightly to USD5.7bn. The
2017 to 125 pesos to the dollar in 2022. Argentina’s recent increases derive from the increasing role that
the Caribbean
in 2021 before increasing slightly to 7% in 2022. The taking on functions previously allocated to internal
2022 defence budget increase to USD3.4bn was the security forces. In 2022, the president unveiled a plan
to bring the National Guard under military control,
though this was subject to legal challenge in late year.
▼ Figure 16 Latin America and the Caribbean: defence These factors are likely to drive future increases in
spending by country and sub-region, 2022 the defence budget but could result in conflicting
The Caribbean, 3.8% funding priorities and perhaps mask any reductions
Other Central America, 4.7%
for core defence capabilities.
Mexico, 11.2%
Defence industry
Other South
America, 2.7% Brazil has been keen to develop indigenous defence
industrial capabilities through successive national
Ecuador
3.1% Brazil defence strategies since 2005 that have aimed to
44.7% progress from off-the-shelf foreign purchases to the
Peru, 3.4%
pursuit of programmes that would boost domestic
capabilities and enable import substitution. Brazil has
Argentina
6.6% looked to leverage technology transfer and industrial
participation in its foreign procurement contracts in
Chile, 7.3%
order to develop domestic industry. This has resulted
Colombia, 12.4% in a defence industrial base with the capability to
Note: Analysis excludes Cuba, Suriname and Venezuela ©IISS produce large-scale naval and air platforms as well as
372 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Peru
rockets and artillery. The country has also developed Beyond Brazil, the lack of any significant and
capabilities in the uninhabited arena with Akaer, a sustained growth in defence spending and the low
domestic company, developing the Albatross family levels of funding allocated by the major regional
of medium-altitude long-endurance uninhabited players to investment (procurement and R&D) – at
aerial vehicles (MALE UAVs). between 2% and 10% of annual defence expenditure –
According to Brazil’s defence minister, the constrains the development of indigenous capabilities
country’s defence industry makes up 4.8% of GDP in Latin America. Colombia’s offset policy has yet
and supports almost 3m direct and indirect jobs. to result in a wide-ranging or advanced domestic
He also stated that the Brazilian defence-industrial defence capability, with the country still heavily
base extends to more than 1,100 companies, of reliant on foreign imports for major programmes.
which 142 are strategic. Embraer – Brazil’s primary One area of development is in space systems, with
defence aerospace company – reported a 31% drop in Colombia’s air force inaugurating a space operations
company-wide revenues in 2020 but revenue growth centre on 28 July 2022. It plans to launch a new satellite
returned in 2021, reaching 11%. Nevertheless, the in 2022 or 2023. Mexico, meanwhile, has established
defence and security sector saw revenues fall in 2021 a small defence industry capable of producing small
following the agreement with the air force to reduce arms and light weapons, 4x4 tactical patrol vehicles,
the number of KC-390 transport aircraft on order UAVs, fast interceptor craft and coastal and ocean
from 29 to 19. patrol vessels.
Latin America and the Caribbean 373
Since 2010, Peru has acquired defence equipment from helicopters, SH-2 Seasprite helicopters and KC-130H tanker
over 15 countries. A reduction in defence spending since aircraft, were acquired from the Netherlands, New Zealand
2013 and recent budgetary pressures resulting from the and Spain respectively.
coronavirus pandemic have meant that much acquisition Similarly, apart from the procurement of Israeli and Russian
has been relatively small scale and that some programmes, anti-tank missiles in the 2000s, and Chinese multiple rocket
such as new frigates for the navy and 8x8 armoured vehicles launchers and Russian helicopters in the 2010s, the army has
for the army, have been postponed or scaled down. Indeed, seen relatively little investment and continues to operate largely
the largest single acquisition since 2010 has been the army’s obsolescent equipment. In contrast, the navy has acquired
procurement of 24 Mi-171Sh transport helicopters from Russia improved systems. A 2012 naval cooperation agreement with
for USD528 million. South Korea has so far seen the donation of two Po Hang-class
Although replacements were examined for the air force’s corvettes as well as the licensed-production of two landing
ageing Mirage 2000 and MiG-29 fighter aircraft in the early platform dock (LPD) vessels at state-owned shipyard SIMA,
2010s, there has been little progress since – likely because located in Callao. The shipyard will likely also be involved in
of the relatively high cost of any potential acquisition. building new offshore patrol vessels (OPVs). A number of
Nonetheless, some second-hand aircraft, including utility foreign designs have been linked to this requirement.
c. 2012 Río Itaya Patrol boat 1 1.09 SIMA Peru 2013 Coast
Guard
Jan Griffon Utility craft air 5 13.27 Griffon Hoverwork 2013 Navy
2012 2000TD cushioned
Nov KT-1P Training aircraft 20 208.87 Korea Aerospace 2014–17 Air Force
2012 Industries (KAI)
M = multinational
[a] Budget for the Ministry of Legal Affairs, Public Safety, Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015)
Immigration & Labour 6.34
1 (1st) div (1 armd bde (1 armd recce regt, 3 tk regt, 1 MRL 8: 105mm 4 SLAM Pampero; 127mm 4 CP-30
mech inf regt, 1 SP arty gp, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 int coy, 1 MOR 886: 81mm 492; SP 107mm 25 M106A2; 120mm
sigs sqn, 1 log coy), 1 (3rd) jungle bde (2 jungle inf regt, 330 Brandt; SP 120mm 39 TAM-VCTM
2 jungle inf coy, 1 arty gp, 1 engr coy, 1 int coy, 1 sigs AIRCRAFT
coy, 1 log coy, 1 med coy); 1 (12th) jungle bde (2 jungle TPT • Light 13: 1 Beech 80 Queen Air; 3 C-212-200
inf regt, 1 jungle inf coy, 1 arty gp, 1 engr bn, 1 int coy, Aviocar; 4 Cessna 208EX Grand Caravan; 1 Cessna 500
1 sigs coy, 1 log coy, 1 med coy), 2 engr bn, 1 sigs bn, Citation (survey); 1 Cessna 550 Citation Bravo; 2 DHC-6
1 log coy) Twin Otter; 1 Sabreliner 75A (Gaviao 75A)
1 (3rd) div (1 armd bde (1 armd recce sqn, 3 tk regt, 1 TRG 5 T-41 Mescalero
mech inf regt, 1 SP arty gp, 1 cbt engr sqn, 1 int coy, 1 HELICOPTERS
sigs sqn, 1 log coy); 1 mech bde (1 armd recce regt, 1 MRH 5: 4 SA315B Lama; 1 Z-11
tk regt, 2 mech inf regt, 1 SP arty gp, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 TPT 62: Medium 3 AS332B Super Puma; Light 59:
int coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log coy); 1 mech bde (1 armd recce 1 Bell 212; 25 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois – 6 armed);
regt, 1 tk regt, 2 mech inf regt, 1 SP arty gp, 1 cbt engr 5 Bell 206B3; 13 UH-1H-II Huey II; 15 AB206B1
bn, 1 int coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log coy); 1 int bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 AIR DEFENCE
log coy, 1 AD gp (2 AD bn)) SAM • Point-defence RBS-70
1 (Rapid Deployment Force) div (1 SF gp; 1 mech bde (1 GUNS • TOWED 229: 20mm 200 GAI-B01; 30mm 21
armd recce regt, 3 mech inf regt, 1 arty gp, 1 MRL gp, HS L81; 35mm 8 GDF-002 (Skyguard fire control)
1 cbt engr coy, 1 sigs coy,1 log coy); 1 AB bde (1 recce
sqn, 2 para regt, 1 air aslt regt, 1 arty gp, 1 cbt engr coy, Navy 16,400
1 sigs coy, 1 log coy)) Commands: Surface Fleet, Submarines, Naval Avn, Marines
Light
FORCES BY ROLE
1 (2nd) mtn inf div (1 mtn inf bde (1 recce regt, 3 mtn inf
SPECIAL FORCES
regt, 1 mtn inf coy, 2 arty gp, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs coy,
1 (diver) SF gp
1 log coy); 1 mtn inf bde (1 recce regt, 3 mtn inf regt, 1
mtn inf coy, 1 arty gp, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs coy, 1 log EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
coy); 1 mtn inf bde (1 recce regt, 2 mtn inf regt, 2 arty SUBMARINES • SSK
gp, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs coy, 1 construction coy, 1 log 1 Santa Cruz (GER TR-1700) (non-operational,
coy), 1 arty gp, 1 AD bn, 1 sigs bn) undergoing MLU since 2015) with 6 single 533mm TT
1 mot cav regt (presidential escort) with SST-4 HWT
COMBAT SUPPORT 1 Salta (GER T-209/1100) (non-operational since 2013)
1 engr bn with 8 single 533mm TT with Mk 37/SST-4 HWT)
1 CBRN coy PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 5
1 sigs gp (1 EW bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 maint bn) DESTROYERS • DDH 1 Hercules (UK Type-42)
1 sigs bn (utilised as a fast troop-transport ship), with 1 114mm
the Caribbean
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT FRIGATES • FFGHM 4 Almirante Brown (GER MEKO
3 maint bn 360) (of which 1†) with 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet
HELICOPTER AShM, 1 octuple Albatros lnchr with Aspide SAM,
1 avn gp (bde) (1 avn bn, 1 tpt hel bn, 1 atk/ISR hel sqn) 2 triple ILAS-3 (B-515) 324mm TT with A244/S LWT,
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 AS555 Fennec hel)
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 24
MBT 231: 225 TAM, 6 TAM S21 CORVETTES 9:
LT TK 117: 107 SK-105A1 Kuerassier; 6 SK-105A2 FSGH 6 Espora (GER MEKO 140) with 2 twin lnchr
Kuerassier; 4 Patagón with MM38 Exocet AShM, 2 triple 324mm ILAS-3 (B-
RECCE 47 AML-90 515) ASTT with A244/S LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1
IFV 232: 118 VCTP (incl variants); 114 M113A2 (20mm AS555 Fennec hel)
cannon) FSG 3 Drummond (FRA A-69) (of which 2†) with 2
APC 278 twin lnchr with MM38 Exocet AShM, 2 triple 324mm
APC (T) 274: 70 M113A1-ACAV; 204 M113A2 ILAS-3 (B-515) ASTT with A244/S LWT, 1 100mm gun
APC (W) 4 WZ-551B1 PSOH 4 Bouchard (FRA OPV 87) (of which 1 ex-FRA
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES L'Adroit) (capacity 1 hel)
ARV Greif PSO 1 Teniente Olivieri (ex-US oilfield tug)
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE PCFGT 1 Intrepida (GER Lurssen 45m) with 2 single
MSL • SP 3 M1025 HMMWV with TOW-2A lnchr with MM38 Exocet AShM, 2 single 533mm TT with
RCL 105mm 150 M-1968 SST-4 HWT, 1 76mm gun
ARTILLERY 1,108 PCF 1 Intrepida (GER Lurssen 45m) with 1 76mm gun
SP 155mm 42: 23 AMX F3; 19 VCA 155 Palmaria PCO 1 Murature (ex-US King – trg/river-patrol role) with
TOWED 172: 105mm 64 Model 56 pack howitzer; 2 105mm gun
155mm 108: 28 CITEFA M-77/CITEFA M-81; 80 PB 7: 4 Baradero (ISR Dabur); 2 Punta Mogotes (ex-US
SOFMA L-33 Point); 1 Zurubi
378 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
AMPHIBIOUS 6 LCVP 2 (tac air) sqn with EMB-312 Tucano (on loan for
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 16 border surv/interdiction)
ABU 3 Red ISR
AFS 4 Puerto Argentina (ex-RUS Neftegaz) 1 sqn with Learjet 35A
AGB 1 Almirante Irizar (damaged by fire in 2007; SEARCH & RESCUE/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
returned to service in mid-2017) 2 sqn with Bell 212; Bell 412; Mi-171, SA-315B Lama
AGHS 3: 1 Austral (ex-GER Sonne); 1 Cormoran; 1 Puerto TANKER/TRANSPORT
Deseado (ice-breaking capability, used for polar research) 1 sqn with C-130H Hercules; KC-130H Hercules; L-100-30
AGOR 1 Commodoro Rivadavia TRANSPORT
AK 2 Costa Sur (capacity 4 LCVP) 1 sqn with Beech A200 King Air (UC-12B Huron);
AOR 1 Patagonia (ex-FRA Durance) with 1 hel platform Cessna 182 Skylane
AXS 1 Libertad 1 sqn with DHC-6 Twin Otter; Saab 340
1 sqn with F-28 Friendship
Naval Aviation 2,000 1 sqn with Learjet 35A; Learjet 60
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 1 (Pres) flt with B-737-700; B-757-23ER; S-70A Black
AIRCRAFT 16 combat capable Hawk, S-76B
FGA (5 Super Etendard Modernisé non-operational and TRAINING
undergoing modernisation; 11 Super Etendard in store) 1 sqn with AT-63 Pampa II
ASW 6: 2 S-2T Tracker; 4 P-3B Orion† 1 sqn with EMB-312 Tucano
TPT • Light 7 Beech 200F/M King Air 1 sqn with Grob 120TP
TRG 10 T-34C Turbo Mentor* 1 sqn with IA-63 Pampa III*
HELICOPTERS 1 sqn with T-6C Texan II
ASW 2 SH-3H (ASH-3H) Sea King
1 hel sqn with Hughes 369; SA-315B Lama
MRH 1 AS555 Fennec
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
TPT • Medium 6: 2 S-61T; 4 UH-3H Sea King
1 sqn with Hughes 369; MD-500; MD-500D
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
AAM • IR R-550 Magic EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AShM AM39 Exocet AIRCRAFT 22 combat capable
ATK 12: 10 A-4 (A-4AR) Skyhawk (of which 6†); 2
Marines 2,500 OA-4 (OA-4AR) Skyhawk (of which 1†)
FORCES BY ROLE ELINT 1 Learjet 35A
MANOEUVRE TKR/TPT 2 KC-130H Hercules
Amphibious TPT 25: Medium 4: 3 C-130H Hercules; 1 L-100-30;
1 (fleet) force (1 cdo gp, 1 (AAV) amph bn, 1 mne bn, Light 17: 3 Beech A200 King Air (UC-12B Huron); 4
1 arty bn, 1 ADA bn) Cessna 182 Skylane; 2 DHC-6 Twin Otter; 3 Learjet
1 (fleet) force (2 mne bn, 2 navy det) 35A (of which 2 test and calibration and 1 medevac);
1 force (1 mne bn) 1 Learjet 60 (VIP); 1 PA-28-236 Dakota; 3 Saab 340
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE (jointly operated with LADE); PAX 4: 1 B-737; 1 B-737-
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES 700; 1 B-757-23ER; 1 F-28 Fellowship
RECCE 12 ERC-90F Sagaie TRG 46: 2 AT-63 Pampa II* (LIFT); 11 EMB-312 Tucano;
APC • APC (W) 31 VCR 9 Grob 120TP; 8 IA-63 Pampa III*; 6 P2002JF Sierra; 10
AAV 11 LVTP-7 T-6C Texan II (8 EMB-312 Tucano in store)
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES HELICOPTERS
ARV AAVR 7 MRH 29: 6 Bell 412EP; 11 Hughes 369; 3 MD-500; 4
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MD-500D; 5 SA315B Lama
RCL 105mm 30 M-1974 FMK-1 TPT 12: Medium 3: 2 Mi-171E; 1 S-70A Black Hawk
ARTILLERY 89 (VIP); Light 9: 7 Bell 212; 2 S-76B (VIP)
TOWED 19: 105mm 13 Model 56 pack howitzer; AIR DEFENCE
155mm 6 M114 GUNS 88: 20mm: 86 Oerlikon/Rh-202 with 9 Elta EL/
MOR 70: 81mm 58; 120mm 12 M-2106 radar; 35mm: 2 GDF-001 with Skyguard radar
AIR DEFENCE AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
SAM • Point-defence RBS-70 AAM • IR AIM-9L Sidewinder; R-550 Magic; Shafrir 2‡
GUNS 40mm 4 Bofors 40L
Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 31,250
Air Force 12,900
4 Major Comds – Air Operations, Personnel, Air Regions, Gendarmerie 18,000
Logistics, 8 air bde Ministry of Security
FORCES BY ROLE
Air Operations Command COMMAND
FORCES BY ROLE 7 regional comd
GROUND ATTACK SPECIAL FORCES
2 sqn with A-4/OA-4 (A-4AR/OA-4AR) Skyhawk 1 SF unit
Latin America and the Caribbean 379
MANOEUVRE
Other Bahamas BHS
17 paramilitary bn
Bahamian Dollar BSD 2021 2022 2023
Aviation
1 (mixed) avn bn GDP BSD 11.2bn 12.7bn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE USD 11.2bn 12.7bn
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES per capita USD 28,792 32,246
APC (W) 87: 47 Grenadier; 40 UR-416 Growth % 13.7 8.0
ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm Inflation % 2.9 5.7
AIRCRAFT
Def bdgt BSD 95.4m 94.5m 146m
TPT 13: Light 12: 3 Cessna 152; 3 Cessna 206; 1 Cessna
USD 95.4m 94.5m
336; 1 PA-28 Cherokee; 2 PC-6B Turbo Porter; 2 PC-12;
PAX 1 Learjet 35 USD1=BSD 1.00 1.00
HELICOPTERS Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)
MRH 2 MD-500C 152
TPT • Light 17: 3 AW119 Koala; 2 Bell 206 Jet Ranger
(AB-206); 7 AS350 Ecureuil; 1 H135; 1 H155; 3 R-44 Raven II 52
TRG 1 S-300C 2008 2015 2022
the Caribbean
ARS 1 Prefecto Mansilla RBDF’s Sandy Bottom Project, the largest-ever capital investment
AX 5: 1 Mandubi; 4 other in the service, includes the acquisition of patrol craft and the devel-
opment of bases and port facilities. The maritime wing is focused
AXS 1 Dr Bernardo Houssay
around patrol vessels and smaller patrol boats, while the air wing
AIRCRAFT has a small inventory of light aircraft. Apart from limited mainte-
MP 1 Beech 350ER King Air nance facilities, the Bahamas has no indigenous defence industry.
TPT • Light 6: 5 C-212 Aviocar; 1 Beech 350ER King Air
TRG 2 Piper PA-28 Archer III ACTIVE 1,500
HELICOPTERS
SAR 3 AS565MA Panther ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
MRH 1 AS365 Dauphin 2
TPT 7: Medium 3: 1 H225 Puma; 2 SA330L (AS330L) Royal Bahamas Defence Force 1,500
Puma; Light 4: 2 AS355 Ecureuil II; 2 Bell 206 (AB-206)
FORCES BY ROLE
Jet Ranger
MANOEUVRE
TRG 4 S-300C
Amphibious
1 mne coy (incl marines with internal- and base-
DEPLOYMENT security duties)
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 2 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 21
CYPRUS: UN • UNFICYP 251; 2 inf coy; 1 hel flt with 2 Bell 212 PCC 2 Bahamas
INDIA/PAKISTAN: UN • UNMOGIP 3 PB 19: 4 Arthur Dion Hanna (Damen Stan Patrol 4207);
LEBANON: UN • UNIFIl 2 2 Dauntless; 4 Lignum Vitae (Damen 3007); 1 Safe 33;
4 Safe 44; 2 Sea Ark 12m; 2 Sea Ark 15m
MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 3 LOGISTICS & SUPPORT • AKR 1 Lawrence Major
WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 3 (Damen 5612)
380 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
31 n.k.
2008 2015 2022 16
2008 2015 2022
Population 302,674
Population 412,387
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Male 8.5% 3.0% 3.0% 3.1% 24.4% 6.3%
Male 16.1% 5.4% 5.1% 4.1% 17.2% 2.3%
Female 8.5% 3.0% 3.1% 3.2% 25.3% 8.7%
Female 15.4% 5.0% 4.5% 3.9% 18.6% 2.5%
Capabilities Capabilities
Maritime security and resource protection are the main tasks of
Belize maintains a small Defence Force (BDF) and coastguard to
the Barbados Defence Force (BDF), but it has a secondary public- provide national security, particularly control of the borders with
safety role in support of the police force. The BDF has undertaken Guatemala and Mexico. In 2022, a new National Security Strategy
counter-narcotics work, while troops have also been tasked with underscored priorities of maintaining sovereignty and territorial
supporting law enforcement. There are plans to improve disaster- integrity; reducing trans-national, cross-border and other violent
relief capabilities. Barbados is a member of the Caribbean Commu- crime; counter-terrorism; and reducing risk from natural human-
nity, and the Caribbean Regional Security System is headquartered caused hazards. The UK has a long-standing security relationship
there. The BDF has participated in US SOUTHCOM’s Tradewinds with Belize and maintains a small training unit there, and the BDF
disaster-response exercise. There is limited capacity to deploy inde- also trains with US SOUTHCOM. Overall training levels are limited
pendently within the region, such as on hurricane-relief duties. The but generally sufficient for the BDF’s tasks. Belize is a member of
inventory consists principally of a small number of patrol vessels. the Caribbean Community. The BDF does not deploy internation-
Apart from limited maintenance facilities, Barbados has no indig- ally and logistics support is adequate for border-security missions.
The conventional equipment inventory is limited and there is no
enous defence industry.
significant domestic defence industry.
ACTIVE 610 (Army 500 Coast Guard 110) ACTIVE 1,500 (Army 1,500) Gendarmerie &
RESERVE 430 (Joint 430) Paramilitary 550
RESERVE 700 (Joint 700)
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
Army 500
FORCES BY ROLE Army ε1,500
MANOEUVRE FORCES BY ROLE
Light SPECIAL FORCES
1 inf bn (cadre) 1 SF unit
Latin America and the Caribbean 381
MANOEUVRE Capabilities
Light
The armed forces are constitutionally tasked with maintaining
2 inf bn (3 inf coy)
sovereignty and territorial defence, though principal tasks are
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT counter-narcotics and internal and border security. Joint task forces
1 spt gp have been formed and dispatched to border regions to combat
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE smuggling, and a series of border posts have been established.
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • RCL 84mm Airspace control is an emerging strategic priority. The armed forces
have also been playing a greater role in disaster-relief operations,
Carl Gustaf
with a new dedicated joint command established in 2022.There is
ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm 6 defence-technology cooperation with Russia, and China remains
a significant supplier of military materiel. Bolivia cooperates with
Air Wing
Peru and Paraguay on countering illicit trafficking and on providing
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE disaster relief. The armed forces have stressed the need to improve
AIRCRAFT conditions for personnel, amid greater internal deployments to
TPT • Light 2: 1 BN-2B Defender†; 1 Cessna 182 border areas on counter-trafficking tasks. An aerospace R&D centre
Skylane† was created in 2018 in the military-engineering school, with the
objective of developing munitions and ISR UAVs. There is some
TRG 1 T-67M-200 Firefly
local maintenance, repair and overhaul capacity.
HELICOPTERS
TPT • Light 3: 2 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); 1 Bell 407 ACTIVE 34,100 (Army 22,800 Navy 4,800 Air 6,500)
Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 37,100
Reserve Conscript liability 12 months voluntary conscription for both males
FORCES BY ROLE and females
MANOEUVRE
Light ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
1 inf bn (3 inf coy)
Army 9,800; 13,000 conscript (total 22,800)
Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 550 FORCES BY ROLE
COMMAND
Coast Guard 550 6 mil region HQ
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 10 div HQ
All operational patrol vessels under 10t FLD SPECIAL FORCES
3 SF regt
FOREIGN FORCES MANOEUVRE
Reconnaissance
the Caribbean
1 mot cav gp
Armoured
Bolivia BOL 1 armd bn
Mechanised
Bolivian Boliviano BOB 2021 2022 2023 1 mech cav regt
GDP BOB 279bn 298bn 2 mech inf regt
USD 40.7bn 43.4bn Light
per capita USD 3,449 3,631 1 (aslt) cav gp
5 (horsed) cav gp
Growth % 6.1 3.8
3 mot inf regt
Inflation % 0.7 3.2 21 inf regt
Def bdgt BOB 3.26bn 3.30bn Air Manoeuvre
USD 476m 481m 2 AB regt (bn)
USD1=BOB 6.86 6.86 Other
Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 1 (Presidential Guard) inf regt
519 COMBAT SUPPORT
6 arty regt (bn)
293 6 engr bn
2008 2015 2022 1 int coy
1 MP bn
Population 12,054,379 1 sigs bn
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
2 log bn
Male 15.2% 5.0% 4.5% 4.1% 18.4% 3.1%
AVIATION
Female 14.6% 4.9% 4.4% 4.0% 18.3% 3.6% 2 avn coy
382 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Marines 1,700 (incl 1,000 Naval Military Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 37,100+
Police)
FORCES BY ROLE National Police 31,100+
MANOEUVRE FORCES BY ROLE
Mechanised MANOEUVRE
1 mech inf bn Other
Amphibious 27 frontier sy unit
6 mne bn (1 in each Naval District) 9 paramilitary bde
COMBAT SUPPORT 2 (rapid action) paramilitary regt
4 (naval) MP bn
Narcotics Police 6,000+
FOE (700) – Special Operations Forces
Air Force 6,500 (incl conscripts)
FORCES BY ROLE
GROUND ATTACK DEPLOYMENT
1 sqn with K-8WB Karakorum CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 7
ISR
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN •
1 sqn with Cessna 206; Cessna 402; Learjet 25B/25D
MONUSCO 4
(secondary VIP role)
SEARCH & RESCUE SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 5
1 sqn with AS332B Super Puma; H125 Ecureuil; H145 SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 4
Latin America and the Caribbean 383
the Caribbean
with Chile and Colombia. There is also defence cooperation with 1 arty bn, 1 engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 MP coy, 1 log bn)
France, Sweden and the US, centred on procurement, technical 1 (15th) mech inf bde (3 mech inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 engr
advice and personnel training. Brazil’s air-transport fleet enables it
coy, 1 log bn)
Light
to independently deploy forces. It contributes small contingents to
1 (4th) mot inf bde (1 mech cav sqn, 1 mot inf bn, 1 inf bn,
several UN missions. Brazil is attempting to modernise its equip-
1 mtn inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn)
ment across all domains. Major platform developments include
1 (7th) mot inf bde (3 mot inf bn, 1 arty bn)
PROSUB (one nuclear-powered and four diesel-electric subma-
1 (8th) mot inf bde (1 mech cav sqn, 3 mot inf bn, 1 arty
rines) and the acquisition in 2018 of a former UK helicopter carrier.
bn, 1 log bn)
Projects to boost aerospace capabilities are also underway includ- 1 (10th) mot inf bde (1 mech cav sqn, 4 mot inf bn, 1 inf
ing the FX-2 project to procure the Saab Gripen combat aircraft, as coy, 1 arty bn, 1 engr coy, 1 sigs coy)
well as the plan to introduce the Embraer KC-390 transport aircraft. 1 (13th) mot inf bde (1 mot inf bn, 2 inf bn, 1 inf coy,
Brazil has a well-developed defence-industrial base, across all 1 arty bn)
domains, with a capability to design and manufacture equipment. 1 (14th) mot inf bde (1 mech cav sqn, 3 inf bn, 1 arty bn)
Aerospace firms Avibras and Embraer also export some products. 10 inf bn
Local companies are also involved in the SISFRON border-security 1 (1st) jungle inf bde (1 mech cav sqn, 2 jungle inf bn,
programme. There are industrial partnerships, including tech- 1 arty bn)
nology transfers and R&D support, with France’s Naval Group 4 (2nd, 16th, 17th & 22nd) jungle inf bde (3 jungle inf bn)
(PROSUB) and Sweden’s Saab (FX-2 fighter). 1 (23rd) jungle inf bde (1 cav sqn, 4 jungle inf bn, 1 arty
bn, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn)
ACTIVE 366,500 (Army 214,000 Navy 85,000 Air Air Manoeuvre
67,500) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 395,000 1 AB bde (1 cav sqn, 3 AB bn, 1 arty bn, 1 engr coy, 1 sigs
Conscript liability 12 months (can go to 18; often waived) coy, 1 log bn)
1 (12th) air mob bde (1 cav sqn, 3 air mob bn, 1 arty bn,
RESERVE 1,340,000 1 engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn)
384 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Other HELICOPTERS
1 (9th) mot trg bde (3 mot inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 log bn) MRH 51: 22 AS565 Panther (HM-1); 12 AS565 K2 Panther
1 (18th) sy bde (2 sy bn, 2 sy coy) (HM-1); 17 AS550A2 Fennec (HA-1 – armed)
1 sy bn TPT 41: Heavy 14 H225M Caracal (HM-4); Medium 12:
7 sy coy 8 AS532 Cougar (HM-3); 4 S-70A-36 Black Hawk (HM-2);
3 gd cav regt Light 15 AS350L1 Ecureuil (HA-1)
1 gd inf bn UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES
COMBAT SUPPORT ISR • Medium 1 Nauru 1000C
3 SP arty bn AIR DEFENCE
6 fd arty bn SAM • Point-defence RBS-70; 9K38 Igla (RS-SA-18
1 MRL bn Grouse); 9K338 Igla-S (RS-SA-24 Grinch)
1 STA bty GUNS 100:
6 engr bn SP 35mm 34 Gepard 1A2
1 engr gp (1 engr bn, 4 construction bn) TOWED 66: 35mm 39 GDF-001 towed (some with Super
1 engr gp (4 construction bn, 1 construction coy) Fledermaus radar); 40mm 27 L/70 (some with BOFI)
2 construction bn
1 CBRN bn Navy 85,000
1 EW coy Organised into 9 districts with HQ I Rio de Janeiro, HQ II
1 int coy Salvador, HQ III Natal, HQ IV Belém, HQ V Rio Grande,
8 MP bn HQ VI Ladario, HQ VII Brasilia, HQ VIII Sao Paulo, HQ
2 MP coy IX Manaus
4 sigs bn
FORCES BY ROLE
2 sigs coy
SPECIAL FORCES
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
5 log bn 1 (diver) SF gp
1 tpt bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
4 spt bn SUBMARINES • SSK 6:
HELICOPTER 1 Riachuelo (FRA Scorpène) with 6 533mm TT with SM39
1 avn bde (3 hel bn, 1 maint bn) Exocet AShM/F21 HWT
1 hel bn 2 Tupi (GER T-209/1400) with 8 single 533mm TT with
AIR DEFENCE Mk 24 Tigerfish HWT
1 ADA bde (5 ADA bn) 2 Tupi (GER T-209/1400) with 8 single 533mm TT with
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Mk 48 HWT
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES 1 Tikuna (GER T-209/1450) with 8 single 533mm TT with
MBT 296: 41 Leopard 1A1BE; 220 Leopard 1A5BR; 35 Mk 24 Tigerfish HWT
M60A3/TTS PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 7
LT TK 50 M41C FRIGATES 7
RECCE 408 EE-9 Cascavel FFGHM 6:
IFV 13 VBTP-MR Guarani 30mm 1 Greenhalgh (ex-UK Broadsword) with 4 single lnchr
APC 1,458 with MM40 Exocet Block 2 AShM, 2 sextuple lnchr
APC (T) 660: 198 M113A1; 386 M113BR; 12 M113A2; with Sea Wolf SAM, 2 triple 324mm STWS Mk.2
64 M577A2 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT (capacity 2 Super Lynx
APC (W) 798: 223 EE-11 Urutu; ε575 VBTP-MR Mk21A hel)
Guarani 6×6 5 Niterói with 2 twin lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 2
AUV IVECO LMV (LMV-BR) AShM, 1 octuple Albatros lnchr with Aspide SAM,
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46
AEV 7+: Greif; 2 Sabiex HART; 5 Pionierpanzer 2 Dachs LWT, 1 twin 375mm Bofors ASW Rocket Launcher
ARV 13+: 9 BPz-2; 4 M88A1; M578 LARV System A/S mor, 1 115mm gun (capacity 1 Super
VLB 5+: XLP-10; 5 Leopard 1 with Biber Lynx Mk21A hel)
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE FFGH 1 Barroso with 2 twin lnchr with MM40 Exocet
MSL • MANPATS Eryx; Milan; MSS-1.2 AC Block 2 AShM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT
RCL 194+: 84mm Carl Gustaf; 106mm 194 M40A1 with Mk 46 LWT, 1 115mm gun (capacity 1 Super Lynx
ARTILLERY 1,881 Mk21A hel)
SP 169: 155mm 169: 37 M109A3; 100 M109A5; 32 PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 44
M109A5+ CORVETTES • FSGH 1 Inhaúma with 2 twin lnchr with
TOWED 431: 105mm 336: 233 M101/M102; 40 L118 MM40 Exocet Block 2 AShM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk
Light Gun; 63 Model 56 pack howitzer; 155mm 95 M114 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 115mm gun (1 Super Lynx
MRL 127mm 36: 18 ASTROS II Mk3M; 18 ASTROS II Mk6 Mk21A hel)
MOR 1,245: 81mm 1,168: 453 L16, 715 M936 AGR; PSO 3 Amazonas with 1 hel landing platform
120mm 77 M2 PCO 6: 4 Bracuí (ex-UK River); 1 Imperial Marinheiro with
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AP 1 Jacaretinga 1 76mm gun; 1 Parnaiba with 1 hel landing platform
Latin America and the Caribbean 385
PCC 2 Macaé (FRA Vigilante) 1 sqn with AS350 Ecureuil (armed); H225M Caracal
PCR 5: 2 Pedro Teixeira with 1 hel landing platform; 3 (UH-15)
Roraima 1 sqn with AS332 Super Puma; AS532 Cougar (UH-14);
PB 23: 12 Grajaú; 6 Marlim (ITA Meatini derivative); 5
H225M Caracal (UH-15)
Piratini (US PGM)
PBR 4 LPR-40 1 sqn with H225M Caracal (UH-15)
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 3 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
MSC 3 Aratù (GER Schutze) AIRCRAFT 7 combat capable
AMPHIBIOUS ATK 7: 5 A-4M (AF-1B) Skyhawk; 2 TA-4M (AF-1C)
PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 2
Skyhawk
LPH 1 Atlântico (ex-UK Ocean) (capacity 18 hels; 4
LCVP; 40 vehs; 800 troops) HELICOPTERS
LPD 1 Bahia (ex-FRA Foudre) (capacity 4 hels; 8 LCM, ASW 18: 9 Super Lynx Mk21A; 3 Super Lynx Mk21B;
450 troops) 6 S-70B Seahawk (MH-16)
LANDING SHIPS 2 CSAR 3 H225M Caracal (UH-15A)
LST 1 Mattoso Maia (ex-US Newport) with 1 Mk 15
TPT 55: Heavy 8 H225M Caracal (UH-15); Medium 7:
Phalanx CIWS (capacity 3 LCVP; 1 LCPL; 400 troops)
5 AS332 Super Puma; 2 AS532 Cougar (UH-14); Light 40:
LSLH 1 Almirante Sabóia (ex-UK Sir Bedivere) (capacity
1 med hel; 18 MBT; 340 troops) 15 AS350 Ecureuil (armed); 8 AS355 Ecureuil II (armed);
LANDING CRAFT 16: 15 Bell 206B3 Jet Ranger III (IH-6B); 2 H135 (UH-17)
LCM 12: 10 EDVM-25; 2 Icarai (ex-FRA CTM) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AShM: AM39 Exocet;
LCT 1 Marambaia (ex-FRA CDIC) Sea Skua; AGM-119 Penguin
LCU 3 Guarapari (LCU 1610)
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 42 Marines 16,000
ABU 5: 4 Comandante Varella; 1 Faroleiro Mario Seixas
ABUH 1 Almirante Graça Aranha (lighthouse tender) FORCES BY ROLE
AFS 1 Potengi SPECIAL FORCES
AGHS 5: 1 Caravelas (riverine); 4 Rio Tocantin 1 SF bn
AGOS 2: 1 Ary Rongel with 1 hel landing platform; 1 MANOEUVRE
Almirante Maximiano (capacity 2 AS350/AS355 Ecureuil hel) Amphibious
AGS 8: 1 Aspirante Moura; 1 Cruzeiro do Sul; 1 Antares;
1 amph div (1 lt armd bn, 3 mne bn, 1 arty bn)
3 Amorim do Valle (ex-UK River (MCM)); 1 Rio Branco; 1
Vital de Oliveira 1 amph aslt bn
AH 5: 2 Oswaldo Cruz with 1 hel landing platform; 1 7 (regional) mne gp
Dr Montenegro; 1 Tenente Maximiano with 1 hel landing 1 rvn bn
the Caribbean
AOR 1 Almirante Gastão Motta 1 engr bn
AP 3: 1 Almirante Leverger; 1 Paraguassu; 1 Pará (all river
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
transports)
ARS 3 Mearim 1 log bn
ASR 1 Guillobel EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ATF 2 Tritao ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
AX 1 Brasil (Niterói mod) with 1 hel landing platform LT TK 18 SK-105 Kuerassier
AXL 3 Nascimento
APC 60
AXS 1 Cisne Branco
APC (T) 30 M113A1 (incl variants)
Naval Aviation 2,100 APC (W) 30 Piranha IIIC
FORCES BY ROLE AAV 47: 13 AAV-7A1; 20 AAVP-7A1 RAM/RS;
GROUND ATTACK 2 AAVC-7A1 RAM/RS (CP); 12 LVTP-7
1 sqn with A-4M (AF-1B) Skyhawk; TA-4M (AF-1C)
ENGINEERING VEHICLES • ARV 2: 1 AAVR-7;
Skyhawk
1 AAVR-7A1 RAM/RS
ANTI SURFACE WARFARE
1 sqn with Super Lynx Mk21A/B ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
ANTI SUBMARINE WARFARE MSL• MANPATS RB-56 Bill; MSS-1.2 AC
1 sqn with S-70B Seahawk (MH-16) ARTILLERY 65
TRAINING TOWED 41: 105mm 33: 18 L118 Light Gun; 15 M101;
1 sqn with Bell 206B3 Jet Ranger III
155mm 8 M114
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
MRL 127mm 6 ASTROS II Mk6
2 sqn with AS350 Ecureuil (armed)
1 sqn with AS350 Ecureuil (armed); AS355 Ecureuil II MOR 81mm 18 M29
(armed); H135 (UH-17) AIR DEFENCE • GUNS 40mm 6 L/70 (with BOFI)
386 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
the Caribbean
cooperation with the US is centred on procurement, technical Light
advice and personnel training. There is routine national training, 1 (1st) mot inf bde (1 recce coy, 1 mot inf bn, 1 arty gp,
and the armed forces participate in international exercises. Chile 3 AT coy, 1 engr bn)
has a limited capacity to deploy independently beyond its borders. 1 (4th) mot inf bde (1 mot inf bn, 1 MRL gp, 2 AT coy,
The plans to upgrade the country’s F-16s to prolong service life
1 engr bn)
have been temporarily suspended due to the lack of available
1 (24th) mot inf bde (1 mot inf bn, 1 arty gp, 1 AT coy)
funding. Capability priorities reflect a focus on littoral and blue-
1 (Maipo) mot inf bde (3 mot inf regt, 1 arty regt)
water surveillance. In 2020, two frigates were bought from Australia
and the surface fleet has boosted its air-defence capabilities more
1 (6th) reinforced regt (1 mot inf bn, 1 arty gp, 1 sigs coy)
generally, with upgrades also to the navy’s ex-UK Type-23 frigates. 1 (10th) reinforced regt (1 mot inf bn, 2 AT coy, 1 engr bn)
A new multi-role amphibious vessel will enhance Chile’s ability to 1 (11th) mot inf det (1 inf bn, 1 arty gp)
provide logistic support and carry out HADR operations. Chile has 1 (14th) mot inf det (1 mot inf bn, 1 arty gp, 1 sigs coy,
a developed defence-industrial base, with ENAER conducting air- 1 AT coy)
craft maintenance. ASMAR and FAMAE are key maritime and land 4 mot inf regt
firms respectively, with the former building a new icebreaker that 1 (3rd) mtn det (1 mtn inf bn, 1 arty gp, 1 engr coy)
will enhance Chile’s ability to support operations in Antarctica. The 1 (9th) mtn det (1 mtn inf bn, 1 engr coy, 1 construction bn)
air force is also currently contributing to the development of the 2 (8th & 17th) mtn det (1 mtn inf bn, 1 arty coy)
country’s first indigenously built satellite constellation. COMBAT SUPPORT
ACTIVE 68,500 (Army 37,650 Navy 19,800 Air 1 engr regt
4 sigs bn
11,050) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 44,700
1 sigs coy
Conscript liability Army 12 months; Navy 18 months; Air Force 12
1 int bde (7 int gp)
months. Legally, conscription can last for 2 years
2 int regt
RESERVE 19,100 (Army 19,100) 1 MP regt
388 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
the Caribbean
FORCES BY ROLE ASM AGM-65G Maverick
FIGHTER BOMBS
1 sqn with F-5E/F Tiger III+ Laser-guided Paveway II
2 sqn with F-16AM/BM Fighting Falcon INS/GPS guided JDAM
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
1 sqn with F-16C/D Block 50 Fighting Falcon (Puma) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 44,700
ISR
1 (photo) flt with; DHC-6-300 Twin Otter; Gulfstream IV Carabineros 44,700
TANKER/TRANSPORT Ministry of Interior; 15 zones, 36 districts, 179 comisaria
1 sqn with B-737-300; C-130B/H Hercules; E-3D Sentry; EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
KC-130R Hercules; KC-135 Stratotanker ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
TRANSPORT
APC • APC (W) 20 MOWAG Roland
3 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); C-212-200/300 Aviocar;
ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm
Cessna O-2A; Cessna 525 Citation CJ1; DHC-6-100/300
AIRCRAFT
Twin Otter; PA-28-236 Dakota; Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois)
TPT • Light 4: 1 Beech 200 King Air; 1 Cessna 208;
1 VIP flt with B-767-300ER; B-737-500; Gulfstream IV
1 Cessna 550 Citation V; 1 PA-31T Cheyenne II
TRAINING
HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 16: 5 AW109E Power;
1 sqn with EMB-314 Super Tucano*
1 AW139; 1 Bell 206 Jet Ranger; 2 BK-117; 5 Bo-105; 2 H135
1 sqn with Cirrus SR-22T; T-35A/B Pillan
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
1 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); Bell 206B (trg); Bell DEPLOYMENT
412 Twin Huey; S-70A Black Hawk BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR (Operation Althea) 8
AIR DEFENCE
1 AD regt M163/M167 Vulcan CYPRUS: UN • UNFICYP 6
4 AD sqn with Crotale; NASAMS; Mistral; Oerlikon GDF-005 MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 3
390 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
1 (8th) inf div (1 (16th) lt inf bde (1 recce bn, 1 inf bn, PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 58
1 spt bn, 1 Gaula anti-kidnap gp); 1 (18th) inf bde (1 CORVETTES 6
(urban) spec ops bn; 1 air mob gp, 5 sy bn, 1 arty bn, FSGHM 4 Almirante Padilla with 2 quad lnchr with
1 engr bn, 1 spt bn); 1 (28th) jungle bde (2 inf, 2 COIN, Hae Sung I AShM, 2 twin Simbad lnchr with Mistral
1 spt bn); 1 (rapid reaction) sy bde, 4 COIN bn) SAM, 2 triple 324mm ILAS-3 (B-515) ASTT each
3 COIN mobile bde (each: 4 COIN bn, 1 spt bn) with A244/S LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Bo-105/
COMBAT SUPPORT AS555SN Fennec hel)
1 cbt engr bde (1 SF engr bn, 1 (emergency response) FSG 1 Almirante Tono (Ex-ROK Po Hang (Flight IV))
engr bn, 1 EOD bn, 1 construction bn, 1 demining bn, 2 twin lnchr with Hae Sung I AShM, 2 triple 324mm
1 maint bn) ASTT with Mk 46, 2 76mm guns
1 int bde (2 SIGINT bn, 1 log bn, 1 maint bn) FS 1 Narino (ex-ROK Dong Hae) with 2 triple 324mm
SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
PSOH 3: 2 20 de Julio (CHL Piloto Pardo); 1 20 de Julio
2 spt/log bde (each: 1 spt bn, 1 maint bn, 1 supply bn,
(CHL Piloto Pardo) with 1 76mm gun
1 tpt bn, 1 medical bn, 1 log bn)
PCR 10: 2 Arauca with 1 76mm guns; 8 Nodriza (PAF I-IV)
AVIATION
with hel landing platform
1 air aslt div (1 counter-narcotics bde (4 counter-narcotics
PBR 39: 5 Diligente; 16 LPR-40; 3 Swiftships; 9 Tenerife
bn, 1 spt bn); 1 (25th) avn bde (4 hel bn; 5 avn bn; 1 avn (US Bender Marine 12m); 2 PAF-L; 4 others
log bn); 1 (32nd) avn bde (1 avn bn, 2 maint bn, 1 trg AMPHIBIOUS 16
bn, 1 spt bn); 1 SF avn bn) LCT 6 Golfo de Tribuga
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE LCU 2 Morrosquillo (LCU 1466)
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES UCAC 8 Griffon 2000TD
RECCE 121 EE-9 Cascavel LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 8
IFV 60: 28 Commando Advanced; 32 LAV III ABU 1 Quindio
APC 114 AG 1 Inirida
APC (T) 54: 28 M113A1 (TPM-113A1); 26 M113A2 AGHS 2: 1 Caribe; 1 Roncador
(TPM-113A2) AGOR 2 Providencia
APC (W) 56 EE-11 Urutu AGS 1 Gorgona
PPV 4+: some Hunter XL; 4 RG-31 Nyala AXS 1 Gloria
AUV 126 M1117 Guardian Coast Guard
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
MSL
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 17
SP 77 Nimrod
PCO 2: 1 San Andres (ex-US Balsam); 1 Valle del Cauca
MANPATS TOW; Spike-ER
Durable (ex-US Reliance) with 1 hel landing platform
RCL 106mm 73 M40A1
PCC 3 Punta Espada (CPV-46)
the Caribbean
PB 12: 1 11 de Noviembre (CPV-40) (GER Fassmer); 2 Castillo
TOWED 120: 105mm 107: 22 LG1 MkIII; 85 M101; y Rada (Swiftships 105); 2 Jaime Gomez (ex-US Peterson
155mm 13 155/52 APU SBT-1 Mk 3); 1 Jorge Luis Marrugo Campo; 1 José Maria Palas
MOR 1,676: 81mm 1,507; 120mm 169 (Swiftships 110); 3 Point; 2 Toledo (US Bender Marine 35m)
AIRCRAFT LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • ABU 1 Isla Albuquerque
ELINT 3: 2 Beech B200 King Air; 1 Beech 350 King Air
TPT • Light 23: 2 An-32B; 2 Beech B200 King Air; Naval Aviation 150
3 Beech 350 King Air; 1 Beech C90 King Air; 2 C-212 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Aviocar (Medevac); 8 Cessna 208B Grand Caravan; AIRCRAFT
1 Cessna 208B-EX Grand Caravan; 4 Turbo Commander 695A MP 3 CN235 MPA Persuader
HELICOPTERS ISR 1 PA-31 Navajo (upgraded for ISR)
MRH 19: 8 Mi-17-1V Hip; 6 Mi-17MD; 5 Mi-17V-5 Hip TPT • Light 14: 1 Beech 360ER King Air; 2 Beech C90
TPT 92: Medium 53: 46 UH-60L Black Hawk; 7 S-70i King Air; 1 C-212 (Medevac); 4 Cessna 206; 3 Cessna
Black Hawk; Light 39: 24 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); 15 208 Caravan; 1 PA-31 Navajo; 1 PA-34 Seneca; 1 Beech
Bell 212 (UH-1N Twin Huey) 350 King Air
AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 40mm 4 M1A1 HELICOPTERS
SAR 2 AS365 Dauphin
Navy 56,400 (incl 12,100 conscript) MRH 9: 1 AS555SN Fennec; 3 Bell 412 Twin Huey;
4 Bell 412EP Twin Huey; 1 Bell 412EPI Twin Huey
HQ located at Bogotá
TPT • Light 8: 1 Bell 212; 4 Bell 212 (UH-1N); 1 BK-
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 117; 2 Bo-105
SUBMARINES 4
SSK 2 Pijao (GER T-209/1200) each with 8 single 533mm Marines 22,250
TT each with SeaHake (DM2A3) HWT FORCES BY ROLE
SSC 2 Intrépido (ex-GER T-206A) each with 8 single SPECIAL FORCES
533mm TT each with SeaHake (DM2A3) HWT 1 SF bde (4 SF bn)
392 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
MANOEUVRE ELINT 11: 3 Beech 350 King Air; 6 Cessna 208 Grand
Amphibious Caravan; 1 ECN235; 1 Turbo Commander 695
1 mne bde (1 SF (Gaula) bn, 5 mne bn, 2 rvn bn, 1 spt bn) TKR/TPT 1 KC-767
1 mne bde (1 SF bn, 2 mne bn, 2 rvn bn, 1 spt bn) TPT 74: Medium 10: 3 C-130B Hercules; 6 C-130H
1 rvn bde (1 SF bn, 1 mne bn, 2 rvn bn, 1 spt bn) Hercules; 1 B-737F; Light 52: 7 ATR-42; 2 Beech 300 King
1 rvn bde (4 rvn bn) Air; 1 Beech 350C King Air (medevac); 1 Beech 350i King
1 rvn bde (3 rvn bn) Air (VIP); 2 Beech 350 King Air (medevac); 2 Beech C90
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT King Air; 3 Beech C90GTx King Air; 4 C-212; 6 C295M; 8
1 log bde (6 spt bn) Cessna 172; 1 Cessna 182R; 12 Cessna 208B (medevac);
1 trg bde (7 trg bn, 1 spt bn) 1 CN235M; 2 EMB-110P1 (C-95); PAX 12: 2 B-737-400; 2
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE B-737-800; 1 B-737BBJ (VIP); 2 ERJ-135BJ Legacy 600 (VIP);
ARTILLERY • MOR 82: 81mm 74; 120mm 8 2 ERJ-145; 1 F-28-1000 Fellowship; 1 F-28-3000 Fellowship;
AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence Mistral 1 Learjet 60
TRG 68: 14 EMB-312 Tucano*; 24 EMB-314 Super Tucano
Air Force 13,650 (A-29)*; 23 Lancair Synergy (T-90 Calima); 7 T-6C Texan II
FORCES BY ROLE HELICOPTERS
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK MRH 18: 4 AH-60L Arpia III; 10 AH-60L Arpia IV; 1 AW139
1 sqn with Kfir C-10/C-12/TC-12 (VIP); 1 Bell 412EP Twin Huey (VIP); 2 Hughes 500M
GROUND ATTACK/ISR TPT 49: Medium 16 UH-60L Black Hawk (incl 1 VIP hel);
1 sqn with AC-47T; ECN235; IAI Arava Light 33: 10 Bell 205 (UH-1H Huey II); 12 Bell 206B3 Jet
1 sqn with EMB-312 Tucano* Ranger III; 11 Bell 212
2 sqn with EMB-314 Super Tucano* (A-29) TRG 60 TH-67
GROUND ATTACK UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES • ISR • Medium
1 sqn with AC-47T Spooky (Fantasma); Bell 205 (UH-1H 8: 6 Hermes 450; 2 Hermes 900
Huey II); Cessna 208 Grand Caravan AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
1 sqn with Cessna 208 Grand Caravan; C-212; UH-60L AAM • IR Python 3; IIR Python 4; Python 5; ARH Derby;
Black Hawk I-Derby ER (reported)
EW/ELINT ASM Spike-ER; Spike-NLOS
2 sqn with Beech 350 King Air; Cessna 208; SA 2-37; BOMBS
Turbo Commander 695 Laser-guided Paveway II
ELINT INS/GPS guided Spice
2 sqn with Cessna 560
TRANSPORT Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 172,400
1 (Presidential) sqn with AW139; B-737BBJ; EMB-600
Legacy; Bell 412EP; F-28 Fellowship; UH-60L Black Hawk
National Police Force 172,400
1 sqn with B-737-400; B-737-800; Beech C90GTx King Air; EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
C-130B/H Hercules; C-212; C295M; CN235M; KC-767 AIRCRAFT
1 sqn with Beech 350C King Air; Bell 212; Cessna 208B; ELINT 5 C-26B Metroliner
EMB-110P1 (C-95) TPT • Light 42: 5 ATR-42; 3 Beech 200 King Air; 2 Beech
1 sqn with Beech C90 King Air 300 King Air; 2 Beech 1900; 1 Beech C99; 3 BT-67; 3 C-26
TRAINING Metroliner; 3 Cessna 152; 3 Cessna 172; 9 Cessna 206; 2
1 sqn with Cessna 172 Cessna 208 Caravan; 2 DHC-6 Twin Otter; 1 DHC-8; 3
1 sqn with Lancair Synergy (T-90 Calima) PA-31 Navajo
1 sqn with T-6C Texan II HELICOPTERS
1 hel sqn with Bell 206B3 MRH 5: 2 Bell 407GXP; 1 Bell 412EP; 2 MD-500D
1 hel sqn with TH-67 TPT 80: Medium 22: 10 UH-60A Black Hawk; 9 UH-60L
HELICOPTER Black Hawk; 3 S-70i Black Hawk; Light 58: 34 Bell 205
1 sqn with AH-60L Arpia III (UH-1H-II Huey II); 6 Bell 206B; 5 Bell 206L/L3/L4 Long
1 sqn with UH-60L Black Hawk (CSAR) Ranger; 8 Bell 212; 5 Bell 407
1 sqn with Hughes 500M
1 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H Huey II) DEPLOYMENT
1 sqn with Bell 206B3 Jet Ranger III
1 sqn with Bell 212; Bell 205 (UH-1H Huey II) CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 2
ISR UAV EGYPT: MFO 275; 1 inf bn
1 sqn with Hermes 450; Hermes 900 LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 1
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 2
AIRCRAFT 66 combat capable
FGA 22: 10 Kfir C-10; 9 Kfir C-12; 3 Kfir TC-12
ATK 6 AC-47T Spooky (Fantasma) FOREIGN FORCES
ISR 11: 5 Cessna 560 Citation II; 6 SA 2-37 United States US Southern Command: 50
Latin America and the Caribbean 393
the Caribbean
operations. The Special Intervention Unit (UEI) has received
specialist training from non-regional states, including the US. In Capabilities
May 2022, Costa Rica declared a state of emergency in the face of
a cyber-attack, underscoring its limited national defences against Cuba’s armed forces are principally focused on protecting ter-
such a threat. The Public Force, Coast Guard and Air Surveillance ritorial integrity and rely on a mass-mobilisation system. Military
units have little heavy equipment, and recent modernisation has capability is limited by equipment obsolescence and a largely
depended on donations from countries such as China and the conscript-based force. Cuba maintains military ties with China
US. Apart from limited maintenance facilities, Costa Rica has no and Russia, and the latter has supplied oil and fuel following Ven-
domestic defence industry. ezuela’s economic collapse. Defence cooperation with Russia is
largely centred around technical and maintenance support. Coop-
Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 9,950
eration with China appears to be on a smaller scale and involves
training agreements and personnel exchanges. In recent years
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Cuba has sent medics and maintenance personnel to South Africa
and has also trained some South African personnel in Cuba. The
Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 9,950 armed forces are no longer designed for expeditionary operations
and have little logistical capability to support operational deploy-
Special Intervention Unit ments abroad. The inventory is almost entirely composed of legacy
FORCES BY ROLE Soviet-era systems with varying degrees of obsolescence. Service-
SPECIAL FORCES ability appears problematic, with much equipment at a low level
1 spec ops unit of availability and maintenance demands growing as fleets age.
Much of the aviation fleet is reported to be in storage. Training
Public Force 9,000 levels are uncertain and flying hours are likely to be low due to
11 regional directorates limited availability of aircraft. It is unlikely that significant equip-
ment recapitalisation can be financed in the near term. Cuba has
Coast Guard Unit 550 little in the way of domestic defence industry, apart from some
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE upgrade and maintenance capacity.
394 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
ACTIVE 49,000 (Army 38,000 Navy 3,000 Air 8,000) AIR DEFENCE
Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 26,500 SAM
Conscript liability 2 years Short-range 2K12 Kub (RS-SA-6 Gainful)
Pont-defence 200+: 200 9K35 Strela-10 (RS-SA-13
RESERVE 39,000 (Army 39,000) Gendarmerie & Gopher); 9K33 Osa (RS-SA-8 Gecko); 9K31 Strela-1 (RS-
Paramilitary 1,120,000 SA-9 Gaskin); 9K36 Strela-3 (RS-SA-14 Gremlin); 9K310
Ready Reserves (serve 45 days per year) to fill out Active and Igla-1 (SA-16 Gimlet); 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-7 Grail)‡
Reserve units; see also Paramilitary GUNS 400
SP 23mm ZSU-23-4; 30mm BTR-60P SP; 57mm
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE ZSU-57-2
TOWED 100mm KS-19/M-1939/85mm KS-12/57mm
Army ε38,000 S-60/37mm M-1939/30mm M-53/23mm ZU-23
FORCES BY ROLE
COMMAND
Navy ε3,000
Western Comd HQ at Cabanas; Eastern Comd HQ
3 regional comd HQ
at Holquin
3 army comd HQ
COMMAND EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
3 SF regt SUBMARINES • SSW 1 Delfin
MANOEUVRE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 9
Armoured PCG 2 Rio Damuji with two single P-22 (RS-SS-N-2C
1 tk div (3 tk bde) Styx) AShM, 2 57mm guns, 1 hel landing platform
Mechanised PCM 1 Project 1241PE (FSU Pauk II) with 1 quad lnchr
2 (mixed) mech bde (manual aiming) with 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-N-5 Grail)
Light SAM, 2 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 1 76mm gun
2 (frontier) bde PBF 6 Project 205 (FSU Osa II)† each with 4 single lnchr
Air Manoeuvre (for P-20U (RS-SS-N-2B Styx) AShM – missiles removed
1 AB bde to coastal-defence units)
AIR DEFENCE MINE WARFARE AND MINE COUNTERMEASURES 5
1 ADA regt MHI 3 Korund (Project 1258 (Yevgenya))†
1 SAM bde MSC 2 Yakhont (FSU Project 1265 (Sonya))†
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 2
Reserves 39,000 ABU 1
FORCES BY ROLE AX 1
MANOEUVRE
Light
Coastal Defence
14 inf bde EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE† ARTILLERY • TOWED 122mm M-1931/37; 130mm
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES M-46; 152mm M-1937
MBT ε400 T-54/T-55/T-62 COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM 4+: Bandera IV
LT TK PT-76 (reported); 4 4K51 Rubezh (RS-SSC-3 Styx)
ASLT BTR-60 100mm
Naval Infantry 550+
RECCE BRDM-2;
AIFV ε50 BMP-1/1P FORCES BY ROLE
APC ε500 BTR-152/BTR-50/BTR-60 MANOEUVRE
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE Amphibious
MSL 2 amph aslt bn
SP 2K16 Shmel (RS-AT-1 Snapper)
MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger) Anti-aircraft Defence and Revolutionary Air
GUNS 600+: 57mm 600 ZIS-2 (M-1943); 85mm D-44 Force ε8,000 (incl conscripts)
ARTILLERY 1,715+ Air assets divided between Western Air Zone and Eastern
SP 40+: 100mm AAPMP-100; CATAP-100; 122mm 2S1 Air Zone
Gvozdika; AAP-T-122; AAP-BMP-122; Jupiter III; Jupiter FORCES BY ROLE
IV; 130mm AAP-T-130; Jupiter V; 152mm 2S3 Akatsiya FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
TOWED 500: 122mm D-30; M-30 (M-1938); 130mm 3 sqn with MiG-21bis/UM Fishbed; MiG-29/MiG-
M-46; 152mm D-1; M-1937 (ML-20) 29UB Fulcrum
MRL • SP 175: 122mm BM-21 Grad; 140mm BM-14 TRANSPORT
MOR 1,000: 82mm M-41; 82mm M-43; 120mm M-43; M-38 1 (VIP) tpt sqn with An-24 Coke; Mi-8P Hip
Latin America and the Caribbean 395
ATTACK HELICOPTER
2 sqn with Mi-17 Hip H; Mi-35 Hind Dominican Republic DOM
TRAINING Dominican Peso DOP 2021 2022 2023
1 (tac trg) sqn with L-39C Albatros (basic); Z-142 GDP DOP 5.41tr 6.17tr
(primary) USD 94.7bn 112bn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE per capita USD 8,986 10,573
AIRCRAFT 10 combat capable Growth % 12.3 5.3
FTR 5: 2 MiG-29 Fulcrum†; 3 MiG-29UB Fulcrum† Inflation % 8.2 9.0
FGA 5: up to 3 MiG-21bis Fishbed; up to 2 MiG- Def bdgt DOP 33.2bn 41.8bn 49.9bn
21UM Fishbed USD 582m 761m
ISR 1 An-30 Clank† USD1=DOP 57.09 54.93
TPT 23: Heavy 2 Il-76 Candid; Light 9: 1 An-24 Coke Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)
667
(Aerogaviota); 3 An-26 Curl (Aerogaviota); 5 ATR-42-
500 (Cubana & Aergaviota); PAX 12: 6 An-158 (Cubana);
296
3 Il-96-300 (Cubana); 3 Tu-204E-100 (Cubana) 2008 2015 2022
TRG 25+: up to 25 L-39 Albatros; some Z-142C
Population 10,694,700
HELICOPTERS
ATK 4 Mi-35 Hind† (8 more in store) Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
MRH 8 Mi-17 Hip H (12 more in store) Male 13.3% 4.5% 4.5% 4.3% 20.8% 3.2%
TPT • Medium 2 Mi-8P Hip Female 12.9% 4.4% 4.3% 4.1% 20.2% 3.6%
AIR DEFENCE • SAM
Medium-range S-75 Dvina (RS-SA-2 Guideline); S-75
Capabilities
The principal tasks for the Dominican armed forces include
Dvina mod (RS-SA-2 Guideline – on T-55 chassis)
internal- and border-security missions, as well as disaster relief.
Short-range S-125M/M1 Pechora-M/M1 (RS-SA-3 Goa); Training and operations increasingly focus on counter-narcotics
S-125M1 Pechora-M1 mod (RS-SA-3 Goa – on T-55 chassis) and include collaboration with the police in an inter-agency task
force. The US sends training teams to the country under the terms
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
of a 2015 military-partnership agreement, and the navy has trained
AAM • IR R-3‡ (RS-AA-2 Atoll); R-60 (RS-AA-8 Aphid); with French forces. The Dominican Republic has participated in US
R-73 (RS-AA-11A Archer); IR/SARH R-23/24‡ (RS-AA-7 SOUTHCOM’s Tradewinds disaster-response exercise. In response
to instability in Haiti, the army has strengthened its presence along
the Caribbean
ASM Kh-23‡ (RS-AS-7 Kerry) has carried out overflight operations; in 2022, 12,000 troops were
deployed to the border. However, there is little capacity to deploy
and sustain forces abroad. The army’s limited number of armoured
Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 26,500 active vehicles are obsolete and likely difficult to maintain. The air force
operates a modest number of light fixed-wing and rotary-wing
State Security 20,000 assets, and the navy a small fleet of mainly ex-US patrol craft of
Ministry of Interior varying sizes. Apart from maintenance facilities, the country does
not have a domestic defence industry.
Border Guards 6,500 ACTIVE 56,050 (Army 28,750 Navy 11,200 Air
Ministry of Interior 16,100) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 15,000
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 20
PCC 2 Stenka ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
PB 18 Zhuk
Army 28,750
Youth Labour Army 70,000 reservists 5 Defence Zones
FORCES BY ROLE
Civil Defence Force 50,000 reservists SPECIAL FORCES
3 SF bn
Territorial Militia ε1,000,000 reservists MANOEUVRE
Light
FOREIGN FORCES 4 (1st, 2nd, 3rd & 4th) inf bde (3 inf bn)
2 (5th & 6th) inf bde (2 inf bn)
United States US Southern Command: 650 (JTF-GTMO) at Air Manoeuvre
Guantanamo Bay 1 air cav bde (1 cdo bn, 1 (6th) mtn bn, 1 hel sqn with
396 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Bell 205 (op by Air Force); OH-58 Kiowa; R-22; R-44 Raven II) TRG 12: 8 EMB-314 Super Tucano*; 4 T-35B Pillan
Other HELICOPTERS
1 (Presidential Guard) gd regt ISR 9 OH-58 Kiowa (CH-136)
1 (MoD) sy bn TPT • Light 16: 8 Bell 205 (UH-1H Huey II); 5 Bell 205
COMBAT SUPPORT (UH-1H Iroquois); 1 H155 (VIP); 2 S-333
1 cbt spt bde (1 lt armd bn; 1 arty bn; 1 engr bn; 1 sigs bn) AIR DEFENCE • GUNS 20mm 4
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 15,000
LT TK 12 M41B (76mm)
APC • APC (W) 8 LAV-150 Commando National Police 15,000
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
RCL 106mm 20 M40A1 Ecuador ECU
GUNS 37mm 20 M3
ARTILLERY 104 United States Dollar USD 2021 2022 2023
TOWED 105mm 16: 4 M101; 12 Reinosa 105/26 GDP USD 106bn 115bn
MOR 88: 81mm 60 M1; 107mm 4 M30; 120mm 24 Expal
per capita USD 5,979 6,413
Model L
Growth % 4.2 2.9
HELICOPTERS
ISR 8: 4 OH-58A Kiowa; 4 OH-58C Kiowa Inflation % 0.1 3.2
TPT • Light 6: 4 R-22; 2 R-44 Raven II Def bdgt USD 1.59bn 1.58bn 1.67bn
FMA (US) USD 5.0m 5.0m 5.0m
Navy 11,200 Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015)
HQ located at Santo Domingo 2.02
FORCES BY ROLE
SPECIAL FORCES 1.38
1 (SEAL) SF unit 2008 2015 2022
MANOEUVRE
Amphibious Population 17,289,554
1 mne sy unit Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Male 12.7% 4.4% 4.4% 4.3% 19.7% 4.1%
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 17
Female 12.2% 4.2% 4.3% 4.2% 20.9% 4.7%
PCO 1 Almirante Didiez Burgos (ex-US Balsam)
PCC 2 Tortuguero (ex-US White Sumac)
PB 14: 1 Altair (Swiftships 35m); 4 Bellatrix (US Sewart Capabilities
Seacraft); 1 Betelgeuse (Damen Stan Patrol 2606); 2 Canopus Ecuador’s armed forces are able to fulfil internal-security tasks,
(Swiftships 110); 3 Hamal (Damen Stan Patrol 1505); 3 Point although the crisis in Venezuela and resulting refugee flows have
AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT added to existing security challenges in the northern border area.
LCU 1 Neyba (ex-US LCU 1675) These security conditions led the armed forces to create a joint
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 1 task force for counter-insurgency and counter-narcotics opera-
tions. Defence cooperation with Peru includes demining efforts
AX 1 Almirante Juan Bautista Cambiaso
on the border. Quito has recently signed a new defence agree-
ment with Colombia to increase joint operations to counter drug
Air Force 16,100 trafficking and illicit smuggling. Military ties with Washington
FORCES BY ROLE have been revived, which has led to the re-establishment of bilat-
GROUND ATTACK eral training programmes and equipment donations. The armed
1 sqn with EMB-314 Super Tucano* forces train regularly and have participated in multinational mili-
SEARCH & RESCUE tary exercises. There is limited capability to deploy independently
beyond national borders. The equipment inventory is derived from
1 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H Huey II); Bell 205 (UH-1H
a variety of sources, though obsolescence and low availability is a
Iroquois); Bell 430 (VIP); OH-58 Kiowa (CH-136); S-333 challenge. Modernisation plans are modest in scope and are cur-
TRANSPORT rently focused on armoured vehicles as well as maritime-patrol
1 sqn with C-212-400 Aviocar; PA-31 Navajo capabilities. Ecuador’s defence industries are centred on the army’s
TRAINING Office of Industries (DINE), which produces military equipment
1 sqn with T-35B Pillan through army-run enterprises. The state-owned shipyard ASTI-
AIR DEFENCE NAVE has some construction, maintenance and repair capabilities,
1 ADA bn with 20mm guns although the navy’s submarines are being modernised in Chile.
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ACTIVE 41,250 (Army 25,650 Navy 9,400 Air 6,200)
AIRCRAFT 8 combat capable Paramilitary 500
ISR 1 AMT-200 Super Ximango Conscript liability Voluntary conscription
TPT • Light 13: 3 C-212-400 Aviocar; 1 Cessna 172; 1
Cessna 182; 1 Cessna 206; 1 Cessna 207; 1 Commander RESERVE 118,000 (Joint 118,000)
690; 3 EA-100; 1 PA-31 Navajo; 1 P2006T Ages 18–55
Latin America and the Caribbean 397
the Caribbean
1 (23rd) engr bde (3 engr bn) CORVETTES • FSGM 6
2 indep MP coy
5 Esmeraldas (ITA Tipo 550) with 2 triple lnchr
1 indep sigs coy
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT with MM40 Exocet AShM, 1 quad Albatros lnchr
1 (25th) log bde (1 log bn, 1 tpt bn, 1 maint bn, 1 med bn) with Aspide SAM, 2 triple 324mm ILAS-3 (B-515)
9 indep med coy ASTT with A244 LWT, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing
AVIATION platform
1 (15th) avn bde (2 tpt avn gp, 2 hel gp, 1 mixed avn gp) 1 Esmeraldas (ITA Tipo 550) with 2 triple lnchr with
AIR DEFENCE MM40 Exocet AShM, 1 quad Albatros lnchr with
1 ADA gp
Aspide SAM, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PCFG 3 Quito (GER Lurssen TNC-45 45m) with 4 single
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
lnchr with MM38 Exocet AShM, 1 76mm gun (upgrade
LT TK 25 AMX-13
RECCE 42: 10 EE-3 Jararaca; 32 EE-9 Cascavel programme ongoing)
APC 151 LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 8
APC (T) 102: 82 AMX-VCI; 20 M113 AE 1 Calicuchima
APC (W) 49: 17 EE-11 Urutu; 32 UR-416 AG 1 Hualcopo (ex-PRC Fu Yuan Yu Leng 999) (utilised
ARTILLERY 486 in transport ship role)
SP 155mm 5 Mk F3 AGOS 1 Orion with 1 hel landing platform
TOWED 106: 105mm 84: 36 M101; 24 M2A2; 24 Model
AGS 1 Sirius
56 pack howitzer; 155mm 22: 12 M114; 10 M198
AKL 1 Isla Bartolome (operated by TRANSNAVE)
MRL 122mm 18 BM-21 Grad
MOR 81mm 357 M29 ATF 1 Chimborazo
AIRCRAFT AWT 1 Atahualpa
TPT • Light 10: 1 Beech 200 King Air; 2 C-212; 1 CN235; AXS 1 Guayas
398 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Honduras. The armed forces have long-standing training pro- Air Force 2,000
grammes, including with regional states and with the US, focused
on internal security, disaster relief and support to civilian authori- FORCES BY ROLE
ties. El Salvador has deployed on UN peacekeeping missions up to FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK/ISR
company strength but lacks the logistical support to sustain inde- 1 sqn with A-37B/OA-37B Dragonfly; O-2A/B Skymaster*
pendent international deployments. The armed forces have received
little new heavy military equipment in recent years and are depend- TRANSPORT
ent on an inventory of Cold War-era platforms; the majority of these 1 sqn with Cessna 337G; IAI-202 Arava
are operational, indicating adequate support and maintenance. El TRAINING
Salvador lacks a substantive defence industry but has successfully
produced light armoured vehicles based upon commercial vehicles. 1 sqn with R-235GT Guerrier; T-35 Pillan; T-41D
Mescalero; TH-300; TH-300C
ACTIVE 24,500 (Army 20,500 Navy 2,000 Air 2,000) TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
Paramilitary 26,000
1 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); Bell 407; Bell
Conscript liability 12 months (selective); 11 months for officers
and NCOs 412EP Twin Huey; MD-530F; UH-1M Iroquois
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
RESERVE 9,900 (Joint 9,900)
AIRCRAFT 25 combat capable
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE ATK 14 A-37B Dragonfly
ISR 11: 6 O-2A/B Skymaster*; 5 OA-37B Dragonfly*
Army 20,500 TPT • Light 4: 1 Cessna 337G Skymaster; 3 IAI-201 Arava
FORCES BY ROLE TRG 9: 5 R-235GT Guerrier; 3 T-35 Pillan; 1 T-41D Mescalero
SPECIAL FORCES HELICOPTERS
1 spec ops gp (1 SF coy, 1 para bn, 1 (naval inf) coy) MRH 14: 4 Bell 412EP Twin Huey (of which 1 VIP); 8+
MANOEUVRE
MD-530F; 2 UH-1M Iroquois
Reconnaissance
1 armd cav regt (2 armd cav bn) TPT• Light 9: 8 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); 1 Bell 407
Light (VIP tpt, govt owned)
6 inf bde (3 inf bn) TRG 3: 2 TH-300; 1 TH-300C; (4 TH-300 in store)
Other AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AAM • IR Shafrir‡
1 (special) sy bde (2 border gd bn, 2 MP bn)
COMBAT SUPPORT
Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 26,000
1 arty bde (2 fd arty bn, 1 AD bn)
1 engr comd (2 engr bn)
National Civilian Police 26,000
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
the Caribbean
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
AIRCRAFT
RECCE 5 AML-90 (4 more in store)
APC • APC (W) 38: 30 VAL Cashuat (mod); 8 UR-416 ISR 1 O-2A Skymaster
AUV 5+ SandCat TPT • Light 1 Cessna 310
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE HELICOPTERS
RCL 399: 106mm 20 M40A1 (incl 16 SP); 90mm 379 M67 MRH 9: 2 MD-520N; 7 MD-500E
ARTILLERY 229+
TPT • Light 3: 1 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); 2 R-44
TOWED 66: 105mm 54: 36 M102; 18 M-56 (FRY);
155mm 12 M198 Raven II
MOR 163+: 81mm 151 M29; 120mm 12+: 12 UBM 52;
(some M-74 in store) DEPLOYMENT
AIR DEFENCE • GUNS 35: 20mm 31 M-55; 4 TCM-20
LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 52; 1 inf pl
Navy 2,000 MALI: UN • MINUSMA 176; 1 hel sqn with 3 MD-500E
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 12 SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 1
PB 12: 1 Bering 65; 3 Camcraft (30m); 1 Defiant 85; 1 SUDAN: UN • UNIFSA 1
Swiftships 77; 1 Swiftships 65; 4 Type-44 (ex-US); 1 YP 660
WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 1
AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • LCM 4 LCM 8 (of
which 3†)
FOREIGN FORCES
Naval Inf (SF Commandos) 90
FORCES BY ROLE United States US Southern Command: 1 Forward
SPECIAL FORCES Operating Location (Military, DEA, USCG and Customs
1 SF coy personnel)
400 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
MANOEUVRE
Guatemala GUA Light
1 (strategic reserve) mech bde (1 inf bn, 1 cav regt, 1
Guatemalan Quetzal GTQ 2021 2022 2023
log coy)
GDP GTQ 665bn 722bn
6 inf bde (1 inf bn)
USD 86.0bn 91.3bn
Air Manoeuvre
per capita USD 4,688 4,880
1 AB bde with (2 AB bn)
Growth % 8.0 3.4
Amphibious
Inflation % 4.3 6.4
1 mne bde
Def bdgt GTQ 2.63bn 3.16bn
Other
USD 340m 400m
1 (Presidential) gd bde (1 gd bn, 1 MP bn, 1 CSS coy)
USD1=GTQ 7.74 7.90
COMBAT SUPPORT
Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)
340 1 engr comd (1 engr bn, 1 construction bn)
2 MP bde with (1 MP bn)
206
2008 2015 2022 Reserves
Population 17,703,190 FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
Age 0–14 15 –19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus Light
Male 16.5% 5.0% 4.7% 4.5% 16.6% 2.3% ε19 inf bn
Female 15.9% 4.9% 4.7% 4.5% 17.6% 2.8%
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
Capabilities
RECCE (7 M8 in store)
The armed forces are refocusing on border security, having drawn
APC 39
down their decade-long direct support for the National Civil Police
in 2018 as part of the inter-agency Plan Fortaleza. Guatemala APC (T) 10 M113 (5 more in store)
maintains an inter-agency task force with neighbouring El Salvador APC (W) 29: 22 Armadillo; 7 V-100 Commando
and Honduras. The army has trained with US SOUTHCOM, as well ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
as with regional partners such as Brazil and Colombia. Training for RCL 120+: 75mm M20; 105mm 64 M-1974 FMK-1
conventional military operations is limited by budget constraints
and the long focus on providing internal security. Guatemala has
(ARG); 106mm 56 M40A1
participated in UN peacekeeping missions to company level. The ARTILLERY 149
equipment inventory is small and ageing. The US has provided TOWED 105mm 76: 12 M101; 8 M102; 56 M-56
several soft-skinned vehicles to the army and helicopters to the MOR 73: 81mm 55 M1; 107mm (12 M30 in store);
air force, while there has been modest recapitalisation of the
120mm 18 ECIA
air force’s fixed-wing transport and surveillance capacity. Aside
from limited maintenance facilities, the country has no domestic AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 32: 20mm 32: 16
defence industry. GAI-D01; 16 M-55
the Caribbean
has no combat aircraft in its inventory. There is no expeditionary or
National Civil Police 25,000 associated logistics capability. Equipment is mostly composed of
second-hand platforms, mainly of Brazilian and North American
FORCES BY ROLE manufacture. The air force has expanded its modest air-transport
SPECIAL FORCES capabilities with some second-hand utility aircraft. Apart from main-
tenance facilities, there is no defence-industrial sector.
1 SF bn
MANOEUVRE ACTIVE 3,400 (Army 3,000 Navy 200 Air 200)
Active numbers combined Guyana Defence Force
Other
1 (integrated task force) paramilitary unit (incl mil RESERVE 670 (Army 500 Navy 170)
and treasury police)
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
DEPLOYMENT
Army 3,000
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 4 FORCES BY ROLE
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • SPECIAL FORCES
1 SF sqn
MONUSCO 152; 1 spec ops coy MANOEUVRE
LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 2 Light
3 inf bn
MALI: UN • MINUSMA 2 COMBAT SUPPORT
SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 7 1 arty coy
1 (spt wpn) cbt spt coy
SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 3 1 engr bn
402 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Male 15.0% 5.1% 5.0% 4.7% 17.5% 2.0% Male 14.5% 5.3% 5.1% 4.4% 16.7% 2.5%
Female 15.1% 5.1% 5.0% 4.8% 18.1% 2.5% Female 14.1% 5.3% 5.1% 4.6% 19.0% 3.2%
Latin America and the Caribbean 403
the Caribbean
1 indep inf bn
Other 200 King Air; 2 Cessna 172 Skyhawk; 2 Cessna 182 Skylane;
1 (Presidential) gd coy 1 Cessna 185; 3 Cessna 208B Grand Caravan; 1 Cessna 210;
COMBAT SUPPORT 1 EMB-135 Legacy 600; 1 IAI-201 Arava; 1 L-410 (leased); 1
1 engr bn PA-31 Navajo; 1 PA-42 Cheyenne; 1 Turbo Commander 690
1 sigs bn TRG 15: 9 EMB-312 Tucano; 6 MXT-7-180 Star Rocket
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE HELICOPTERS
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MRH 7: 1 Bell 412EP Twin Huey (VIP); 4 Bell 412SP Twin
LT TK 12 FV101 Scorpion
Huey; 2 Hughes 500
RECCE 43: 3 FV107 Scimitar; 40 FV601 Saladin
AUV 1 FV105 Sultan (CP) TPT • Light 6: 5 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); 1 H125 Ecureuil
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE AIR DEFENCE • GUNS 20mm 48: 24 M-55A2; 24 TCM-20
RCL 50+: 84mm Carl Gustaf; 106mm 50 M40A1 AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AAM • IR Shafrir‡
ARTILLERY 118+
TOWED 28: 105mm: 24 M102; 155mm: 4 M198 Military Police 4,000
MOR 90+: 81mm; 120mm 60 FMK-2; 160mm 30 M-66
FORCES BY ROLE
MANOUEVRE
Navy 1,350
Other
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
8 sy bn
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 15
PCO 1 General Cabañas (ISR OPV 62 Sa’ar)
PB 14: 2 Lempira (Damen Stan Patrol 4207 – leased); 1 Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 8,000
Chamelecon (Swiftships 85); 1 Tegucigalpa (US Guardian
32m); 3 Guaymuras (Swiftships 105); 5 Nacaome (Swiftships Public Security Forces 8,000
65); 1 Río Aguán (Defiant 85); 1 Rio Coco (US PB Mk III) Ministry of Public Security and Defence; 11 regional comd
404 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
COMBAT SUPPORT
DEPLOYMENT
1 engr regt (4 engr sqn)
WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 10 1 MP bn
1 cbt spt bn (1 (PMV) lt mech inf coy)
FOREIGN FORCES COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
United States US Southern Command: 400; 1 avn bn with
1 spt bn (1 med coy, 1 log coy, 1 tpt coy)
4 CH-47F Chinook; 12 UH-60 Black Hawk
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
Jamaica JAM
AUV 18 Bushmaster
Jamaican Dollar JMD 2021 2022 2023 ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm 12 L16A1
GDP JMD 2.30tr 2.62tr
USD 15.4bn 16.1bn Reserves
per capita USD 5,615 5,870 FORCES BY ROLE
Growth % 4.6 2.8 MANOEUVRE
Inflation % 5.9 9.0
Light
Def bdgt JMD 30.9bn 33.2bn
3 inf bn
USD 207m 204m
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
USD1=JMD 149.70 162.61
1 spt bn
Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)
246
Coast Guard 300
102 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
2008 2015 2022
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 11
Population 2,818,596 PCC 1 Nanny of the Maroons (Damen Fast Crew Supplier
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus 5009)
Male 12.4% 4.4% 4.4% 4.0% 19.6% 4.6% PBF 3
Female 12.0% 4.3% 4.3% 4.0% 20.8% 5.1% PB 7: 3 Honour (Damen Stan Patrol 4207); 4 Dauntless
Space
Mexico MEX EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Mexican Peso MXN 2021 2022 2023
SATELLITES • COMMUNICATIONS 2 Mexsat
the Caribbean
However, recent moves suggested a broadening of the armed
APC 309
forces’ internal role, for instance with plans to transfer the National
APC (T) 73: 40 HWK-11; 33 M5A1 half-track
Guard to Ministry of Defence control. There have also been strains
APC (W) 236: 95 BDX; 16 DN-4; 2 DN-6; 28 LAV-100
in the US-Mexico security relationship. The US has provided equip-
(Pantera); 26 LAV-150 ST; 25 MOWAG Roland; 44 VCR
ment and training to Mexican forces under the Mérida Initiative, as
well as through bilateral programmes via the Pentagon. The armed
(3 amb; 5 cmd post)
forces have a moderate capability to deploy independently, but AUV 379: 100 DN-XI; 247 SandCat; 32 VBL
do not do so in significant numbers. There are plans to recapital- ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
ise diverse and ageing conventional combat platforms across all ARV 7: 3 M32 Recovery Sherman; 4 VCR ARV
three services. In 2020, Mexico brought back to service some of ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
its ageing F-5 combat aircraft. State-owned shipyards have pro- MSL • SP 8 VBL with Milan
duced patrol craft for the navy. Army factories have produced light RCL • 106mm 1,187+ M40A1 (incl some SP)
armoured utility vehicles for domestic use. Airbus Helicopters is GUNS 37mm 30 M3
expanding a manufacturing plant for sub-assemblies that it oper- ARTILLERY 1,390
ates in Querétaro. TOWED 123: 105mm 123: 40 M101; 40 M-56; 16 M2A1,
14 M3; 13 NORINCO M90
ACTIVE 216,000 (Army 157,500 Navy 50,500 Air MOR 1,267: 81mm 1,100: 400 M1; 400 Brandt; 300 SB
8,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 136,900 120mm 167: 75 Brandt; 60 M-65; 32 RT-61
Conscript liability 12 months (partial, selection by ballot) from age AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 80: 12.7mm 40 M55;
18, serving on Saturdays; voluntary for women; conscripts allo- 20mm 40 GAI-B01
cated to reserves.
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
FFGHM 1 Benito Juárez (Damen SIGMA 10514) with
AIRCRAFT 3 combat capable
2 quad lnchr with RGM-84L Harpoon Block II AShM, 1
MP 6 CN235-300 MPA Persuader
8-cell Mk 56 VLS with RIM-162 ESSM SAM, 1 21-cell
ISR 2 Z-143Lsi
Mk 49 lnchr with RIM-116C RAM Block 2 SAM, 2 triple
TPT 20: Light 18: 5 Beech 350ER King Air (4 used
324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 54 LWT, 1 57mm gun
for ISR); 3 Beech 350i King Air; 4 C295M; 2 C295W; 1
(capacity 1 med hel) (fitted for but not with Mk 56 VLS
DHC-8 Dash 8; 2 Learjet 31A; 1 Learjet 60; PAX 2: 1
with RIM-162 Evolved SeaSparrow Missile)
CL-605 Challenger; 1 Gulfstream 550
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 128
TRG 46: 7 MX-7-180 Star Rocket; 13 T-6C+ Texan II; 26
PSOH 8:
Z-242L
4 Oaxaca with 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 AS565MB
HELICOPTERS
Panther hel)
MRH 21: 2 AS555 Fennec; 15 Mi-17-1V Hip; 4 Mi-17V-5 Hip
4 Oaxaca (mod) with 1 57mm gun (capacity 1
SAR 14: 4 AS565MB Panther; 10 AS565MBe Panther
AS565MB Panther hel)
TPT 26: Heavy 3 H225M Caracal; Medium 8 UH-60M
PCOH 16:
Black Hawk; Light 15: 1 AW109SP; 1 H145; 5 MD-902
4 Durango with 1 57mm gun (capacity 1 Bo-105 hel)
(SAR role); 8 S-333
4 Holzinger (capacity 1 MD-902 Explorer)
3 Sierra with 1 57mm gun (capacity 1 MD-902 TRG 4 Schweizer 300C
Explorer)
Marines 21,500
5 Uribe (ESP Halcon) (capacity 1 Bo-105 hel)
PCO 9: 6 Valle (US Auk MSF) with 1 76mm gun; 3 Valle FORCES BY ROLE
(US Auk MSF) with 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform SPECIAL FORCES
PCGH 1 Huracan (ex-ISR Aliya) with 4 single lnchr with 3 SF unit
Gabriel II AShM, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS MANOEUVRE
PCC 2 Democrata Light
PBF 72: 6 Acuario; 2 Acuario B; 48 Polaris (SWE CB90); 16 32 inf bn(-)
Polaris II (SWE IC 16M) Air Manoeuvre
PB 20: 3 Azteca; 3 Cabo (ex-US Cape Higgon); 2 Lago; 2 1 AB bn
Punta (US Point); 10 Tenochtitlan (Damen Stan Patrol 4207) Amphibious
AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING SHIPS 1 amph bde (4 inf bn, 1 amph bn, 1 arty gp)
LST 4: 2 Monte Azules with 1 hel landing platform; 1 Other
Papaloapan (ex-US Newport) with 2 twin 76mm guns, 1 1 (Presidential) gd bn (included in army above)
hel landing platform; 1 Papaloapan (ex-US Newport) with COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
1 hel landing platform 2 spt bn
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 27 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AGOR 2 Altair (ex-US Robert D. Conrad) ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
AGS 9: 5 Arrecife; 1 Onjuku; 1 Río Hondo; 1 Río Tecolutla; APC • APC (W) 29: 3 BTR-60 (APC-60); 26 BTR-70
1 Río Tuxpan (APC-70)
AK 1 Río Suchiate ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
AOTL 2 Aguascalientes RCL 106mm M40A1
AP 2: 1 Isla María Madre (Damen Fast Crew Supplier ARTILLERY 22+
5009); 1 Nautla TOWED 105mm 16 M-56
ATF 4 Otomi with 1 76mm gun MRL 122mm 6 Firos-25
ATS 4 Kukulkan MOR 81mm some
AX 2 Huasteco (also serve as troop transport, supply and
AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence 9K38 Igla (RS-
hospital ships)
SA-18 Grouse)
AXS 1 Cuauhtemoc
the Caribbean
USD 81.0m 84.9m
in store); 55 T-6C+ Texan II* USD1=NIO 35.20 35.91
HELICOPTERS
Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm constant 2015)
MRH 41: 14 Bell 407GXP; 11 Bell 412EP Twin Huey; 16 90
Mi-17 Hip H
ISR 11: 3 MD-530MF; 8 MD-530MG 43
TPT 99: Heavy 12 H225M Caracal; Medium 28: 3 AS332L 2008 2015 2022
Super Puma (VIP); 2 H225 (VIP); 6 S-70A-24 Black Hawk;
17 UH-60M Black Hawk Light 59: 5 AW109SP; 45 Bell 206; Population 6,301,880
1 Bell 206B Jet Ranger II; 8 Bell 206L
UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES • ISR 9: Medium Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
4: 3 Hermes 450; 1 Hermes 900; Light 5 S4 Ehécatl Male 12.5% 4.6% 4.8% 5.0% 19.1% 2.8%
Female 12.0% 4.4% 4.7% 5.1% 21.5% 3.5%
Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 136,900
Federal Ministerial Police 4,500 Capabilities
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Nicaragua’s armed forces are primarily a territorial light-infantry
HELICOPTERS force, with limited coastal-patrol capability. They are tasked with
TPT • Light 25: 18 Bell 205 (UH-1H); 7 Bell 212 border and internal security, as well as with support for disaster-
relief efforts and ecological protection. Nicaragua has renewed
UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES
its training relationship with Russia and improved ties with China
ISR • Heavy 2 Dominator XP and Iran. Training is largely focused on key internal- and border-
security tasks, although the mechanised brigade has received
National Guard 115,000 Russian training. The armed forces do not undertake significant
Public Security Secretariat. Gendarmerie created in international deployments and lack the logistical support for
2019 from elements of the Army, Navy, Air Force and large-scale military operations, although the mechanised brigade
Federal Police can deploy internally. Equipment primarily consists of ageing Cold
408 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
War-era platforms. Russia has supplied some second-hand tanks PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS
and armoured vehicles to help re-equip the mechanised brigade PB 12: 3 Dabur; 2 Farallones; 1 Río Segovia (Zhuk 1400ME); 4
and has supported the establishment of a repair workshop to Rodman 101; 2 Soberanía (ex-JAM Damen Stan Patrol 4207)
maintain the vehicles in-country. There are maintenance facilities
but no domestic defence industry. Marines
ACTIVE 12,000 (Army 10,000 Navy 800 Air 1,200) FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Amphibious
1 mne bn
Army ε10,000
Air Force 1,200
FORCES BY ROLE
FORCES BY ROLE
SPECIAL FORCES
1 SF bde (2 SF bn) TRANSPORT
MANOEUVRE 1 sqn with An-26 Curl; Beech 90 King Air; Cessna U206;
Mechanised Cessna 404 Titan (VIP)
1 mech inf bde (1 armd recce bn, 1 tk bn, 1 mech inf bn, TRAINING
1 arty bn, 1 MRL bn, 1 AT coy) 1 unit with Cessna 172; PA-18 Super Cub; PA-28 Cherokee
Light TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
1 regional comd (3 lt inf bn) 1 sqn with Mi-17 Hip H (armed)
1 regional comd (2 lt inf bn; 1 arty bn) AIR DEFENCE
3 regional comd (2 lt inf bn) 1 gp with ZU-23
2 indep lt inf bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Other AIRCRAFT
1 comd regt (1 inf bn, 1 sy bn, 1 int unit, 1 sigs bn) TPT • Light 9: 3 An-26 Curl; 1 Beech 90 King Air; 1
1 (ecological) sy bn Cessna 172; 1 Cessna U206; 1 Cessna 404 Titan (VIP); 2
COMBAT SUPPORT PA-28 Cherokee
1 engr bn TRG 2 PA-18 Super Cub
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT HELICOPTERS
1 med bn MRH 7 Mi-17 Hip H (armed)†
1 tpt regt TPT • Medium 2 Mi-171E
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIR DEFENCE • GUNS 23mm 18 ZU-23
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • ASM 9M17 Skorpion
MBT 82: 62 T-55 (65 more in store); 20 T-72B1MS (RS-AT-2 Swatter)
LT TK (10 PT-76 in store)
RECCE 20 BRDM-2
IFV 17+ BMP-1 Panama PAN
APC • APC (W) 90+: 41 BTR-152 (61 more in store); 45 Panamanian Balboa PAB 2021 2022 2023
BTR-60 (15 more in store); 4+ BTR-70M
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES GDP PAB 63.6bn 71.1bn
AEV IMR USD 63.6bn 71.1bn
VLB TMM-3 per capita USD 14,664 16,173
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE Growth % 15.3 7.5
MSL
Inflation % 1.6 3.9
SP 12 9P133 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger)
MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger) Def bdgt [a] PAB 830m 870m
RCL 82mm B-10 USD 830m 870m
GUNS 281: 57mm 174 ZIS-2; (90 more in store); 76mm FMA (US) USD 2.0m 0.0m 0.0m
83 ZIS-3; 100mm 24 M-1944
USD1=PAB 1.00 1.00
ARTILLERY 766
TOWED 12: 122mm 12 D-30; (152mm 30 D-20 in store) [a] Public security expenditure
MRL 151: 107mm 33 Type-63: 122mm 118: 18 BM- Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)
21 Grad; 100 Grad 1P (BM-21P) (single-tube rocket 797
launcher, man portable)
MOR 603: 82mm 579; 120mm 24 M-43; (160mm 4 M-160 314
in store) 2008 2015 2022
AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence 9K36 Strela-3
Population 4,337,768
(RS-SA-14 Gremlin); 9K310 Igla-1 (RS-SA-16 Gimlet); 9K32
Strela-2 (RS-SA-7 Grail)‡
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Capabilities AIRCRAFT
TPT • Light 17: 1 Beech 100 King Air; 1 Beech 250
Panama abolished its armed forces in 1990, but retains a border
King Air; 1 Beech 350 King Air; 2 DHC-6-400 Twin
service, a police force and an air/maritime service for low-level
Otter; 3 C-212M Aviocar; 1 Cessna 152, 1 Cessna 172;
security tasks. The primary security focus is on the southern border
with Colombia, and the majority of the border service is deployed 2 Cessna 208B; 1 Cessna 210; 1 ERJ-135BJ; 1 PA-31
there. Both Colombia and the US have provided training and Navajo; 2 PA-34 Seneca
support. Training is focused on internal and border security rather TRG (2 T-35D Pillan in store)
than conventional military operations and there is no capability to HELICOPTERS
mount significant external deployments. None of Panama’s secu- MRH 10: 8 AW139; 1 Bell 412EP; 1 MD-500E
rity services maintain heavy military equipment, focusing instead TPT • Light 5: 1 AW109; 2 Bell 212; 2 Bell 407
on light-transport, patrol and surveillance capabilities. Aside
from limited maintenance facilities, the country has no domestic
defence industry. Paraguay PRY
Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 27,700 Paraguayan Guarani PYG 2021 2022 2023
GDP PYG 264tr 293tr
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
USD 38.8bn 41.9bn
the Caribbean
Other
1 (presidential) gd bn(-)
Capabilities
National Aeronaval Service 3,700 The armed forces are small by regional standards and the equip-
FORCES BY ROLE ment inventory for all services is ageing and largely obsolete.
TRANSPORT The country faces internal challenges from insurgency and
1 sqn with Beech 250 King Air; C-212M Aviocar; Cessna transnational organised crime, chiefly drug trafficking. Conscript
210; PA-31 Navajo; PA-34 Seneca numbers have reduced in recent years, and there are a signifi-
cant number of higher ranks in the force structure. Key forma-
1 (Presidential) flt with ERJ-135BJ; S-76C
tions have long been under-strength. Paraguay has had a con-
TRAINING
sistent if limited tradition of contributing to UN peacekeeping
1 unit with Cessna 152; Cessna 172; T-35D Pillan
operations since 2001. There is only limited ability to self-sustain
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER forces abroad, and no effective power-projection capacity. There
1 sqn with AW139; Bell 205; Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); is a small force of river-patrol craft. Armoured capability is very
Bell 212; Bell 407; Bell 412EP; H145; MD-500E limited. Recent acquisitions of heavy equipment have been con-
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE fined to small quantities of engineering and transport capabili-
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 14 ties but there is a plan to upgrade the air force’s fleet of training
PCC 1 Saettia aircraft. There is some local maintenance capacity but the effec-
PB 13: 1 Cocle (ex-US Swift); 1 Chiriqui (ex-US PB tiveness of systems is limited by age. While there is some R&D
MkIV); 2 Panquiaco (UK Vosper 31.5m); 5 3 De and manufacturing cooperation with local research institutes,
there is no traditional defence-industrial base.
Noviembre (ex-US Point), 4 Type-200
AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 1 ACTIVE 13,950 (Army 7,400 Navy 3,800 Air 2,750)
LCU 1 General Estaban Huertas Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 14,800
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 2
Conscript liability 12 months
AG 1 Lina María
AKR 1 Manuel Amador Guerror (Damen Stan Lander 5612) RESERVE 164,500 (Joint 164,500)
410 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
FORCES BY ROLE
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
MANOEUVRE
Army 47,500
Peru PER 4 mil region
Peruvian Nuevo Sol PEN 2021 2022 2023 FORCES BY ROLE
SPECIAL FORCES
GDP PEN 877bn 957bn
1 (1st) SF bde (2 spec ops bn, 2 cdo bn, 1 cdo coy, 1 CT
USD 226bn 239bn coy, 1 airmob arty gp, 1 MP coy, 1 cbt spt bn)
per capita USD 6,679 7,005 1 (3rd) SF bde (1 spec ops bn, 2 cdo bn, 1 airmob arty
Growth % 13.6 2.7 gp, 1 MP coy)
Inflation % 4.0 7.5 1 (6th) SF bde (2 spec ops bn, 2 cdo bn, 1 cdo coy, 1 MP coy)
MANOEUVRE
Def bdgt PEN 7.05bn 6.98bn 7.31bn
Armoured
USD 1.82bn 1.75bn 1 (3rd) armd bde (2 tk bn, 1 armd inf bn, 1 arty gp, 1 AT
USD1=PEN 3.88 4.00 coy, 1 AD gp, 1 engr bn, 1 cbt spt bn)
Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 1 (9th) armd bde (2 tk bn, 1 armd inf bn, 1 SP arty gp, 1
2.47 ADA gp)
Mechanised
1.17 1 (3rd) armd cav bde (3 mech cav bn, 1 mot inf bn, 1
2008 2015 2022 arty gp, 1 AD gp, 1 engr bn, 1 cbt spt bn)
1 (1st) cav bde (4 mech cav bn, 1 MP coy, 1 cbt spt bn)
Population 32,275,736 Light
2 (2nd & 31st) mot inf bde (4 mot inf bn, 1 arty gp, 1 MP
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus coy, 1 log bn)
Male 13.4% 4.2% 3.8% 3.9% 20.2% 3.6% 3 (1st, 7th & 32nd) inf bde (3 inf bn, 1 MP coy, 1 cbt spt bn)
Female 12.9% 4.1% 3.8% 4.0% 21.6% 4.5% 1 (33rd) inf bde (4 inf bn)
1 (4th) mtn bde (1 armd regt, 3 mot inf bn, 1 arty gp, 1
Capabilities MP coy, 1 cbt spt bn)
1 (5th) mtn bde (1 armd regt, 2 mot inf bn, 3 jungle coy,
Peru’s armed forces are primarily orientated towards preserving
territorial integrity and security, focusing on counter-insurgency
1 arty gp, 1 MP coy, 1 cbt spt bn)
and counter-narcotics operations, while also strengthening their 1 (6th) jungle inf bde (4 jungle bn, 1 engr bn, 1 MP coy,
disaster-relief capabilities. The armed forces are capable of fulfill- 1 cbt spt bn)
ing domestic-security tasks, although they are limited by economic 1 (35th) jungle inf bde (1 SF gp, 3 jungle bn, 3 jungle coy,
constraints and an increasingly ageing inventory. Peru maintains 1 jungle arty gp, 1 AT coy, 1 AD gp, 1 jungle engr bn)
close ties with Colombia, including a cooperation agreement on air COMBAT SUPPORT
control, humanitarian assistance and counter-narcotics. The armed 1 arty gp (bde) (4 arty gp, 2 AD gp, 1 sigs gp)
forces train regularly and take part in national and multilateral
the Caribbean
exercises, and Peru took part in the 2022 iteration of the RIMPAC
1 (22nd) engr bde (3 engr bn, 1 demining coy)
multinational exercise. The armed forces are capable of indepen-
dently deploying externally and contribute to UN missions abroad. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
There has been some aviation modernisation, though not across 1 (1st Multipurpose) spt bde
the whole fleet. Tanker/transport capabilities have been boosted AVIATION
with the recent acquisition of two second-hand KC-130Hs. The 1 (1st) avn bde (1 atk hel/recce hel bn, 1 avn bn, 2 aslt
navy is looking to acquire new OPVs and some second-hand anti- hel/tpt hel bn)
submarine warfare helicopters but its ageing fleet of submarines AIR DEFENCE
have yet to finish a modernisation process. The state-owned ship- 1 AD gp (regional troops)
yard SIMA and aviation firm SEMAN are key players in Peru’s defence
industry, both in terms of manufacturing and maintenance. In 2017, EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
SEMAN completed final assembly for the last Korean-designed KT-1 ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
trainer, and in 2018 the navy commissioned the first locally built MBT 165 T-55; (75† in store)
and South Korean-designed multipurpose vessel. LT TK 96 AMX-13
RECCE 95: 30 BRDM-2; 15 Fiat 6616; 50 M9A1
ACTIVE 81,000 (Army 47,500 Navy 24,000 Air 9,500) APC 295
Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 77,000 APC (T) 120 M113A1
Conscript liability 12 months voluntary conscription for APC (W) 175: 150 UR-416; 25 Fiat 6614
both males and females ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
RESERVE 188,000 (Army 188,000) ARV M578
VLB GQL-111
ANTI-TANK-ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE MSL
SP 22 M1165A2 HMMWV with 9K135 Kornet E
Space (RS-AT-14 Spriggan)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger); HJ-73C;
SATELLITES • ISR PéruSAT-1 9K135 Kornet E (RS-AT-14 Spriggan); Spike-ER
412 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
the Caribbean
ISR APC (W) 120: 20 BMR-600; 100 MOWAG Roland
1 (photo-survey) sqn with Learjet 36A; SA-227-BC Metro AIRCRAFT
III (C-26B) TPT • Light 5: 1 An-32B Cline; 1 Beech 1900C;
TRANSPORT 3 Cessna 208B
1 sqn with B-737; An-32 Cline HELICOPTERS
1 sqn with DHC-6 Twin Otter; DHC-6-400 Twin Otter; MRH 4 Mi-17 Hip H
PC-6 Turbo Porter TPT • Light 16: 5 H145; 2 Mi-171Sh; 9 UH-1H Huey II
1 sqn with L-100-20
TRAINING General Police 43,000
2 (drug interdiction) sqn with EMB-312 Tucano
Security Police 21,000
1 sqn with MB-339A*
1 sqn with Z-242 Technical Police 13,000
1 hel sqn with Enstrom 280FX; Schweizer 300C
ATTACK HELICOPTER Coast Guard 1,000
1 sqn with Mi-25†/Mi-35P Hind Personnel included as part of Navy
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 sqn with Mi-17-1V Hip PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 45
1 sqn with Bell 206 Jet Ranger; Bell 212 (AB-212); Bell 412 PSOH 1 Carvajal (ITA Lupo mod) with 1 127mm gun
Twin Huey (capacity 1 Bell 212 (AB-212)/SH-3D Sea King)
1 sqn with Bo-105LS PCC 10: 6 Río Pativilca (ROK Tae Geuk); 4 Río Nepeña
AIR DEFENCE PBF 1 Río Itaya (SWE Combat Boat 90)
6 bn with S-125 Pechora (RS-SA-3 Goa) PB 12: 6 Chicama (US Dauntless); 2 Punta Sal (Defiant
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 45); 1 Río Chira; 3 Río Santa
AIRCRAFT 60 combat capable PBR 21: 1 Río Viru; 8 Parachique; 12 Zorritos
FTR 19: 9 MiG-29S Fulcrum C; 3 MiG-29SE Fulcrum C; 5 LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AH 1 Puno
414 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
AIRCRAFT
TPT • Light 3: 1 DHC-6 Twin Otter; 2 F-27 Friendship
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
(All services form the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force) USD1=UYU 43.57 41.93
Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)
RESERVE 650 532
409
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE 2008 2015 2022
the Caribbean
UN missions. The arrival of ex-US Coast Guard patrol boats as part
ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm 6 L16A1 of the navy’s fleet modernisation plan heralds a focus on policing
and coast guard roles, while the navy is also focused on tackling
personnel issues and rebuilding broader capabilities. The air force is
Coast Guard 1,600 focused on the counter-insurgency role, but ambitions to purchase
FORCES BY ROLE a light fighter aircraft remain hampered by funding problems. The
COMMAND acquisition of air-defence radars may have improved the armed
forces’ ability to monitor domestic airspace, but the lack of inter-
1 mne HQ diction capability will continue to limit the capacity to respond to
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE contingencies. Much equipment is second-hand, and there is little
capacity for independent power projection. Maintenance work is
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 17
sometimes outsourced to foreign companies, such as Chile’s ENAER.
PCO 3: 2 Port of Spain (AUS Cape); 1 Nelson II (ex-PRC
Shuke III) ACTIVE 21,100 (Army 13,500 Navy 5,000 Air 2,600)
PCC 6: 2 Point Lisas (Damen Fast Crew Supplier 5009); 4 Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 1,400
Speyside (Damen Stan Patrol 5009)
PB 8: 2 Gaspar Grande†; 6 Scarlet Ibis (Austal 30m) ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
the Caribbean
1 armd bn
Capabilities Light
The armed forces and national guard are tasked with protecting 4 inf bn
sovereignty, assuring territorial integrity and assisting with 1 ranger bn
internal-security and counter-narcotics operations. They have COMBAT SUPPORT
sufficient capabilities and funding to fulfil internal-security tasks 1 arty bn
and their regime-protection role, but economic challenges have 2 engr regt
affected equipment availability and training levels. Venezuela EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
and Colombia have recently re-established military relations ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
after tensions due to the humanitarian crisis and to the presence MBT 173: 81 AMX-30V; 92 T-72B1
of irregular Colombian armed groups and resulting troop LT TK 109: 31 AMX-13; 78 Scorpion-90
deployments near the Colombia–Venezuela border. There are close RECCE 121: 42 Dragoon 300 LFV2; 79 V-100/V-150
ties with China and Russia, with Caracas relying on both countries IFV 237: 123 BMP-3 (incl variants); 114 BTR-80A
for procurements and technical support. The armed forces train
(incl variants)
regularly and civil–military cooperation has increased. Venezuela
APC 81
has also taken part in joint combined exercises with China, Cuba
APC (T) 45: 25 AMX-VCI; 12 AMX-PC (CP); 8 AMX-
and Russia. There is little logistics capability to support deployment
abroad. Equipment is relatively modern and much is of Chinese VCTB (Amb)
and Russian manufacture. While the economic crisis has affected APC (W) 36 Dragoon 300
the government’s ability to sustain military expenditure and ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
procurement have suffered as a consequence, there have recently ARV 5: 3 AMX-30D; BREM-1; 2 Dragoon 300RV; Samson
been renewed, but modest, maintenance and modernisation VLB Leguan
efforts. Venezuela’s defence industry is based on a series of small, NBC VEHICLES 10 TPz-1 Fuchs NBC
state-owned companies, mainly focused on the production of ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
small arms and munitions. Local platform production has been MSL • MANPATS IMI MAPATS
limited to small coastal-patrol boats. RCL 106mm 175 M40A1
418 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
the Caribbean
3 sqn with AS332B Super Puma; AS532 Cougar
2 sqn with Mi-17 Hip H (Internal sy, customs) 9 regional comd
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT 80 combat capable ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
FTR 18: 15 F-16A Fighting Falcon†; 3 F-16B Fighting APC • APC (W) 44: 24 Fiat 6614; 20 UR-416
Falcon† AUV 121 VN4
FGA 22 Su-30MKV Flanker ARTILLERY • MOR 50 81mm
EW 4: 2 Falcon 20DC; 2 SA-227 Metro III (C-26B) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS
TKR 1 KC-137 PB 34: 12 Protector; 12 Punta; 10 Rio Orinoco II
TPT 75: Medium 14: 5 C-130H Hercules (some in store); AIRCRAFT
1 G-222; 8 Y-8; Light 56: 6 Beech 200 King Air; 2 Beech TPT • Light 34: 1 Beech 55 Baron; 1 Beech 80 Queen Air;
350 King Air; 10 Cessna 182N Skylane; 12 Cessna 206 1 Beech 90 King Air; 1 Beech 200C King Air; 3 Cessna 152
Stationair; 4 Cessna 208B Caravan; 1 Cessna 500 Citation Aerobat; 2 Cessna 172; 2 Cessna 402C; 4 Cessna U206
I; 3 Cessna 550 Citation II; 1 Cessna 551; 1 Cessna 750 Stationair; 6 DA42 MPP; 1 IAI-201 Arava; 12 M-28 Skytruck
Citation X; 2 Do-228-212; 1 Do-228-212NG; 11 Quad TRG 3: 1 PZL 106 Kruk; 2 PLZ M2-6 Isquierka
City Challenger II; 2 Short 360 Sherpa; PAX 5: 1 A319CJ; 1 HELICOPTERS
B-737; 1 Falcon 20F; 2 Falcon 900 MRH 13: 8 Bell 412EP; 5 Mi-17V-5 Hip H
TRG 82: 24 DA40NG; 6 DA42VI; 17 EMB-312 Tucano*; TPT • Light 18: 9 AS355F Ecureuil II; 4 AW109; 4 Bell
23 K-8W Karakorum*; 12 SF-260E 206B/L Jet Ranger/Long Ranger; 1 Bell 212 (AB 212);
HELICOPTERS TRG 5 F-280C
MRH 8 Mi-17 (Mi-17VS) Hip H
TPT 22: Medium 14: 3 AS332B Super Puma; 7 AS532 Gendarmerie & Paramilitary ε220,000
Cougar; 2 AS532UL Cougar; 2 Mi-172 (VIP); Light 8+
Enstrom 480B Bolivarian National Militia ε220,000
420 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Chapter Nine
Sub-Saharan Africa
In West Africa, tentative improvements in the region’s accounts for 25.1% of total regional spending, up
security achieved in recent years are now either at from 11.0% in 2010.
risk or are being rolled back. Jihadist activity is again Nigeria’s budget has grown significantly in recent
on the rise, notably in Gulf of Guinea countries, while years, from NGN594bn (USD1.83bn) in 2019 to
coups and insurrections have highlighted continued NGN1.14 trillion (USD2.78bn) in 2022, averaging 16%
problems with civil-military relations. nominal growth between 2020 and 2022. However,
Conflict continued in the Eastern DRC, and in the budget has been stagnant in real terms, and
September an agreement was signed enabling accounted for between 0.5% and 0.6% of GDP, well
the intervention of armed forces from East African below the regional average of 1.5%.
Community (EAC) states. An initial force of Kenyan South Africa retains the largest defence budget in
troops landed at Goma in early November; it has been sub-Saharan Africa, but the country’s share of regional
reported that the Kenyan contingent alone could spending has fallen considerably over the last decade.
number up to 900. In 2011, South African spending accounted for 27% of
Though a ceasefire was signed between the the total for sub-Saharan Africa but this proportion has
Ethiopian government and Tigrayan forces at the end declined every year since, falling to just 15% in 2022.
of the year, in 2022 Ethiopia more than quadrupled Two decades of underfunding have left the South
its defence budget from USD0.38bn to USD1.58bn African National Defence Force in a parlous state.
amid the return to conflict with the Tigray People’s Nevertheless, it has sustained contingents in the DRC
Liberation Front. As a result, growth in East African and Mozambique and some border patrols. The air
defence spending in 2022 was faster than in other force has faced significant challenges in generating
sub-regions. Combined with consistent spending operational capability, but a new support contract for
in Tanzania and a 2020 jump in Uganda’s defence the Gripen has enabled the start of a process to rebuild
budget, this means that the sub-region now air combat capability.
Nigeria 143,000
Uganda 45,000
Angola Ethiopia Kenya
Regional
9.4% total
Chad 33,250
USD1.8bn USD1.6bn USD1.3bn 1,959,880
Sub-Saharan Africa 421
60
50
% share of total
40
30
20
10
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2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
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Sub-Saharan
So
Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa: selected main battle tank fleets, 2022
Angola
Modern
Chad Mixed
Democratic Republic
Ageing
of the Congo
Eritrea Obsolescent
Ethiopia
Kenya
Nigeria
South Sudan
Sudan
Uganda
Sub-Saharan Africa
WEST AFRICA facing ‘its worst food crisis in ten years’ and that
‘between 2015 and 2022, the number of people
Tentative improvements in the region’s security in need of emergency food assistance nearly
in the latter years of the last decade are now quadrupled, from 7–27 million’. The risk for
either at risk or are being rolled back. In 2016– local states remains that these factors will fuel
18, there was hope that, despite difficult security instability, including jihadist activity.
challenges, the region’s governments were in the Responses have varied. Senegal has looked to
ascendant. Nigeria had regained the upper hand maintain military professionalism and continues
over Boko Haram, principally assisted by Chad to receive assistance in this regard, including
and Cameroon. Cameroon, after consolidating from France and also the United States, which
and adapting its forces, had reduced the jihadist in recent years has been working with the
threat, and Mali – with the military support of Senegalese forces on NCO development and
the French-led Operation Barkhane, the EU and professional military education. Togo is also
other countries – was on the cusp of moving pursuing modernisation and professionalisation
beyond the 2012 coup and resulting conflict efforts, while Benin is looking to adapt its armed
and instability. forces to address non-traditional threats. Both
Five years later, the security situation in the these states have suffered terrorist attacks in
region has deteriorated. Coups and insurrections recent years. There were around 20 in Benin
have highlighted problems not only related to between the end of 2021 and summer 2022, while
civil-military relations in regional states but also in May 2022, eight Togolese soldiers were killed
in relation to military assistance from abroad. (along with 15 attackers) and 13 troops were
To be most effective and durable, this assistance injured. According to analysts, Côte d’Ivoire’s
needs to be focused as much on longer-term armed forces benefit from important, but discreet,
force health as it is on the generation of combat French military cooperation, and while recent
capability (such as through special- or rapid- jihadist attacks have generally been unsuccessful,
reaction forces) that governments might desire to the current government is looking to improve its
tackle more immediate threats. But requirements, military and security capacities. Plans have been
and timescales, can be different for the recipient announced to boost personnel numbers, while
states, and in some cases choices have been made there were reports of additional armoured vehicle
to look beyond their security partners of recent procurements in 2022.
years. Indeed, assistance initiatives are also being There is continuing jihadist activity in Burkina
reshaped, with France rebalancing its forces in Faso, Mali, Niger and the Lake Chad Basin area.
the region, other Western states reducing security Niger’s armed forces are receiving additional
assistance, and Russia increasing its activity equipment. Airlift capacity has been increased
and influence in places. Meanwhile, jihadist with the delivery of a second (of three) C-130H
activity is again on the rise, notably in Gulf of medium transport aircraft from the US, while
Guinea countries. Regional states are having to reconnaissance and attack capabilities will be
deal not only with political instability but also boosted by the arrival of Turkish-produced Hurkus
community conflicts, resource constraints and light-attack aircraft. Reports currently point to
illicit trafficking. At the same time, they are also only two airframes, while there are also reports
feeling the effects of the coronavirus pandemic, indicating that protected patrol vehicles may also
which hindered local industrial and agricultural be procured.
production and exacerbated poverty. An April The situation is worse in Mali and Burkina
2022 report by Oxfam said that West Africa was Faso, where the armed forces seized power in
Sub-Saharan Africa 423
Sub-Saharan
as presidential elections approach in 2023. Abuja Mohamud, in place of the close trilateral relationship
Africa
continues to pursue military modernisation formed between Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia after
efforts, and the government’s bid to acquire 12 the peace deal between Ethiopia and Eritrea in June
AH-1Z Viper attack helicopters was approved in 2018. The al-Shabaab terrorist group still poses a
April by the US State Department (with this then regional threat. In July 2022 hundreds of al-Shabaab
sent to Congress for approval). If acquired, these fighters crossed the Ethiopian border from Somalia.
could be assigned to the army’s planned new Although Ethiopia claims to have effectively
light aviation formation. Although the country contained this threat, it illustrates the extent to which
maintains equipment of diverse origin, and the Ethiopian security system has been challenged
French firms have supplied many of the navy’s by the multiple conflicts in the country.
recent procurements, in recent years China has Security in the Horn of Africa is also threatened
also emerged as a significant arms supplier with by regional tensions, particularly around the Nile
CS/VP3 protected patrol vehicles and ZSD-89 and the continuing construction of the Grand
tracked armoured personnel carrier among the Ethiopian Renaissance Dam near the border
equipment delivered. with Sudan. Ethiopia’s dam is a critical issue
424 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
for Egypt, with the country dependent on the rivalries continue to play out in the Horn, with the
Nile for 85% of its water requirements. This has contest in Somalia between the central government
led to the resurfacing of allegations of Egyptian and the federal states a notable example.
support for armed opposition groups in Ethiopia. Qatar supports the Somali central government,
There have been allegations, principally on social while the United Arab Emirates supports
media, of Egyptian involvement in the delivery autonomous regions in the north. Somaliland
by air of supplies into Tigray in 2022 and the and Puntland have also received significant
unsubstantiated claim that the Ethiopian Air support from Saudi Arabia, while Turkey has been
Force shot down one of these aircraft when the supportive of the central state.
fighting reignited in northern Tigray in August. Meanwhile, the region’s economic community,
Meanwhile, Sudan’s November 2020 reoccupation IGAD, is failing to resolve disputes between
of the fertile al-Fashaga triangle, formerly home to nations. Ongoing tensions between Sudan and
many Ethiopian farmers, has created a rift between Ethiopia and between Kenya and Somalia, coupled
Sudan and Ethiopia just as the two were becoming with external interference in the Horn, leave
more dependent on one another for their stability. IGAD unable to agree on actions between states
Sudan’s own faltering political transition means and unable to counter external influences. The
the country is ill-equipped to play a constructive current lack of unity among IGAD states, which
role in the region. existed previously and was both a product and an
Middle Eastern states’ interest in the region enabler of IGAD’s capacity to address problems
is usually attributed to political and security within the region (Ethiopia chaired IGAD in 2010–
considerations, but there are growing signs of more 19), leaves the region without an effective voice
constructive, and mutually beneficial, economic or institution to address its own political and
engagement. However, Middle Eastern political security challenges.
CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN AFRICA led to the deaths of protesters and peacekeepers,
the government in Kinshasa in August reportedly
Instability continues to mark much of the region. said it would re-evaluate the UN mission’s plan to
To the north, there are risks that the conflicts in the stay another two years. Meanwhile, in September
Central African Republic and South Sudan may 2022, an agreement was signed enabling the
spill over into surrounding regions. While piracy intervention of additional armed forces from the
along the East African coast has declined, there are East African Community (EAC). A status of forces
still risks of maritime terrorism in the region due to agreement was signed in Kinshasa between the
the insurgency in Mozambique. In the centre and EAC secretary-general and the president of the
south of the region, insurgencies in the Democratic DRC. An initial force of Kenyan troops landed at
Republic of the Congo (DRC) and in Mozambique Goma in early November, and it has been reported
contrast with the generally stable security situation that the Kenyan contingent alone could number up
elsewhere in the Southern African Development to 900. The mission will be led by the DRC armed
Community (SADC) region, even if Eswatini, forces and the deployment was planned to last six
Lesotho and Zimbabwe and potentially Angola are months initially.
politically fragile. The insurgency in Mozambique’s northern Cabo
The security situation is worsening in the DRC’s Delgado province has spread to Niassa province
eastern provinces of Ituri and North and South to the west and Nampula province to the south.
Kivu, despite the efforts of government forces and Government forces and Rwandan and SADC
the United Nations mission, MONUSCO. Non-state contingents have failed to stabilise the area. But
armed groups aiming to attack Uganda (ISIS- the 2,000 Rwandan troops and police deployed to
allied Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)), Rwanda Palma and the TotalEnergies gas installation on the
(Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda Afungi Peninsula have largely secured the area.
(FDLR)) and Burundi (RED-Tabara) have brought SADC special forces had some success, but the
instability and led these countries to deploy forces force is far too small and lacks air mobility and air
to strike at them inside the DRC. These groups have support. Meanwhile, the South African Navy has
been in the DRC for so long that they have effectively been unable to sustain the patrols needed to stop
become local insurgencies. Meanwhile, M23 rebels supplies reaching insurgents by sea. South Africa
are again active in the east, with Kinshasa accusing is deploying an infantry battalion, but without
Rwanda of supporting them. Conflict between the effective air support there is little prospect of early
local militias and with government forces as well as stabilisation. Indeed, South Africa lacks the military
a plethora of illegal activities – including logging, strength to play a major role in the region or even
mining and smuggling – further complicate the on its periphery and faces growing risk of internal
situation. In May 2021, the government in Kinshasa instability. The civil unrest of July 2021 in KwaZulu-
declared a ‘state of siege’ with the armed forces Natal and Gauteng provinces saw 354 killed and
assuming control of local governments in North led to authorities deploying some 25,000 troops
Sub-Saharan
Kivu and Ituri, while in December 2021 Ugandan to support the police. In August 2022, specialised
Africa
armed forces were allowed into the DRC to combat police units were required to deal with illegal gold
the ADF. However, government forces remain mining in Mpumalanga province. Both the Police
unable to tackle the nation’s security challenges Service and the Defence Force are underfunded and
and MONUSCO lacks the strength, mobility and understrength. The latter is stretched by two external
air support to be effective. Protesters in the east deployments (DRC and Mozambique) and border
have demanded that MONUSCO forces withdraw patrols. Troops were deployed internally in 2020 to
from some locations, asserting it has failed to help the police enforce the COVID-19 lockdown and
restore security. After violent demonstrations that in 2021 to deal with civil unrest.
It was also able to deploy troops to help enforce the three Rooivalk and five Oryx helicopters in the DRC and
COVID-19 lockdown in 2020 and to contain the July two Oryx in Mozambique, while the lack of airlift hampers
2021 riots. The army is reverting to a more traditional troop rotation and support.
organisational structure by re-establishing standing The navy is in a similar situation. Specialists say that
brigades, with a mechanised and light brigade in the only one frigate and one submarine have been refitted
process of formation with a motorised and airborne brigade since delivery in the early 2000s and their combat systems
to follow, and afterwards two division headquarters and are now largely obsolescent. The only logistics ship is
additional brigades. ageing and in need of refit and many smaller vessels are
The air force, however, has faced significant challenges not operational. The first of three inshore patrol vessels
in generating operational capability. In September, the has been delivered and a new survey ship is under
flight of one of the air force’s Gripen combat aircraft construction, but continued underfunding casts doubt on
marked the start of a process of rebuilding air combat how long these can be maintained in operational status.
capability, following the agreement of a support Meanwhile, the defence industry has been crippled by
contract. However, it was unclear how many aircraft a lack of local orders, inadequate government support
the deal covered. Other aircraft have been grounded, and problems in obtaining export permits. The state-
including most of the Hawk trainers, about half of the owned Denel group is attempting to recover from the
Rooivalk attack and Oryx transport helicopters and many damage of ‘state capture’ in the mid-2010s but will find
of the AW109 utility and Super Lynx maritime helicopters. this challenging without acquisition funding for the
The only maritime-surveillance capability currently SANDF and export support. The risk is that much of the
available for operations is a single C-47TP with weather rest of the industry may wind down, forcing the SANDF
radar. Only two C-130s, two C-212s and some Caravans to rely on imported equipment, which will in turn present
are available for transport. Even most of the PC-7 Mk II problems in supporting locally manufactured equipment
trainers are grounded for lack of maintenance. As a result, in service, given dependencies related to maintenance
the air force is facing problems in keeping operational its and spares requirements.
South Sudan
Increase Togo USD0.06bn
USD0.17bn
Kenya
USD1.35bn
Niger Ethiopia
USD0.24bn USD1.58bn
Zambia
Benin USD0.44bn
USD0.39bn Mauritius
USD0.23bn
Burkina
Guinea Faso
Lesotho
USD0.33bn USD0.47bn
USD0.04bn Nigeria
USD2.78bn
Dem Republic
of Congo
USD0.37bn Mali
USD0.83bn
Namibia
USD0.36bn
Tanzania
Angola USD0.94bn
USD1.76bn
Rwanda Côte d'Ivoire
USD0.17bn USD0.61bn
USD0.75bn
Djibouti Equatorial Guinea Eritrea Guinea-Bissau Seychelles Somalia Sudan USD0.26bn
n.k n.k n.k n.k n.k n.k n.k
Sub-Saharan
[1] Map illustrating 2022 planned defence-spending levels (in USDbn at market
Africa
Real % Change (2021–22) exchange rates), as well as the annual real percentage change in planned
More than 20% increase Between 0% and 3% decrease defence spending between 2021 and 2022 (at constant 2015 prices and exchange
Between 10% and 20% increase Between 3% and 10% decrease rates). Percentage changes in defence spending can vary considerably from
year to year, as states revise the level of funding allocated to defence. Changes
Between 3% and 10% increase Between 10% and 20% decrease indicated here highlight the short-term trend in planned defence spending
Between 0% and 3% increase More than 20% decrease between 2021 and 2022. Actual spending changes prior to 2021, and projected
spending levels post-2022, are not reflected.
ε Estimate Spending 2% of GDP or above Insufficient data
©IISS
inflation rates across the region in 2020 that persisted prices are leading to growing concerns about food
into 2021 and were exacerbated in 2022. Even in security in countries such as Chad, the Democratic
countries that are benefitting from higher commodity Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Madagascar and South
prices, such as Angola, Nigeria and South Africa, the Sudan. When food-security concerns are combined
challenges of soaring food prices and fiscal policy with poor employment prospects, the risk is that this
tightening are weighing on growth. Higher food undermines political stability.
428 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
▼ Figure 19 Sub-Saharan Africa: defence spending by ▼ Figure 20 Sub-Saharan Africa: regional defence
country and sub-region, 2022 spending as % of GDP (average)
% of GDP
1.0
Ethiopia Zimbabwe
7.5% 3.6%
0.5
Other
Southern Africa
Other 9.0%
West Africa 0.0
14.5% 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
Nigeria, 13.2%
Côte d’Ivoire, 2.9% Note: Analysis excludes Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Seychelles,
Mali, 4.0% Somalia, Sudan
Angolan defence spending has also been 0.6% of GDP. Nonetheless, Nigerian spending is
constrained in recent years. Any increases in local- still considerably higher than levels seen over the
currency terms between 2015 and 2021 were wiped previous decade. The 2022 budget noted that funding
out by depreciations in the new kwanza and soaring would be allocated to settle the final payment for
inflation. Over that period, real cuts to defence three JF-17 Thunder aircraft; the procurement of a
spending averaged 17%, as inflation rates ranged hydrographic survey ship, a landing ship tank and
from 10% to 30% while the kwanza dropped from three AW109 helicopters; and part-payment for the
120 kwanza to the dollar in 2015 to 631 to the dollar procurement of one AW139 helicopter. The Nigerian
in 2021. Angola’s economy, and therefore public defence budget is likely to increase as instability in
finances, was severely affected by the 2014–16 the north of the country worsens. Nigeria continues
collapse in oil prices. This placed the oil producer to pursue significant defence acquisitions, including
on a weak footing when the coronavirus pandemic the potential purchase of 12 AH-1Z Viper attack
emerged in 2020, creating a further economic helicopters in a deal valued at USD997m (including
shock. However, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in support and spares) that was approved by the US
February 2022 and the subsequent spike in oil prices State Department in April 2022.
has benefitted Angola’s GDP. With greater fiscal Defence spending in Mali has increased every
headroom, the government enacted a sizeable uplift year in real terms since 2013, with funding reaching
to defence spending, from AOA627bn (USD993m) USD831m in 2022, quadruple the level reached in
in 2021 to AOA790bn (USD1.76bn) in 2022, leading 2012. French forces completed their withdrawal
to the first real-terms increase in Angolan spending from Mali in August following several coups in 2020
for seven years. The increase will help fund Angola’s and 2021 and the shift towards Russian support by
order of three Airbus C295 maritime-patrol aircraft the military-led government. In August 2022, Russia
in April 2022 in a deal valued at USD188.11m. delivered L-39 and Su-25 ground-attack aircraft. The
Nigeria’s economy is also benefitting from higher country ordered C295 light transport aircraft from
oil prices, but slow reform of the downstream Airbus in December 2021.
energy sector means recurrent fuel shortages and There has been strong growth in recent years
power, blackouts present a drag on output while in other countries in West Africa, including Benin,
high rates of inflation restrict consumer purchasing Burkina Faso, Ghana and Senegal. As a result, West
power according to the World Bank. The 2020 African spending grew to exceed the share spent by
defence budget rose to NGN900bn (USD2.51bn), a Southern African states in 2021, although in light
41% real increase over 2019 levels. The 2021 budget of growth in Angola it fell back below this amount
grew to NGN966bn (USD2.42bn – Nigerian naira in 2022.
depreciated over 2021) in 2021 and NGN1.14 trillion However, the fastest-growing sub-region in 2022
(USD2.78bn) in 2022. But with inflation reaching was East Africa. Ethiopia more than quadrupled
16–17% in both years, the budget has been stagnant its defence budget from USD0.38bn to USD1.58bn
in real terms, accounting for between 0.5% and amid a return to conflict between the Tigray People’s
Sub-Saharan
Africa
25 25
Regional defence spending
20
USDbn (constant, 2015)
20
15
15 10
10 5
0
5
-5
0 -10
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
Southern Africa West Africa East Africa Central Africa Real growth
© IISS
Liberation Front and the Ethiopian government. with downside risks amplified by the uncertainty
Combined with consistent spending in Tanzania surrounding Denel’s strategic direction, together
and a 2020 jump in Uganda’s defence budget, this with a loss of key personnel.
means that the sub-region now accounts for 25.1% Nigeria’s defence-industrial base is small, with
of total regional spending, up from 11.0% in 2010. the largest concerns being the Nigerian Naval
In contrast, spending in Central Africa continues to Dockyard and Proforce. Efforts to bolster indigenous
stagnate, with the sub-region now accounting for capabilities have, until recent years, been restricted
4.6% of the sub-Saharan Africa total, down from a by economic conditions and conflicting budget
high of 7.4% in 2016. priorities, such as the drive to professionalise the
armed forces and the need to counter insurgent
Defence industry groups. These create a higher personnel and
The lack of sustained growth in regional defence operational burden within the budget, further
spending, and the low proportions allocated to constricting funds for R&D. The 2020 surge in
investment and R&D, have continued to restrict the Nigerian defence spending was primarily seen in
development of indigenous capabilities and local the personnel account, which grew to 80% of the
defence industries. entire budget, a level at which it was maintained
The South African DoD Strategic Plan 2020– into 2021 and 2022. As a result, capital spending has
2025 acknowledged that the economic outlook and fallen from 26.6% of the budget in 2019 to 13.6% in
persistently low defence budget allocations have 2022. Similarly, while allocations to the state-owned
had ‘a profound adverse impact on the availability Defence Industries Corporation of Nigeria (DICON)
and modernisation of required defence capabilities’. have been maintained over the last five years as a
This was apparent when a lack of funding and proportion of the defence budget, allocations have
maintenance saw South Africa’s Gripen C/Ds fallen from 1.1% in 2016 to just 0.32% in 2022.
grounded in September 2021, with two deemed Angola’s industrial ambitions have been
beyond economic repair. To address this, the country restricted by low levels of investment, with no major
signed a USD30m support contract with Saab in programmes signed in recent years. The country
September 2022. State-owned Denel, the country’s still has ambitions for the local assembly of tactical
primary defence manufacturer, was already facing a vehicles, platform maintenance capabilities and
severe liquidity crisis before the pandemic, with the improved naval capabilities. For its part, Uganda
company struggling to pay staff wages in 2019–21. opened a new armoured vehicle manufacturing and
Although the company has now managed to settle assembly facility in Nakasongola in July 2022. The
salary payments, ratings agencies are cautioning that plant was a joint project with the STREIT Group, a
the company still faces severe liquidity constraints company based in the United Arab Emirates.
Sub-Saharan Africa 431
Sub-Saharan
KDF, and others, if there is sustained investment in KSL.
Africa
PROJECT HOEFYSTER TO PROCEED
AUGUST
State-owned company Denel has received regular bailouts in recent years and its collapse would be
a significant blow to South Africa’s defence-industrial capability. Under Project Hoefyster, Denel Land
Systems was selected in 2007 to develop the Badger wheeled infantry fighting vehicle, based on Finnish
company Patria’s Armoured Modular Vehicle (AMV), to partially replace the South African Army’s ageing
fleet of Ratels. However, technical difficulties, staff shortages, COVID-19 and ‘state capture’ have meant that
no deliveries have been made as part of the 2013 production contract. In February 2022 ARMSCOR, the
defence procurement agency, recommended cancelling the programme. However, following discussions,
both Denel and ARMSCOR decided that it was ‘feasible’ to proceed with the project provided a funding
structure is agreed; this could potentially include measures such as a reconsideration of penalty charges incurred
to date by Denel.
432 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Tackling the al-Shabaab terrorist group remains a principal and Kenya’s suspension of payments. Overall, KDF has a var-
focus of the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF). This emphasis is ied list of suppliers, but China has delivered the most, span-
reflected in the procurement of mine-resistant ambush pro- ning both land and air systems. For its part, US deliveries have
tected vehicles (MRAPs) and helicopters. Until a recent con- focused on air assets and there have been more US donations
tract for Turkish MRAPs, the KDF had purchased armoured than sales. At the same time, some plans have faced prob-
vehicles only in relatively small batches, with the result being lems. The mooted purchase in 2017 of a squadron of AT-802L
that the KDF and Police now operate a variety of equipment ground-attack/ISR aircraft from L-3 Communications (now
types. Meanwhile, several purchases have attracted scrutiny, L3Harris) appears to have been abandoned after elections
including surplus Jordanian F-5 fighters and Chinese Z-9W in Kenya that year and objections to the deal in the US. The
helicopters. Kenyan media reported that auditors were inves- proposed maximum contract value, at up to USD418m, may
tigating the procurements. The Navy has received the least also have been an issue. By way of comparison, Kenya’s most
investment. The delivery of a Spanish-built patrol vessel un- expensive procurement, of three C-27J Spartan transport air-
der a 2003 contract was delayed due to contractual disputes craft, was valued at USD197.48m.
FORCES BY ROLE
Angola ANG MANOEUVRE
Armoured
New Angolan Kwanza
AOA
2021 2022 2023 1 tk bde
GDP AOA 47.5tr 56.0tr
Light
1 SF bde
USD 75.2bn 125bn
1 (1st) div (1 mot inf bde, 2 inf bde)
per capita USD 2,352 3,791 1 (2nd) div (3 mot inf bde, 3 inf bde, 1 arty regt)
Growth % 0.8 2.9 1 (3rd) div (2 mot inf bde, 3 inf bde)
Inflation % 25.8 21.7 1 (4th) div (1 tk regt, 5 mot inf bde, 2 inf bde, 1 engr bde)
Def bdgt AOA 627bn 790bn 1 (5th) div (2 inf bde)
1 (6th) div (1 mot inf bde, 2 inf bde, 1 engr bde)
USD 993m 1.76bn
COMBAT SUPPORT
USD1=AOA 631.45 448.96 Some engr units
Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
5.41 Some log units
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE†
1.39 ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
2008 2015 2022
MBT 300: ε200 T-55AM2; 50 T-62; 50 T-72M1
Population 34,795,287 LT TK 10 PT-76
ASLT 9+ PTL-02 Assaulter
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus RECCE 603: 600 BRDM-2; 3+ Cayman BRDM
Male 23.7% 5.3% 4.1% 3.3% 11.5% 1.0% IFV 250 BMP-1/BMP-2
Female 23.7% 5.5% 4.3% 3.6% 12.8% 1.3% APC 276
APC (T) 31 MT-LB
APC (W) 200+: ε200 BTR-152-60/-70/-80; WZ-551 (CP)
Capabilities
PPV 45 Casspir NG2000
Though numerically one of the region’s largest and best- ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
equipped armed forces, Angola’s available inventory faces ARV 5+: 5 BTS-2; T-54/T-55
maintenance and readiness challenges. The armed forces are MW Bozena
constitutionally tasked with ensuring sovereignty and territo- ARTILLERY 1,503+
rial integrity, and there is growing attention to the protection SP 25+: 122mm 9+ 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 4 2S3 Akatsiya;
of offshore resources and maritime-security cooperation with
203mm 12 2S7 Pion
regional and external powers. Defence ties with Russia continue,
TOWED 575: 122mm 523 D-30; 130mm 48 M-46; 152mm
mainly in the form of equipment deliveries, though there are
4 D-20
plans to boost defence-industrial cooperation. There are increas-
ing military ties with China, and Luanda is looking for help in
MRL 153+: 122mm 110: 70 BM-21 Grad; 40 RM-70;
military modernisation, defence-industrial development and 220mm; 3+ 9P140MB Uragan-M; 240mm BM-24
maritime security. There were discussions with US AFRICOM in MOR 750: 82mm 250; 120mm 500
2022 on shared security concerns. Angola retains conscription, ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
but there are also volunteer components. In recent years, force MSL • MANPATS 9K11 (RS-AT-3 Sagger)
health and education have been investment priorities. The armed RCL 500: 400 82mm B-10/107mm B-11†; 106mm 100 M40†
forces train regularly and have participated in multinational GUNS • SP 100mm SU-100†
Sub-Saharan
exercises. Angola is the only regional state with a strategic-airlift AIR DEFENCE
Africa
capacity and an order for medium-lift aircraft for transport mis- SAM • Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-7 Grail)‡;
sions and maritime surveillance was placed with Spain in 2022. 9K36 Strela-3 (RS-SA-14 Gremlin); 9K310 Igla-1 (RS-
Improving the military-logistics system has been identified as SA-16 Gimlet)
a key requirement. Modernisation and equipment-purchasing GUNS
plans were curtailed in recent years by the fall in oil prices and a SP 23mm ZSU-23-4
reduced defence budget. The defence industry is limited to in-ser- TOWED 450+: 14.5mm ZPU-4; 23mm ZU-23-2; 37mm
vice maintenance facilities, but Angola has ambitions to develop M-1939; 57mm S-60
greater capacity by partnering with countries such as Brazil,
China, Portugal and Russia.
Navy ε1,000
ACTIVE 107,000 (Army 100,000 Navy 1,000 Air EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
6,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 10,000 PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 24
Conscript liability 2 years PCO 2 Ngola Kiluange with 1 hel landing platform
(Ministry of Fisheries)
PCC 5 Rei Bula Matadi (Ministry of Fisheries)
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE PBF 8: 3 HSI 32; 5 PVC-170
PB 9: 4 Mandume; 5 Comandante Imperial Santana
Army 100,000 (Ministry of Fisheries)
434 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
continuing piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. A National Guard has Air Force ε250
been established to focus on counter-terrorism and internal
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
security issues. There have been reports of efforts to improve
AIRCRAFT
soldiers’ living conditions. The increased security threat in the
TPT 3: Light 1 DHC-6 Twin Otter†; PAX 2: 1 B-727;
North led to the opening of a new military base there. In July
1 HS-748†
2022, Benin signed a military cooperation agreement with
TRG (1 LH-10 Ellipse non-operational)
Niger and security cooperation with Rwanda was boosted after
a bilateral meeting in September; this might include logisti-
HELICOPTERS
cal support. There is a military-cooperation agreement with TPT • Light 5: 4 AW109BA; 1 AS350B Ecureuil†
France, whose Senegal-based forces have delivered training to
boost Benin’s border-surveillance capacity. Armoured vehicles National Guard ε3,500
have also been received from China. The US has provided similar FORCES BY ROLE
training to the army and national police. Benin contributes per- MANOEUVRE
sonnel to the Multinational Joint Task Force fighting Islamist ter- Air Manoeuvre
rorist groups. There is a limited capacity to deploy beyond neigh- 1 AB bn
bouring states without external support. There is some mainte-
nance capability but no defence-manufacturing sector. Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 4,800
ACTIVE 12,300 (Army 8,000 Navy 550 Air 250 National Republican Police ε4,800
Guard 3,500) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 4,800 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Conscript liability 18 months (selective) ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
APC • PPV Casspir NG
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
DEPLOYMENT
Army ε8,000 CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 6
FORCES BY ROLE
CHAD: Lake Chad Basin Commission • MNJTF 150
MANOEUVRE
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN •
Armoured
MONUSCO 9
2 armd sqn
Light MALI: UN • MINUSMA 299; 1 mech inf coy(+)
1 (rapid reaction) mot inf bn SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 4
8 inf bn SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 2
COMBAT SUPPORT
2 arty bn
1 engr bn
Botswana BWA
1 sigs bn Botswana Pula BWP 2021 2022 2023
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT GDP BWP 195bn 220bn
1 log bn USD 17.6bn 18.0bn
1 spt bn
per capita USD 7,337 7,348
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Sub-Saharan
Growth % 11.4 4.1
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
Africa
Inflation % 6.7 11.2
LT TK 18 PT-76†
Def bdgt [a] BWP 5.76bn 6.06bn
RECCE 24: 3 AML-90; 14 BRDM-2; 7 M8
USD 520m 495m
APC 34
USD1=BWP 11.09 12.24
APC (T) 22 M113;
APC (W) 2 Bastion APC [a] Defence, Justice and Security Budget
PPV 10 Casspir NG Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)
611
AUV 16+: 6+ Dongfeng Mengshi; 10 VBL
ARTILLERY 16+
288
TOWED 105mm 16: 12 L118 Light Gun; 4 M101
2008 2015 2022
MOR 81mm some; 120mm some
Population 2,384,246
Navy ε550
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 6: Male 14.9% 4.6% 4.3% 4.3% 17.6% 2.4%
2 Matelot Brice Kpomasse (ex-PRC); 3 FPB 98; 1 27m (PRC) Female 14.7% 4.7% 4.5% 4.4% 20.4% 3.4%
436 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Capabilities ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
MSL
The Botswana Defence Force (BDF) comprises ground forces
SP V-150 TOW
and a small but comparatively well-equipped air wing. The BDF’s
primary responsibility is to ensure territorial integrity; its other tasks MANPATS TOW
include tackling poaching. There is a history of involvement in RCL 84mm Carl Gustaf
peacekeeping operations. The BDF has reportedly been working ARTILLERY 78
on a defence doctrine that is believed to be influenced by US TOWED 30: 105mm 18: 12 L118 Light Gun; 6 Model 56
concepts and practices. Botswana has a good relationship with
pack howitzer; 155mm 12 Soltam
the US which provides training to the BDF. The armed forces also
MRL 122mm 20 APRA-40
train with other African nations, including Namibia, with whom it
holds biannual exercises. The operations centre for the Southern MOR 28: 81mm 22; 120mm 6 M-43
African Development Community (SADC) Standby Force is located AIR DEFENCE
in Gaborone. The BDF has deployed a small force to Mozambique, SAM
to join soldiers from other SADC countries. Recent personnel priori- Short-range 1 VL MICA
ties include improving conditions of service and overhauling retire-
Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-7 Grail)‡; 9K310
ment ages. Recruitment into the BDF is voluntary. Some BDF mili-
Igla-1 (RS-SA-16 Gimlet); Javelin; Mistral
tary personnel have travelled to China for training. The air force has
a modest airlift capacity and the BDF is able to deploy a small force GUNS • TOWED 20mm 7 M167 Vulcan; 37mm PG-65
by air if required. There is interest in replacing the ageing fleet of
F-5 combat aircraft, though a successor type has yet to be ordered Air Wing 500
due to financial constraints. While reports suggest a limited mainte- FORCES BY ROLE
nance capacity, there is no defence-manufacturing sector.
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
ACTIVE 9,000 (Army 8,500 Air 500) 1 sqn with F-5A Freedom Fighter; F-5D Tiger II
ISR
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE 1 sqn with O-2 Skymaster
TRANSPORT
Army 8,500 2 sqn with BD-700 Global Express; BN-2/-2B Defender*;
FORCES BY ROLE Beech 200 King Air (VIP); C-130B Hercules; C-212-
MANOEUVRE 300/400 Aviocar; CN-235M-100; Do-328-110 (VIP)
Armoured TRAINING
1 armd bde(-) 1 sqn with PC-7 MkII Turbo Trainer*
Light TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
2 inf bde (1 armd recce regt, 4 inf bn, 1 cdo unit, 1 engr 1 sqn with AS350B Ecureuil; Bell 412EP/SP Twin Huey;
regt, 1 log bn, 2 ADA regt) EC225LP Super Puma
COMBAT SUPPORT EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 arty bde
AIRCRAFT 28 combat capable
1 engr coy
FTR 13: 8 F-5A Freedom Fighter; 5 F-5D Tiger II
1 sigs coy
ISR 5 O-2 Skymaster
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
TPT 20: Medium 3 C-130B Hercules; Light 16: 4 BN-2
1 log gp
Defender*; 6 BN-2B Defender*; 1 Beech 200 King Air
AIR DEFENCE
1 AD bde(-) (VIP); 1 C-212-300 Aviocar; 1 C-212-400 Aviocar; 2 CN-
235M-100; 1 Do-328-110 (VIP); PAX 1 BD700 Global Express
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
TRG 5 PC-7 MkII Turbo Trainer*
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
LT TK 45: ε20 SK-105 Kurassier; 25 FV101 Scorpion HELICOPTERS
IFV 35+ Piranha V UT-30 MRH 7: 2 Bell 412EP Twin Huey; 5 Bell 412SP Twin Huey
APC 157: TPT 9: Medium 1 EC225LP Super Puma; Light 8 AS350B
APC (W) 145: 50 BTR-60; 50 LAV-150 Commando (some Ecureuil
with 90mm gun); 45 Piranha III
PPV 12 Casspir DEPLOYMENT
AUV 70: 6 FV103 Spartan; 64 VBL
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN •
ARV Greif; M578 MONUSCO 2
MW Aardvark Mk2 MOZAMBIQUE: SADC • SAMIM 359
Sub-Saharan Africa 437
6 inf regt
Burkina Faso BFA Air Manoeuvre
CFA Franc BCEAO XOF 2021 2022 2023 1 AB regt (1 CT coy)
COMBAT SUPPORT
GDP XOF 10.6tr 11.3tr
1 arty bn (2 arty tp)
USD 19.1bn 18.3bn
per capita USD 887 825
1 engr bn
Growth % 6.9 3.6 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Inflation % 3.9 14.2 ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
Def bdgt XOF 254bn 291bn RECCE 83: 19 AML-60/AML-90; 24 EE-9 Cascavel;
USD 459m 469m 30 Ferret; 2 M20; 8 M8
USD1=XOF 554.24 620.61 APC 138
Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) APC (W) 24: 13 Panhard M3; 11 Bastion APC
435 PPV 114: 24 Ejder Yalcin; 6 Gila; 63 Puma M26-15;
21 Stark Motors Storm
97
AUV 46+: 8+ Bastion Patsas; 38 Cobra
2008 2015 2022
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
Population 21,935,389 MW 3 Shrek-M
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
RCL 75mm Type-52 (M20); 84mm Carl Gustaf
Male 21.7% 5.5% 4.9% 3.7% 11.9% 1.4%
Female 21.0% 5.4% 4.9% 4.0% 14.0% 1.8% ARTILLERY 50+
TOWED 14: 105mm 8 M101; 122mm 6
Capabilities MRL 9: 107mm ε4 Type-63; 122mm 5 APR-40
In recent years, Burkina Faso’s security forces have been chal- MOR 27+: 81mm Brandt; 82mm 15; 120mm 12
lenged by an increasing terrorist threat, which has led Ouaga- AIR DEFENCE
dougou to refocus its military efforts particularly on the north of
SAM • Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-7 Grail)‡
the country. In 2022, two military coups illustrated problems with
military cohesion. The effect that these coups, and continuing GUNS • TOWED 42: 14.5mm 30 ZPU; 20mm 12 TCM-20
instability, will have on Burkina Faso’s defence cooperation with
France remains unclear. ECOWAS missions have continued to work Air Force 600
on processes for a transition to constitutional democracy with
the new leadership. In early October, US sources reported assur- FORCES BY ROLE
ances that Burkina Faso would not extend an invitation to Russia’s GROUND ATTACK/TRAINING
Wagner Group, but later in the same month authorities in Ouaga-
dougou reportedly indicated that they could review relations with 1 sqn with SF-260WL Warrior*; Embraer EMB-314
Russia. In recent years, the US donated armoured vehicles and Super Tucano*
other equipment. Aviation capacity is slowly improving with the TRANSPORT
arrival of additional helicopters and more modern PPVs. Financial
challenges and political instability might hinder broader capabil- 1 sqn with AT-802 Air Tractor; B-727 (VIP); Beech 200
ity developments. Without external support, deployment capacity King Air; 1 C295W; CN235-220; PA-34 Seneca; Tetras
Sub-Saharan
is limited to neighbouring countries. While there are maintenance ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
Africa
facilities, there is no defence-manufacturing sector.
1 sqn with AS350 Ecureuil; Mi-8 Hip; Mi-17 Hip H; Mi-35
ACTIVE 7,000 (Army 6,400 Air 600) Gendarmerie & Hind AW 139; UH-1Y Huey
Paramilitary 4,450
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT 5 combat capable
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
ISR 1 DA42M (reported)
TPT 10: Light 9: 1 AT-802 Air Tractor; 2 Beech 200 King
Army 6,400
Three military regions. In 2011, several regiments were Air; 1 C295W; 1 CN235-220; 1 PA-34 Seneca; 3 Tetras;
disbanded and merged into other formations, including PAX 1 B-727 (VIP)
the new 24th and 34th régiments interarmes TRG 5: 3 EMB-314 Super Tucano*; 2 SF-260WL Warrior*
FORCES BY ROLE HELICOPTERS
MANOEUVRE ATK 2 Mi-35 Hind
Mechanised
MRH 3: 2 Mi-17 Hip H; 1 AW139
1 cbd arms regt
Light TPT 3: Medium 1 Mi-8 Hip; Light 2: 1 AS350 Ecureuil;
1 cbd arms regt 1 UH-1H Huey
438 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 4,450 have increased the individual skills of those troops. Peacekeeping
missions help to fund the armed forces, though financial and
National Gendarmerie 4,200 equipment deficiencies otherwise restrict military effectiveness.
Apart from limited maintenance facilities, the country has no
Ministry of Defence and Veteran Affairs
domestic defence-industrial capability.
FORCES BY ROLE
SPECIAL FORCES ACTIVE 30,050 (Army 30,000 Navy 50) Gendarmerie
1 spec ops gp (USIGN) & Paramilitary 1,000
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
APC • APC (W) some Bastion APC
Male 13.6% 4.5% 4.5% 4.5% 19.3% 2.2% GDP XAF 25.2tr 27.4tr
Female 13.4% 4.4% 4.5% 4.6% 20.8% 3.7% USD 45.4bn 44.2bn
Sub-Saharan
per capita USD 1,667 1,584
Capabilities
Africa
Growth % 3.6 3.8
Defence priorities include territorial defence, maritime secu- Inflation % 2.3 4.6
rity, and EEZ and airspace protection. Authorities are working to Def bdgt XAF 246bn 260bn
boost Coast Guard capability and presence as part of a 2017-27
coast guard strategic plan. There are plans to host the maritime USD 444m 419m
coordination centre HQ for ‘Zone G’ of the Yaoundé maritime USD1=XAF 554.25 619.61
security architecture. There is interest in greater regional and Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)
international defence engagement, possibly including participa- 399
tion in UN peacekeeping missions. The armed forces take part
in multinational regional exercises and cooperative activities.
299
2022 saw broader maritime security cooperation with the US
Navy and regional partners. Security cooperation with Portugal 2008 2015 2022
includes training of aircrew and maintenance staff. China report-
Population 29,321,637
edly donated equipment, including trucks and buses, to the armed
forces in 2021. Equipment capabilities remain limited and there is
no defence industry, beyond maintenance facilities. Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Male 21.1% 5.4% 4.6% 3.9% 13.2% 1.5%
ACTIVE 1,200 (Army 1,000 Coast Guard 100 Air 100)
Female 20.8% 5.4% 4.6% 4.0% 13.7% 1.7%
Conscript liability Selective conscription (14 months)
440 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Sub-Saharan
USD 43.2m 38.9m IFV 18 Ratel
Africa
USD1=XAF 554.19 620.63 APC • APC (W) 14+: 4 BTR-152†; 10+ VAB†
Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) AUV Cobra (reported)
56 ARTILLERY • MOR 12+: 81mm†; 120mm 12 M-1943†
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
26 RCL 106mm 14 M40†
2008 2015 2022 PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PBR 9†
Population 5,454,533
Air Force 150
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Male 20.1% 5.6% 5.0% 4.2% 13.4% 1.5% AIRCRAFT • TPT 6: Medium (1 C-130A Hercules in
store); Light 6: 3 BN-2 Islander; 1 Cessna 172RJ Skyhawk;
Female 19.1% 5.2% 4.7% 4.2% 15.2% 2.0%
2 J.300 Joker
Capabilities HELICOPTERS
ATK 1 Mi-24V Hind E
Effective military and security organisations remain largely absent
in the wake of violence in 2013 and the armed forces remain unable MRH some SA341B Gazelle
to fully address the country’s internal-security challenges. Under TPT 2: Medium 1 Mi-8T Hip; Light 1 AS350 Ecureuil
442 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Sub-Saharan
FORCES BY ROLE
Africa
GROUND ATTACK
1 unit with PC-7; PC-9*; SF-260WL Warrior*; Su-25 Frogfoot
TRANSPORT
1 sqn with An-26 Curl; C-130H-30 Hercules; Mi-17 Hip
H; Mi-171
1 (Presidential) Flt with B-737BBJ; Beech 1900; DC-9-87;
Gulfstream II
ATTACK HELICOPTER
1 sqn with AS550C Fennec; Mi-24V Hind; SA316 Alouette III
MANOEUVRE
Other
1 sy bn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT 10 combat capable
FTR (1 MiG-29S Fulcrum C in store)
ATK 7: 6 Su-25 Frogfoot (2 more in store); 1 Su-25UB
Frogfoot B (1 more in store)
444 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Army ε23,000
Côte d’Ivoire CIV FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
CFA Franc BCEAO XOF 2021 2022 2023
Armoured
GDP XOF 38.8tr 42.6tr 1 armd bn
USD 70.1bn 68.6bn Light
per capita USD 2,534 2,418 7 inf bn
Growth % 7.0 5.5 Air Manoeuvre
Inflation % 4.2 5.5
1 cdo/AB bn
COMBAT SUPPORT
Def bdgt [a] XOF 354bn 379bn
1 arty bn
USD 638m 610m 1 engr bn
USD1=XOF 554.24 620.60 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
[a] Defence budget only - order and security expenses excluded 1 log bn
AIR DEFENCE
Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)
1 AD bn
613
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
336 ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
MBT 10 T-55†
2008 2015 2022
RECCE 18: 13 BRDM-2; 5 Cayman BRDM
Population 28,713,423 IFV 10 BMP-1/BMP-2†
APC 78
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus APC (W) 56: 9 Bastion APC; 6 BTR-80; 12 Panhard M3;
Male 18.7% 5.6% 4.7% 4.1% 15.7% 1.3% 13 VAB; 16 WZ-551
Female 18.6% 5.6% 4.7% 4.1% 15.2% 1.6% PPV 22: 21 Springbuck HD; 1 Snake
AUV 20 Cobra II
Capabilities ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
VLB MTU
The armed forces are still regenerating and security sector reform ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
initiatives continue. Deteriorating security in the north raises MSL • MANPATS 9K111-1 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel)
requirements relating to regional cooperation, notwithstanding (reported); 9K135 Kornet (RS-AT-14 Spriggan) (reported)
tensions with Malian leaders. A 2015 law detailed defence zones RCL 106mm ε12 M40A1
and military regions and stressed the armed forces’ role in assist- ARTILLERY 36+
ing societal development. The Military Programme Law (LPM) TOWED 4+: 105mm 4 M-1950; 122mm (reported)
for 2016–20 outlined plans to reduce military strength, though MRL 122mm 6 BM-21
the outcome remains unclear. The 2021–25 National Develop- MOR 26+: 81mm; 82mm 10 M-37; 120mm 16 AM-50
ment Plan indicated that efforts have been made also to improve AIRCRAFT • TPT • Medium 1 An-12 Cub†
housing allowances for paramilitary personnel. The authorities AIR DEFENCE
have standardised promotion and salary structures and are also SAM • Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-7 Grail)‡
looking to improve military infrastructure. The armed forces have (reported)
also received new APCs and PPVs, as well as a former French patrol GUNS 21+
boat. There is close defence cooperation with France, which has a
Sub-Saharan
SP 20mm 6 M3 VDAA
significant training mission in the country, and a new training facil- TOWED 15+: 20mm 10; 23mm ZU-23-2; 40mm 5 L/60
Africa
ity, built with French assistance, was opened in 2022. The armed-
forces school at Zambakro runs courses for Ivorian as well as
Navy ε1,000
regional personnel, and the second Higher Defence Studies course
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
graduated in late 2021 with personnel from across the region. In
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 4
2021, with French assistance, Côte d’Ivoire opened the Interna-
PB 4: 3 L’Emergence; 1 Atchan 2
tional Academy for the Fight Against Terrorism (AILCT) in Abidjan,
AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 1
to help develop regional as well as Ivorian counter-terrorist capa-
bility; aspects of the US-led Flintlock 2022 exercise were held there.
LCM 1 Aby
Except for limited maintenance facilities, there is no domestic
defence-industrial capability. Air Force ε1,400
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE†
ACTIVE 27,400 (Army 23,000 Navy 1,000 Air 1,400 AIRCRAFT
Special Forces 2,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary n.k. TPT 3: Light 2: 1 An-26 Curl; 1 C295W; PAX 1 B-727
Moves to restructure and reform the armed forces continue HELICOPTERS
ATK 3 Mi-24V Hind E
MRH 2 Mi-8P Hip
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE TPT • Medium 2 SA330L Puma (IAR-330L)
446 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE Belgium 1
RCL 57mm M18; 73mm SPG-9; 75mm M20; Benin 9
106mm M40A1 Bhutan 2
GUNS 85mm 10 Type-56 (D-44) Bolivia 4
ARTILLERY 726+ Botswana 2
SP 16: 122mm 6 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 10 2S3 Akatsiya
Brazil 23
TOWED 125: 122mm 77 M-30 (M-1938)/D-30/Type-60;
Burkina Faso 5
130mm 42 Type-59 (M-46)/Type-59-I; 152mm 6 D-20
(reported) Cameroon 4
MRL 57+: 107mm 12 Type-63; 122mm 24+: 24 BM-21 Canada (Operation Crocodile) 7
Grad; some RM-70; 128mm 6 M-51; 130mm 3 Type-82; China, People’s Republic of 233; 1 engr coy; 1 fd hospital
132mm 12 Czech Republic 2
MOR 528+: 81mm 100; 82mm 400; 107mm M30; Egypt 11
120mm 28: 10 Brandt; 18 other France 4
AIR DEFENCE Gambia 2
SAM • Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-7 Grail)‡ Ghana 19
GUNS • TOWED 64: 14.5mm 12 ZPU-4; 37mm 52
Guatemala 152; 1 spec ops coy
M-1939
India 1,891; 2 inf bn; 1 med coy
Republican Guard 8,000 Indonesia 1,037; 1 inf bn; 1 engr coy
Jordan 11
FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE Kenya 264
Armoured Malawi 751; 1 inf bn
1 armd regt Malaysia 6
Light Mali 4
3 gd bde Mongolia 2
COMBAT SUPPORT Morocco 926; 1 inf bn; 1 fd hospital
1 arty regt Nepal 1,154; 1 inf bn; 1 engr coy
Niger 5
Navy 6,700 (incl infantry and marines) Nigeria 8
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Pakistan 1,974; 2 inf bn; 1 hel sqn with SA330 Puma
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 1 Paraguay 6
PB 1 Type-062 (PRC Shanghai II)†
Peru 6
Poland 1
Air Force 2,550
Romania 8
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Russia 9
AIRCRAFT 4 combat capable
Senegal 6
ATK 4 Su-25 Frogfoot
TPT 4: Medium 1 C-130H Hercules; Light 1 An-26 Curl; Sierra Leone 2
PAX 2 B-727 South Africa (Operation Mistral) 1,183; 1 inf bn; 1 hel sqn
HELICOPTERS Switzerland 1
ATK 7: 4 Mi-24 Hind; 3 Mi-24V Hind Tanzania 849; 1 spec ops coy; 1 inf bn
Sub-Saharan
TPT • Medium 3: 1 AS332L Super Puma; 2 Mi-8 Hip Tunisia 10
Africa
United Kingdom 3
Paramilitary United States 3
Uruguay 819; 1 inf bn; 1 hel sqn
National Police Force
Zambia 7
Incl Rapid Intervention Police (National and Provincial)
Zimbabwe 3
People’s Defence Force
DEPLOYMENT
MOZAMBIQUE: SADC • SAMIM 1
FOREIGN FORCES
All part of MONUSCO unless otherwise specified
Algeria 2
Bangladesh 1,637; 1 inf bn; 1 engr coy; 1 avn coy; 1 hel coy
448 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Other
Djibouti DJB 1 (Republican Guard) gd regt (1 sy sqn, 1 (close
protection) sy sqn, 1 cbt spt sqn (1 recce pl, 1 armd pl,
Djiboutian Franc DJF 2021 2022 2023 1 arty pl), 1 spt sqn)
GDP DJF 599bn 662bn COMBAT SUPPORT
USD 3.37bn 3.73bn 1 arty regt
per capita USD 3,365 3,666 1 demining coy
1 sigs regt
Growth % 4.8 3.6
1 CIS sect
Inflation % 1.2 6.6 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
Def exp DJF n.k n.k 1 log regt
USD n.k n.k 1 maint coy
FMA (US) USD 5m 6m 6m EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
USD1=DJF 177.74 177.71 ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
ASLT 3+ PTL-02 Assaulter
Population 957,273 RECCE 23: 4 AML-60†; 17 AML-90; 2 BRDM-2
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus IFV 28: 8 BTR-80A; 16-20 Ratel
APC 67
Male 14.5% 4.6% 4.7% 4.5% 15.2% 1.8%
APC (W) 30+: 12 BTR-60†; 4+ AT-105 Saxon; 14 Puma
Female 14.4% 4.9% 5.5% 5.8% 21.8% 2.3% PPV 37: 3 Casspir; 10 RG-33L; 24 Puma M26-15
AUV 37: 10 Cougar 4×4 (one with 90mm gun); 2 CS/
Capabilities VN3B; 10 PKSV; 15 VBL
Djibouti’s strategic location and relative stability have led a number ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
of foreign states to station forces in the country. The armed forces’ RCL 106mm 16 M40A1
main responsibility is internal and border security, as well as ARTILLERY 82
counter-insurgency operations. The 2017 defence White Paper SP 155mm 10 M109L
highlighted a requirement to modernise key capabilities and while TOWED 122mm 9 D-30
funds remain limited, recent purchases, including armed UAVs MRL 12: 107mm 2 PKSV AUV with PH-63; 122mm 10: 6
from Turkey, highlight some investment in new systems. Djibouti (6-tube Toyota Land Cruiser 70 series); 2 (30-tube Iveco
maintains close defence cooperation with France as it hosts its
110-16); 2 (30-tube)
largest foreign military base. The US also operates its Combined
Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa from Djibouti. Japan has based
MOR 51: 81mm 25; 120mm 26: 20 Brandt; 6 RT-F1
forces there for regional counter-piracy missions and the EU and AIR DEFENCE • GUNS 15+
NATO have at various times maintained a presence to support their SP 20mm 5 M693
operations. Djibouti also hosts an Italian base with a focus on anti- TOWED 10: 23mm 5 ZU-23-2; 40mm 5 L/70
piracy activities. China’s first overseas military base, including dock
facilities, was officially opened in Djibouti in 2017. France and the Navy ε200
US provide training assistance. EU NAVFOR Somalia has delivered
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
maritime-security training to the navy and coastguard. Djibouti
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 15
participates in a number of regional multinational exercises and
contributes personnel to the AMISOM mission in Somalia but has PCC 2 Adj Ali M Houmed (NLD Damen Stan Patrol 5009)
limited capacity to independently deploy beyond its territory. PBF 2 Battalion-17
Army equipment consists predominantly of older French and PB 11: 1 Plascoa†; 1 PRC 27m; 2 Sea Ark 1739; 1 Swari†;
Soviet-era equipment. There are some maintenance facilities, but 6 others
no defence manufacturing sector. AMPHIBIOUS 2
LANDING SHIPS • LSM 1 PRC 66m (capacity 6
ACTIVE 8,450 (Army 8,000 Navy 200 Air 250) light tanks)
Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 4,650 LANDING CRAFT • LCT 1 EDIC 700
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AKR 1 Col. Maj. Ali Gaad
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE (NLD Damen Stan Lander 5612)
Sub-Saharan
Light
Africa
3 inf bn(-)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
MBT 3 T-55
ASLT 6 PTL-02 Assaulter
RECCE 6 BRDM-2
IFV 23: 20 BMP-1; 3 WZ-551 IFV
APC 41
APC (W) 16: 10 BTR-152; 6 WZ-551
PPV 25 Reva
AUV Dongfeng Mengshi
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
MSL • MANPATS HJ-8
AIR DEFENCE
SAM Point-defence QW-2 (CH-SA-8)
GUNS • SP • 23mm ZU-23-2 (tch)
450 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
MSL • MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger); Ethiopia ETH
9K111-1 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel) Ethiopian Birr ETB 2021 2022 2023
GUNS 85mm D-44
GDP ΕTB 4.34tr 5.93tr
ARTILLERY 258
USD 99.3bn 111bn
SP 45: 122mm 32 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 13 2S5 Giatsint-S
per capita USD 996 1,098
TOWED 19+: 122mm D-30; 130mm 19 M-46
MRL 44: 122mm 35 BM-21 Grad; 220mm 9 9P140 Uragan Growth % 6.3 3.8
MOR 150+: 82mm 50+; 120mm/160mm 100+ Inflation % 26.8 33.6
AIR DEFENCE Def bdgt ETB 16.5bn 84.0bn
SAM • Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-7 Grail)‡ USD 377m 1.58bn
GUNS 70+ USD1=ETB 43.73 53.29
SP 23mm ZSU-23-4 Shilka Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)
TOWED 23mm ZU-23 1463
Sub-Saharan
conflict-related attrition remains unclear. The country’s inventory
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE comprises mostly Soviet-era equipment, though surplus stocks have
Africa
AIRCRAFT 14 combat capable been acquired from China, Hungary, Ukraine and the US. Modern air-
FTR 8: 4 MiG-29 Fulcrum; 2 MiG-29UB Fulcrum; 1 Su-27 defence systems have been purchased from Russia and, in response
to the Tigray conflict, armed UAVs have arrived from Turkey, China
Flanker; 1 Su-27UBK Flanker
and reportedly Iran. There is a modest local defence-industrial base,
FGA 2 MiG-29SE Fulcrum primarily centred on small arms, with some licensed production of
TPT • Light 5: 1 Beech 200 King Air; 4 Y-12(II) light armoured vehicles. There is adequate maintenance capability
TRG 16+: 8 L-90 Redigo; 4 MB-339CE*; 4+ Z-143/Z-242 but only a limited capacity to support advanced platforms.
HELICOPTERS
ACTIVE 503,000 (Army 500,000 Air 3,000)
MRH 8: 4 Bell 412EP Twin Huey (AB-412EP); 4 Mi-17
Hip H
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
AAM • IR R-60 (RS-AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (RS-AA-11A
Archer); IR/SARH R-27 (RS-AA-10 Alamo) Army ε500,000
Div mostly bde sized
FORCES BY ROLE
DEPLOYMENT
SPECIAL FORCES
ETHIOPIA: Tigray: 100,000 (reported) 1 cdo div
452 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
ARTILLERY
TOWED 107mm PH-63; 122mm D-30; 130mm M-46;
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
155mm AH-2
MRL 122mm BM-21
Army 3,200
Republican Guard under direct presidential control
AIR DEFENCE
FORCES BY ROLE
SAM
MANOEUVRE
Short-range S-125M1 Pechora-M1 (RS-SA-3 Goa)
Light
Point-defence 9K310 Igla-1 (RS-SA-16 Gimlet) 1 (Republican Guard) gd gp (bn)
GUNS (1 armd/recce coy, 3 inf coy, 1 arty bty, 1 ADA bty)
TOWED 23mm ZU-23; 37mm M-1939 8 inf coy
Air Manoeuvre
1 cdo/AB coy
FOREIGN FORCES COMBAT SUPPORT
Eritrea Army: 100,000 (reported) 1 engr coy
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
Gabon GAB RECCE 56: 24 AML-60/AML-90; 12 EE-3 Jararaca;
14 EE-9 Cascavel; 6 ERC-90F4 Sagaie
CFA Franc BEAC XAF 2021 2022 2023
IFV 22: 12 EE-11 Urutu (with 20mm gun); 10 VN-1
GDP XAF 11.2tr 13.8tr APC 93
USD 20.2bn 22.2bn APC (W) 35: 9 LAV-150 Commando; 5 Bastion APC;
per capita USD 9,483 10,282 3 WZ-523; 5 VAB; 12 VXB-170; 1 Pandur
Growth % 1.5 2.7 PPV 58: 8 Aravis; 34 Matador; 16 VP-11
AUV 17: 3 RAM Mk3; 14 VBL
Inflation % 1.1 3.5
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
Def bdgt [a] XAF 173bn 173bn MSL • MANPATS Milan
USD 312m 280m RCL 106mm M40A1
USD1=XAF 554.25 619.61 ARTILLERY 67
[a] Includes funds allocated to Republican Guard TOWED 105mm 4 M101
MRL 24: 107mm 16 PH-63; 140mm 8 Teruel
Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)
269
MOR 39: 81mm 35; 120mm 4 Brandt
AIR DEFENCE • GUNS 41
SP 20mm 4 ERC-20
112
TOWED 37+: 14.5mm ZPU-4; 23mm 24 ZU-23-2;
2008 2015 2022
37mm 10 M-1939; 40mm 3 L/70
Population 2,340,613
Navy ε500
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus HQ located at Port Gentil
Male 18.0% 5.8% 5.4% 5.1% 15.5% 2.1% EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Female 17.5% 5.5% 4.9% 4.3% 13.9% 2.0% PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 10
PB 10: 1 Patra†; 4 Port Gentil (FRA VCSM); 4 Rodman 66;
Sub-Saharan
1 Vice Amiral d'Escadre Jean Léonard Mbini (PRC 66m)
Capabilities
Africa
AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 1
Oil revenues have allowed the government to support small but LCM 1 Mk 9 (ex-UK)
regionally capable armed forces, while the country has benefited
from the long-term presence of French troops acting as a security Air Force 1,000
guarantor. There is regular training with French forces, including FORCES BY ROLE
with France’s regionally deployed naval units, as well as with the US FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
and other international partners. There are reports of a developing 1 sqn with Mirage F-1AZ
security relationship with Russia. Gabonese forces have taken part TRANSPORT
in the US Navy-led Obangame Express exercise. A new maritime- 1 (Republican Guard) sqn with AS332 Super Puma; ATR-
operations centre was built by the US in 2019. Military medicine 42F; Falcon 900; Gulfstream IV-SP/G650ER
is well regarded. The armed forces retain sufficient airlift to ensure 1 sqn with C-130H Hercules; CN-235M-100
mobility within the country, but very limited capability to project ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
power by sea and air. Apart from limited maintenance facilities, 1 sqn with Bell 412 Twin Huey (AB-412); SA330C/H
there is no domestic defence-industrial capacity. Puma; SA342M Gazelle
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ACTIVE 4,700 (Army 3,200 Navy 500 Air 1,000)
AIRCRAFT 8 combat capable
Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 2,000 FGA 6 Mirage F-1AZ
454 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Light
Ghana GHA 1 (rapid reaction) mot inf bn
6 inf bn
Ghanaian New Cedi GHS 2021 2022 2023 Air Manoeuvre
GDP GHS 459bn 589bn 2 AB coy
USD 79.2bn 76.0bn COMBAT SUPPORT
1 arty regt (1 arty bty, 2 mor bty)
per capita USD 2,521 2,369
1 fd engr regt (bn)
Growth % 5.4 3.6 1 sigs regt
Inflation % 10.0 27.2 1 sigs sqn
Def bdgt GHS 2.10bn 2.03bn COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
USD 362m 262m 1 log gp
1 tpt coy
USD1=GHS 5.80 7.75
2 maint coy
Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)
1 med coy
303
1 trg bn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
87
2008 2015 2022
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
RECCE 3 EE-9 Cascavel
Population 33,107,275 IFV 48: 24 Ratel-90; 15 Ratel-20; 4 Piranha 25mm; 5+
Type-05P 25mm
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus APC 105
Male 19.2% 5.0% 4.2% 3.7% 14.7% 1.9% APC (W) 55+: 46 Piranha; 9+ Type-05P
Female 18.8% 4.9% 4.3% 4.0% 16.8% 2.4% PPV 50 Streit Typhoon
AUV 73 Cobra/Cobra II
ARTILLERY 87+
Capabilities TOWED 122mm 6 D-30
Ghana’s armed forces are among the most capable in the MRL 3+: 107mm Type-63; 122mm 3 Type-81
region, with a long-term development plan. The ability to MOR 78: 81mm 50; 120mm 28 Tampella
control its EEZ is of increasing importance, and this underpins ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
the navy’s expansion plans, including the opening of a new AEV 1 Type-05P AEV
forward-operating base. Internal and maritime security are central ARV Piranha reported
military tasks, including disaster-response, along with peace- ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
keeping missions abroad. The US delivers training and support RCL 84mm Carl Gustaf
and there is also significant and long-standing defence engage- AIR DEFENCE
ment with the UK. Air-force training, close-air support and airlift SAM • Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-7 Grail)‡
capabilities have developed in recent years. There are plans GUNS • TOWED 8+: 14.5mm 4+: 4 ZPU-2; ZPU-4;
to boost training and exercises, as well as to improve military 23mm 4 ZU-23-2
infrastructure. The army is a regular contributor to UN peace-
keeping operations. Ghanaian professional military education
institutions regularly train personnel from regional states. The devel-
Navy 2,000
Naval HQ located at Accra; Western HQ located at
opment of forward-operating bases continues, with the principal
Sekondi; Eastern HQ located at Tema
objective of protecting energy resources. There is a limited defence-
Sub-Saharan
industrial base, including in maintenance, ammunition manu- EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Africa
facturing and, more recently, armoured-vehicle production. The PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 18
Defence Industries Holding Company was created in 2019 to PCO 2 Anzone (US)
improve defence industrial capacity. PCC 10: 2 Achimota (GER Lurssen 57m) with 1 76mm
gun; 2 Dzata (GER Lurssen 45m); 4 Snake (PRC 47m); 2
ACTIVE 15,500 (Army 11,500 Navy 2,000 Air 2,000) Yaa Asantewa (ex-GER Albatros)
PBF 1 Stephen Otu (ROK Sea Dolphin)
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE PB 5: 4 Flex Fighter; 1 David Hansen (US)
ISR Capabilities
1 unit with DA42
TRANSPORT Guinea’s armed forces remain limited in size and conventional
capacity. Special-forces troops toppled the government of former
1 sqn with BN-2 Defender; C295; Cessna 172
president Alpha Condé in September 2021, with their leader sworn
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER in as interim president a month later. ECOWAS has sanctioned the
1 sqn with AW109A; Bell 412SP Twin Huey; Mi-17V-5 new leadership and called for elections within six months, which
Hip H; SA319 Alouette III; Z-9EH so far have not occurred. Guinea’s new leaders have discussed a
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE† far longer transition period. Before the coup, there had been plans
AIRCRAFT 4 combat capable since 2010 to bring the armed forces under political control and
ATK (3 MB-326K in store) begin a professionalisation process. Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea
is a key concern, as is illegal trafficking and fishing. A military-
TPT 10: Light 10: 1 BN-2 Defender; 3 C295; 3 Cessna 172;
programme law for the period 2015–20 was not fully implemented
3 DA42; (PAX 1 F-28 Fellowship (VIP) in store) due to funding issues. Defence cooperation in recent years with
TRG 4 K-8 Karakorum*; (2 L-39ZO*; 2 MB-339A* in store) France and the US has led to financial and training assistance,
HELICOPTERS including for personnel earmarked for deployment to Mali. Much
MRH 10: 1 Bell 412SP Twin Huey; 3 Mi-17V-5 Hip H; of the country’s military equipment is ageing and of Soviet-era
2 SA319 Alouette III; 4 Z-9EH vintage; serviceability will be questionable for some types. There
TPT 6: Medium 4 Mi-171Sh; Light 2 AW109A is limited organic airlift and France was in recent years supporting
the development of a light aviation observation capability. Guinea
is also attempting to improve its logistics and military-health
DEPLOYMENT capacities. There are no significant defence-industrial capabilities.
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 13 ACTIVE 9,700 (Army 8,500 Navy 400 Air 800)
CYPRUS: UN • UNFICYP 1 Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 2,600
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • Conscript liability 9–12 months (students, before graduation)
MONUSCO 19
GAMBIA: ECOWAS • ECOMIG 50 ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 874; 1 recce coy; 1 mech inf bn
MALI: UN • MINUSMA 141; 1 engr coy Army 8,500
SOMALIA: UN • UNSOM 1; UN • UNSOS 1 FORCES BY ROLE
SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 725; 1 inf bn MANOEUVRE
Armoured
SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 656; 1 inf bn; 1 fd hosptial
1 armd bn
SYRIA/ISRAEL: UN • UNDOF 6 Light
WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 16 1 SF bn
5 inf bn
Guinea GUI 1 ranger bn
1 cdo bn
Guinean Franc GNF 2021 2022 2023 Air Manoeuvre
GDP GNF 157tr 185tr
1 air mob bn
Other
USD 16.1bn 19.7bn
1 (Presidential Guard) gd bn
per capita USD 1,128 1,346 COMBAT SUPPORT
Growth % 3.8 4.6 1 arty bn
Inflation % 12.6 12.7 1 AD bn
Def bdgt GNF 2.41tr 3.06tr 1 engr bn
USD 247m 327m EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
USD1=GNF 9729.04 9365.60 ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
MBT 38: 30 T-34; 8 T-54
Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)
LT TK 15 PT-76
227
RECCE 27: 2 AML-90; 25 BRDM-1/BRDM-2
IFV 2 BMP-1
39
2008 2015 2022
APC 59
APC (T) 10 BTR-50
Population 13,237,832 APC (W) 30: 16 BTR-40; 8 BTR-60; 6 BTR-152
PPV 19: 10 Mamba†; some Puma M26-15; 9 Puma M36
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus AUV Dongfeng Mengshi
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
Male 20.7% 5.2% 4.5% 3.7% 14.0% 1.8%
ARV T-54/T-55 reported
Female 20.3% 5.2% 4.5% 3.7% 14.2% 2.2% ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
Sub-Saharan Africa 457
Sub-Saharan
number of draft laws to restructure the armed services and police
DEPLOYMENT have been produced
Africa
MALI: UN • MINUSMA 667; 1 mech inf bn
SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 3 ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 1
WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 5 Army ε4,000
FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
Reconnaissance
1 recce coy
Armoured
1 armd bn (sqn)
Light
5 inf bn
COMBAT SUPPORT
1 arty bn
1 engr coy
458 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE service was established in late 2018. The long-standing defence
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES and security agreement with the UK was reaffirmed with a new
MBT 10 T-34 five-year Defence Cooperation Agreement in 2021, which has
LT TK 15 PT-76 included a permanent UK training unit within the country, support
for maritime security and a counter-IED training centre. There are
RECCE 10 BRDM-2
strong ties with the US, with the Cooperative Security Location
APC • APC (W) 55: 35 BTR-40/BTR-60; 20 Type-56 Manda Bay remaining an operational base for AFRICOM. There has
(BTR-152) also been evidence of developing relationships with the Chinese
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE and Jordanian armed forces. Regular operational deployments have
RCL 75mm Type-52 (M20); 82mm B-10 increased military experience and confidence. Kenya has been a key
GUNS 85mm 8 D-44 contributor to AMISOM in Somalia, demonstrating limited capacity
ARTILLERY 26+ to project power immediately beyond its own territory. The armed
TOWED 122mm 18 D-30/M-30 (M-1938) forces also provide smaller contributions to other UN missions and
are a leading element of the East African Standby Force. Kenya is
MOR 8+: 82mm M-43; 120mm 8 M-1943
the lead-contributor to the November 2022 EAC deployment to the
AIR DEFENCE eastern DRC. Kenya’s armed forces regularly participate in multina-
SAM • Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-7 Grail)‡ tional exercises. Involvement in regional security missions and mul-
GUNS • TOWED 34: 23mm 18 ZU-23; 37mm 6 M-1939; tinational exercises may also foster improved levels of cooperation
57mm 10 S-60 and interoperability. Recent equipment investments have focused
on improving counter-insurgency capabilities and transport capac-
Navy ε350 ity to support regional deployments. There is a limited defence
industry focused on equipment maintenance as well as the manu-
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE facture of small arms and ammunition.
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 4
PB 4: 2 Alfeite†; 2 Rodman 55m ACTIVE 24,100 (Army 20,000 Navy 1,600 Air 2,500)
Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 5,000
Air Force 100
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 1 Cessna 208B
Army 20,000
FORCES BY ROLE
Kenya KEN SPECIAL FORCES
Kenyan Shilling KES 2021 2022 2023 1 spec ops bn
1 ranger regt (1 ranger bn, 1 AB bn)
GDP KES 12.1tr 13.4tr
MANOEUVRE
USD 111bn 115bn Armoured
per capita USD 2,219 2,255 1 armd bde (2 armd recce bn, 2 armd bn)
Growth % 7.5 5.3 Mechanised
Inflation % 6.1 7.4
1 mech inf bde (3 mech inf bn)
Light
Def bdgt [a] KES 120bn 157bn
3 inf bde (3 inf bn)
USD 1.10bn 1.35bn COMBAT SUPPORT
USD1=KES 109.47 116.72 1 arty bde (2 arty bn, 1 ADA bn, 1 mor bty)
[a] Includes national intelligence funding 1 engr bde (2 engr bn)
Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) HELICOPTER
1199 1 air cav bn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
790 ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
2008 2015 2022 MBT 78 Vickers Mk 3
RECCE 84: 72 AML-60/AML-90; 12 Ferret
Population 55,864,655 APC 200
APC (W) 95: 52 UR-416; 31 WZ-551 (incl CP);
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
12 Bastion APC; (10 M3 Panhard in store)
Male 18.7% 5.8% 4.8% 3.8% 15.4% 1.5% PPV 105 Puma M26-15; CS/VP14; Springbuck
Female 18.5% 5.8% 4.8% 3.8% 15.4% 1.7% AUV 2+ BOV M10 (CP)
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
Capabilities ARV 7 Vickers ARV
MW Bozena
The armed forces are concerned with threats to regional stabil-
ity and tackling security challenges, particularly from neighbour- ARTILLERY 112
ing Somalia, though there is also concern about the possibility of SP 155mm 3+ NORA B-52
overspill from the conflict in Ethiopia. Kenya deployed forces to TOWED 105mm 47: 40 L118 Light Gun; 7 Model 56
the DRC in late 2022 as part of an East African Community deploy- pack howitzer
ment, following rising violence in the eastern DRC. A coastguard MOR 62: 81mm 50; 120mm 12 Brandt
Sub-Saharan Africa 459
Sub-Saharan
HELICOPTERS per capita USD 1,181 1,187
Africa
ATK 3 AH-1F Cobra Growth % 2.1 2.1
MRH 12: 3 AW139; 9 H125M (AS550) Fennec Inflation % 6.0 8.1
TPT 19: Medium 11: 1 Mi-171E; 10 SA330 Puma†; Light
Def bdgt LSL 519m 637m
8 Bell 205 (UH-1H Huey II)
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES USD 34.9m 39.6m
AAM • IR AIM-9 Sidewinder USD1=LSL 14.85 16.11
ASM AGM-65 Maverick Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)
53
Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 5,000
30
Police General Service Unit 5,000 2008 2015 2022
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES Population 2,193,970
APC • PPV 25 CS/VP3
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
AUV 30: some Streit Cyclone; 30 VN-4
Male 16.5% 5.3% 4.7% 4.2% 16.6% 2.0%
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 5
PB 5 (2 on Lake Victoria) Female 16.3% 5.2% 4.6% 4.1% 16.9% 3.4%
460 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Capabilities
Liberia LBR
Lesotho has a small ground force and an air wing for light trans-
port and liaison. It is a SADC member state, and a force from that Liberian Dollar LRD 2021 2022 2023
organisation deployed to the country in late 2017 to support the
GDP LRD 3.51bn 3.90bn
government following the assassination of the army chief. The
mission concluded at the end of November 2018. The Lesotho USD 3.51bn 3.90bn
Defence Force (LDF) is charged with protecting territorial integ- per capita USD 677 735
rity and sovereignty and ensuring internal security. Lesotho’s new Growth % 5.0 3.7
government has expressed its desire to carry out defence reforms.
Inflation % 7.8 6.9
The armed forces are comprised of volunteers. India has provided
training to the LDF since 2001. In April 2020 the army was briefly Def bdgt LRD 19.6m 18.7m
deployed internally by the prime minister. The armed forces, and USD 19.6m 18.7m
military facilities, were also utilised in the country’s coronavirus USD1=LRD 1.00 1.00
response. There is limited capacity to deploy and sustain mis-
Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)
sions beyond national borders, though Lesotho deployed person- 34
nel to Mozambique in 2021 as part of the SADC mission. Lesotho’s
limited inventory is obsolescent by modern standards and there is
5
little possibility of significant recapitalisation, although there is an
2008 2015 2022
aspiration to acquire light helicopters. Except for limited mainte-
nance capacity, there is no defence-industrial base. Population 5,358,483
ACTIVE 2,000 (Army 2,000) Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Male 21.7% 5.5% 4.7% 3.6% 13.1% 1.4%
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Female 21.2% 5.4% 4.8% 3.7% 13.5% 1.4%
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus Navy 500 (incl some 100 Marines)
Male 19.1% 5.3% 4.7% 4.2% 15.0% 1.7% EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 8
Female 18.8% 5.2% 4.7% 4.2% 15.0% 2.0%
PCC 1 Trozona
PB 7 (ex-US CG MLB)
Capabilities AMPHIBIOUS • LCT 1 (ex-FRA EDIC)
Madagascar’s principal defence aspirations include ensuring sov-
ereignty and territorial integrity. Maritime security is also an area Air Force 500
of focus. The army is the largest armed service. The armed forces FORCES BY ROLE
intervened in domestic politics in 2009. Madagascar is a member TRANSPORT
of the SADC and its regional Standby Force. In 2018, the country 1 sqn with An-26 Curl; Yak-40 Codling (VIP)
Sub-Saharan
signed an ‘umbrella defence agreement’ with India to explore 1 (liaison) sqn with Cessna 310; Cessna 337 Skymaster;
Africa
closer defence ties and an intergovernmental agreement with PA-23 Aztec
Russia on military cooperation. This latter agreement was reported TRAINING
to have entered into force in 2022 with reports that it included 1 sqn with Cessna 172; J.300 Joker; Tetras
arms sales, joint development of military equipment and person- TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
nel training. China has also embarked on outreach activities to 1 sqn with SA318C Alouette II
foster better relations with Madagascar. There is no independ- EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ent capacity to deploy and support operations beyond national AIRCRAFT • TPT 22: Light 20: 1 An-26 Curl; 4 Cessna
borders. The equipment inventory is obsolescent, and with eco- 172; 5 Cessna 206; 1 Cessna 310; 2 Cessna 337 Skymaster;
nomic development a key government target, equipment recapi- 1 CN235M; 2 J.300 Joker; 1 PA-23 Aztec; 1 Tetras; 2 Yak-40
talisation is unlikely to be a key priority. A small number of second- Codling (VIP); PAX 2 B-737
hand transport aircraft and helicopters were acquired in 2019, HELICOPTERS
modestly boosting military mobility, with new protected patrol MRH 3 SA318C Alouette II
vehicles observed at a parade in 2020. TPT • Light 4: 3 AS350 Ecureuil; 1 BK117
ACTIVE 13,500 (Army 12,500 Navy 500 Air 500) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 8,100
Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 8,100
Conscript liability 18 months (incl for civil purposes) Gendarmerie 8,100
462 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
COMBAT SUPPORT
Malawi MWI 3 lt arty bty
1 engr bn
Malawian Kwacha MWK 2021 2022 2023 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
GDP MWK 9.60tr 11.2tr 12 log coy
USD 12.0bn 11.6bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
per capita USD 559 523 ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
RECCE 58: 30 Eland-90; 8 FV701 Ferret; 20 FV721 Fox
Growth % 2.2 0.9
APC • PPV 31: 14 Casspir; 9 Marauder; 8 Puma M26-15
Inflation % 9.3 18.4 AUV 8 RAM Mk3
Def bdgt MWK 65.8bn 72.1bn ARTILLERY 107
USD 82.3m 74.6m TOWED 105mm 9 L118 Light Gun
USD1=MWK 799.67 965.99 MOR 81mm 98: 82 L16A1; 16 M3
AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 72: 12.7mm 32;
Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)
75
14.5mm 40 ZPU-4
Navy 220
26
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
2008 2015 2022
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 3: 1
Population 20,794,353 Kasungu (ex-FRA Antares)†; 2 Mutharika (PRC)
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus Air Force 200
Male 19.5% 5.6% 4.7% 4.0% 13.5% 1.7% EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Female 19.8% 5.8% 4.9% 4.2% 14.2% 2.1% AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 3: 1 Do-228; 2 MA600
HELICOPTERS • TPT 8: Medium 3: 1 AS532UL Cougar;
Capabilities 1 SA330H Puma; 1 H215 Super Puma Light 5: 1 AS350L
Ecureuil; 4 SA341B Gazelle
The Malawi Defence Forces (MDF) are constitutionally
tasked with ensuring sovereignty and territorial integrity. Addi-
tional tasks include providing military assistance to civil authori-
Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 4,200
ties and support to the police, and in recent years the army has
been used to help with infrastructure development, attempts to
Police Mobile Service 4,200
control illegal deforestation and the government’s coronavirus EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
response. The army is the largest of the armed forces. Counter- AIRCRAFT
trafficking is a role for the MDF’s small air force, previously an air TPT • Light 4: 3 BN-2T Defender (border patrol); 1
wing, and its naval unit. The MDF took delivery in 2022 of two SC.7 3M Skyvan
transport aircraft from China, suitable for transporting personnel. HELICOPTERS • MRH 2 AS365 Dauphin 2
Development priorities include improving combat readiness and
military medicine and engineering. Malawi is a member of the
SADC and its Standby Force. The armed forces have contributed DEPLOYMENT
to peacekeeping missions, including in Côte d’Ivoire, the DRC DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN •
and Mozambique. The UK provided training and support for the
MONUSCO 751; 1 inf bn
deployment to the DRC (to the Force Intervention Brigade),
and the UK also supports the MDF’s counter-poaching opera- MOZAMBQIUE: SADC • SAMIM 2
tions. The armed forces have no independent capacity to deploy SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 6
and support operations beyond national borders. SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 4
ACTIVE 10,700 (Army 10,500 Air Force 200) WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 5
Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 4,200
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
Army 10,500
FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
Mechanised
1 mech bn
Light
2 inf bde (2 inf bn)
1 inf bde (1 inf bn)
Air Manoeuvre
1 para bn
Sub-Saharan Africa 463
FORCES BY ROLE
Mali MLI The remnants of the pre-conflict Malian army are being
reformed into new combined-arms battlegroups, each of
CFA Franc BCEAO XOF 2021 2022 2023 which comprises one lt mech coy, three mot inf coy, one
GDP XOF 10.6tr 11.4tr arty bty and additional recce, cdo and cbt spt elms
USD 19.2bn 18.4bn MANOEUVRE
Light
per capita USD 918 858
9 mot inf bn
Growth % 3.1 2.5 1 inf coy (Special Joint Unit)
Inflation % 3.8 8.0 5 inf coy (ULRI)
Def bdgt [a] XOF 474bn 515bn Air Manoeuvre
USD 855m 831m 1 para bn
COMBAT SUPPORT
USD1=XOF 554.23 619.62
1 engr bn
[a] Defence and security budget COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 1 med unit
755
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
159 LT TK 2+ PT-76
2008 2015 2022
RECCE 6+ BRDM-2
Population 20,741,769 IFV 6 VN2C
APC 232:
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus APC (W) 48+: 27 Bastion APC; 10+ BTR-60PB; 11 BTR-70
PPV 186: 50 Casspir; 13 Marauder; 30 Puma M26-15/Puma
Male 23.8% 5.2% 3.9% 3.1% 11.2% 1.5%
M36; 24 Stark Motors Storm Light; 30 Streit Cougar;
Female 23.5% 5.5% 4.5% 3.7% 12.6% 1.5% 4 Streit Gladiator; 5+ Streit Python; 30 Streit Typhoon†
ARTILLERY 30+
Capabilities TOWED 122mm D-30
The armed forces remain focused on countering rebel and Islam- MRL 122mm 30+ BM-21 Grad
ist groups. The two military coups in August 2020 and May 2021
and the policies of Mali’s new rulers have accelerated the dete- Air Force 2,000
rioration of security relationships with Mali’s external partners FORCES BY ROLE
and with neighbouring states. At the same time, the authorities’ TRANSPORT
political and security partnership with Russia has deepened. In 1 sqn with BT-67; C295; Y-12E
May 2022, Mali left the G5 Sahel security partnership. The Russian TRAINING
private military company, Wagner Group, has been present in 1 sqn with Tetras
the country since December 2021 and has been accused of
TRANSPORT/ATTACK HELICOPTER
committing war crimes. Following the recent changes in govern-
1 sqn with H215; Mi-24D Hind; Mi-35M Hind
ment, France in 2021 suspended joint military operations and in
early 2022 accelerated the withdrawal of its forces; authorities in EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Bamako revoked the 2014 defence cooperation agreement and AIRCRAFT 9 combat capable
the 2013 Status of Force Agreement with France. France’s Opera- ISR 1 Cessna 208 Caravan
tion Barkhane officially withdrew from Mali in August 2022. The TPT • Light 12: 1 BT-67; 2 C295; 7 Tetras; 2 Y-12E
Sub-Saharan
EUTM Mali also decided to reduce its training activities. MINUSMA (1 An-24 Coke; 2 An-26 Curl; 2 BN-2 Islander all in store)
remains, though some contingents left or have reduced in size. TRG 9: 3 A-29 Super Tucano*; 6 L-39C Albratros*
Africa
The armed forces still suffer from operational deficiencies as well (6 L-29 Delfin; 2 SF-260WL Warrior* all in store)
as broader institutional weakness though there were defence- HELICOPTERS
reform plans, including under the 2015–19 military-programming
ATK 8: 2 Mi-24D Hind; 2 Mi-24P Hind F; 4 Mi-35M Hind
law. Improvements are still required in recruitment and training, as
TPT 8: Medium 7: 2 H215 (AS332L1) Super Puma;
well as in basic administrative support. Despite vehicle deliver-
ies by external partners, and the acquisition of several aircraft
4 Mi-171Sh Hip; 1 Mi-8T Hip; (1 Mi-8 Hip in store);
from Russia, the armed forces remain under-equipped. Mali does Light (1 AS350 Ecureuil in store)
not possess a defence-manufacturing industry and, with limited
equipment and maintenance capabilities, equipment serviceabil- Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 20,000 active
ity will likely be variable.
Gendarmerie 6,000
ACTIVE 21,000 (Army 19,000 Air Force 2,000) FORCES BY ROLE
Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 20,000 MANOEUVRE
Other
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE 8 paramilitary coy
1 air tpt gp (2 sy coy; 1 tpt coy)
Army ε19,000 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
464 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Sub-Saharan
Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 2,550 Mozambique faces a continuing internal threat from Islamist
Africa
groups that continue to challenge national defence forces, with
Special Mobile Force ε1,750 attacks being carried out in the country’s northern provinces of
FORCES BY ROLE Cabo Delgado, Niassa and Nampula. In 2021, the Southern African
MANOEUVRE Development Community (SADC) deployed a multinational force,
Reconnaissance while there has also been support from Portugal, Russia, Rwanda,
and the United States. The armed forces are tasked with ensuring
2 recce coy
territorial integrity and internal security, as well as tackling piracy
Light and human trafficking. The disarmament, demobilisation, and
5 (rifle) mot inf coy integration of Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO) per-
COMBAT SUPPORT sonnel into the military is a long-standing objective and significant
1 engr sqn numbers of RENAMO fighters have been disarmed. Mozambique
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT has defence relationships with China, Portugal and Russia,
1 spt pl although US forces have delivered training to the Mozambican
military in response to the Islamist insurgency. Russian private
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
military contractors were hired to advise Mozambican forces in
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES 2019, although they have since been withdrawn. Corruption in the
IFV 2 VAB with 20mm gun armed forces is reportedly a continuing concern. The armed forces
APC • APC (W) 12: 3 Tactica; 9 VAB have no capacity to deploy beyond Mozambique’s borders without
ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm 2 assistance. Soviet-era equipment makes up the majority of the
466 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
inventory and maintaining this will be problematic, not least in the FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
absence of any local defence industry. Moreover, Mozambique’s 1 sqn with MiG-21bis Fishbed; MiG-21UM Mongol B
recent economic performance will likely limit the government’s TRANSPORT
ability to recapitalise its inventory. 1 sqn with An-26 Curl; FTB-337G Milirole; Cessna 150B;
ACTIVE 11,200 (Army 10,000 Navy 200 Air 1,000) Cessna 172; PA-34 Seneca
Conscript liability 2 years ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
1 sqn with Mi-24 Hind†
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT 8 combat capable
FGA 8: 6 MiG-21bis Fishbed; 2 MiG-21UM Mongol B
Army ε9,000–10,000
ISR 2 FTB-337G Milirole
FORCES BY ROLE TPT 6: Light 5: 1 An-26 Curl; 2 Cessna 150B; 1 Cessna
SPECIAL FORCES 172; 1 PA-34 Seneca; (4 PA-32 Cherokee non-op); PAX 1
3 SF bn Hawker 850XP
MANOEUVRE TRG 2 L-39 Albatros
Light HELICOPTERS
7 inf bn ATK 2 Mi-24V Hind E
COMBAT SUPPORT MRH 2+ SA314B Gazelle
2-3 arty bn TPT • Medium 2 Mi-8 Hip
2 engr bn COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
1 log bn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE†
FOREIGN FORCES
Equipment estimated at 10% or less serviceability Angola SAMIM 8
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES Austria EUTM Mozambique 1
MBT 60+ T-54 Botswana SAMIM 359
RECCE 30 BRDM-1/BRDM-2 Democratic of the Congo SAMIM 1
IFV 40 BMP-1 Estonia EUTM Mozambique 1
APC 338 Finland EUTM Mozambique 4
APC (T) 30 FV430
France EUTM Mozambique 6
APC (W) 285: 160 BTR-60; 100 BTR-152; 25 AT-105 Saxon
Greece EUTM Mozambique 8
PPV 23+: 11 Casspir; 12 Marauder; some Tata Motors
MRAP Lesotho SAMIM 122
AUV 9+ Tiger 4×4 Lithuania EUTM Mozambique 2
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE Malawi SAMIM 2
MSL • MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger); Portugal EUTM Mozambqiue 120
9K111 Fagot (RS-AT-4 Spigot) Romania EUTM Mozambique 6
RCL 75mm; 82mm B-10; 107mm 24 B-12 Rwanda Army: 1,500
GUNS 85mm 18: 6 D-48; 12 PT-56 (D-44) South Africa SAMIM 1,200
ARTILLERY 126 Spain EUTM Mozambique 2
TOWED 62: 100mm 20 M-1944; 105mm 12 M101;
Tanzania SAMIM 290
122mm 12 D-30; 130mm 6 M-46; 152mm 12 D-1
Zimbabwe SAMIM 1
MRL 122mm 12 BM-21 Grad
MOR 52: 82mm 40 M-43; 120mm 12 M-43
AIR DEFENCE • GUNS 290+
SP 57mm 20 ZSU-57-2
TOWED 270+: 20mm M-55; 23mm 120 ZU-23-2; 37mm
90 M-1939; (10 M-1939 in store); 57mm 60 S-60; (30 S-60
in store)
Navy ε200
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 30
PBF 26: 20+ DV 15; 2 HSI 32; 2 Interceptor (LKA Solas
Marine); 2 Namilti (ex-IND C-401)
PB 4: 3 Ocean Eagle 43 (capacity 1 Camcopter S-100
UAV); 1 Pebane (ex-ESP Conejera)
UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES
ISR • Light 1 S-100 Camcopter
Light
Namibia NAM 3 inf bde (total: 6 inf bn)
Other
Namibian Dollar NAD 2021 2022 2023 1 (Presidential Guard) gd bn
GDP NAD 182bn 201bn COMBAT SUPPORT
USD 12.3bn 12.5bn 1 arty bde with (1 arty regt)
per capita USD 4,826 4,809 1 AT regt
1 engr regt
Growth % 2.7 3.0
1 sigs regt
Inflation % 3.6 6.4 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
Def bdgt NAD 5.43bn 5.85bn 1 log bn
USD 367m 363m AIR DEFENCE
USD1=NAD 14.78 16.10 1 AD regt
Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
567 ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
MBT T-54/T-55†; T-34†
249 RECCE 12 BRDM-2
2008 2015 2022 IFV 7: 5 Type-05P mod (with BMP-1 turret); 2 Wolf
Turbo 2 mod (with BMP-1 turret)
Population 2,727,409
APC 61
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus APC (W) 13: 10 BTR-60; 3 Type-05P
PPV 48: 20 Casspir; 28 Wolf Turbo 2
Male 17.6% 5.3% 4.8% 4.3% 15.4% 1.7%
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
Female 17.2% 5.2% 4.8% 4.4% 17.0% 2.3% ARV T-54/T-55 reported
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
Capabilities RCL 82mm B-10
The Namibian defence authorities aim to develop a small, mobile GUNS 12+: 57mm ZIS-2; 76mm 12 ZIS-3
and well-equipped professional force. According to the constitu- ARTILLERY 72
tion, the primary mission of the Namibian Defence Force (NDF) TOWED 140mm 24 G-2
is territorial defence. Secondary roles include assistance to civil MRL 122mm 8: 5 BM-21 Grad; 3 PHL-81
authorities and supporting the AU, SADC and UN. The NDF Devel- MOR 40: 81mm; 82mm
opment Strategy 2012–22 stated that the NDF design should be AIR DEFENCE
based on a conventional force with a force-projection capabil-
SAM • Point-defence FN-6 (CH-SA-10)
ity. The navy exercises with SADC as part of the SADC’s Standing
Maritime Committee and participated in the multinational UNITAS GUNS 65
exercise for the first time in 2022. It also has conducted multina- SP 23mm 15 Zumlac
tional training missions organised by US forces. Annual meetings TOWED 50+: 14.5mm 50 ZPU-4; 57mm S-60
of a permanent commission on defence and security between
Namibia and Botswana were elevated in 2021 to a biannual Navy ε900
commission, chaired by the two countries’ heads of state. While
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
the NDF receives a comparatively large proportion of the state
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 7
budget, there have been recent problems in adequately funding
training. A recruitment drive for officers and other ranks was PSO 1 Elephant with 1 hel landing platform
announced in 2022, the first in seven years. Namibia has deployed PCC 3: 2 Daures (ex-PRC Haiqing (Type-037-IS)) with 2
Sub-Saharan
on AU, SADC and UN missions and the NDF sent a small force to FQF-3200 A/S mor; 1 Oryx
Africa
Mozambique in 2022, but there is only limited capacity for inde- PB 3: 1 Brendan Simbwaye (BRZ Grajaú); 2 Terrace Bay
pendent power projection. The NDF is equipped for the most part (BRZ Marlim)
with ageing or obsolescent systems, but economic difficulties AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 1 F406 Caravan II
make recapitalisation unlikely in the near term. There is a limited HELICOPTERS • TPT • Medium 1 S-61L
defence-manufacturing sector, mainly focused on armoured vehi-
cles, tactical communications and ammunition. Marines ε700
ACTIVE 9,900 (Army 9,000 Navy 900) Gendarmerie
& Paramilitary 6,000 Air Force
FORCES BY ROLE
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE 1 sqn with F-7 (F-7NM); FT-7 (FT-7NG)
ISR
Army 9,000 1 sqn with O-2A Skymaster
FORCES BY ROLE TRANSPORT
MANOEUVRE Some sqn with An-26 Curl; Falcon 900; Learjet 36; Y-12
Reconnaissance TRAINING
1 recce regt 1 sqn with K-8 Karakorum*
468 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER relatively well trained, and there is training support from France,
1 sqn with H425; Mi-8 Hip; Mi-25 Hind D; SA315 Lama Italy and the US. Combat operations have also been conducted
(Cheetah); SA316B Alouette III (Chetak) with US forces. There is limited capacity to deploy beyond neigh-
bouring countries without external support. Operations in austere
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
environments have demonstrated adequate sustainment and
AIRCRAFT 11+ combat capable
manoeuvre capacity. While there have been moves to integrate
FTR 7: 5 F-7 (F-7NM); 2 FT-7 (FT-7NG) better-protected armoured vehicles, the armed forces are gen-
ISR 5 Cessna O-2A Skymaster erally underequipped and under-resourced. Apart from limited
TPT 6: Light 5: 2 An-26 Curl; 1 Learjet 36; 2 Y-12; PAX 1 maintenance facilities, the country has no domestic defence-
Falcon 900 industrial capability.
TRG 4+ K-8 Karakorum*
HELICOPTERS ACTIVE 33,100 (Army 33,000 Air 100) Gendarmerie
ATK 2 Mi-25 Hind D & Paramilitary 24,500
MRH 5: 1 H425; 1 SA315 Lama (Cheetah); 3 SA316B Conscript liability Selective conscription, 2 years
Alouette III (Chetak)
TPT • Medium 1 Mi-8 Hip ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 6,000
Army ε33,000
Police Force • Special Field Force 6,000 (incl 8 Mil Zones
Border Guard and Special Reserve Force) FORCES BY ROLE
SPECIAL FORCES
DEPLOYMENT 2 spec ops coy
9 (intervention) cdo bn
SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 2 MANOEUVRE
SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 7 Light
14 (combined arms) inf bn
Niger NER Amphibious
1 rvn coy
CFA Franc BCEAO XOF 2021 2022 2023 COMBAT SUPPORT
GDP XOF 8.29tr 9.08tr 1 engr coy
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
USD 15.0bn 14.6bn
1 log gp
per capita USD 595 561
AIR DEFENCE
Growth % 1.3 6.7 1 AD coy
Inflation % 3.8 4.5 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Def bdgt XOF 112bn 151bn ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
USD 203m 244m RECCE 125: 35 AML-20/AML-60; 90 AML-90
USD1=XOF 554.23 620.59 APC 151
Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) APC (W) 53: 11 Bastion APC; 22 Panhard M3; 20 WZ-551
228 PPV 98+: 15 IAG Guardian Xtreme; 57 Mamba Mk7;
21 Puma M26-15; 5+ Puma M36
44 AUV 10+: 3+ Tiger 4×4; 7 VBL; Bastion Patsas
2008 2015 2022 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
RCL 14: 75mm 6 M20; 106mm 8 M40
Population 24,484,587 ARTILLERY 40+
MRL 107mm PH-63 (tch)
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
MOR 40: 81mm 19 Brandt; 82mm 17; 120mm 4 Brandt
Male 25.2% 5.7% 4.4% 3.2% 9.7% 1.3% AIR DEFENCE • GUNS 39
Female 24.8% 5.8% 4.6% 3.4% 10.5% 1.4% SP 20mm 10 Panhard M3 VDAA
TOWED 20mm 29
Capabilities
Principal military roles include maintaining internal and border Air Force 100
security, in light of the regional threat from Islamist groups. The EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
country is a member of the G5 Sahel group and part of the Multi- AIRCRAFT 2 combat capable
National Joint Task Force fighting Boko Haram in the Lake Chad
ATK 2 Su-25 Frogfoot
Basin. Niamey hosts air contingents from France, Germany and
the US, which maintains a detachment of UAVs. France redeployed
ISR 6: 4 Cessna 208 Caravan; 2 DA42 MPP Twin Star
part of its Barkhane operation to Niger after withdrawing from Mali TPT 8: Medium 2 C-130H Hercules; Light 5: 1 An-26
and has conducted joint counter-terrorism operations with Niger’s Curl; 2 Cessna 208 Caravan; 1 Do-28 Skyservant;
armed forces. Niger’s armed forces are combat experienced and 1 Do-228-201; PAX 1 B-737-700 (VIP)
Sub-Saharan Africa 469
Sub-Saharan
USD1=NGN 398.77 410.59
bde, 1 engr regt)
Africa
Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) Light
2.94 1 (6th) inf div (1 amph bde, 2 inf bde)
1 (7th) inf div (1 spec ops bn, 1 recce bn(-), 1 armd bde,
1.31 7 (task force) inf bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr regt)
2008 2015 2022 1 (8th Task Force) inf div (2 inf bde)
1 (82nd) composite div (1 recce bn, 3 mot inf bde, 1 arty
Population 225,082,083
bde, 1 engr regt)
1 (Multi-National Joint Task Force) bde (2 inf bn(-))
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Other
Male 20.9% 5.7% 4.8% 3.8% 13.8% 1.6% 1 (Presidential Guard) gd bde (4 gd bn)
Female 20.1% 5.5% 4.6% 3.7% 13.8% 1.8% AIR DEFENCE
1 AD regt
Capabilities EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Nigeria is West Africa’s principal military power and faces numerous ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
security challenges, including from the Islamic State West MBT 319+: 100 T-55†; 10 T-72AV; 31 T-72M1; 172 Vickers
African Province, Boko Haram and militants in the Delta. Reform Mk 3; 6+ VT-4
initiatives have developed after relative military weaknesses LT TK 154 FV101 Scorpion
470 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
ASLT 6+ ST-1 PB 81: 1 Andoni; 1 Dorina (FPB 98); 4 FPB 110 MkII; 8
RECCE 312: 88 AML-60; 40 AML-90; 70 EE-9 Cascavel; Okpoku (FPB 72); 1 Karaduwa; 1 Sagbama; 2 Sea Eagle
44 ERC-90F1 Lynx; 50 FV721 Fox; 20 FV601 Saladin Mk2 (Suncraft 38m); 15 Stingray (Suncraft 16m); 40 Suncraft
IFV 31: 9 BTR-4EN; 22 BVP-1 12m; 4 Swiftships; 2 Town (of which one laid up); 2 Yola†
APC 865+ MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 2
APC (T) 373: 248 4K-7FA Steyr; 65 MT-LB; 60 ZSD-89 MCC 2 Ohue (ITA Lerici mod)†
APC (W) 172+: 10 FV603 Saracen; 110 AVGP Grizzly AMPHIBIOUS 5
mod/Piranha I 6x6; 47 BTR-3UN; 5 BTR-80; some EE-11 LANDING SHIPS • LST 1 Kada (NLD Damen LST 100)
Urutu (reported); with 1 hel landing platform
PPV 320+: 14 Caiman; some Conqueror; 159 CS/VP3; LANDING CRAFT • LCVP 4 Stingray 20
47 Ezugwu; 5+ Isotrex Phantom II; some Marauder; 7+ LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 2
Maxxpro; 8 Proforce Ara-1; 13 Proforce Ara-2; some AGHS 1 Lana (OSV 190)
Proforce Viper; 23 REVA III 4×4; 10 Streit Spartan; 9 AX 1 Prosperity
Streit Cougar (Igirigi); 25 Streit Typhoon
AUV 183+: 107 Cobra; FV103 Spartan; 4+ Tiger 4×4; 72 VBL Naval Aviation
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARV 17+: AVGP Husky; 2 Greif; 15 Vickers ARV HELICOPTERS
VLB MTU-20; VAB MRH 2 AW139 (AB-139)
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
TPT • Light 3 AW109E Power†
MSL • MANPATS Shershen
RCL 84mm Carl Gustaf; 106mm M40A1 Special Boat Service 200
ARTILLERY 518+ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
SP 43+: 105mm 4+ SH-5; 122mm some SH-2; 155mm
FORCES BY ROLE
39 Palmaria
TOWED 104: 105mm 49 M-56; 122mm 48 D-30/D-74; SPECIAL FORCES
130mm 7 M-46; (155mm 24 FH-77B in store) 1 SF unit
MRL 122mm 41: 9 BM-21 Grad; 25 APR-21; 7 RM-70
MOR 330+: 81mm 200; 82mm 100; 120mm 30+ Air Force 18,000
AIR DEFENCE FORCES BY ROLE
SAM • Point-defence 16+: 16 Roland; Blowpipe; 9K32 Very limited op capability
Strela-2 (RS-SA-7 Grail)‡ FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
GUNS 89+ 1 sqn with F-7 (F-7NI); FT-7 (FT-7NI)
SP 23mm 29 ZSU-23-4 Shilka MARITIME PATROL
TOWED 60+: 20mm 60+; 23mm ZU-23; 40mm L/70 1 sqn with ATR-42-500 MP; Do-128D-6 Turbo SkyServant;
Do-228-100/200
Navy 25,000 (incl Coast Guard) TRANSPORT
Western Comd HQ located at Apapa; Eastern Comd HQ 2 sqn with C-130H Hercules; C-130H-30 Hercules; G-222
located at Calabar; Central Comd HQ located at Brass 1 (Presidential) gp with B-727; B-737BBJ; BAe-125-800;
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Beech 350 King Air; Do-228-200; Falcon 7X; Falcon 900;
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES Gulfstream IV/V
FFGHM (1 Aradu (GER MEKO 360) (non-operational) TRAINING
with 8 single lnchr with Otomat Mk1 AShM, 1 octuple 1 unit with Air Beetle†
Albatros lnchr with Aspide SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT 1 unit with Alpha Jet*
with A244/S LWT, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 med hel)) 1 unit with L-39 Albatros†*
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 122 1 unit with Super Mushshak; DA40NG
CORVETTES • FSM (1 Erinomi (UK Vosper Mk 9) 1 hel unit with Mi-34 Hermit (trg)
(non-operational) with 1 triple lnchr with Seacat† SAM, ATTACK HELICOPTER
1 twin 375mm Bofors ASW Rocket Launcher System A/S
1 sqn with Mi-24/Mi-35 Hind†
mor, 1 76mm gun)
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
PSOH 4: 2 Centenary with 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Z-9
1 sqn with H215 (AS332) Super Puma; (AS365N)
hel); 2 Thunder (ex-US Hamilton) with 1 76mm gun
Dauphin; AW109LUH; H135
PCFG 1 Siri (FRA Combattante IIIB)† with 2 twin lnchr
with MM38 Exocet AShM, 1 76mm gun EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PCF 2 Siri (FRA Combattante IIIB) with 1 76mm gun AIRCRAFT 62 combat capable
PCO 4 Kyanwa (ex-US CG Balsam) FTR 12: 10 F-7 (F-7NI); 2 FT-7 (FT-7NI)
PCC 4: 2 Ekpe (GER Lurssen 57m)† with 1 76mm gun; FGA 3 JF-17 Thunder Block II
2 Kano (Damen Fast Crew Supplier 4008) ELINT 2 ATR-42-500 MP
PBF 26: 2 ARESA 1700; 4 C-Falcon; 12 Manta MkIII ISR 1 Beech 350 King Air
(Suncraft 17m); 3 Shaldag II; 2 Torie (Nautic Sentinel MP 1 Cessna 525 Citation CJ3 (operated on behalf
17m); 3 Wave Rider of NIMASA)
Sub-Saharan Africa 471
Sub-Saharan
of modern artillery and armoured vehicles. There is limited mainte-
Africa
DEPLOYMENT nance capacity but no defence manufacturing sector.
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 6 ACTIVE 33,000 (Army 32,000 Air 1,000)
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 2,000
MONUSCO 8
GAMBIA: ECOWAS • ECOMIG 197 ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 2
MALI: UN • MINUSMA 78; 1 fd hospital Army 32,000
SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 14 FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 15
Light
WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 8
2 cdo bn
4 inf div (3 inf bde)
FOREIGN FORCES COMBAT SUPPORT
United Kingdom 80 (trg teams) 1 arty bde
472 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES Senegal SEN
MBT 34: 24 T-54/T-55; 10 Tiran-5 CFA Franc BCEAO XOF 2021 2022 2023
RECCE 90: ε90 AML-60/AML-90 GDP XOF 15.3tr 17.1tr
IFV 38+: BMP; 13+ Ratel-23; 10 Ratel-60; 15 Ratel-90 USD 27.6bn 27.5bn
APC 60+ per capita USD 1,607 1,558
APC (W) 20+: BTR; Buffalo (Panhard M3); 20 WZ-551 Growth % 6.1 4.7
(reported) Inflation % 2.2 7.5
PPV 40 RG-31 Nyala Def bdgt XOF 263bn 263bn
AUV 92: 76 Cobra/Cobra II; 16 VBL USD 474m 423m
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES USD1=XOF 554.23 620.61
ARV T-54/T-55 ARV reported Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE 416
Sub-Saharan
AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 39: 14.5mm 6 ZPU-4
Africa
(tch); 20mm 21 M693; 40mm 12 L/60 DEPLOYMENT
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 191;
Navy (incl Coast Guard) 950
1 inf coy
FORCES BY ROLE
SPECIAL FORCES DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN •
1 cdo coy MONUSCO 6
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE GAMBIA: ECOWAS • ECOMIG 250
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 10
MALI: UN • MINUSMA 941; 1 mech inf bn; 1 engr coy
PCO 1 Fouladou (OPV 190 Mk II)
PCC 1 Njambour (FRA SFCN 59m) with 2 76mm gun SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 3
PBF 6: 3 Anambe (Shaldag II); 2 Ferlo (RPB 33); 1 Lac Retba SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 2
(Shaldag V)
PB 2: 1 Conejera; 1 Kedougou
AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 2
FOREIGN FORCES
LCT 2 EDIC 700 France 400; 1 Falcon 50MI
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT• AG 1 Spain 65; 2 C295M
474 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Sub-Saharan
minimal national infrastructure available to support domestic
Africa
Maritime Wing ε200 operations. The equipment inventory is limited and eclectic, and
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE government plans to re-establish and equip Somalia’s air and
maritime forces remain unfulfilled. There is no domestic defence-
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 2 industrial capability.
PB 2: 1 Type-062/I (ex-PRC Shanghai III)†; 1 Isle of Man
ACTIVE 13,900 (Army 13,900)
DEPLOYMENT ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 7
Army 13,900
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • FORCES BY ROLE
MONUSCO 2 COMMAND
4 div HQ
LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 3
MANOEUVRE
MALI: UN • MINUSMA 18 Light
Some cdo bn(+)
SOMALIA: UN • UNSOM 1; UN • UNSOS 1
12 inf bde (3 inf bn)
SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 7 2 indep inf bn
476 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Sub-Saharan
Army 38,000 5 AD regt
Africa
FORCES BY ROLE EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Regt are bn sized. A new army structure is planned ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
with 3 mixed regular/reserve divisions (1 mechanised, 1 MBT 24 Olifant 2 (133 Olifant 1B in store)
motorised and 1 contingency) comprising 12 brigades (1 ASLT 50 Rooikat-76 (126 in store)
armoured, 1 mechanised, 7 motorised, 1 airborne, 1 air- IFV 534 Ratel-20/Ratel-60/Ratel-90
landed and 1 sea landed) APC • PPV 810: 370 Casspir; 60 Mamba (refurbished);
COMMAND 380 Mamba†
2 bde HQ ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
SPECIAL FORCES
ARV Gemsbok
2 SF regt(-)
VLB Leguan
MANOEUVRE
MW Husky
Reconnaissance
1 armd recce regt ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
Armoured MSL
1 tk regt(-) SP ZT-3 Swift
Mechanised MANPATS Milan ADT/ER
2 mech inf bn RCL 106mm M40A1 (some SP)
478 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Sub-Saharan
in February 2022 were ready for graduation after this process. The
FOREIGN FORCES
Africa
same report said that regional commanders were recruiting inde-
pendently in order to strengthen their position, in violation of the All UNMISS, unless otherwise indicated
peace agreement. Reports continue of the use of child soldiers, Albania 2
forced recruitment, and of sexual violence. There is no capacity to
Australia 15
deploy and sustain military units beyond national borders. Equip-
ment is primarily of Soviet origin with some light arms of Chinese Azerbaijan 1
origin, and there have been efforts to expand the small air force. Bangladesh 1,628; 1 inf coy; 2 rvn coy; 2 engr coy
Sanctions remain in place, with both the EU and UN arms embar- Benin 4
goes widened in 2018 to include all types of military equipment.
Bhutan 5
South Sudan has no established domestic defence industry but
Bolivia 5
has reportedly sought to develop an ammunition-manufacturing
capacity in recent years. Brazil 11
Cambodia 84; 1 MP unit
ACTIVE 53,000 (Army 53,000)
Canada 8
China, People’s Republic of 1,054; 1 inf bn; 1 engr coy; 1
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE fd hospital
480 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Ecuador 3
Sudan SDN
Egypt 5
Sudanese Pound SDG 2021 2022 2023
El Salvador 1
GDP SDG 15.0tr 32.3tr
Ethiopia 1,476; 3 inf bn
USD 35.1bn 42.8bn
Fiji 3
per capita USD 772 916
Gambia 4
Growth % 0.5 -0.3
Germany 14
Inflation % 359.1 154.9
Ghana 725; 1 inf bn Def exp SDG n.k n.k
Guatemala 7 USD n.k n.k
Guinea 3 USD1=SDG 425.62 756.05
India 2,396; 2 inf bn; 1 engr coy; 1 sigs coy; 1 fd hospital Population 47,958,856
Indonesia 3
Japan 4 Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Sub-Saharan
HJ-8; 9K135 Kornet (RS-AT-14 Spriggan)
2 An-72 Coaler; 4 An-74TK-200; 2 An-74TK-300; PAX
Africa
RCL 106mm 40 M40A1 4: 1 Falcon 20F (VIP); 1 Falcon 50 (VIP); 1 Falcon 900; 1
GUNS 76mm ZIS-3; 100mm M-1944; 85mm D-44 Il-62M Classic
ARTILLERY 860+ TRG 15+: 11 K-8 Karakorum*; some SAFAT-03; 3 Utva-75
SP 66: 122mm 56 2S1 Gvozdika; 155mm 10 Mk F3 HELICOPTERS
TOWED 128+: 105mm 20 M101; 122mm 21+: 21 D-30; ATK 40: 25 Mi-24 Hind; 2 Mi-24P Hind; 7 Mi-24V Hind E;
D-74; M-30; 130mm 75 M-46/Type-59-I; 155mm 12 6 Mi-35P Hind
M114A1 MRH ε3 Mi-17 Hip H
MRL 666+: 107mm 477 Type-63; 122mm 188: 120 BM-21 TPT 27: Medium 23: 21 Mi-8 Hip; 2 Mi-171; Light 4: 1
Grad; 50 Saqr; 18 Type-81; 302mm 1+ WS-1 Bell 205; 3 Bo-105
MOR 81mm; 82mm; 120mm AM-49; M-43; W86 TRG some SAFAT 02
AIR DEFENCE UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES
SAM • Point-defence 4+: 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-7 Grail)‡; CISR • Heavy CH-3; CH-4
4+ 9K33 Osa (RS-SA-8 Gecko); FN-6 (CH-SA-10) AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Medium-range: (18 S-75M
GUNS 966+ Dvina (RS-SA-2 Guideline)‡ (non-operational))
SP 20: 20mm 8 M163 Vulcan; 12 M3 VDAA AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AAM • IR R-3 (RS-AA-2
TOWED 946+: 740+ 14.5mm ZPU-2/14.5mm ZPU- Atoll)‡; R-60 (RS-AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (RS-AA-11A Archer);
4/37mm Type-63/57mm S-60/85mm M-1944; 20mm 16 ARH R-77 (RS-AA-12A Adder)
482 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Sub-Saharan
TRANSPORT
Africa
1 sqn with Cessna 404 Titan; DHC-5D Buffalo; F-28
Fellowship; F-50; Gulfstream G550; Y-12 (II)
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
1 sqn with Bell 205 (AB-205); Bell 412EP Twin Huey
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE†
AIRCRAFT 17 combat capable
FTR 11: 9 F-7 (F-7TN); 2 FT-7 (FT-7N)
ISR 1 SB7L-360 Seeker
TPT 12: Medium 2 Y-8; Light 7: 2 Cessna 404 Titan; 3
DHC-5D Buffalo; 2 Y-12(II); PAX 3: 1 F-28 Fellowship; 1
F-50; 1 Gulfstream G550
TRG 9: 3 FT-5 (JJ-5); 6 K-8 Karakorum*
HELICOPTERS
MRH 1 Bell 412EP Twin Huey
TPT 2: Medium 1+ H225; Light 1 Bell 205 (AB-205)
484 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Air Manoeuvre
Togo TGO 1 cdo/para regt (3 cdo/para coy)
Other
CFA Franc BCEAO XOF 2021 2022 2023
1 (Presidential Guard) gd regt (1 gd bn, 1 cdo bn, 2
GDP XOF 4.67tr 5.09tr indep gd coy)
USD 8.43bn 8.36bn COMBAT SUPPORT
per capita USD 993 961 1 cbt spt regt (1 fd arty bty, 2 ADA bty, 1 engr/log/tpt bn)
Growth % 5.3 5.4 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Inflation % 4.3 5.6 ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
Def bdgt XOF 65.6bn 106bn MBT 2 T-54/T-55
USD 118m 173m LT TK 18 FV101 Scorpion
USD1=XOF 554.27 608.60 RECCE 55: 3 AML-60; 7 AML-90; 36 EE-9 Cascavel; 6 M8;
Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 3 M20
161 IFV 20 BMP-2
APC 86
47 APC (T) 4 M3A1 half-track
2008 2015 2022 APC (W) 32: 2 Mbombe 4; 30 UR-416
PPV 50 Mamba Mk7
Population 8,492,333
AUV 32: 29 Bastion Patsas; 1 FV103 Spartan; 2 VBL
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
RCL 75mm Type-52 (M20)/Type-56; 82mm Type-65
Male 19.9% 5.0% 4.2% 3.7% 14.7% 1.7%
(B-10)
Female 19.4% 5.0% 4.2% 3.8% 16.0% 2.5% GUNS 57mm 5 ZIS-2
ARTILLERY 30+
Capabilities SP 122mm 6
Defence authorities are increasingly concerned by the chal- TOWED 105mm 4 HM-2
lenge from piracy and other illicit maritime activities in the Gulf MRL 122mm PHL-81 mod (SC6 chassis)
of Guinea as well as jihadist activity in the north. As a result,
regional cooperation is now being strengthened. In 2020 Togo
MOR 82mm 20 M-43
adopted a new military-programming law, leading to the creation AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 43 14.5mm 38 ZPU-4;
of a special-forces group. Togo plans to increase its force strength 37mm 5 M-1939
and recently acquired modern APCs while there have been uncon-
firmed reports of interest in armed UAVs. France continues to Navy ε200 (incl Marine Infantry unit)
deliver military training, including for Togolese peacekeeping
contingents. There is also a peacekeeping training centre in Lomé. EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
The United States’ Africa Contingency Operations Training and PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 3
Assistance programme has provided assistance with training. The PBF 1 Agou (RPB 33)
armed forces have taken part in multilateral exercises, including PB 2 Kara (FRA Esterel)
the US-led Obangame Express. Togo’s deployment capabilities are
limited without external support, while financial challenges limit
capability development more broadly. There are some mainte- Air Force 250
nance facilities but there is no defence-manufacturing sector. FORCES BY ROLE
TRANSPORT
ACTIVE 13,450 (Army 13,000 Navy 200 Air 250)
1 sqn with Beech 200 King Air
Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 3,000
1 VIP unit with DC-8; F-28-1000
Conscript liability Selective conscription, 2 years
TRAINING
1 sqn with TB-30 Epsilon*
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
1 sqn with SA315 Lama; SA316 Alouette III; SA319
Army ε13,000 Alouette III; SA342L1 Gazelle
FORCES BY ROLE
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE†
MANOEUVRE
AIRCRAFT 3 combat capable
Reconnaissance
TPT 5: Light 2 Beech 200 King Air; PAX 3: 1 DC-8; 2
1 armd recce regt
Mechanised F-28-1000 (VIP)
1 armd bn TRG 3 TB-30 Epsilon* (3 Alpha Jet*; 4 EMB-326G* in store)
Light HELICOPTERS
2 cbd arms regt MRH 6: 2 SA315 Lama; 1 SA316 Alouette III; 1 SA319
2 inf regt Alouette III; 2 SA342L1 Gazelle
1 rapid reaction force TPT • Medium 2 Mi-8T Hip C (1 SA330 Puma in store)
Sub-Saharan Africa 485
Special Forces Group largest contributors to the East Africa Standby Force and in 2014
signed a Mutual Defence Treaty with Kenya and Rwanda. Train-
FORCES BY ROLE ing levels are adequate, particularly for the special forces, and are
SPECIAL FORCES improving after recent experiences. There is regular training with
1 SF unit international partners, including at Uganda’s own facilities. Airlift is
limited, though rotary-wing aviation has improved in recent years,
Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 3,000 partly due to US assistance. Motorised infantry formations still
lack sufficient transport and logistics capacity. Mechanised forces
Gendarmerie ε3,000 are relatively well equipped, though equipment is disparate and
Ministry of Interior ageing. Improvements include the arrival of MRAP and other pro-
tected vehicles. There is limited defence-industrial capacity, and a
FORCES BY ROLE new armoured vehicle plant was opened in July. Uganda’s 2015–19
2 reg sections Security Sector Development plan included the establishment of
SPECIAL FORCES an engineering centre and a defence-research facility.
1 SF unit
MANOEUVRE ACTIVE 45,000 (Ugandan People’s Defence Force
Other 45,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 1,400
1 (mobile) paramilitary sqn
RESERVE 10,000
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
APC • PPV Mamba Mk7
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
DEPLOYMENT
Ugandan People’s Defence Force ε40,000–
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 10 45,000
MALI: UN • MINUSMA 733; 1 mech inf bn; 1 fd hospital FORCES BY ROLE
SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 2 MANOEUVRE
Armoured
WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 3
1 armd bde
Light
Uganda UGA 1 cdo bn
5 inf div (total: 16 inf bde)
Ugandan Shilling UGX 2021 2022 2023 1 mtn div
GDP UGX 153tr 171tr Other
USD 43.0bn 48.4bn 1 (Special Forces Command) mot bde
COMBAT SUPPORT
per capita USD 1,012 1,106
1 arty bde
Growth % 6.7 4.4
AIR DEFENCE
Inflation % 2.2 6.4 2 AD bn
Def bdgt UGX 4.35tr 3.87tr 3.76tr EQUIPMENT BY TYPE†
USD 1.22bn 1.09bn ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
USD1=UGX 3562.19 3544.40 MBT 279+: 140 T-54/T-55; 45 T-55AM2; 40 T-72A; 10
Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) T-72B1; 44 T-90S; ZTZ-85-IIM
1007 LT TK ε20 PT-76
Sub-Saharan
RECCE 46: 40 Eland-20; 6 FV701 Ferret
Africa
183 IFV 39: 37 BMP-2; 2+ VN2C
2008 2015 2022 APC 185
APC (W) 58: 15 BTR-60; 20 Buffel; 4 OT-64; 19 Bastion APC
Population 46,205,893 PPV 127+: 42 Casspir; some Chui; 35 Hizir; 40 Mamba;
10 RG-33L
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus AUV 15 Cougar
Male 24.1% 5.7% 4.3% 3.3% 10.2% 1.0% ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
Female 23.5% 5.8% 4.7% 4.0% 12.0% 1.4% ARV 1 BTS-4; T-54/T-55 reported
VLB MTU reported
Capabilities MW Husky
ARTILLERY 337+
Uganda’s armed forces are well equipped and are important con-
SP 155mm 6 ATMOS 2000
tributors to East African security. Operational experience and
training have led to improvements in administration and planning,
TOWED 243+: 122mm M-30; 130mm 221; 155mm 22:
as well as in military skills including counter-IED and urban patrol- 4 G-5; 18 M-839
ling. The years spent targeting the Lord’s Resistance Army has also MRL 6+: 107mm (12-tube); 122mm 6+: BM-21 Grad; 6 RM-70
given the military counter-insurgency experience. There are plans MOR 82+: 81mm L16; 82mm M-43; 120mm 78 Soltam;
to establish a National Defence College. Uganda is one of the SP 120mm 4+ SandCat with Spear
486 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
AIR DEFENCE
SAM • Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-7 Grail)‡; Zambia ZMB
9K310 Igla-1 (RS-SA-16 Gimlet) Zambian Kwacha ZMW 2021 2022 2023
GUNS • TOWED 20+: 14.5mm ZPU-1/ZPU-2/ZPU-4;
GDP ZMW 427bn 465bn
37mm 20 M-1939
USD 21.3bn 27.0bn
SPECIAL FORCES
AIR DEFENCE
1 cdo bn
MANOEUVRE 2 bty with S-125M Pechora-M (RS-SA-3 Goa)
Armoured EQUIPMENT BY TYPE†
1 armd regt (1 tk bn, 1 armd recce regt) Very low serviceability
Light
AIRCRAFT 21 combat capable
6 inf bn
COMBAT SUPPORT TPT 19: Medium 2 C-27J Spartan; Light 15: 1 Cessna 208B
1 arty regt (2 fd arty bn, 1 MRL bn) Grand Caravan; 5 Do-28; 2 MA60; 3 Y-12(II); 4 Y-12(IV);
1 engr regt PAX 2: 1 Gulfstream G650ER; 1 HS-748
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE TRG 40: 15 K-8 Karakorum*; 6 L-15*; 8 MFI-15 Safari; 11
Some equipment†
SF-260TW
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
MBT 30: 10 T-55; 20 ZTZ-59 HELICOPTERS
LT TK 30 PT-76 MRH 9: 1 AW139; 4 Mi-17 Hip H; 4 Z-9
RECCE 70 BRDM-1/BRDM-2 (ε30 serviceable) TPT • Light 12: 9 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois/AB-205);
IFV 23 Ratel-20 3 Bell 212
APC • APC (W) 47+: 13 BTR-60; 20 BTR-70; 10 BTR-80;
UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES 3+
4+ WZ-551
AUV 22 Tigr ISR • Medium 3+ Hermes 450
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AIR DEFENCE
ARV T-54/T-55 reported SAM • Short-range 6 S-125M Pechora-M (RS-SA-3 Goa)
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
MSL • MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger)
AAM • IR PL-5E-II
RCL 12+: 57mm 12 M18; 75mm M20; 84mm Carl Gustaf
ARTILLERY 194 ASM 9K11 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger)
SP 6 Atmos M-46
TOWED 61: 105mm 18 Model 56 pack howitzer; Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 1,400
122mm 25 D-30; 130mm 18 M-46
MRL 122mm 30 BM-21 Grad (ε12 serviceable) Police Mobile Unit 700
MOR 917: 81mm 55; 82mm 24; 120mm 12 SP 120mm 6+
FORCES BY ROLE
Elbit Spear Mk2
AIR DEFENCE MANOEUVRE
SAM • MANPAD 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-7 Grail)‡ Other
GUNS 1 police bn (4 police coy)
SP 23mm 4 ZSU-23-4 Shilka
TOWED 136: 14.5mm ZPU-4; 20mm 50 M-55 (triple); Police Paramilitary Unit 700
23mm ZU-23; 37mm 40 M-1939; PG-65; 40mm L/70;
FORCES BY ROLE
57mm ε30 S-60; 85mm 16 M-1939 KS-12
MANOEUVRE
Reserve 3,000 Other
FORCES BY ROLE 1 paramilitary bn (3 paramilitary coy)
Sub-Saharan
MANOEUVRE
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Africa
Light
3 inf bn ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
APC • PPV 9+: 3+ Marauder; 6 CS/VP3
Air Force 1,600
FORCES BY ROLE DEPLOYMENT
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
1 sqn with K-8 Karakorum* CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 930;
1 sqn with L-15* 1 inf bn
TRANSPORT
1 sqn with MA60; Y-12(II); Y-12(IV) DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN •
1 (VIP) unit with AW139; HS-748 MONUSCO 7
1 (liaison) sqn with Do-28
LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 2
TRAINING
1 sqn with MFI-15 Safari MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 1
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 9
1 sqn with Mi-17 Hip H
1 (liaison) sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois/AB-205) SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 5
488 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
MANOEUVRE
Zimbabwe ZWE Armoured
1 armd sqn
Zimbabwe Dollar ZWL 2021 2022 2023 Mechanised
GDP ZWL 2.91tr 14.4tr 1 mech inf bn
USD 32.9bn 38.3bn Light
15 inf bn
per capita USD 2,122 2,420
1 cdo bn
Growth % 7.2 3.0
Air Manoeuvre
Inflation % 98.5 284.9 1 para bn
Def bdgt USD 23.3bn 61.6bn Other
ZWL 287m 751m 3 gd bn
USD1=ZWL 81.00 82.00 1 (Presidential Guard) gd gp
COMBAT SUPPORT
Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)
1 arty bde
393
1 fd arty regt
2 engr regt
1
AIR DEFENCE
2008 2015 2022
1 AD regt
Population 15,121,004 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus MBT 40: 30 Type-59†; 10 Type-69†
Male 18.9% 5.1% 4.7% 4.3% 14.6% 1.8% RECCE 115: 20 Eland-60/90; 15 FV701 Ferret†; 80 EE-9
Female 19.2% 5.3% 4.9% 4.3% 14.3% 2.8%
Cascavel (90mm)
IFV 2+ YW307
APC • APC (T) 30: 8 ZSD-85 (incl CP); 22 VTT-323
Capabilities ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
Zimbabwe’s political instability and weak economy remain key ARV T-54/T-55 reported; ZJX-93 ARV
challenges for the government. Principal tasks for the Zimbabwe VLB MTU reported
Defence Forces include ensuring sovereignty, territorial integrity ARTILLERY 254
and border security, as well as providing internal-security support SP 122mm 12 2S1 Gvozdika
to the police. The armed forces take an active political role. TOWED 122mm 20: 4 D-30; 16 Type-60 (D-74)
Zimbabwe is a member of the AU and the SADC and takes part in MRL 76: 107mm 16 Type-63; 122mm 60 RM-70
SADC Standby Force exercises. Zimbabwe has also sent military
MOR 146: 81mm/82mm ε140; 120mm 6 M-43
forces as part of the SADC deployment to Mozambique. There are
AIR DEFENCE
defence ties with China and an emergent defence relationship
SAM • Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-7 Grail)‡
with Belarus, while Russia in mid-2019 reportedly said it would
GUNS • TOWED 116: 14.5mm 36 ZPU-1/ZPU-2/ZPU-4;
consider alternative payment means for military cooperation.
Military leaders have identified training as a development priority.
23mm 45 ZU-23-2; 37mm 35 M-1939
Small numbers of personnel have deployed on peacekeeping
operations but there is no capacity to sustain a force far beyond Air Force 4,000
national borders. Equipment recapitalisation is also a priority, FORCES BY ROLE
though much will depend on domestic economic health and FIGHTER
perhaps the extent to which China and Russia provide support. 1 sqn with F-7 II†; FT-7†
There are plans to revive state-owned small-arms and munitions FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
manufacturer Zimbabwe Defence Industries, although these may 1 sqn with K-8 Karakorum*
be hindered by continuing UK, US and EU sanctions. GROUND ATTACK/ISR
ACTIVE 29,000 (Army 25,000 Air 4,000) 1 sqn with Cessna 337/O-2A Skymaster*
ISR/TRAINING
Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 21,800
1 sqn with SF-260F/M; SF-260TP*; SF-260W Warrior*
TRANSPORT
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE 1 sqn with BN-2 Islander; CASA 212-200 Aviocar (VIP)
ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
Army ε25,000 1 sqn with Mi-35 Hind; Mi-35P Hind (liaison); SA316
Alouette III; AS532UL Cougar (VIP)
FORCES BY ROLE
1 trg sqn with Bell 412 Twin Huey, SA316 Alouette III
COMMAND
AIR DEFENCE
1 SF bde HQ
1 sqn
1 mech bde HQ
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
5 inf bde HQ
AIRCRAFT 45 combat capable
SPECIAL FORCES
FTR 9: 7 F-7 II†; 2 FT-7†
1 SF regt
Sub-Saharan Africa 489
Sub-Saharan
Africa
490 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Explanatory notes
liability where relevant, outline organisation, number conversions are less suitable when assessing the spending
of formations and units, and an inventory of the major of countries such as India and Saudi Arabia, which rely
equipment of each service. Details of national forces heavily on imports of military equipment from relatively
stationed abroad and of foreign forces stationed within high-cost producers. For those countries it would be neces-
the given country are also provided. sary to adopt a hybrid approach to determine defence
expenditure in dollars, with the market exchange rate used
Arms procurements and deliveries for converting defence procurement and the PPP conversion
A series of thematic tables, graphics and text follow the rate applied to all other defence expenditure (personnel,
regional data. These are designed to illustrate key trends, operations, etc.). As such, to produce standardised inter-
principal programmes and significant events in regional national comparisons, PPP conversions would have to be
defence procurements. More detailed information on applied to all countries. In the absence of defence-based PPP
defence procurements, organised by country, equipment rates, analysts would have to use the GDP-based PPP rates
type and manufacturing company, can be found on the that are available for all countries. However, these are also
IISS Military Balance+ database (https://www.iiss.org/mili- statistical estimates and, as such, difficult to apply to mili-
tarybalanceplus). The information in this section meets the tary expenditure because they reflect the purchasing power
threshold for a Military Balance country entry and as such of the wider economy, primarily civilian goods and services.
does not feature information on sales of small arms and
light weapons. Definitions of terms
Despite efforts by NATO and the UN to develop a stan-
Defence economics dardised definition of military expenditure, many coun-
Country entries include annual defence budgets (and expen- tries prefer to use their own definitions (which are often not
diture where applicable), selected economic-performance made public). In order to present a comprehensive picture,
indicators and demographic aggregates. All country entries The Military Balance lists three different measures of military-
are subject to revision each year as new information, partic- related spending data.
ularly regarding actual defence expenditure, becomes
available. On p. 500, there are also international compari- • For most countries, an official defence-budget
sons of defence expenditure and military personnel, giving figure is provided.
expenditure figures for the past three years in per capita • For those countries where other military-
terms and as a % of gross domestic product (GDP). The aim related outlays, over and above the defence
is to provide a measure of military expenditure and the allo- budget, are known or can be reasonably esti-
cation of economic resources to defence. mated, an additional measurement referred to as
Individual country entries show economic performance defence expenditure is also provided. Defence-
over the past two years and current demographic data. expenditure figures will naturally be higher than
Where this data is unavailable, information from the last official budget figures, depending on the range of
available year is provided. All financial data in the country additional factors included.
entries is shown in both national currency and US dollars • For NATO countries, a defence-budget figure, as
at current – not constant – prices. US-dollar conversions are well as defence expenditure reported by NATO
calculated from the exchange rates listed in the entry. in local-currency terms and converted using IMF
The use of market exchange rates has limitations, partic- exchange rates, is quoted.
ularly because it does not consider the varying levels of
development or the differing cost of inputs (principally NATO’s military-expenditure definition (the most
personnel, equipment and investment, factors that help comprehensive) is cash outlays of central or federal govern-
determine a country’s military capability) specific to each ments to meet the costs of national armed forces. The term
country’s national context. An alternative approach is to ‘armed forces’ includes strategic, land, naval, air, command,
make conversions using purchasing power parity (PPP) administration and support forces. It also includes other
exchange rates, which at least partially takes these cost forces if they are trained, structured and equipped to
differentials into account. support defence forces and are realistically deployable.
However, the suitability of PPP conversions depends on Defence expenditures are reported in four categories:
the extent to which a country is self-sufficient in developing Operating Costs, Procurement and Construction, Research
Reference
and producing the armaments required by its armed forces. and Development (R&D) and Other Expenditure. Operating
For Russia and China they are appropriate, as imported Costs include salaries and pensions for military and civilian
systems play almost no role in Russia’s case and only a personnel; the cost of maintaining and training units, service
small and decreasing one in that of China. However, PPP organisations, headquarters and support elements; and the
492 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
main armament, and fire control and optics. For maritime The definition includes aircraft designated by type as
domain equipment, they include crew-to-displacement bomber, fighter, fighter/ground attack, ground attack
ratio, primary missile armament, sensor suites, signature and anti-submarine warfare. Other aircraft considered
reduction, and propulsion. For air domain equipment, to be combat capable are marked with an asterisk (*).
they include avionics, weapons, signature management, Operational groupings of air forces are shown where
and upgrades. known. Typical squadron aircraft strengths can vary both
Platform types assessed in this fashion are described as between aircraft types and from country to country. When
having either an ‘obsolete’, ‘obsolescent’, ‘ageing’, ‘modern’ assessing missile ranges, The Military Balance uses the
or ‘advanced’ level of capability when compared with following range indicators:
other designs within the same category of equipment. This • Short-range ballistic missile (SRBM): less than 1,000 km;
should not be taken as an assessment of the physical age or • Medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM): 1,000–3,000 km;
remaining service life of a given platform or whether it can • Intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM): 3,000–5,000 km;
actually be employed offensively. Examples of these assess- • Intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM): over 5,000 km.
ments appear in certain graphics within The Military Balance.
Other IISS defence data
Deployments The Military Balance+ database is integrating information
The Military Balance mainly lists permanent bases and opera- on military-owned cyber capacities. The research taxonomy
tional deployments abroad, including peacekeeping opera- focuses on enablers, including indicators of capability from
tions. Domestic deployments are not included, with the the armed forces. The Military Balance+ also contains data
exception of overseas territories. Information in the country- on bilateral, multilateral and notable large or important
data sections details troop deployments and, where avail- military exercises held on a national basis. More broadly,
able, the role and equipment of deployed units. Personnel the Military Balance+ enables subscribers to view multiple
figures are not generally included for embassy staff or years of Military Balance data, and conduct searches
standing multinational headquarters. for complex queries more rapidly than is possible by
consulting the print book.
Land forces
To make international comparison easier and more consis- Attribution and acknowledgements
tent, The Military Balance categorises forces by role and The International Institute for Strategic Studies owes no
translates national military terminology for unit and forma- allegiance to any government, group of governments, or
tion sizes. Typical personnel strength, equipment holdings any political or other organisation. Its assessments are its
and organisation of formations such as brigades and divi- own, based on the material available to it from a wide
sions vary from country to country. In addition, some unit variety of sources. The cooperation of governments of
terms, such as ‘regiment’, ‘squadron’, ‘battery’ and ‘troop’, all listed countries has been sought and, in many cases,
can refer to significantly different unit sizes in different received. However, some data in The Military Balance is
countries. Unless otherwise stated, these terms should be estimated. Care is taken to ensure that this data is as accu-
assumed to reflect standard British usage where they occur. rate and free from bias as possible. The Institute owes a
considerable debt to a number of its own members, consul-
Naval forces tants and all those who help compile and check material.
Classifying naval vessels according to role is complex. The Director-General and Chief Executive and staff of the
A post-war consensus on primary surface combatants Institute assume full responsibility for the data and judge-
revolved around a distinction between independently ments in this book. Comments and suggestions on the data
operating cruisers, air-defence escorts (destroyers) and anti- and textual material contained within the book, as well as
submarine-warfare escorts (frigates). However, ships are on the style and presentation of data, are welcomed and
increasingly performing a range of roles. Also, modern ship should be communicated to the Editor of The Military
design has meant that the full-load displacement (FLD) of Balance at: The International Institute for Strategic Studies,
different warship types has evolved and in some cases over- Arundel House, 6 Temple Place, London, WC2R 2PG, UK,
laps. For these reasons, The Military Balance now classifies email: milbal@iiss.org. Copyright on all information in The
vessels by an assessed combination of role, equipment fit Military Balance belongs strictly to the IISS. Application to
and displacement. reproduce limited amounts of data may be made to the
Reference
FORCES BY ROLE
Command: free-standing, deployable formation headquarters (HQs).
Special Forces (SF): elite units specially trained and equipped for unconventional warfare and operations in
enemy-controlled territory. Many are employed in counter-terrorist roles.
Manoeuvre: combat units and formations capable of manoeuvring. These are subdivided as follows:
Reconnaissance: combat units and formations whose primary purpose is to gain information.
Armoured: units and formations principally equipped with main battle tanks (MBTs) and infantry
fighting vehicles (IFVs) to provide heavy mounted close-combat capability. Units and
formations intended to provide mounted close-combat capability with lighter armoured
vehicles, such as light tanks or wheeled assault guns, are classified as light armoured.
Mechanised: units and formations primarily equipped with lighter armoured vehicles such as
armoured personnel carriers (APCs). They have less mounted firepower and protection
than their armoured equivalents, but can usually deploy more infantry.
Light: units and formations whose principal combat capability is dismounted infantry, with
few, if any, organic armoured vehicles. Some may be motorised and equipped with soft-
skinned vehicles.
Air Manoeuvre: units and formations trained and equipped for delivery by transport aircraft and/
or helicopters.
Amphibious: amphibious forces are trained and equipped to project force from the sea.
Other Forces: includes security units such as Presidential Guards, paramilitary units such as border
guards and combat formations permanently employed in training or demonstration tasks.
Combat Support: combat support units and formations not integral to manoeuvre formations. Includes
artillery, engineers, military intelligence, nuclear, biological and chemical defence, signals
and information operations.
Combat Service includes logistics, maintenance, medical, supply and transport units and formations.
Support (CSS):
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Light Weapons: small arms, machine guns, grenades and grenade launchers and unguided man-portable
anti-armour and support weapons have proliferated so much and are sufficiently easy to
manufacture or copy that listing them would be impractical.
Crew-Served crew-served recoilless rifles, man-portable ATGW, MANPADs and mortars of greater than
Weapons: 80mm calibre are listed, but the high degree of proliferation and local manufacture of
many of these weapons means that estimates of numbers held may not be reliable.
Armoured Fighting armoured combat vehicles with a combat weight of at least six metric tonnes, further
Vehicles (AFVs): subdivided as below:
Main Battle Tank armoured, tracked combat vehicles, armed with a turret-mounted gun of at least 100mm
(MBT): calibre and with a combat weight of between 35 and 75 metric tonnes.
Light Tank (LT TK): armoured, tracked combat vehicles, armed with a turret-mounted gun of at least 75mm
calibre and with a combat weight of between 15 and 40 metric tonnes.
Wheeled Assault armoured, wheeled combat vehicles, armed with a turret-mounted gun of at least 75mm
Gun (ASLT): calibre and with a combat weight of at least 15 metric tonnes.
Armoured armoured vehicles primarily designed for reconnaissance tasks with no significant
Reconnaissance transport capability and either a main gun of less than 75mm calibre or a combat weight
(RECCE): of less than 15 metric tonnes, or both.
Infantry Fighting armoured combat vehicles designed and equipped to transport an infantry squad and
Vehicle (IFV): armed with a cannon of at least 20mm calibre.
Explanatory Notes 495
Armoured lightly armoured combat vehicles designed and equipped to transport an infantry squad
Personnel Carrier but either unarmed or armed with a cannon of less than 20mm calibre.
(APC):
Airborne Combat armoured vehicles designed to be deployable by parachute alongside airborne forces.
Vehicle (ABCV):
Amphibious Assault armoured vehicles designed to have an amphibious ship-to-shore capability.
Vehicle (AAV):
Armoured Utility armoured vehicles not designed to transport an infantry squad, but capable of
Vehicle (AUV): undertaking a variety of other utility battlefield tasks, including light reconnaissance
and light transport.
Specialist Variants: variants of armoured vehicles listed above that are designed to fill a specialised role, such
as command posts (CP), artillery observation posts (OP), signals (sigs) and ambulances
(amb), are categorised with their parent vehicles.
Engineering and includes armoured engineer vehicles (AEV), armoured repair and recovery vehicles (ARV),
Maintenance Vehicles: assault bridging (VLB) and mine-warfare vehicles (MW).
Nuclear, Biological armoured vehicles principally designed to operate in potentially contaminated terrain.
and Chemical Defence
Vehicles (NBC):
Anti-Tank/Anti- guns, guided weapons and recoilless rifles designed to engage armoured vehicles and
Infrastructure (AT): battlefield hardened targets.
Surface-to-Surface launch vehicles for transporting and firing surface-to-surface ballistic and cruise missiles.
Missile Launchers (SSM):
Artillery: weapons (including guns, howitzers, gun/howitzers, multiple-rocket launchers, mortars
and gun/mortars) with a calibre greater than 100mm for artillery pieces and 80mm and
above for mortars, capable of engaging ground targets with indirect fire.
Coastal Defence: land-based coastal artillery pieces and anti-ship-missile launchers.
Air Defence (AD): guns, directed-energy (DE) weapons and surface-to-air missile (SAM) launchers designed to
engage fixed-wing, rotary-wing and uninhabited aircraft. Missiles are further classified by
maximum notional engagement range: point-defence (up to 10 km); short-range (10–30
km); medium-range (30–75 km); and long-range (75 km+). Systems primarily intended to
intercept missiles rather than aircraft are categorised separately as Missile Defence.
offshore-patrol ships (PSO), with an FLD greater than 1,500 tonnes; patrol craft (PC), which
have an FLD between 250 and 1,499 tonnes; and patrol boats (PB) with an FLD between
ten and 250 tonnes. Vessels with a top speed greater than 35 knots are designated as ‘fast’ .
496 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Mine warfare vessels: all surface vessels configured primarily for mine laying (ML) or countermeasures.
Countermeasures vessels are either: sweepers (MS), which are designed to locate and
destroy mines in an area; hunters (MH), which are designed to locate and destroy
individual mines; or countermeasures vessels (MC), which combine both roles.
Amphibious vessels: vessels designed to transport combat personnel and/or equipment onto shore.
These include aviation-capable amphibious assault ships (LHA), which can embark
rotary-wing or STOVL air assets and may have a well deck for LCACs and landing craft;
aviation-capable amphibious assault ships with a well dock for LCACs and landing craft
(LHD), which can embark rotary-wing or STOVL assets; landing platform helicopters
(LPH), which have a primary role of launch and recovery platform for rotary-wing or
STOVL assets; landing platform docks (LPD), which do not have a through deck but
do have a well dock and carry both combat personnel and equipment; and land ships
docks (LSD) with a well dock but focused more on equipment transport. Landing
ships (LS) are amphibious vessels capable of ocean passage and landing craft (LC) are
smaller vessels designed to transport personnel and equipment from a larger vessel
to land or across small stretches of water. Landing ships have a hold; landing craft are
open vessels. Landing craft air cushioned (LCAC) are differentiated from utility craft
air cushioned (UCAC) in that the former have a bow ramp for the disembarkation of
vehicles and personnel.
Auxiliary vessels: ocean-going surface vessels performing an auxiliary military role, supporting combat
ships or operations. These generally fulfil five roles: replenishment (such as oilers (AO)
and solid stores (AKS)); logistics (such as cargo ships (AK) and logistics ships (AFS));
maintenance (such as cable-repair ships (ARC) or buoy tenders (ABU)); research (such as
survey ships (AFS)); and special purpose (such as intelligence-collection ships (AGI) and
ocean-going tugs (ATF)).
Weapons systems: weapons are listed in the following order: land-attack cruise missiles (LACM), anti-ship
missiles (AShM), surface-to-air missiles (SAM), heavy (HWT) and lightweight (LWT)
torpedoes, anti-submarine weapons (A/S), CIWS, guns and aircraft. Missiles with a range
less than 5 km and guns with a calibre less than 57mm are generally not included.
Organisations: naval groupings such as fleets and squadrons frequently change and are shown only
where doing so would aid qualitative judgements.
Legacy platforms: legacy-generation platforms, unless specifically modified for a new role, may be listed
with their original designations although they may not conform fully with current
guidance criteria.
Anti-Surface Warfare ASuW units are equipped with fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft intended for
(ASuW): anti-surface-warfare missions.
Maritime Patrol (MP): fixed-wing aircraft and uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs) intended for maritime
surface surveillance, which may possess an anti-surface-warfare capability. MP units
are equipped with fixed-wing aircraft or UAVs.
Electronic Warfare fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft and UAVs intended for electronic warfare. EW units are
(EW): equipped with fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft or UAVs.
Intelligence/ fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft and UAVs intended to provide radar, visible-light or
Surveillance/ infrared imagery, or a mix thereof. ISR units are equipped with fixed- or rotary-wing
Reconnaissance (ISR): aircraft or UAVs.
Combat/Intelligence/ aircraft and UAVs that have the capability to deliver air-to-surface weapons, as well as
Surveillance/ undertake ISR tasks. CISR units are equipped with armed aircraft and/or UAVs for ISR and
Reconnaissance (CISR): air-to-surface missions.
COMINT/ELINT/ fixed- and rotary-wing platforms and UAVs capable of gathering electronic (ELINT),
SIGINT: communications (COMINT) or signals intelligence (SIGINT). COMINT units are equipped
with fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft or UAVs intended for the communications-intelligence
task. ELINT units are equipped with fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft or UAVs used for
gathering electronic intelligence. SIGINT units are equipped with fixed- or rotary-wing
aircraft or UAVs used to collect signals intelligence.
Airborne Early fixed- and rotary-wing platforms capable of providing airborne early warning, with a
Warning (& Control) varying degree of onboard command and control depending on the
(AEW (&C)): platform. AEW(&C) units are equipped with fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft.
Search and Rescue units are equipped with fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft used to recover military personnel
(SAR): or civilians.
Combat Search and units are equipped with armed fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft for recovery of personnel
Rescue (CSAR): from hostile territory.
Tanker (Tkr): fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft designed for air-to-air refuelling. Tkr units are equipped
with fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft used for air-to-air refuelling.
Tanker Transport platforms capable of both air-to-air refuelling and military airlift.
(Tkr/Tpt):
Transport (Tpt): fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft intended for military airlift. Light transport aircraft are
categorised as having a maximum payload of up to 11,340 kg; medium up to 27,215 kg;
and heavy above 27,215 kg. Light transport helicopters have an internal payload of up
to 2,000 kg; medium transport helicopters up to 4,535 kg; heavy transport helicopters
greater than 4,535 kg. PAX aircraft are platforms generally unsuited for transporting
cargo on the main deck. Tpt units are equipped with fixed- or rotary-wing platforms to
transport personnel or cargo.
Trainer (Trg): fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft designed primarily for the training role; some also have
the capacity to carry light to medium ordnance. Trg units are equipped with fixed- or
rotary-wing training aircraft intended for pilot or other aircrew training.
Multi-Role Helicopter rotary-wing platforms designed to carry out a variety of military tasks including light
(MRH): transport, armed reconnaissance and battlefield support.
Uninhabited Aerial remotely piloted or controlled uninhabited fixed- or rotary-wing systems. Light UAVs are
Vehicles (UAVs): those weighing 20–150 kg; medium: 150–600 kg; and large: more than 600 kg.
Loitering & Direct air vehicles with an integral warhead that share some characteristics with both UAVs and
Attack Munitions: cruise missiles. They are designed to either fly directly to their target (Direct Attack), or in
a search or holding pattern (Loitering).
Reference
498 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Reference
Table 17 List of abbreviations for data sections
AAM air-to-air missile ARV armoured recovery vehicle DD/G/H/M
AAR search-and-rescue vessel AS anti-submarine/submarine tender destroyer/with surface-to-surface
AAV amphibious assault vehicle ASAT anti-satellite missile/with hangar/with SAM
AB airborne ASBM anti-ship ballistic missile DDR disarmament, demobilisation and
ABM anti-ballistic missile ASCM anti-ship cruise missile reintegration
ABU/H sea-going buoy tender/with hangar AShM anti-ship missile DE directed energy
ABCV airborne combat vehicle aslt assault def defence
ac aircraft ASM air-to-surface missile det detachment
ACS crane ship ASR submarine rescue craft div division
AD air defence ASTT anti-submarine torpedo tube ECM electronic countermeasures
ADA air-defence artillery ASW anti-submarine warfare ELINT electronic intelligence
adj adjusted ASuW anti-surface warfare elm element/s
AE auxiliary, ammunition carrier AT anti-tank engr engineer
AEM missile support ship ATF ocean going tug EOD explosive ordnance disposal
AEV armoured engineer vehicle ATGW anti-tank guided weapon EPF expeditionary fast transport vessel
AEW(&C) airborne early warning (and control) Atk attack/ground attack eqpt equipment
AFD/L auxiliary floating dry dock/small ATS tug, salvage and rescue ship ESB expeditionary sea base
AFS/H logistics ship/with hangar AUV armoured utility vehicle ESD expeditionary transport dock
AFSB afloat forward staging base avn aviation EW electronic warfare
AFV armoured fighting vehicle AWT water tanker excl excludes/excluding
AG misc auxiliary AX/L/S training craft/light/sail exp expenditure/expeditionary
AGB/H icebreaker/with hangar BA Budget Authority (US) FAC forward air control
AGE/H experimental auxiliary ship/with Bbr bomber fd field
hangar BCT brigade combat team FF/G/H/M frigate/with surface-to-surface
AGF/H command ship/with hangar missile/with hangar/with SAM
bde brigade
AGHS hydrographic survey vessel FGA fighter/ground attack
bdgt budget
AGI intelligence collection vessel FLD full-load displacement
BG battlegroup
AGM space tracking vessel flt flight
BMD ballistic-missile defence
AGOR oceanographic research vessel FMA Foreign Military Assistance
bn battalion/billion
AGOS oceanographic surveillance vessel FRS fleet replacement squadron
bty battery
AGS/H survey ship/with hangar FS/G/H/M corvette/with surface-to-surface
C2 command and control
AH hospital ship missile/with hangar/with SAM
C4 command, control,
AIP air-independent propulsion Ftr fighter
communications, and computers
AK/L cargo ship/light FTX field training exercise
casevac casualty evacuation
aka also known as FY fiscal year
cav cavalry
AKEH dry cargo/ammunition ship gd guard
cbt combat
AKR/H roll-on/roll-off cargo ship/with GDP gross domestic product
CBRN chemical, biological, radiological,
hangar nuclear, explosive GLCM ground-launched cruise missile
AKS/L stores ship/light cdo commando GMLS Guided Missile Launching System
ALBM air-launched ballistic missile C/G/H/M/N cruiser/with surface-to-surface gp group
ALCM air-launched cruise missile missile/with hangar/with SAM/ GPS Global Positioning System
amb ambulance nuclear-powered HA/DR humanitarian assistance/
amph amphibious/amphibian CISR combat ISR disaster relief
AO/S oiler/small CIMIC civil–military cooperation hel helicopter
AOE fast combat support ship CIWS close-in weapons system HQ headquarters
AOR/L/H fleet replenishment oiler with RAS COIN counter-insurgency HUMINT human intelligence
capability/light/with hangar comd command HWT heavyweight torpedo
AOT/L oiler transport/light COMINT communications intelligence hy heavy
AP transport ship comms communications ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile
APB barracks ship coy company IFV infantry fighting vehicle
APC armoured personnel carrier CP command post IIR imaging infrared
AR/C/D/L repair ship/cable/dry dock/light CS combat support IMINT imagery intelligence
ARG amphibious ready group CSAR combat search and rescue imp improved
ARH active radar homing CSS combat service support indep independent
ARM anti-radiation missile CT counter-terrorism inf infantry
armd armoured CV/H/L/N/S info ops information operations
ARS/H rescue and salvage ship/with aircraft carrier/helicopter/light/ INS inertial navigation system
hangar nuclear powered/STOVL int intelligence
arty artillery CW chemical warfare/weapons IOC Initial operating capability
Reference 499
MP maritime patrol/military police SAM surface-to-air missile VLB vehicle launched bridge
MR motor rifle SAR search and rescue/synthetic VLS vertical launch system
MRBM medium-range ballistic missile aperture radar VSHORAD very short-range air defence
MRH multi-role helicopter SARH semi-active radar homing WFU withdrawn from use
MRL multiple rocket launcher sat satellite wg wing
Defence spending Defence spending Defence spending Active armed Estimated Active
(current USDm) per capita (current USD) % of GDP forces (000) reservists (000) paramilitary (000)
2020 2021 2022 2020 2021 2022 2020 2021 2022 2022 2022 2022
North America
Canada 20,144 23,178 24,617 534 611 644 1.22 1.17 1.12 67 34 5
United States 774,527 759,645 766,606 2,328 2,268 2,272 3.71 3.30 3.06 1,360 817 0
Total 794,671 782,823 791,223 1,431 1,439 1,458 2.47 2.24 2.09 1,426 852 5
Europe
Albania 222 245 286 72 79 92 1.47 1.34 1.57 8 0 0
Austria 3,466 4,200 3,643 391 473 409 0.80 0.88 0.78 23 112 0
500 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Belgium 5,323 5,520 5,663 454 469 478 1.02 0.92 0.96 23 6 0
Bosnia-Herzegovina 168 192 169 44 50 44 0.84 0.82 0.71 11 6 0
Bulgaria 1,249 1,270 1,341 179 184 195 1.79 1.58 1.58 37 3 0
Croatia 997 1,413 1,273 236 336 304 1.74 2.09 1.84 17 21 0
Cyprus 419 571 497 331 445 384 1.70 2.06 1.86 12 50 0
Czech Republic 3,253 3,938 3,826 304 368 357 1.32 1.40 1.29 27 0 0
Denmark 4,919 5,371 5,064 838 911 855 1.38 1.35 1.31 15 44 0
Estonia 716 779 830 583 638 685 2.31 2.12 2.15 7 18 0
Finland 4,153 5,913 5,819 745 1,058 1,039 1.53 1.99 2.07 19 238 3
France 54,943 58,812 54,417 810 864 797 2.08 1.99 1.96 203 41 101
Germany 52,094 55,543 53,371 650 695 633 1.34 1.30 1.32 183 33 0
Greece 4,976 7,688 7,869 469 727 747 2.64 3.55 3.54 132 289 4
Hungary 2,175 2,620 2,992 223 269 308 1.39 1.44 1.62 32 20 0
Iceland 52 44 42 149 123 117 0.24 0.17 0.15 0 0 0
Ireland 1,187 1,269 1,170 229 243 222 0.28 0.25 0.23 8 2 0
Table 18 International comparisons of defence expenditure and military personnel
Italy 29,696 33,479 31,120 476 537 509 1.57 1.59 1.56 161 18 176
Latvia 757 824 852 402 442 462 2.27 2.14 2.12 7 16 0
Lithuania 1,161 1,308 1,585 425 482 590 2.07 2.01 2.34 23 7 14
Luxembourg 390 412 444 620 644 683 0.53 0.47 0.54 0 0 1
Macedonia, North 188 207 229 88 97 108 1.59 1.49 1.63 8 5 8
Malta 81 85 87 177 184 188 0.54 0.49 0.51 2 0 0
Montenegro 74 91 100 121 150 166 1.65 1.55 1.63 2 3 4
Netherlands 12,594 13,883 15,228 729 801 875 1.39 1.37 1.54 34 6 7
Norway 6,476 7,503 7,433 1,184 1,362 1,338 1.79 1.56 1.47 25 40 0
Poland 12,780 13,424 13,396 334 352 352 2.13 1.98 1.87 114 0 14
Portugal 2,853 2,932 2,591 277 286 253 1.25 1.17 1.01 27 24 25
Romania 5,182 5,557 5,188 243 262 280 2.08 1.96 1.73 72 55 57
Serbia 896 1,032 1,221 128 148 181 1.68 1.64 1.95 28 50 4
Defence spending Defence spending Defence spending Active armed Estimated Active
(current USDm) per capita (current USD) % of GDP forces (000) reservists (000) paramilitary (000)
2020 2021 2022 2020 2021 2022 2020 2021 2022 2022 2022 2022
Slovakia 1,847 1,992 2,008 339 366 370 1.76 1.73 1.79 18 0 0
Slovenia 605 836 883 288 397 420 1.13 1.35 1.42 6 1 0
Spain 13,744 15,126 14,669 275 320 311 1.07 1.06 1.06 124 15 76
Sweden 7,036 8,296 8,074 690 808 770 1.29 1.31 1.34 15 10 0
Switzerland 5,723 5,689 5,554 681 673 653 0.77 0.71 0.69 20 123 0
Turkey 10,885 9,547 6,188 133 116 75 1.51 1.17 0.73 355 379 157
United Kingdom* 61,473 70,870 70,029 935 1,073 1,033 2.23 2.22 2.19 150 72 0
Total 314,753 348,476 335,152 412 471 467 1.46 1.47 1.46 1,948 1,705 649
Russia and Eurasia
Armenia 628 622 749 208 206 250 4.97 4.46 4.23 43 210 4
Azerbaijan 2,267 2,698 2,641 222 262 255 5.31 4.94 3.77 64 300 15
Belarus 601 640 818 63 68 87 0.98 0.94 1.03 48 290 110
Georgia 283 279 314 57 57 64 2.04 1.68 1.35 21 0 5
Kazakhstan 1,430 1,538 1,876 75 80 97 0.84 0.78 0.84 39 0 32
Kyrgyzstan n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. 11 0 10
Moldova 44 52 46 13 16 14 0.39 0.38 0.32 5 58 1
Russia [a] 42,671 48,531 66,857 301 341 471 2.87 2.73 3.13 1,190 1,500 559
Tajikistan 89 94 107 10 10 12 1.09 1.07 1.07 9 0 8
Turkmenistan* n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. 37 0 20
Ukraine [b] 4,353 4,298 3,547 99 98 81 2.86 2.21 n.k. 688 400 250
Uzbekistan n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. 48 0 20
Total** 52,367 58,751 76,955 117 126 148 2.37 2.13 1.97 2,202 2,758 1,033
Table 18 International comparisons of defence expenditure and military personnel
Asia
Afghanistan 2,014 n.k. n.k. 55 n.k. n.k. 10.00 n.k. n.k. 100 0 0
Australia 31,418 34,185 33,841 1,234 1,324 1,295 2.31 2.09 1.96 60 30 0
Bangladesh 3,786 4,059 4,320 23 25 26 1.01 0.98 0.94 163 0 64
Brunei 439 454 435 946 964 910 3.66 3.24 2.36 7 1 1
Cambodia* 1,032 1,024 1,003 61 59 60 4.10 3.89 3.54 124 0 67
China 187,208 213,923 242,409 134 152 171 1.26 1.21 1.20 2,035 510 500
Fiji 52 46 44 55 49 46 1.16 1.07 0.90 4 6 0
India 65,307 67,498 66,645 49 50 48 2.45 2.13 1.92 1,468 1,155 1,608
Indonesia 8,116 8,407 9,059 30 31 33 0.77 0.71 0.70 396 400 280
Reference 501
Reference
Defence spending Defence spending Defence spending Active armed Estimated Active
(current USDm) per capita (current USD) % of GDP forces (000) reservists (000) paramilitary (000)
2020 2021 2022 2020 2021 2022 2020 2021 2022 2022 2022 2022
Japan 53,758 52,198 48,079 428 419 387 1.07 1.06 1.12 247 56 14
Korea, DPR of n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. 1,280 600 189
Korea, Republic of 40,999 46,258 42,991 791 894 829 2.49 2.55 2.48 555 3,100 14
Laos n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. 29 0 100
Malaysia 3,709 3,829 4,148 114 114 122 1.10 1.03 0.96 113 52 23
Maldives 82 92 101 210 236 258 2.20 1.78 1.71 4 0 0
Mongolia 105 100 90 33 31 28 0.81 0.67 0.59 10 137 8
502 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Algeria 9,699 9,088 8,945 226 209 202 6.69 5.59 4.78 139 150 187
Bahrain 1,405 1,399 1,399 934 916 908 4.05 3.61 3.22 8 0 11
Egypt 4,106 4,839 5,211 39 45 48 1.41 1.45 1.39 439 479 397
Iran 16,549 28,102 44,011 195 327 507 1.70 1.77 2.23 610 350 40
Iraq 10,191 7,423 8,690 262 187 215 6.01 3.71 3.16 193 0 266
Israel 17,234 20,408 19,350 1,987 2,323 2,171 4.97 4.85 4.30 170 465 8
Jordan 1,719 1,801 1,933 159 165 176 4.90 4.91 4.75 101 65 15
Kuwait 6,823 9,635 9,172 2,279 3,178 2,989 6.44 7.10 5.00 18 24 7
Lebanon 741 n.k. n.k. 136 n.k. n.k. 3.03 n.k. n.k. 60 0 20
Libya n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k.
Mauritania 207 213 229 52 52 55 2.41 2.15 2.27 16 0 5
Morocco 5,961 6,521 6,413 168 182 175 4.92 4.57 4.50 196 150 50
Oman 7,483 6,431 6,431 2,059 1,741 1,709 10.12 7.49 5.90 43 0 4
Defence spending Defence spending Defence spending Active armed Estimated Active
(current USDm) per capita (current USD) % of GDP forces (000) reservists (000) paramilitary (000)
2020 2021 2022 2020 2021 2022 2020 2021 2022 2022 2022 2022
Palestinian Territories n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. 0 0 n.k.
Qatar 6,466 6,258 8,419 2,645 2,523 3,357 4.48 3.48 3.80 17 0 5
Saudi Arabia 52,000 50,667 45,600 1,522 1,457 1,290 7.39 6.08 4.51 257 0 25
Syria n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. 169 0 100
Tunisia 1,153 1,231 1,283 98 104 108 2.91 2.81 2.95 36 0 12
United Arab Emirates 19,826 19,159 20,356 1,984 1,944 2,053 5.52 4.56 4.04 63 0 0
Yemen n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. 40 0 0
Total** 161,564 173,176 187,442 921 1024 1064 4.81 4.28 3.79 2,572 1,683 1,152
Latin America and the Caribbean
Antigua and Barbuda 8 7 8 80 75 76 0.57 0.50 0.45 0 0 0
Argentina 2,904 2,588 3,380 64 56 73 0.75 0.53 0.54 72 0 31
Bahamas 86 95 95 254 270 266 0.88 0.85 0.74 2 0 0
Barbados 41 40 42 138 132 140 0.87 0.82 0.73 1 0 0
Belize 25 20 23 61 49 57 1.26 0.86 0.87 2 1 0
Bolivia 479 476 481 41 40 40 1.30 1.17 1.11 34 0 37
Brazil 22,234 21,293 22,951 105 100 106 1.53 1.32 1.21 367 1,340 395
Chile 4,049 4,041 3,758 223 221 204 1.60 1.28 1.21 69 19 45
Colombia 5,480 6,078 6,307 112 121 129 2.04 1.95 1.85 256 35 172
Costa Rica 457 430 423 90 84 81 0.75 0.68 0.62 0 0 10
Cuba n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. 49 39 27
Dominican Republic 589 582 761 56 55 71 0.75 0.61 0.68 56 0 15
Ecuador 1,545 1,593 1,581 91 93 91 1.56 1.51 1.37 41 118 1
Table 18 International comparisons of defence expenditure and military personnel
Reference
Defence spending Defence spending Defence spending Active armed Estimated Active
(current USDm) per capita (current USD) % of GDP forces (000) reservists (000) paramilitary (000)
2020 2021 2022 2020 2021 2022 2020 2021 2022 2022 2022 2022
Peru 2,132 1,818 1,746 67 56 54 1.04 0.80 0.73 81 188 77
Suriname n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. 2 0 0
Trinidad and Tobago 954 773 838 789 633 596 4.46 3.22 2.86 5 1 0
Uruguay 509 516 546 150 152 160 0.95 0.87 0.77 21 0 1
Venezuela n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. 123 8 220
Total** 49,150 49,508 51,245 115 109 109 1.17 1.00 0.92 1,488 2,132 1,269
Sub-Saharan Africa
504 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
Asia 456,944 497,432 515,635 279 312 309 2.20 1.82 1.64 9,178 13,295 3,507
Middle East and North Africa 161,564 173,176 187,442 921 1,024 1,064 4.81 4.28 3.79 2,572 1,683 1,152
Latin America and the
49,150 49,508 51,245 115 109 109 1.17 1.00 0.92 1,488 2,132 1,269
Caribbean
Sub-Saharan Africa 17,034 17,992 20,965 32 32 33 1.49 1.42 1.48 1,960 93 295
Global totals 1,846,484 1,928,158 1,978,617 295 321 326 1.96 1.76 1.67 20,774 22,517 7,911
Totals may not sum precisely due to rounding. * Estimates. **Totals exclude defence-spending estimates for states where insufficient official information is available in order to enable approximate comparisons of
regional defence-spending between years. Defence Spending per capita (current US$) and Defence Spending % of GDP totals are regional averages. [a] ‘National Defence’ budget chapter. Excludes other defence-
related expenditures included under other budget lines (e.g. pensions) - see Table 5, p.191 [b] Official budget (including military pensions). Actual spending expected to be much higher in 2022 following Russian
invasion in February. Significant depreciation of the Ukrainian hryvnia against the US dollar in 2022. Defence Spending as % of GDP includes US foreign military financing programmes - other figures do not.
Reference 505
Reference
506 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023
BALANCE CHART
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, counter-space activities. The Assured Access China, Russia, and the US already have offensive and defensive also present a more difficult target set to attack physically. China, China has devoted considerable resources to building up its own space capabilities. Beijing has launched a greater can be divided in part by which element of the space-based architecture they communications, and can be used against uplinks, downlinks, or both. Precision
which began on 24 February 2022, has under- To Space organisation is the largest within counter-space space systems in service and are continuing to Russia and the US are also developing rendezvous and proximity number of militarily-relevant satellites over the past decade than either Moscow or Washington, with a particular are intended to affect, and partly by whether the desired effect is short-term navigation and timing signals are a target for electronic warfare.
scored the importance of space for military US Space Command, in part a reflection of pursue further developments. Concern over the vulnerability of operations that have benign and potentially malign applications. focus on intelligence gathering systems, and has commissioned its own Beidou global satellite navigation system. or permanent. China, India, Russia and the US have tested one or more Ground infrastructure, and personnel, are also potentially vulnerable to
operations. Space has proven to be an enabler the increased importance of this area, while military systems has also spurred activity aimed at more rapidly The proliferation of satellites, particularly in LEO, combined with Russia inherited a substantial, if ageing, set of space capabilities and supporting industries from the Soviet counterspace capabilities. attack. Satellite services could be denied by damaging or destroying elements
for Ukraine through external commercial and China is working on improving its capacity to replacing in-orbit systems. US Space Command in 2023 intends to concern over the space debris hazard, also underpins increasing Union. However, despite a recapitalisation effort in the 2010s, Moscow is unable to match either Beijing or Washing- Kinetic weapons, such as direct-ascent interceptors or air-launched of the ground architecture required to control or communicate with orbital
CHINA, RUSSIA AND satellite imagery has also played a role in how
the war has been portrayed and perceived.
Near-Earth space is more congested than
discussion in the United Nations on ‘reducing
space threats through norms, rules and princi-
ples of behaviour.’ This chart shows principal
t
3 (
ip
bit to the standard circular orbit path. This results in
Ell
s Or an orbit that spends most of its time over either the
hly
u
no Northern or Southern Hemisphere (usually the
Hig
hr
o O)
(ME
Northern), with much longer visibility of the higher
Signals Intelligence Early Warning ≈40,000km (at apogee) i t latitudes in these respective regions. Also
Orb
Communications
c
yn
Positioning, Navigation and Timing termed Molniya orbits. Used for tasks
tr h
os
Ea including communications and
Ge
m O) remote sensing.
11 10
≈36,000km
b it (LE
u
Or
di
th
Me
Space Surveillence r
43 18
3 5 ≈2,000km to 36,000km Ea
w
Lo
6 Rendezvous and
GSO 5 Proximity Operations
<2,000km
11
Geosynchronous Orbit (GSO)
2 At around 36,000km from the Earth’s
8 surface, satellites can enter an orbit with
1 a period matching the rotation of the Earth,
allowing them to effectively remain permanently
at the same longitude. A geosynchronous orbit
over the equator will remain overhead a single spot
Positioning, Navigation and Timing on the Earth’s surface for its entire orbit, known as
a geostationary or geosynchronous equatorial
orbit (GEO). This predictable positioning is
important for missile early warning, commu-
nications and some signals intelligence
Medium Earth Orbit (MEO) satellites, which frequently use
Between 2,000km and 20,000km above this orbit type.
31 Remote Sensing the Earth’s surface. MEO is not frequently
Communications (Meteorology) used by military satellites due to the risk of
Remote Sensing (Radar)
Rendezvous and radiation from the Van Allen belts damaging
28
Proximity Operations inadequately protected components. However,
8 one particular semi-synchronous MEO has a
MEO 27 Remote Sensing (EO) Space 12-hour orbit period, which makes it ideal for
15 Surveillence positioning, navigation and timing (PNT)
19 6 Remote Sensing
4 (Other) satellites. For this reason, PNT systems Low Earth Orbit (LEO)
2 Reusable spacecraft such as GPS, GLONASS and Beidou Up to 2,000km above the Earth’s
5 2 are usually placed in MEO. surface. Remote-sensing satellites,
36 X-37B CSSHQ including electro-optical and radar imaging,
and most signals intelligence satellites use
1 Andøya Spaceport Nordmela LEO due to the proximity requirements of their
Signals Intelligence
9 sensors. Using an inclined polar LEO, known as a
SaxaVord Spaceport, Plesetsk Cosmodrome, sun-synchronous orbit, a satellite will cross any
Shetland Isles Arkhangelsk Oblast point on the Earth’s surface at the same local time
Spaceport Cornwall, on each orbit, and the relative angle of sunlight
7
Cornwall Newquay Airport
(Air-launch to orbit)
at each point will be consistent for each orbit.
This is important for imaging satellites
Canso, Nova Scotia Baikonur Cosmodrome, Baikonur (Tyuratam) since it makes temporal comparison
78 of images much easier; it also
has battery-charging
Palmachim Air Force Base Semnan Space Center, Semnan advantages.
Mid-Atlantic Regional Spaceport (MARS), Virginia
13 Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center
LEO Kennedy Space Center, Florida
Vostochny Cosmodrome, Amur Oblast
Legend
• US Minotaur-1 550 (L) Electron Photon Antares-230+ Atlas V 18,500 Astra Rocket-3.3 Falcon 9 22,800 Launcher ONE Launch site status
Minotaur-4 1735 (L) 100 (L) 8,200 (L) (L) / 3,960 (G) N/A (L) / 5,300 (G) 500 (L)
Planned
Minotaur-5 678 (G) Electron 225 (L) Delta IV Heavy Falcon Heavy
23,040 (L) / 6,275 (G) 26,700 (L) Operational; has achieved orbital launch
Minotaur-C 1,275 (L)
Firefly Alpha
1,000 (L)
Launch Vehicle Fuel Type (inc boosters)
Liquid
• RUSSIA Angara-1 3,700 (L) Angara-A5 Soyuz-2 (Core) Soyuz-2 Soyuz-2 FG 5,000 Proton-M Blok-DM-03
24,500 (L) 2,100 (L) (IK VG Upper (L) / 2100 (G) 3,200 (G) Puerto Belgrano Solid
stage) 00 (L) Proton-M Briz-M
Abbot Point,
3,300 (G) (L) = Launch Vehicle Payload Mass to LEO kg
Queensland
Zenit-3F N/A (G) = Launch Vehicle Payload Mass to GEO kg
Whaler's Way Orbital Launch Complex,
South Australia
• CHINA CZ-3 11,500 (L) CZ-5 23,000 (L) CZ-6 1,500 (L) CZ-11 700 (L) Jielong-1 150 (L) CZ-2 3,300 (L) Kuaizhou-1 Ceres-1 Shian Quxian-1
/ 5,500 (G) /4,500 (G) CZ-7 10,000 CZ-4 4,200 (L) 400 (L) 350 (L) 300 (L)
(L) / 7,200 (G) / 1,500 (G)
CZ-8 7,600
(L) / ,500 (G)